plaintiff. The Board’s claim for $39,004.30 succeeded under s 28B(2)(b). The Court allowed the parties an opportunity to consider the reasons, including whether the Board would revisit its exercise of...
Key principles
For s 28B(2)(b) of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), “at the time of the motor accident” refers to the time of the accident, not merely its...
A premium paid after an accident does not become a payment made before or at the accident merely because the premium covers a period commencing earlier that day. The statutory...
The general rule that the law disregards fractions of a day does not displace the ordinary meaning of s 28B(2)(b), because the section requires the sequence of the accident and...
Regulation 5 of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Regulations 2010 (Tas), and the related registration provisions considered, did not deem the premium to have...
Issues before the court
Does “at the time of the motor accident” in s 28B(2)(b) mean the instant of the accident or the calendar date of the accident?
Did the statutory registration and premium scheme deem the premium paid after the accident to have been paid by the accident?
Plain English Summary
The vehicle’s premium had expired before the accident. Although the owners paid to renew it later on the same day, that payment covered a period beginning on the accident date but was still made after the accident. The Court held that s 28B(2)(b) asks whether payment had actually been made when the accident occurred, not whether the premium later covered that date. The Board’s claim for the benefits it had paid therefore succeeded, while its separate discretion whether to pursue recovery remained relevant.
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Deep Dive
2,313 words · generated 01/10/2026
What happened
On 25 January 2015, Lynda Churchman was driving a Kia Grand Carnival Rio on the Midlands Highway in Tasmania. Around noon, the vehicle was involved in a single-vehicle collision. Four passengers were injured. The Motor Accidents Insurance Board (MAIB) paid $39,004.30 in scheduled benefits for those injuries under the statutory scheme described by Wood J [1].
Could the rule that the law disregards fractions of a day make the late-day payment effective from the beginning of 25 January?
Could the Board recover the scheduled benefits it had paid?
Cited legislation
4 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The vehicle’s registration and premium had expired at midnight on 24 January. The Churchmans renewed the registration and paid the premium by electronic funds transfer at 10:22 pm on 25 January. The renewed period was recorded as running from 25 January to 24 July 2015 [2]. The parties agreed that the Board had paid the stated benefits and that the premium payment occurred after the accident [3]-[4].
The Board relied on s 28B(2)(b) of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas). That section allows the Board to recover scheduled benefits in specified circumstances, including where, at the time of the accident, a premium for the vehicle’s use had not been paid. The Board had decided to pursue recovery under its discretion in s 33A. The question for the Court was whether the late-evening payment counted as a payment “at the time of the motor accident”, even though it was made on the same calendar date.
The defendants’ arguments had two main strands. First, they said “at the time of the motor accident” should mean “at the date of the accident”. On that reading, a payment on the same day could be treated as effective for the day. Second, they relied on the linked provisions governing premiums, certificates and vehicle registration. They argued that because the renewed premium covered a period beginning on 25 January, it should be treated as paid for the accident that occurred earlier that day.
Wood J rejected those arguments for the purpose of s 28B(2)(b). The judgment concluded that the time of payment, rather than the period covered by the premium, controlled the statutory question. The claim succeeded for $39,004.30. However, the judge gave the parties an opportunity to consider the reasons and whether the Board would revisit its discretionary decision to recover [112]-[113]. Those pinpoint references reflect the judgment’s final paragraphs as indicated by its total of 113 paragraphs.
Why the court decided this way
The Court began from the ordinary approach to statutory construction: consider the statutory words, their grammatical meaning, and the provision in the context of the Act as a whole. Purpose and policy are relevant, as is the statutory direction in s 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) to prefer an interpretation that promotes the legislation’s purpose. Wood J also recognised that the Act is beneficial legislation, but stressed that this does not decide the meaning of every provision. Section 28B is itself a provision that permits recovery of benefits in certain circumstances, and s 33A separately gives the Board a discretion in exercising that power.
The phrase “at the time of the motor accident” was not treated as interchangeable with “on the date of the accident”. The Court considered the wording elsewhere in the Act. Some provisions referred to circumstances that made most sense at the moment of an accident. Other provisions concerned continuing states of affairs, for which either a date or a moment might work. The context did not support adopting “date” as a consistent meaning throughout the Act.
