Reasoning
15 I will refer to the contentions for the applicant in the course of setting out my reasoning on the first respondent's contentions.
16 The starting point for resolution of the issues is the language of s 75AC of the Act. The effect of s 75AC(1) is that a defect will be made out under s 75AD where the safety of goods "is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.". It is to be noted that the defect referred to is not a defect of any particular kind save as to safety. In determining the extent of the safety of goods, s 75AC(2) requires that the court have regard "to all relevant circumstances."
17 The nature of "relevant circumstances" is assisted by pars (a)-(f) of s 75AC(2). But those paragraphs neither set outer parameters of the relevant circumstances nor specify a minimum qualification to be met by such circumstances. That is because they are enumerated as inclusive circumstances only. Whether or not any of the pars can be satisfied in any particular case will depend on whether the evidence in that case gives rise to a finding of one of the inclusive circumstances. Absence of evidence supporting a finding of the existence of any of the matters set out in the pars does not mean that the court is still not to have regard to all the relevant circumstances as they arise in the particular case nor that the requirements of s 75AC(1) necessarily cannot be satisfied. Absent evidence satisfying a finding of any of the circumstances in the pars may mean that an applicant will have more difficulty of making out the requirements of s 75AC(1) understood in the context of the opening words of s 75AC(2). It does not have the necessary consequence that those requirements cannot be made out where the evidence in the case supports the appropriate finding. It means only that the evidence in the case is not of the sort that falls within pars (a)- (f).
18 The pleading of the application of these provisions was considered by Lehane J in Femcare. The allegations there pleaded were summarised by his Honour as follows:
"The clips are goods to which the previous apply: that is, they are goods of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal use. Femcare is the manufacturer of the clips. It supplied them to Endovasive who acquired for resupply. A doctor or hospital, having acquired the clips from Endovasive, supplied them to the applicant or a group member, who acquired the goods as a consumer. She expressly or by implication made known the particular purpose for which she required the clips. Being applied inadequately by an applicator which was out of calibration, they were both not reasonably fit for the purpose made known and not of merchantable quality. As a result the applicant, or the group member, suffered the loss or damage pleaded…"
The related pleading was to the effect that "the goods were defective in that their safety was not such as doctors, hospitals or patients were generally entitled to expect as provided for in s 75AC". What were described as "particulars of defects" were pleaded as follows:
"Particulars of defects
(a) the goods were marketed as having a failure rate of 0.3% but had a much higher failure rate;
(b) the goods were marketed as an effective means of female sterilisation but were frequently not effective for that purpose;
(c) the applicators would not retain calibration despite normal use and when used out of calibration resulted in an increased risk of failed sterilisation due to inadequate clip closure;
(d) the goods did not include the means whereby the operator of the applicator could ascertain whether the applicator was properly calibrated before use; and
(e) the goods did not have adequate instructions or warnings as to inspection, maintenance, service and recalibration of the applicator or of the increased risk of failed sterilisation due to inadequate clip closure if an applicator which was out of calibration was used."
Then followed a pleading that the applicant and each of the group members had suffered loss and damage. Lehane J found the pleadings to be deficient. Firstly they did not relate to the expectations of persons generally but rather to specified categories of persons. That is not applicable to the present pleading. Secondly, the pleading did not address the bases on which Femcare, as an overseas manufacturer, and Endovasive, as an Australian importer, might be liable. This second deficiency is to be understood as a reference to the absence from the pleading there under examination of a pleading that the goods had been supplied or acquired by the consumers who had suffered loss or injury. That also has no direct parallel here.
19 The third deficiency was that there was no clear link pleaded between the particular defective goods and "injury" (not loss or damage). He regarded it as insufficient to plead that a group member suffered "loss and damage" as a result of defects where "such injury and loss would have been avoided in the event of the …applicator not being exposed to the risk of being out of calibration". cf contra Courtney v Medtel Pty Limited [2003] FCA 36 on this aspect. Here it is pleaded that the defect was causative of the injury. What the respondent contends is that something more concerning the nature of the defect is needed to establish the clear link.
