s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

The Corporation Of The Synod Of The Diocese Of Brisbane Trading AS Anglican Church Southern Queensland

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - jurisdictional objection - Applicant was not an "employee" protected from unfair dismissal under s382 of the FW Act. - objection upheld - application dismissed

• [1] On 4 July 2025, the Rev Michael Donaldson applied to the Fair Work Commission under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 for an unfair dismissal remedy. Rev Donaldson believes he was unfairly dismissed from his employment with the Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane trading AS Anglican Church Southern Queensland (ACSQ).

• [2] The ACSQ raises two jurisdictional objections being:

1. Rev Donaldson was not an "employee" protected from unfair dismissal under s 382 of the Act; and
2. Rev Donaldson was not "dismissed" for the purpose of section 386 of the FW Act.

• [3] Rev Donaldson only has standing to make his application if he is "a person who has been dismissed" (per s.385(a)). "Dismissed" is defined in s.12 of the Act by reference to s.386 and applies only to employees.

• [4] On 1 October 2025, I issued a notice of listing and directions to the parties regarding the first jurisdictional objection, whether Rev Donaldson was an employee of ACSQ.

• [5] ACSQ provided detailed submissions and submissions in Reply in support of their position. Ms Nicole Hall, Group Manager - Human Resources - ACSQ, provided a witness statement and statement in reply which provided detail regarding the governance and operational structure of the Anglican Church of Australia (the Church). Annexed to Ms Hall's statement are various relevant documents including the Constitution of the Anglican Church of Australia, Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of Brisbane, ACSQ's Diocesan Handbook and Rules of the Church.

• [6] Rev Donaldson filed submissions and a witness statement, which annexed a range of documents relating to his appointment and his role as Priest in Charge of the Parish of Sandgate Northpoint.

• [7] The parties agreed to the jurisdictional question being dealt with on the papers. For the

reasons stated below, I find that Rev Donaldson was not an employee of ACSQ. The jurisdictional objection is upheld.

• [8] Rev Donaldson commenced employment with the Anglican Diocese of Brisbane (the Church) in August 2018 as a Locum for the Sandgate Northpoint Parish and was formally appointed as Priest-in-Charge in February 2019.

• [9] On 9 April 2025, the Archbishop of Brisbane convened a meeting with Rev Donaldson. Rev Donaldson says he was told in the meeting that he must resign or face revocation of his license.

• [10] On 11 April 2025, Rev Donaldson sent a letter to the Archbishop of Brisbane, resigning as Priest-in-Charge.

• [11] On 15 April 2025, Rev Donaldson received a letter confirming the conclusion of his ministry 29 June 2025. Rev Donaldson submits this resignation was not voluntary but was a result of 'coercive conduct engaged in by the Church'[1] because the Archbishop of Brisbane presented him with an ultimatum to either resign or have his license revoked. Nevertheless, these circumstances are not relevant to this decision.

• [12] ACSQ is a statutory corporation created under s. 3 of the Anglican Church of Australia Act 1895 (Qld) (Anglican Church Act). As a legal entity, ACSQ can sue and be sued in its corporate name. The Anglican Church Act deals with matters including the constitution,[2] holding and dealing with interests in property,[3] and manner and form requirements for canon law. Importantly, the Act does not govern the ordination, appointment or placement of clergy.

• [13] The ACSQ operates under the following documents:

a. The Constitution, Canons and Rules of the Anglican Church of Australia;

b. Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of Brisbane (Constitution & Canons); and

• [14] ACSQ submit the Anglican Church Act:

a. confirms that the governance of the Anglican Church of Australia in Queensland is founded on consensual compacts between bishop, clergy and laity (preamble; s 2);

b. provides that the synod of each diocese may be constituted as a body corporate, with powers to hold and deal with property, to sue and be sued in its corporate name, and to act in accordance with its constitution, acts, canons and resolutions (ss 3, 7-9);

c. establishes a system for recording and evidencing constitutions, acts, canons and resolutions of synods in the Supreme Court (ss 14-16); and

d. expressly preserves the ecclesiastical authority of synods in relation to consensual compacts, acts, canons or resolutions binding within the diocese, including matters of discipline and office, and in particular the appointment, deposition and removal of persons bearing office in the church (s 17(2)).