The Court considered Greig v Fire & All Risks Insurance Company Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 563, in which a similar phrase was read as referring to the date of the accident. Wood J explained that Greig depended on the context of the legislation there, including the way the phrase was used in provisions concerning eligibility and limitation periods. The Tasmanian Act did not use the phrase elsewhere in a way that supported the same date-based interpretation. The case therefore did not control the result.
The defendants also relied on the general legal rule that the law ordinarily does not recognise fractions of a day. The judgment considered authorities including Prowse v McIntyre and Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd. But the rule is not universal: the sequence of events within a day can matter where the legislation requires it to be identified. Section 28B(2)(b) asks whether the premium had been paid at the time of the accident. That necessarily calls for comparison between two events: the accident and the payment. Applying the day-indivisibility rule would erase the distinction the section requires.
The key analytical distinction was between the period of use for which a premium was paid and the time at which the payment was made. Sections 32(1) and 33(4)(c) provide for premiums to be paid for a specified period and for the Registrar to record that period. The premium paid at 10:22 pm covered use from 25 January. That could make the premium effective for a period that included the earlier accident. But it did not establish that the payment transaction itself had occurred before the accident.
The regulations did not change that conclusion. The Court accepted that delegated legislation could be considered for a limited purpose, such as understanding how related provisions operated. But it did not use the regulations to alter the ordinary meaning of the Act’s words. Regulation 5 governed how long a Certificate of Premium Paid remained in force, including circumstances where a premium was paid within 28 days of the previous period’s expiry. It did not answer the distinct question posed by s 28B(2)(b): when had the premium been paid relative to the accident?
Similarly, reg 68(3) of the Vehicle and Traffic (Driver Licensing and Vehicle Registration) Regulations 2010 (Tas) treated a renewed registration as running from the day after expiry for limited purposes, including calculating the registration payment and next expiry date. For other purposes, the vehicle was treated as unregistered from the day after expiry until renewal. That provision did not deem payment to have occurred at an earlier time for s 28B(2)(b).
The judgment also addressed the practical consequences of the competing interpretations. If payment made at any time on the date of an accident were treated as effective from the beginning of that day, owners could potentially avoid recovery even if the premium had expired substantially earlier. Wood J considered that result would undermine the recovery provision. The Court did not, however, decide every possible consequence of a 28-day grace period. It said that a grace period might have sensible or fair features, but that such considerations could not supply a deeming rule absent from the legislation.
Before and after state of the law
Before this decision, the relevant established principles included the ordinary statutory-construction approach, the usual rule that fractions of a day are disregarded, and the qualification that the rule may not apply when the sequence of events matters. The judgment also considered the principle that statutory expressions can take meaning from their context, including the presumption that similar words in the same Act will usually be used consistently. That presumption can yield where context points to a different meaning.
The judgment did not announce a general rule that “at the time of” always means a particular instant, or that same-day payments can never have retrospective effect. Its holding is tied to s 28B(2)(b), the statutory context and the distinction between when the payment occurred and what period it covered. The Court’s reasoning was that this provision focuses on whether payment had been made when the accident happened.
After the decision, the answer under s 28B(2)(b), on the facts considered, could not be derived solely from the date recorded for the renewed premium or certificate. A lawyer or decision-maker applying the judgment would need to distinguish the relevant payment event from the period for which the premium was recorded as covering the vehicle. The decision also makes clear that regulations dealing with certificate periods and registration periods do not automatically answer the timing question under the Act.
The Board’s separate discretion remains part of the statutory picture. The Court noted that s 33A gives the Board discretion and allows it to take into account any matter it considers relevant. The fact that the accident occurred within 24 hours of expiry, or within the period in which the certificate could be in force under the regulations, could be considered by the Board. The judgment did not decide how that discretion should be exercised in this case; it left the Board the opportunity to reconsider its decision.
Key passages with plain-English translation
“The section is concerned with the timing of payment, not the effect of payment in terms of the period of use.”
Plain English: The question is not only whether the premium eventually covered the day of the accident. The question is whether the premium had been paid when the accident happened.
“The commencement of a period of use does not address the question of whether payment is to be treated as having been made at the commencement of that period of use.”
Plain English: A record showing cover from the start of a date does not necessarily mean that the payment itself happened at the start of that date.
“The ordinary meaning of ‘at the time of’ should prevail.”
Plain English: In this provision, the phrase refers to when the accident occurred, rather than treating the whole calendar day as one indivisible time.
