"that did not have a current compensation contribution" on that public street, contrary to Section 107B of that Act. 3. The appellant who pleaded not guilty to both charges conducted his own defence. He argued the appeal before me with competence. There is really no dispute as to the facts. The appellant's argument, leaving aside the formal grounds of appeal, is that the Learned Stipendiary Magistrate erred in imposing the conviction and that upon interpretation of the legislation in question the complaint should have been dismissed. 4. The facts are in short compass. On 29 October 1986, in the early hours of the morning, 12.15am, the appellant was riding the motorcycle on the roadway in question. He was stopped by the Police. The motorcycle bore registration plates N 396-71 but no registration label. The police checked by radio and satisfied themselves that registration was not current. The appellant explained to the Police that he was not aware of the lapse of registration, that he had purchased the motorcycle only a few months before and he understood registration was current until May. Thus it was clear that at the actual time he was riding the motorcycle it was not registered. 5. As soon as practicable and later that morning (about 8am) the appellant attended the Registration Branch and he registered the machine for six months. The Certificate of Registration bore a receipt for monies paid dated 29 October 1986 and indicated that an Insurance fee of $49.50 had been paid. The Certificate (Exhibit A), bearing date 29 October, indicated the expiry date was 28 April 1987. It was contended by the prosecutor that the Registration Certificate bears numbers which showed time of registration. That may be so to one who understands the formula, but it is not apparent on the face of the document. I doubt if anything turns on this as the material before the Magistrate justified his conclusion that the certificate was issued about 8am. But on its face it showed that the motorcycle was registered on 29 October, being the date of the offence charged. 6. In a letter to the prosecutor before the hearing date the appellant advised he would enter a plea of not guilty and he expressly admitted, so that it could be tendered in Court "that I was the driver of a Yamaha 250cc motorcycle on Bagot Road on 29 October 1986" (Exhibit 1). 7. As part of the prosecution's case the prosecution tendered what purported to be a certificate under "Sections 119 and 107B" signed by P.L. Ahmat, Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles in the following form (Exhibit 2): "Motor Registration Office 4 February 1987 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT SECTIONS 119 and 107B I, PAULINE LESLIE AHMAT, a Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles in the Northern Territory, hereby certify that according to the records held at this office, the vehicle described hereunder was unregistered and the compensation contribution had not been paid (as required under the Motor Vehicles Act) AT: 0015 HOURS ON: 29 October 1986 LAST REGISTERED NUMBER: 396-71 MAKE: Yamaha TYPE: SR 250 Motor Cycle ENGINE NO: 3Y9020402 COLOUR: Red EXPIRY DATE OF REGISTRATION: 19 September 1986 NAME OF OWNER: LINDSAY BURRIDGE ADDRESS: 28 Rossiter Street RAPID CREEK NT 5792 Sd/- P L AHMAT DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES" 8. The appellant complains of the tender of this document and its acceptance by the Learned Stipendiary Magistrate who stated "I think it clear that the certificate tendered is prima facie evidence of the lack of registration and the payment of the insurance contribution at the relevant time." I deal with this later. 9. I turn briefly to consider relevant provisions which set out the scheme of registration and compensation contribution, the equivalent of what was once referred to as compulsory insurance. 10. Section 8 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that subject to other provisions of the Act (which are not now relevant) "the Registrar shall register, and shall from time to time renew the registration of, a motor vehicle ---". Section 14 obliges the Registrar upon first registration or renewal to grant "to the owner of the motor vehicle a certificate of registration". Section 103 provides that subject to certain matters, again not relevant, registration and every renewal thereof "shall --- be in force for 12 months from and including the date of the registration, grant or renewal as the case may be". The appellant relying on the principle that the law does not pay regard to fractions of the day argues that the registration he effected on 29 October at about 8am was thus valid for the whole of that day i.e. back to midnight and the motorcycle must in law be deemed to have been registered at 12.15am when he was stopped by the police. He relies also on the wording of Section 103(3) which uses the words "on the date" without reference to time or fraction of days. The words "from and including" are frequently used by draftsmen when there is a need to fix with some measure of precision the commencement and conclusion of a period. (See D.C. Pearce Statutory Interpretation in Australia (2nd Edn) p 112). Otherwise the provisions of Section 28 of the Interpretation Act operate so that "time shall be reckoned exclusive of such day or of the day of such act or event". But those words 'from and including' in this context are not to be interpreted so as to relate back the act of registration to seconds after the preceding midnight. Unless the legislation so compels, an act not done at a particular time of day is not by such words and operation of law deemed to have been done at the commencement of the day. 11. The Learned Stipendiary Magistrate commented: "Firstly, the defendant contends that the registration certificate operates from the 29/10/86, it operates from the first moment of that day - and therefore in reality although effected at 8am or thereabouts has retrospective effect back to a time prior to his apprehension. If the defendant is correct then that would mean that an offender after being apprehended could escape liability merely by effecting registration and paying the prescribed insurance contribution at any time before closing time on the same day at the Motor Registration Offices

• indeed a strange situation." It was suggested that in an endeavour to ensure a common sense interpretation, as it applied to the situation here, and operating on the 'floodgates' principle, His Worship had erred in his interpretation of Section 103. I do not agree. There is authority which supports His Worship's approach.

12. In Beare v. Ward [1927] SAStRp 68; 1928 SASR 1 Angas Parsons J. considered the situation where the defendant owned an unlicensed wireless set which was detected by an inspector. Later that day the defendant obtained a licence showing he was duly licensed on that day. The Magistrate dismissed the charge being of opinion the licence came into effect seconds after midnight of the day in question holding that the law does not regard fractions of the day. Referring to this principle His Honour stated: "That, however, is not the rule of universal application, and there are exceptions to it which were explained by Lord Mansfield in Coombe v. Pitt, [1763] EngR 88; (1763) 3 Burr 1423, at p 1434, where he says:- "Though the law does not, in general, allow of the fraction of a day, yet it admits it in cases where it is necessary to distinguish. And I do not see why the very hour may not be so too, where it is necessary and can be done: for it is not like a mathematical point, which cannot be divided." And in Chick v. Smith, (1840) 8 Dowl 337, Patterson J. said, at p 340:- "The good sense of the matter is that where it is necessary to shew which was the first of two acts, the Court is at liberty to consider fractions of a day. The rule of law would otherwise be absurd." The case under appeal gives a very good illustration of what would be the absurdity if the rule were universal, because all that would be necessary for a man who was informed of the visit of an inspector under the Wireless Telegraphy Act would be to rush off and obtain a licence and then contend that the licence operated from the first moment of that day, and that, therefore, at the time of the inspection by the examining officer he must, by the law, be taken to be a licensed person."
13. See also Campbell v. Strangeways (1877) 3 CPD 105 per Grove J. at 107; Wharton v. Taylor (1965) Crim L Rev 432 and Haslock v. Blyth (1968) Tas SR 1. These authorities refer to licensing legislation in differing forms (fishing and dog licences) but the principle is I think clear. A person who is not in possession of a required licence or registration, contrary to statute, gains no immunity by promptly obtaining the necessary licence or registration on the same day. The offence has been committed - there is no principle of retrospective immunity back to the preceding midnight. Section 107(1) provides "a person shall not drive an unregistered motor vehicle upon a public street". At the time he was stopped the appellant clearly was driving such a vehicle and the appeal against conviction on the first count must fail.