• [15] Under the ACSQ's Constitutions & Canons (specifically the 'Licensing of Clergy Canon'):

a. no person may officiate in a church of the Diocese without the Archbishop's licence (s 2);

b. the Archbishop has canonical authority to suspend or revoke that licence (s 3);

c. the style and title of office is determined by the terms of the licence (s 4); and

d. stipends and emoluments are fixed by resolution of the Archbishop-in-Council (s 5).

• [16] All priests across the ACSQ's parishes receive the same benefits prescribed by the Constitution & Canons and the Diocese Handbook, including:

b. a fully maintained vehicle and all fuel expenses;

i. costs of attending conferences/training as required by ACSQ.

• [17] The Act protects a person from unfair dismissal only if the person is an employee

of a "national system employer". That is, the applicant must be in an employment

relationship with the respondent. For unfair dismissal protection, "employee and employer

• [18] The task here is to ascertain whether Rev Donaldson was in an employment relationship with ACSQ. As was considered in Threadgill, the question is not whether Rev Donaldson was an employee as opposed to an independent contractor, but whether the relationship is of a different character altogether.

• [19] In Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc12 a bishop who lost office claimed sums for outstanding leave entitlements. An industrial magistrate held for the bishop as he was engaged under a contract of employment with the incorporated association. An appeal to the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court succeeded. The bishop's appeal to the High Court was successful. The decision reflected on presumptions about intention to create contractual relations, noting that the question is an objective one in each case. On the facts of that case, the Respondent was not a "church"; was concerned with more than religious affairs; its members were not all observers of the particular faith; and there was a clear history of employment of clergy within particular Greek Orthodox communities. Ermogenous is to that extent distinguishable.

• [20] As to presumptions, none are made here. Rev Donaldson's case is approached on its own facts and in the context of the Church in which he was the Priest-in-charge.

• [21] ACSQ submits a parish priest's ministry is created by the grant of ecclesiastical office under licence, and that stipends/emoluments are not the product of a civil bargain involving mutual promises intended to create legal relations but are incidents of the office itself. Appointments and stipends/emoluments derive from the canons of the church, not from a civil contract, and are administered through its structures.

• [22] ASCQ submit that the decisions in K_nowles v Anglican Church Property Trust Diocese of Bathurst_ [1999] 46 AILR 5-210 (NSWIRC) ('Knowles'), and Threadgill v Church of England [1984] FCA 99 ('Threadgill') establish relevant foundational principles applicable to the present matter.[4]

• [23] The ACSQ's primary case is that no contract was formed. Rev Donaldson's appointment and ministry were conferred and regulated as an ecclesiastical office under licence, with no intention that legal relations be created and in the alternative, if a contract is found, then applying the s 15AA "real substance, practical reality and true nature" test, the circumstances show that the relationship was one of office-holding and not a contract of service.

• [24] Rev Donaldson made several submissions in support of the contention that an employment relationship existed between him and the ACSQ. Rev Donaldson outlined the following arguments to support the conclusion that there was an offer, acceptance, and consideration underpinned by an objective intention to create legally enforceable obligations:

1. During the formal interview conducted by the Appointment Board ('the Board') in late 2018, Rev Donaldson explicitly stated, "I need a job" which suggests seeking remunerated employment, instead of strictly spiritual engagement.

1. The Board comprised of both parish and diocesan representatives, including the Parish Nominator who proceeded to recommend Rev Donaldson for the position which suggests all parties understood the arrangement as a paid employment relationship.

1. Rev Donaldson accepted his appointment as Priest-in-Charge of the Parish of Sandgate-Northpoint in writing on 14 February 2020, thereby forming a mutual agreement with defined expectations.

1. The ACSQ issued fortnightly payments to Rev Donaldson of $2,356.83 gross (including housing and sabbatical allowances), with bank statements describing the payment as "salary".

1. Rev Donaldson's salary was reviewed in September/October each year, with any adjustments effective from January each year. Notably, Rev Donaldson received a $1,000.00 salary increment in recognition of distinguished performance. It is submitted that this structured system of salary review and performance-based increment mirrors secular employment arrangements and demonstrates obligations consistent with an employment contract.