“The MA Regulations and other legislative provisions relied upon by the defendants do not have the effect of creating an artificial time of payment so that payment was made, or to be treated as having been made, by the time of the accident.”
Plain English: The certificate and registration rules did not move the actual payment backwards in time for the recovery provision.
The judgment’s practical emphasis is on keeping distinct questions separate: the certificate’s period of force, the registration period, and the time when money was paid. Treating those as one question would have obscured the statutory wording that made the timing of payment decisive.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
The decision is most directly relevant where a motor vehicle accident occurs after a premium has expired, but the owner pays a renewal premium later on the same day. It is also relevant where the renewed premium is recorded as covering a period beginning on the date of the accident, and a party argues that this date-based coverage means the premium was already paid when the accident occurred.
The reasoning may also matter where a party seeks to use a general rule about disregarding fractions of a day to treat a later event as effective from the start of the date. The Court’s approach indicates that this rule may not determine the issue where the statute asks which of two events happened first.
The decision does not resolve every premium or registration dispute. Its application depends on the statutory language and scheme being considered. It does not decide the effect of every certificate provision, every possible registration lapse, or every claim involving a payment made days or weeks after expiry. Nor does it decide whether a 28-day period of grace exists for all purposes. Wood J expressly left the construction of reg 5(b)(iii) and the ultra vires question undecided.
How later courts have treated it
The supplied judgment contains no decisions issued after 11 March 2020, and therefore provides no basis to describe how later courts have treated Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Churchman. No later case history should be inferred from the judgment alone.
Within Churchman, Wood J considered earlier authorities rather than later treatment of the case. The judgment discussed Prowse v McIntyre, Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd and Associated Beauty Aids Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation on the rule concerning fractions of a day. It considered Greig as an example of contextual interpretation of “at the time of the accident”, and explained why the context of the Tasmanian Act did not support the same date-based construction. It also referred to Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross on when legislation can be treated as part of a single statutory scheme.
For a current case-law status assessment, the judgment itself is not enough. This deep dive is limited to the material supplied and makes no claim about subsequent citation, approval, distinction or reversal.
Still-open questions
Several issues were left open or were expressly unnecessary to decide. First, Wood J did not decide the full effect of reg 5(b)(iii), which concerns a premium paid more than 28 days after expiry. The defendants argued that the regulation might be read in a way that limited or avoided a hiatus; the Court did not resolve that question because the regulation did not determine the meaning of s 28B(2)(b).
Second, the Court did not decide whether the regulations would be ultra vires if they had the broader effect contended for by the defendants. That question was unnecessary once the Court concluded that the regulations did not deem payment to have occurred before the accident for the statutory recovery question.
Third, the judgment did not decide whether the Board should ultimately maintain its recovery claim after considering the reasons. The claim succeeded as a matter of construction, but the judge gave the parties an opportunity to consider the Board’s discretion under s 33A. The decision identifies potentially relevant matters, including the short interval between expiry and the accident, but does not determine how the Board should weigh them.
Finally, the judgment’s reasoning is specific to the wording and structure of the Tasmanian legislation before the Court. Questions under other legislation, or under later amendments, would require separate examination of their language, context and purpose.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Judgment (1 paragraphs)
[1]
For the reasons given, s 28B(2)(b) is concerned with the timing of payment of premiums and whether payment was made at the time of a motor accident and is not resolved by the consequences of payment in terms of the period of use. The MA Regulations and other legislative provisions relied upon by the defendants do not have the effect of creating an artificial time of payment so that payment was made, or to be treated as having been made, by the time of the accident. Furthermore, the words "at the time of the accident" should not be interpreted to mean at the date of the accident.
The inevitable conclusion from this interpretation of s 28B(2)(b) of the Act, is that at the time of the accident, a premium for the use of the vehicle had not been paid. The plaintiff's claim succeeds. The claim is for damages in the sum of $39,004.30 and quantum is agreed. Pursuant to s 28B(2)(b), the plaintiff is entitled to recover that sum from the defendants.
In determining whether to exercise its right to recover, the Board has a discretion and it determined to exercise that right. However, the Board may revisit that determination. It would seem appropriate to give the parties an opportunity to consider these reasons. The defendants may wish to advance matters for the Board's consideration in light of these reasons as bearing on the Board's discretion, and the Board may wish to consider whether there are any matters that warrant their consideration as to whether it pursues its right to recovery. I shall give the parties that opportunity.