20 The submissions concerning the inadequacy of the pleading are to be considered in the context of the statutory provisions together with the statement by counsel for the applicant that the applicant has provided all of the particulars upon which she will seek to rely. I do not consider the statutory provisions require the applicant to bring more than the case the applicant wishes addressed. That is, there is no requirement to bring evidence addressing each of the categories of fact referred to in pars (a)-(f) of s 75AC(2). It is for the applicant to determine what evidence she considers will be sufficient to discharge the onus of proof of the requirements of s 75AD read with s 75AC when all the evidence is in. This is not a case where the applicant is holding back particularisation or in any way endeavouring to take the respondents by surprise. The applicant is committed by counsel to bringing evidence in the way the pleading particularises. Counsel states that when all the evidence in the applicant's case is in, the cause of all of the symptoms in the applicant's eye will be seen to be the lens and that will be sufficient to raise an inference that the safety of the goods is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect. Whether that is sufficient to make the applicant's case is for the applicant to determine in advancing the case.
21 Nevertheless, the case for the first respondent contests that it will be insufficient at the end of the evidence for an inference to be drawn that the goods in causing the injury were defective. This is because it is submitted the applicant is wrongly relying upon Haslbauer as an authority supporting the drawing of such an inference in those circumstances. The passage upon which the applicant relies in that case appear at 452 in the reasons of Barwick CJ where he said:
"To make a prima facie case in a claim based on the defendant's negligence, a plaintiff may be content to rely upon such inferences as can be drawn from the fact of the occurrence which he claims to be due to the defendant's negligence. An inference of such negligence may be drawn where, in the ordinary course of human affairs, such an occurrence is unlikely without want of care on the part of a person in the situation of the defendant. In such a case, the occurrence itself may be said to bespeak the lack of care. Or if his pleadings are wide enough, a plaintiff may rely both upon such an inference and upon evidence, beyond that of the occurrence itself, of specific acts or omissions of the defendant indicating a want of care."
At 456 the Chief Justice stated that the critical time for the drawing of any inference of negligence is at the close of the evidence. I do not regard the applicant's approach as a misapplication of this dicta. Section 75AC does not mandate the bringing of evidence in any particular way. It is open for the applicant to seek to establish the requirements of the section by inference from the evidence in her case.
22 The applicant's approach seeks support from Glendale. That was a case concerning a failure to include a safety warning on goods and so is distinguishable on that basis from the present matter. Nevertheless at 629 Emmett J said of the section here at issue:
"The standard to be adopted in respect of the definition of "defect" in s 75AC is an objective one based upon what the public at large, rather than any particular individual, is entitled to expect. On the other hand, one cannot foresee all possible uses to which consumers will put the goods. The explanatory memorandum published in connection with the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) which inserted Pt VA says that s 75AC(1) does not require goods to be absolutely free from risk. The level of safety required is that which the community is entitled to expect. It is thus the objective knowledge and expectations of the community which are to be assessed, not the subjective knowledge and expectations of an injured party: see paras 13 and 14."
That makes apparent the consumer protection character of the provision. There is no reason in law or the Act why an evidentiary inference cannot be relied upon to meet the requirements of that provision.
23 In applying s 75AC a court in determining the extent of the safety of the goods, is obliged to have regard to all relevant circumstances. If the evidence was that the goods had been causative of injury, the court would be required to move to a finding of the extent of the safety. Then the court would be required to determine whether that safety was not such as persons generally are entitled to expect. If that was established, the court would move to a finding that the goods had a defect before moving to application of the provisions of s 75AD. There seems no reason in principle why this process could not commence and continue from an evidentiary foundation which was inferential.
24 It follows there is no basis upon which to accede to the first respondent's motion for dismissal or strike out of the claim pursuant to s 75AD. Nor is any point to be served by ordering further particularisation.