1. Rev Donaldson accrued leave entitlements, including 4 weeks' annual leave and long service leave. These entitlements were quantified and administered by the Long Service Leave Board. It is submitted that this mirrors the standard accrual system for employees and supports the conclusion that he was an employee as in Solomon Woldeyohannes v Zion Church in Melbourne Australia Inc [2021] FWC 6182.iv

1. The work performed by Rev Donaldson was substantial, regular, and structured. He performed duties way beyond the spiritual and pastoral sphere such as parish financial oversight, renovations, administration (dispute resolution, insurance, risk management), and governance (council meetings, liaising with wardens) as evident in Parish Council Meeting Minutes.

1. Rev Donaldson was subject to a number of formal policies and procedures regulating workplace conduct and expectations, including "Faithfulness in Service". These were enforceable expectations, not optional spiritual guides. Rev Donaldson was also subject to formal oversight, required to submit monthly written reports about parish operations, engage with Human Resources (HR), and held accountable for complaints against him that mirrors secular employment discipline. When complaints were raised against Rev Donalson, they were not resolved through spiritual counselling but managed by a one-sided formal process involving HR Manager Nicole Hall. Ms Hall oversaw a procedural review, akin to a misconduct investigation. The Archbishop's letter of 9 April 2025 presented allegations with a demand for resignation, a process that effectively replicated a disciplinary termination.
2. There is no clause in the appointment letter stating that the engagement was not an employment contract. This distinguishes the matter Rev Hedley Wycliff Atunaisa Fihaki v Uniting Church in Australia Queensland Synod [2023] FWC 1650, where the Letter of Call disclaimed against an employment relationship.
3. The ACSQ asserts that the Archbishop has the unilateral power to revoke Rev Donaldson's licence, and that this is inconsistent with employment. However, it is submitted that such a right to terminate mirrors the practical reality of several employment contracts. The ACSQ contends that the Archbishop's grant of licence defined the entirety of the relationship. The licence authorised him to minister; the Canons, with regulations of the Diocese, governed the structured, remunerated, and enforceable duties he performed. This separation refutes the ACSQ's attempt to collapse employment into licence holding. The ACSQ's reliance on the Archbishop having "admitted" and "canonically instituted" Rev Donaldson to the Parish, and their assertion that such language denotes a conferral rather than a contract, is misplaced. In CFMMEU, the High Court made clear that the labels ascribed by the parties do not determine the legal character of their relationship. Ecclesiastical terminology cannot be taken at face value; instead, the actual working arrangements and conditions must be scrutinised to ascertain the true nature of the relationship. It is submitted that the practical reality is that Rev Donaldson provided labour and services under the direction and control of the Diocese and the Bishop, in return for remuneration, which is the essence of an employment relationship.
4. Knowles and Threadgill pre-date the Act and the more recent High Court decisions including CFMMEU and Hollis. Both cases should be treated with caution as they adopt a narrow view of ecclesiastical employment. Modern courts have accepted that ministers may be employees.vi
5. It is submitted that Rev Donaldson's role extended far beyond spiritual leadership. It encompassed financial management, correspondence with HR, risk governance, and administrative reporting. These are secular duties, inconsistent with a purely ecclesiastical calling. Unlike Threadgill, Rev Donaldson's role was not "primarily or entirely religious in character", but had legal impact, in addition to a religious one. This is especially evident from approximately 80-90% of Rev Donaldson's time being spent on non-spiritual duties during his employment. This predominance of secular and operational functions distinguishes his role from purely ecclesiastical service and confirms that the substance of the relationship was also managerial and administrative in nature, not merely spiritual.
6. ACSQ suggests Rev Donaldson exercised independence and discretion in carrying out his role with no set hours. Rev Donaldson disputes this statement. Rev Donaldson was initially employed part-time and later full-time. Such distinctions in his workload were formalised and go against the argument of Rev Donaldson having discretion over the hours he worked. Rev Donaldson was required to submit regular Priest Reports, act in accordance with Diocesan policies, and had limited autonomy. He was subject to supervision as evidenced by the disciplinary action against him being subject to oversight by the Bishop and HR. When action was initiated against him, it came through HR and not through religious counselling or spiritual discipline. This supports the argument that employment structures, not ecclesiastical discretion, governed his conduct and removal.
7. The fact that the Synod acts as a corporate entity and sets budgets confirms that this is an institutional, not purely spiritual, relationship. This reinforces the contractual nature of the relationship.
8. The ACSQ exercised clear employer-like authority. It required formal reporting, conducted HR investigations against Rev Donaldson, and ultimately forced Rev Donaldson to resign. Having exercised these clear employer-like powers, the ACSQ cannot now avoid legal responsibility by invoking religious language. It cannot simultaneously treat Rev Donaldson as an employee for disciplinary and performance purposes, then retreat behind the notion of spiritual calling to escape statutory scrutiny.
9. The ACSQ enforced workplace obligations, managed performance, and terminated the relationship using mechanisms indistinguishable from those used in secular employment. To allow it to deny accountability under the Act would elevate form over substance, in direct contradiction to CFMMEU and section 15AA of the Act.