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Motor Accidents Insurance Board
Respondent/Defendant:
Churchman [2020] TASSC 6
Legislation Cited (4)
Accidents (Liabilities And Compensation) Act 1973
Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Regulations 2010
Traffic Act 1999
Traffic (Driver Licensing and Vehicle Registration) Regulations 2010
Cases Cited (22)
Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Churchman [2020] TASSC 6 (11 March 2020)
The question of the meaning of s 28B(2)(b) is to be determined by reference to basic principles of statutory interpretation. These principles are well-established: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]-[70]; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue[2009] HCA 41, 239 CLR 27 at [46]- [47]; Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross[2012] HCA 56, 248 CLR 378 at [23]- [32], [68]-[70], [88]-[89]. The task of ascertaining the meaning of the section should begin with a consideration of the words of the statute and their grammatical meaning. It is necessary to decide the legal meaning of the relevant provision by reference to the language of the statute viewed as a whole. The task may require consideration of the context, including the general purpose and policy of a provision and the mischief it is seeking to remedy. Section 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act1931 requires an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object of the legislation to be preferred to one that does not.
Resort to materials outside the statute is legitimate for the purpose of identifying the policy of the statute in order to better understand the language and intended operation of the statute. of the permits resort to extrinsic materials to illuminate meaning in cases where the ordinary meaning is not clear or causes absurd or unreasonable results.
"Ordinarily beneficial legislation should be given an interpretation favourable to the class of persons intended to be benefited - in this case, persons injured in motor vehicle accidents: R v Kearney; ex parte Jurlama[1984] HCA 14; (1984) 158 CLR 426 at 433; IW v City of Perth[1997] HCA 30; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12; Solicitors' Trust v Oxenbould[2013] TASFC 2, 22 Tas R 235 at [36]."
The beneficial approach is only invoked in the event of uncertainty as to the meaning of the words: Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v NSW Aboriginal Land Council[2008] HCA 48, 237 CLR 285. Furthermore, although the Act is beneficial legislation, this does not mean that all of its provisions are to be so interpreted. There are competing objectives evident from the Act. In fact, the particular section under consideration is one which seeks to confine the beneficial effect of the Act. Section 28B allows for the Board to pursue recovery of scheduled benefits in certain cases. Section 33A ameliorates the impact of s 28B, by providing that the Board has a discretion to pursue recovery, and that considerations of mitigating circumstances and hardship may be taken into account by the Board in the exercise of its discretion. The present task remains one of statutory construction: IW v City of Perth (above) at 12.
The defendants draw on a general principle of law that the law is not concerned with divisions of a day, and fractions of a day are disregarded: Prowse v McIntyre[1961] HCA 79; (1961) 111 CLR 264; Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd[1972] HCA 61; (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 446, per Gibbs J. In Forster, Gibbs J referred to Sir William Grant MR in Lester v Garland (1808) 15 VES Jun, at 257 (33 ER, at 752):
If an act is done, it is treated as effective from the first moment of the day on which it was done. As stated by Windeyer J in Associated Beauty Aids Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[1965] HCA 20; (1965) 113 CLR 662 at 669:
In Prowse v McIntyre (above), consideration was given to an expression in a Limitation Act "after their coming to or being of full age" and the principle that the law takes no account of fractions of a day. At 274, Kitto J spoke of the indivisibility of a day: "The beginning of a day is nothing but the end of the day before, and the end of the day is nothing but the beginning of the next; just as the eastern boundary of a piece of land is identical with the western boundary of contiguous land."
There are exceptions to this principle where it is necessary to distinguish the fraction of a day: per Windeyer J in Prowse at 278. The principle may be displaced if the validity of an act is dependent upon the precise time of an event: Marshall v DG Sundin & Co Pty Ltd(1989) 16 NSWLR 463 at 467_._ The legal principle does not apply in circumstances where the actual sequence of events is important: South Australia v Slipper[2003] FCA 1414, 203 ALR 473 at [53]; [2004] FCAFC 164, 136 FCR 259 at 489-90.
The defendants rely upon a decision of Greig v Fire & All Risks Insurance Company Ltd[1989] 2 Qd R 563 as support for their submission that "time" should be construed as meaning "date". The Supreme Court of Queensland construed the meaning of the words "at the time of the accident" in similar legislation, and determined that it meant "at the date of the accident". The case is illustrative of the application and interplay of the various principles of statutory interpretation that arise in this case.