• [25] ACSQ provided a detailed response to each of the arguments raised, which for completeness are considered bellow.

• [26] With respect to the first argument, ACSQ contend that Rev Donaldson's statement, "I need a job" is incapable of supporting an inference that the parties intended to enter into an employment contract. Furthermore, the ACSQ submitted evidence that the meeting regarding Rev Donaldson's Appointment took place as part of "the process of discerning who God might be calling to the Parish".

• [27] ACSQ recorded that Rev Donaldson was recommended for appointment as Priest-in-Charge, and that the Archbishop subsequently made that appointment. This they say, is inconsistent with the proposition that there was a mutual intention to enter into an employment contract.

• [28] ACSQ further submit that Rev Donaldson's subsequent conduct is also inconsistent with his suggestion that there was any mutual intention of establishing a contract (in particular, an employment contract):

a) On 7 December 2018, he wrote to the Bishop to discuss "a date for possible commissioning" and referred to the position as "my appointment."

b) On 14 February 2020, he wrote to the Archbishop stating, "I thank you for the opportunity to minister in this community," and "together we seek to continue the ministry of Jesus in this area." Those expressions are the language of vocation and ministry, not of a contract (such as a contract of employment).

1. There is no evidence that Rev Donaldson took any steps consistent with a belief that an employment relationship had been, or was to be, formed, such as requesting a written employment contract or seeking entitlements under the Fair Work Act.

d) His conduct, both in his words and in his omissions, is wholly inconsistent with any belief that he had entered into a contractual relationship (of employment). It is not the conduct that a reasonable person in his position would have engaged in if he genuinely believed that a legally binding employment contract existed.

• [29] On the submissions before me, I am not persuaded by this argument. The phrase "I need a job" is capable of bearing multiple interpretations depending on the context in which it was made. It does not, of itself, demonstrate an intention to create an employment relationship. Accordingly, I reject this argument.

• [30] With respect to the second argument, ACSQ contend that the Parish Nominators had no authority to create legal relations on behalf of the ACSQ because their role was to assist in discerning who God might be calling to the Parish.[5] The ACSQ contends that the ultimate decision to appoint a priest rested with the Archbishop, acting on the Bishop's recommendation.

• [31] As the ultimate authority to make decisions in these matters lies with the Archbishop, I am not satisfied that the Board possessed the authority to create legal relations, nor that any such intention can properly be inferred.

• [32] With respect to the third argument, ACSQ rely on the letter Rev Donaldson wrote to the Archbishop stating "I thank you for the opportunity to minister in this community," and, "together we seek to continue the ministry of Jesus in this area" to contend that by the use of these words, Rev Donaldson sought to establish a vocation or ministry, rather than an employment relationship.

• [33] Whilst Rev Donaldson, in his letter, states that he "accepts the offer" of the Archbishop, the Archbishop has not, in his correspondence, described it as an offer. Rather, he has consistently used the expressions "I appoint you" and "accepting your appointment". On that basis, I am not satisfied that the correspondence between the Archbishop and Rev Donaldson constitutes an employment contract between the parties.

• [34] With respect to the fourth argument, the ACSQ contended that payments made to Rev Donaldson after his appointment were subsequent conduct, and whilst they may show the arrangements that operated in practice, they do not demonstrate the party's intention. ACSQ further contend that the payment of the stipend was consistent with the canonical understanding of ecclesiastical office and that the processing of clergy payments through the standard payroll system are only reflective of a generic administrative process rather than any legal characterisation of the relationship. With respect to the use of the term "salary" in the description of the bank statements, the ACSQ submitted that the description is generated and inserted by the bank itself and the ACSQ's payroll department does not have any ability to modify it.

• [35] I make no finding as to whether the descriptions appearing in the bank statements were inserted by the ACSQ or generated automatically by the bank. However, when regard is had to the payslips provided to Rev Donaldson,[6] it is clear that the payments were characterised as a stipend and associated allowances. This supports the conclusion that the payments were made in accordance with ecclesiastical practice rather than pursuant to a contract of employment.

• [36] The use of the term "salary" in the bank statements is afforded little weight. Consistent with the High Court's reasoning in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting, labels chosen by the parties, including descriptors such as "salary," "stipend," or similar terminology, are not determinative of the character of the relationship. Such labels may be considered only to the extent that they assist in understanding the underlying rights and obligations created between the parties. In this case, the mere use of the word "salary" does not support a finding that an employment contract existed.

• [37] Subsequently, Rev Donaldson has argued that it was an employment relationship because PAYG tax was deducted, and superannuation was paid.

• [38] Under taxation law, the definition of an "employee" for purposes such as PAYG withholding or income tax assessment differs from the definition of an employee under the Fair Work Act.[7] The tax treatment of a person's stipend or allowance does not, of itself, establish the existence of an employment relationship. Accordingly, I am not satisfied with Rev Donaldson's argument that the payment or taxation of his stipend is indicative of an employment relationship.[8]

• [39] With respect to the fifth argument, the ACSQ contended that Rev Donaldson was not entitled to any 'special increment' and there is no record of that within ACSQ.[9] The ACSQ further contended that Clergy are not paid bonuses or any other form of performance-based incentive.

• [40] Other than Rev Donaldson's own statement, I have not been provided with any evidence substantiating the alleged salary increment.[10] In any event, I am not convinced that the existence of such a payment would be indicative of an employment relationship or the existence of a contract of employment.

• [41] With respect to the sixth argument, ACSQ submitted that Rev Donaldson did not "accrue" leave entitlements in the manner provided for under the Fair Work Act. The ACSQ further submitted that leave taken arose under the canonical instruments which operate according to their own rules.[11]

• [42] ACSQ further contend that Rev Donaldson's reliance on Solomon Woldeyohannes v Zion Church in Melbourne Australia Inc [2021] FWC 6182 is misplaced because in that case, leave entitlements were provided in accordance with "Australian Government law", and back payments were made where entitlements had not been paid.

• [43] In the matter at hand, annual leave and long service leave are provided in accordance with canonical instruments and there is no evidence before me of back pay being provided to Rev Donaldson. As these are materially different circumstances, I do not accept Rev Donaldson's argument.

• [44] Further, the evidence before me indicates that Rev Donaldson was required to notify the Regional Coordinator directly when taking leave, rather than applying for leave through the ACSQ's payroll or human resources system.[12] This process is inconsistent with the ordinary administrative arrangements found in employment relationships and aligns more closely with the ecclesiastical structures governing clergy within the Diocese.

• [45] With respect to the seventh argument, the ACSQ contended that the duties performed by Rev Donaldson were not confined to the conduct of religious services, however, all such duties were undertaken in furtherance of the Church's spiritual and ecclesiastical mission and in accordance with his appointment as a spiritual minister under the relevant canonical instruments, including his responsibilities as a member of the Parish Council and the fact that some tasks were administrative in nature does not alter the essential character of the role.

• [46] The ACSQ relies on Commissioner Booth's decision in Threadgill and contends that the same circumstances in the present matter are analogous because of the similarity in Rev Donaldson's canonical frameworks in both matters.[13]

• [47] I accept that Threadgill is relevantly analogous, and the reasoning adopted by Commissioner Booth supports the ACSQ's contention that the appropriate test to be applied in this matter is whether the position was "primarily or entirely religious in character". I make a finding on this issue at the conclusion of this part.