The provision which required interpretation precluded someone from bringing an action under Northern Territory legislation in respect of injuries received in a motor vehicle accident if they were a resident of the Northern Territory "at the time of the accident". The plaintiff in that matter had resided in the Territory for some time but was moving to Queensland. On the day of his accident, he was travelling to his future residence in Queensland when he was involved in an accident on the Northern Territory side of the border. His claim would not be actionable in the Territory if he was a resident of the Territory at the time of his accident.
When ascertaining the meaning of offence provisions the ordinary rule in Prowse may not apply. There are sound reasons why Parliament may intend a phrase in a penalty provision to adhere to a moment in time. In Beare v Ward[1927] SAStRp 68; [1928] SASR 1, Angas Parsons J considered an appeal arising from a charge of maintaining an unauthorised wireless set. The respondent was the owner, and after a visit from an inspector, and on the same day, he took out a licence. Angas Parsons J overturned the decision of the magistrate which had applied the general principle that the law does not regard fractions of a day. His Honour noted that the general principle is not a rule of universal application and that there are exceptions to it which were explained by Lord Mansfield in Coombe v Pitt[1763] EngR 88; (1973) 3 Burr 1423, at 1434, where he stated: "Though the law does not in general, allow of the fraction of a day, yet it admits it in cases where it is necessary to distinguish. And I do not see why the very hour may not be so too, where it is necessary and can be done: for it is not like a mathematical point, which cannot be divided."
Angas Parsons J referred also to Chick v Smith(1840) 8 Dowl 337 and quoted from Patterson J at 34: "the good sense of the matter is that where it is necessary to show which was the first of two acts, the court is at liberty to consider fractions of a day. The rule of law would otherwise be absurd."
In Burridge v Manison[1987] NTSC 58; (1987) 48 NTR 66, Muirhead AJ was concerned with an appeal involving a charge of driving an unregistered motorcycle on a public street. The appellant had promptly registered the motorcycle on the same day as his act of driving. The certificate of registration bore the same date as the date of the offence charged. He was convicted and appealed. On appeal, he relied on the principle that the law does not pay regard to fractions of the day, and that the registration was valid for the whole of the day. Muirhead AJ referred to the judgment of Angas Parsons J in Additionally, he referred to , per Grove J at 107; and [1968] Tas SR 1. He went on to state at 69, "These authorities refer to licensing legislation in differing forms (fishing and dog licences) but the principle is, I think, clear. A person who is not in possession of a required licence or registration, contrary to statute, gains no immunity by promptly obtaining the necessary licence or registration on the same day. The offence has been committed - there is no principle of retrospective immunity back to the preceding midnight." For a comprehensive survey of the authorities see
When a number of Acts form a single scheme of legislation, it is proper to have regard to all of those Acts for the purpose of construing expressions used in any one of them: Sweeney v Fitzhardinge[1906] HCA 73; (1906) 4 CLR 716 at 726 per Griffith CJ; Howell v Macquarie University[2008] NSWCA 26 at [55] per Campbell JA (Spigelman CJ and Bell JA agreeing).
In Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd(1987) 9 NSWLR 719, Kirby P commented upon the approach to be taken to inter-related statutes:
As has been seen the defendants' argument relies heavily on the regulations particularly the MA Regulations, but also the V&T Regulations, to ascertain the meaning of s 28B(2)(b) of the Act. The general rule is that delegated legislation made under an Act should not be taken into account for the purpose of interpretation of the Act itself: Pearce and Geddes (above), at 133-4. It may be noted that it is the governing Act that determines the meaning of expressions that are used in the Act and the regulations: Acts Interpretation Act, s 19.
There are exceptions to this general rule. If there are regulations that, together with the principal Act, form part of a legislative scheme, it may be useful to refer to them to ascertain the nature of the scheme: Pearce and Geddes (above) at 135 and the cases referred to. There is an important distinction to be noted here. As stated by Mason J in Bryson Motors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[1985] HCA 20; (1985) 156 CLR 651 at 652: "One looks at regulations, not to construe an overall scheme or to throw light on ambiguity in a statutory provision, but to ascertain what the scheme is". There are other exceptional situations where it may be permissible to refer to regulations as an aid to the interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, usefully referred to by Pearce and Geddes at 135:
"Where a contemporaneously prepared Act and set of regulations establish an interdependent regime.
If a statutory provision permits exceptions to be made to it by regulations.