• [48] With respect to the eighth argument, ACSQ contend that Rev Donaldson was not subject to ACSQ's employee Code of Conduct (Diocesan Code of Conduct) or any other related employment policies and was instead subject to the Faithfulness in Service Code, which applies only to clergy and expressly distinguishes between clergy and 'church workers'.[14]

• [49] ACSQ further contended that the involvement of the ACSQ's Human Resources staff in matters concerning complaints about Rev Donaldson's Conduct does not establish an employment relationship because the HR staff provided procedural and administrative support to the Archbishop and did not exercise managerial authority or supervisory control over Rev Donaldson.

• [50] I accept that the usual employee code of conduct did not apply to Rev Donaldson. This supports a finding that the relationship between the parties was not one of employment. Further, I agree with the ACSQ's submissions that the mere presence of human resources staff, who lacked supervisory authority over Rev Donaldson, is insufficient to establish that an employment relationship existed.

• [51] Whilst I accept that the Archbishop held ecclesiastical authority over Rev Donaldson's license and appointment, that authority does not, on the evidence, extend to any meaningful control over the manner in which Rev Donaldson undertook his daily duties. This type of spiritual oversight is insufficient to demonstrate the requisite employment-style control.[15]

• [52] With respect to the ninth argument, I am not satisfied that the mere absence of an express disclaimer against the formation of an employment relationship in the appointment letter is sufficient to give rise to a presumption that an employment contract existed.[16]

• [53] With respect to the tenth argument, the ACSQ contended that the nature of Rev Donaldson's license is directly relevant to the question of intention, as confirmed in Threadgill.[17] The ACSQ further submitted that the license was an ecclesiastical instrument conferring authority to exercised ministry within the parish. It created an ecclesiastical office, not a contractual appointment. When the licence is revoked, the office ceases, and the stipend and emoluments fall away because the spiritual office no longer exists, not because a contract has been terminated. Furthermore, the ACSQ submitted that a contractual right to terminate presupposes a binding civil agreement, however the Archbishop's right of revocation arises under the canonical framework and forms part of the Archbishop's pastoral and supervisory authority over clergy within the Diocese and it ends a spiritual office, not a civil contract and the cessation of any stipend or emoluments follow automatically from the ending of the office.

• [54] ACSQ provided a copy of the 'Deed of Institution and Licence of a Priest-in-Charge' held by Rev Donaldson issued by the Archbishop dated 8 February 2019:

• [55] ACSQ submitted that on an objective reading of the Deed of Institution and Licence, it operated as a canonical instrument conferring ecclesiastical office within a religious institution and contained no terms indicating an intention to create legal relations. In particular:

a. The Archbishop "admits" and "canonically institutes" Rev Donaldson to the Parish of Sandgate-Northpoint as Priest-in-Charge. That is the language of conferral, not of contract.

b. The Rev Donaldson is expressly placed under "the constitution and canons of The Anglican Church of Australia and this our diocese", rather than under a set of negotiated private terms.

c. The Archbishop reserves "all powers and authorities" including "the power to revoke the said appointment and the said licence at any time". This unilateral power of revocation is inconsistent with mutual contractual obligations.

d. The duties are described exclusively in ecclesiastical terms: preaching the Word of God, administering the Sacraments, and performing rites and ceremonies of the Church.

• [56] Consistent with the High Court's reasoning in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting, I do not place determinative weight on the labels or language used in the deed when assessing whether an employment relationship existed between the parties.[18] However, the terminology and structure of the deed remain relevant insofar as they assist in analysing the substance of the rights and obligations it creates, and in determining whether those rights and obligations are capable of giving rise to a contract of employment.

• [57] I do not find the deed to be contractual in nature. Its content is expressly spiritual and ecclesiastical, rather than indicative of a civil employment agreement. The language used in the document including terms such as "admits", "canonically institutes" and references to the Constitution and Canons of the Anglican Church of Australia demonstrate that the deed operates within a religious and canonical framework. These are not terms ordinarily associated with contractual employment arrangements.

• [58] Further, ACSQ reserved the power to revoke Rev Donaldson's license at any time, a feature which is inconsistent with the mutuality of obligation and security of tenure typically found in employment contracts. The deed imposes ecclesiastical obligations and recognises spiritual authority rather than establishing enforceable civil rights and duties.

• [59] In an ordinary employment relationship, one would expect to see certain indicia such as a prescribed notice period for termination or mutual obligations relating to ongoing employment. However, in this case, the position held by Rev Donaldson was a spiritual office, and the Archbishop retained the authority to revoke Rev Donaldson's license at any time.[19] This arrangement reflects the ecclesiastical nature of the role rather than a contractual employment relationship, and accordingly, I am not satisfied with Rev Donaldson's argument.

• [60] Taken together, the form, language and substance of the deed support the conclusion that is not a contract of employment, but rather an ecclesiastical instrument governing ministry within the Church.

• [61] With respect to the eleventh argument, the ACSQ contended that the reliance on Knowles and Threadgill at paragraphs 20-24 of the ACSQ's Outline was directed to the question of intention to create legal relations as in those cases, the courts found that there was no such intention. They are relied upon for that point. Neither s 15AA, Personnel Contracting, nor Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd is relevant to that question. Accordingly, Knowles and Threadgill remain of assistance on that issue.

• [62] The decisions in Knowles and Threadgill establish relevant foundational principles applicable to the present matter.[20] I consider the reasoning in those cases to be persuasive and accordingly follow them in this decision.

• [63] Rev Donaldson's submissions refer to a purported "Threadgill v Church of England [1984] FCA 99" decision.[21] No such decision exists in the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia. It is therefore unclear how this reference was generated. It may be the result of an inadvertent error or the use of incorrect secondary material. In any event, as the authority cannot be located or verified, I place no weight on this reference.

• [64] With respect to the twelfth argument, the ACSQ contended that the priest in Threadgill was subject to the same canonical instruments (and thereby to same parish council duties and responsibilities) as Rev Donaldson and had received substantially the same documentation, including a Deed of Institution and License, and a letter from the Archbishop setting out the conditions "that apply to the appointment" in materially the same terms as those received by Rev Donaldson in "Threadgill".

• [65] On the evidence before me, my conclusion is that, as a Priest-in-Charge, Rev Donaldson's role was primarily religious in character. Further to paragraphs 44-46 above, I have not been persuaded that Rev Donaldson's role was significantly different in nature to that considered in Threadgill. Consistent with the reasoning in Threadgill,[22] I find that, by reason of this primarily religious character, Rev Donaldson was not engaged in an employment relationship within the meaning of the Fair Work Act 2009.

• [66] With respect to the thirteenth argument, ACSQ contend that:

• 1. Priests set the hours for the parish and make adjustments to them and a priest will often make changes (in consultation with the Churchwardens and the Parish Council) to suit the way they want to run things and to bring vibrancy to the parish.[23]

• 2. There is not a lot of supervision of priests from Regional Bishops or Archdeacons. Priests are expected to drive things and act of their own accord.[24]

• 3. For leave, a priest would usually talk to the Archdeacon or the Churchwardens. Depending on the amount of leave, either a neighbouring priest delivers services, or a locum is appointed to act while the priest is on leave.[25]

• 4. A Parish Priest is required to provide an annual report to the annual general meeting of parishioners, as required by C.7.13 of the Diocesan Handbook. A copy of this report is sent with a copy of the Annual Returns to the Registrar for compilation. This is not supervisory in nature but is used to comply with the requirement to provide an Annual Information Statement to the Australian Charities and Not-for Profit in accordance with the Australian Charities and Not for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth).[26]

• 5. Before this investigation, the Regional Bishop had used spiritual and pastoral approaches, including mediation and restorative practices, in an effort to resolve the issues involving Rev Donaldson. These occurred on 23 January 2025 and involved mediation and restorative practices involving Rev Donaldson and the Church wardens lead by the Regional Bishop.[27]

• 6. It was only when those methods proved ineffective in resolving the conflict that the Regional Bishop sought assistance from the ACSQ Group HR team.[28]

• 7. The HR Team assisted with the investigation involving Rev Donaldson. However, the Archbishop retained full authority over the process and over all decisions concerning Rev Donaldson's licence/appointment.[29]

• [67] With respect to the argument that Rev Donaldson was initially engaged on a part-time basis and later moved to full-time hours, I do not consider this evidence to be determinative of the nature of the relationship between the parties or capable of establishing the existence of an employment contract. These matters do not speak directly to the character of the engagement itself. Secondly, regarding the contention that Rev Donaldson was provided with religious counselling before the involvement of the HR team, the evidence before me on this point is unclear and, in any event, does not assist in establishing that an employment relationship existed.