Where a section of an Act expresses itself as subject to regulations."
(1961) 111 CLR 264
(1965) 113 CLR 662
(1972) 127 CLR 421
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1984) 158 CLR 426
(1997) 191 CLR 1
(1989) 16 NSWLR 463
(1979) 144 CLR 633
(1988) 165 CLR 19
(1906) 4 CLR 716
(1987) 9 NSWLR 719
(1985) 156 CLR 651
AI Analysis
Outcomeplaintiff
Disposition:
The Board’s claim for $39,004.30 succeeded under s 28B(2)(b). The Court allowed the parties an opportunity to consider the reasons, including whether the Board would revisit its exercise of discretion under s 33A.
The Act and the regulations made under it constitute beneficial legislation: Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Bricknell[2017] TASFC 7, 27 Tas R 99 at [9]. In that case, the Full Court considered a clause in Sch 1, Pt 2 of the regulations under the Act. It was held that "expenses ... incurred for the provision of the treatment required by him or her" included rent incurred for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment. Having concluded that the relevant sub-clause was ambiguous, Blow CJ stated that the Act and the regulations constitute beneficial legislation and that:
Sheperdson J, with whom Kelly SPJ agreed, noted that at first sight the phrase "at the time of the accident" seems to mean at the moment or instant of the accident. However, the phrase appeared elsewhere in the Act in a context that would suggest the legislature intended the reference would be the date, not the moment of the accident. In particular, the phrase was used in sections concerned with eligibility to bring a claim and time limitations. In concluding that the legislature intended the phrase in question to mean "at the date of the accident", one of his Honour's reasons was that the law, in reckoning time by days, ordinarily takes no account of fractions of a day: Prowse v McIntyre (above) at 280; Forster v Jododex Aust Pty Ltd (above) at 452. Further, there would be considerable difficulties if the same phrase in other provisions of the same statute was construed as referring to the instant of the accident. It was said that provisions imposing time limitations must be construed as referring to the day of the accident, as limitation periods do not run from the instant or moment of an accident: 573.
It was determined in Greig that in order to give the phrase "at the time of the accident" a sensible meaning and one which is compatible with the rest of the Act, that phrase should be construed to mean "at the date of the accident". The desirability for compatibility arises from the statutory presumption that Parliament intends that a phrase have a consistent meaning wherever it appears in a particular piece of legislation. It can be seen that it was the context and the desirability for a compatible interpretation that led to an interpretation that the phrase referred to the date of the accident: 574.
On behalf of the defendants, it was submitted that in order to give the phrase "at the time of the motor accident" in the Act a sensible meaning and in view of the statutory scheme, it should be interpreted to be referring to the date, not the instant of the accident. The limited application of the case of Greig to the facts of this case is acknowledged as the determination of each case must depend upon its own statutory context. The case is relied upon by the defendants as an exemplar instance of the influence of context in providing meaning to a statutory provision. That influence is not in question.
It is convenient to begin the task of statutory construction in this case by considering the defendants' argument regarding the meaning of the phrase "at the time of the motor accident" and whether the phrase appears in the Act other than s 28B(2)(b), either elsewhere in s 28B or in the Act generally and if it does whether the context assists. First, the phrase appears elsewhere in s 28B, other than subs (2)(b).
The authorities I have referred to weigh compellingly in support of a conclusion that the reference to "time" of use in s 29 refers to a moment or instant of use and not to the date of use. In addition, the plaintiff pointed out sections in the Act allowing for a defence if the vehicle was being used for the purpose of registration or repair: s 29(1C). The argument was that this exclusionary provision would not be needed if the offence provision related to the date of the offence, rather than a moment of use. That is a valid point and further supports the interpretation of s 29 advocated by the plaintiff.
The statutory presumption that the same meaning should be given to the same word wherever it occurs in a statute (McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v Smith[1979] HCA 19; (1979) 144 CLR 633 at 643 per Gibbs J) is subject to exceptions. The presumption of consistent use will not be followed if a different meaning is clear from the context: Murphy v Farmer(1988) 165 CLR 19 at 26-8. The nature of s 29 as an offence provision involves a particular need for precision and a different purpose by contrast with the kind of provision under consideration allowing an entitlement to recovery by the Board. Therefore, s 29 is of limited assistance in divining the meaning of the words in s 28B(2)(b). I turn my consideration to the phrase "at the time of" appearing elsewhere in the Act.