• [68] With respect to the fourteenth argument, ACSQ contended that this argument is incorrect and submit that the Synod is a decision-making body within the ACSQ, not a legal person and its approval of budgets within ACSQ has no bearing on whether there was an intention to create legal relations with Rev Donaldson.

• [69] I rely on the fact that in Threadgill the circumstances were materially similar, including that the same ACSQ body was involved.[30] It has already been established that the Archbishop holds the authority to appoint priests and that the issuing of a licence is a discretionary ecclesiastical function. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the corporation itself had no power to enter into contracts of employment for clerical or ministerial roles.[31] It is also probable that the corporation does not employ any person in a clerical capacity. Accordingly, this supports the conclusion that the relationship between the parties was not one of employment.

• [70] With respect to the fifteenth argument, the issue concerning the annual report has been addressed above. As previously discussed, the mere presence or administrative assistance of the HR team in supporting the Archbishop does not establish that the HR team possessed any decision-making authority in relation to Rev Donaldson's role. Their involvement was operational rather than determinative. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that this argument supports the existence of an employment relationship.

• [71] With respect to the sixteenth argument, I am not satisfied with the argument that Rev Donaldson was subject to workplace obligations analogous to those arising under civil law. The obligations relied upon by Rev Donaldson were, in substance, obligations imposed under the Diocese Handbook and the relevant Canons, rather than duties arising from any contractual employment arrangement. These instruments regulate ecclesiastical conduct and ministry, not employment.

• [72] I have found that Rev Donaldson's appointment and ministry were conferred and regulated as an ecclesiastical office under licence, with no intention that legal relations be created. For complement, even if I had been convinced that a contact of employment did exist, then applying the s 15AA "real substance, practical reality and true nature" test, the circumstances show that the relationship was one of office-holding and not a contract of service.

• [73] Overall, when considered together with the discretionary nature of the Archbishop's authority, the absence of contractual indicia, and the primarily religious character of the role, I am not satisfied that Rev Donaldson was engaged in an employment relationship.

• [74] Therefore, I find that Rev Donaldson was not an employee for the purposes of section 382, and the Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with his section 394 application as he is not protected from unfair dismissal.

• [75] Given that the application is jurisdictionally barred, pursuant to section 382(a), the application made pursuant to section 394 is dismissed.

[2] Anglican Church of Australia Act 1895 (Qld).

[4] Knowles v Anglican Property Trust (Diocese of Bathurst) (1999) 46 AILR 5-210 (NSWIRC); Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277.

[5] P.805 of the DCB - ACSQs Outline of Submissions in Reply.

[7] Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277 [22].

[9] P.821 of the DCB - Second Statement of Nicole Hall.

[10] P.35 of the DCB - Statement of Micheal Donaldson.

[11] P.89 to 90 of the DCB - Statement of Nicole Hall.

[12] P.821 and 902 of the DCB - Second Statement of Nicole Hall.

[13] Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277.

[14] P.819 to P.820 of the DCB - Second Statement of Nicole Hall.

[15] Short v J & W Henderson Ltd [1946] SC(HL) 24 at 33-34 cited in Hollis v Vabu [2001] HCA 44; (2001) 207 CLR 21.

[16] See Hedley Fihaki v The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Q.) T/A The Uniting Church in Australia

Queensland Synod [2023] FWCFB 167 [61-64].

[17] Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277 [23].

[18] Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 [184].

[19] See Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth [1969] HCA 29; (1969) 121 CLR 353 at 356 [7] per Kitto J.

[20] Knowles v Anglican Property Trust (Diocese of Bathurst) (1999) 46 AILR 5-210 (NSWIRC); Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277.

[21] P.26 of the DCB - Applicant's Submissions

[22] Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277 [23].

[23] P.89 of the DCB - Statement of Nicole Hall.

[26] P.820 of the DCB - Second Statement of Nicole Hall.

[30] Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277.

[31] Threadgill v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2019] FWC 6277 [11].

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer