Administrative Review - C_hild Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016_ - Review of a decision by the Central Assessment Unit to issue a prohibition notice - Unacceptable risk to children - Consideration of discontinued charges - Assessable information in making a determination

Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 ss 8, 26(2), 26(3)(c), 30

Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Regulations 2016

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 8, 34, 39(1)(b)

Badea v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 37

Clark v Department of Human Services [2022] SACAT 10

Collins & Anor v Djunaedi & Ors [2016] SASCFC 48

Djunaedi & Ors v Collins & Anor [2015] SADC 120

GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38

Griggs v Department of Human Services [2023] SACAT 60

Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 45

Marshall v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2023] SACAT 83

Robert Wayne Collins and Veronika Mohor and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2024] AATA 2776

WWZ v Department for Child Protection [2020] SACAT 111

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 37(1)(a)

1. This case is about whether Ms Mohor, the applicant, should be prohibited from engaging in child-related work.
2. On the one hand, the applicant says she has no criminal history, is an elderly woman that poses no risk to children and that the respondent has unfairly conflated issues relating to her husband to herself.
3. On the other hand, the respondent says that the applicant has been charged with criminal matters (that have ultimately not been proven) and the civil courts have made a series of findings against the applicant that she has engaged in fraud and misrepresentation against multiple adults causing them significant financial loss.
4. The key issues for determination by the Tribunal include:

(a) what is the role of the respondent in these proceedings;

(b) whether the respondent complied with its Working with Children Check Guidelines, July 2024 (the Guidelines);

(c) whether the respondent complied with its Approval Authority Matrix;

(d) what is the assessable information in this case;

(e) what, if anything, did the applicant do;

(f) does the applicant's conduct translate to an unacceptable risk to children; and

(g) should the applicant be permitted to work with children.

1. I have considered all the material before me, including the Book of Documents filed 9 December 2024, Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, Second Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 18 March 2025, Applicant's Outline of Argument, filed 13 February 2025, Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 18 March 2025, Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, the Respondent's Further Submissions, dated 4 April 2025, Case Summaries in Chronological Order filed by the respondent, submissions provided at the hearing and evidence of the applicant provided at the hearing. I have also had regard to the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 (CSPP), the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Regulations 2016 (Regulations), the Guidelines and the Approval Authority Matrix.
2. I have also considered the respondent's original decision and placed some weight on it. However, I have put less weight on it considering that I have had significantly more material available and, in my view, some material before the respondent ought to be given no or low weight.
3. For the reasons that follow, it is my view, the correct and preferrable decision is to affirm the decision of the respondent.

What is the role of the respondent in these proceedings?

1. The applicant expressed some concern that the respondent should not take a position in these proceedings and there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in this case.
2. In my view, the respondent is required to assist the Tribunal to reach the correct and preferrable decision.
3. I agree with the submissions of the respondent that the principles in Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 45 are relevant to how a respondent should approach merits review proceedings in the Tribunal.[1] This allows the respondent to make submissions and take an active role in the proceedings.
4. However, as President Hughes said in WWZ v Department for Child Protection [2020] SACAT 111 at [85]- [86] and [88]:
   • Whilst the decision-maker has a legislated role in the review to assist the Tribunal, that role is to be carried out in a manner that reflects the fact that it is not an applicant (as it is when it appears before the Court), and must act in a manner that is consistent with the pursuit of the correct or preferable decision, rather than a defence of the decision originally made. The Department should approach a defence of the original decision cautiously, in order to avoid an apprehension of bias in any re-making of the decision that may be required on a remittal;
   • It is undesirable for a decision-maker to gather new evidence in support of a decision after a decision has been made. Firstly, it suggests that the decision-maker may have been aware that there was additional evidence available that might assist in the making of a correct decision. If that evidence was available when the decision was made, and required to justify the decision, it is preferable for it to be gathered at that point. Secondly, the decision-maker might be tempted to seek out information that supports the original decision rather than contributes to a correct decision. Thirdly, it requires the challenger to meet a case that is possibly different from that which has been challenged;
   • The Tribunal may, in the exercise of its discretion, allow the decision-maker or the challenger to adduce evidence that was not before the decision-maker when the original decision was made. As to whether a party should be permitted to adduce further evidence in support of the challenge to the decision brought under s 34, the discretion should be exercised by reference to a number of factors including the likely relevance of the evidence, whether (in respect of evidence sought to be adduced by the decision-maker) it was available when the original decision was made, and the time it will take to obtain the evidence, bearing in mind the option of remitting the decision to the decision-maker at any time for the decision to be re-made, and the need for expedition.
5. In this case, the respondent did assist the Tribunal. However, as noted by President Hughes it is not preferrable that large amounts of material were before me that were not before the original decision-maker. Further, for reasons expressed below, it would have been preferrable if the respondent did not take a position in relation to the reliance on certain media articles.

Was the respondent's decision made in accordance with the Guidelines and Approval Authority Matrix, and if not, what is the implication?

1. The applicant asserts that the respondent breached its own Guidelines because the respondent did not obtain a certificate of record as required by 6.3.2.2 of the Guidelines.[2] There is no dispute that there was no certificate of record before the original decision-maker.
2. I have considered the Guidelines themselves. The Guidelines state "Possible information before a decision maker might include ... Court documents - e.g. certificates of record".[3]
3. Further, 6.3.2.2 of the Guidelines state "A Certificate of Record or equivalent should be requested in accordance with the Requesting information from the Applicant, Police and Courts Procedure for the purpose of conducting the risk assessment and obtaining an update in relation to charges disclosed on the applicant's national police record check or confirming an outcome if the applicant disputes their criminal history record result".[4]
4. In my view, the words "possible" and "might" in the Guidelines[5] strongly indicate that there is no obligation on a decision-maker to obtain a certificate of record. Certainly, a certificate of record may be obtained, and be before the decision-maker. However, it is not a breach of the Guidelines to fail to obtain a certificate of record because obtaining a certificate of record is not a mandatory requirement.
5. Further, the word "should" in 6.3.2.2 of the Guidelines suggests that there is a preference to request a certificate of record but it is not mandatory. It follows that the respondent did not breach the Guidelines by failing to obtain a certificate of record.
6. Even if I am wrong and the Guidelines do mandate a certificate of record, the respondent has now obtained a certificate of record and it is before the Tribunal.[6]
7. The applicant also asserts that under the respondent's Approval Authority Matrix,[7] the Team Leader was not authorised to issue a prohibition notice in the circumstances of the current application.[8]
8. The circumstances of when a Team Leader may make a decision in relation to a risk assessment state "Where a risk assessment results in the Assessment Officer recommending the person should be prohibited and the Team Leader agrees".[9] The applicant argues that there is no evidence that an Assessment Officer recommended to the Team Leader prohibition in this case. I agree that in the Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024 and the Supplementary Book of Documents filed 12 February 2025 there is no evidence that an Assessment Officer recommended to the Team Leader prohibition in this case.
9. However, in the Second Supplementary Book of Documents filed 18 March 2025,[10] there is evidence of an Assessment Officer having drafted a prohibition notice for the review and finalisation by the Team Leader. The respondent submits, and I accept, that the draft prohibition notice is effectively the Assessment Officer's recommendation to the Team Leader, recommending the issuing of a prohibition notice. The Team Leader does not have to accept this recommendation and may determine to clear the applicant.[11]
10. It follows that there does not appear to be a breach of the Approval Authority Matrix.
11. In any event, despite concerns around the respondent's decision-making, the applicant conceded that the decision of the respondent does enliven the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal[12] and urged me not to send the matter back to the respondent for reconsideration.

What is the assessable information in this case and does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to exclude assessable information?

1. There was much argument in this case about the meaning of "assessable information" and the "assessable information" in this matter.
2. "Assessable information" is defined in s 8 of the CSPP.
3. Relevant in this case, "assessable information" includes:
   • information that relates to offences with which the person has been charged (s 8(1)(b) CSPP); and
   • any other information, or information of a class, declared by the regulations to be assessable information (s 8(1)(j) CSPP).
4. The Regulations further prescribe that assessable information includes "any other information determined by the Registrar, in accordance with any requirements set out in the guidelines, to be assessable information."
5. The respondent considered as "assessable information" in this case, certain charges against the applicant.
6. The charges are set out in the certificate of record and refer to money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences.[13] In my view, the information relating to the charges clearly falls within s 8(1)(b) of the CSPP and is assessable information.
7. The respondent also relied upon material on the basis that it was deemed to be "assessable information", including:[14]

(a) Collins & Anor v Djunaedi & Ors [2016] SASCFC 48;[15]

(b) Media article titled 'Serial fraudster Robert Collins found guilty of new deception charges' authored by Meagan Dillon, ABC News, dated 5 March 2020;[16]

(c) Media article titled 'Career conman Robert Wayne Collins jailed over latest scam involving New York property' authored by Meagan Dillon, ABC News, dated 27 March 2020;[17]

(d) Media article titled 'Man, 81, faces court accused of stealing more than $900k meant for superannuation, investments and loan' authored by Sophie Landau, dated 1 November 2023[18] (I would place no weight on this article. It does not refer to the applicant whatsoever and nor does it appear relevant to the allegations concerning the applicant in this matter);

(e) Media article titled 'Victims slam notorious fraudster's early release from prison' authored by Dan Nolan, undated;[19]

(f) Media article titled 'Warning after Australia's oldest fraudster was seen at church while on home detention' authored by A Current Affair Staff', undated.[20] (I note that the article contains allegations in respect of matters with respect to which the applicant has never been charged and I would place no weight on this article).

1. On 21 August 2024, a Senior Assessment Officer of the respondent states "I intend to include certain information that is publicly available and stems from a civil proceeding. However, this information does not clearly fall within the definition of assessable information. The specific details are:
   • Media articles indicating Ms Mohor's involvement as an accomplice during her husband's deceptive activities.
   • The District Court of SA's judgment in the civil claim proceeding against the Applicant."
2. By email dated 22 August 2024, in response to the 21 August 2024 email, the respondent declared the media articles and the District Court decision as "assessable information"[21] in accordance with s 8(1)(j) of the CSPP.
3. There was some concern raised in relation to the source of the media articles.[22]
4. The respondent explained that as part of its continuing monitoring obligations, and consistent with the power in s 26(3)(c) of the CSPP, the respondent regularly monitors media and news media. Further, information disclosed by the media may result in the respondent conducting an own motion check under s 30 of the CSPP.[23] In this instance, the respondent says it became aware of the media articles when the applicant made her application for a working with children check.[24]
5. The applicant asserts that the Guidelines require the respondent to make a decision based on supporting assessable information and to be satisfied that the information has a bearing on the central assessment unit's assessment of whether or not the person poses an unacceptable risk to children.[25] The Guidelines state that "In making a determination that information is assessable information, the Registrar must be satisfied that the information has a bearing on the central assessment unit's assessment of whether or not the person poses an unacceptable risk to children".[26] The applicant submits that the email which did not include the media articles or District Court judgment, did not bear on the applicant being an unacceptable risk to children and the information deemed to be assessable information by the Registrar ought to be disregarded on rehearing.[27] The applicant concedes that Tribunal should not undertake a merits review of the decision of the respondent under regulation 8(f) but makes a collateral challenge on a number of bases.[28]
6. I accept it would have been preferrable for the decision-maker to have the District Court's judgment and media articles prior to determining that they could be "assessable information". I also accept that at least one of the media articles makes no reference to the applicant. Further, some other media articles refer to conduct that is not relied upon by the respondent in these proceedings and do not relate to the conduct for which the applicant has been charged. However, I reject the submission that I ought to disregard the District Court's judgment and media articles for the following reasons:

(a) I have had regard to the District Court's judgment and media articles. In other words, even if the original decision-maker did not read those documents, I have;

(b) The Guidelines only require that the information have a bearing on the assessment of whether or not the person poses an unacceptable risk to children. This is a low threshold;

(c) In my view, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review decisions by the respondent as to whether information is "assessable information". The Tribunal is a creature of statute. The Tribunal's review jurisdiction concerns decisions about whether a person ought to be prohibited from working with children. It does not extend to decisions made by the respondent as to what information is "assessable information";

(d) There is authority that the Tribunal has no discretion to ignore or exclude information that is classified as "assessable information".[29] In Badea v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 37 at [102], President Hughes said:

The Tribunal does not have a discretion to exclude or refuse to receive assessable information, because such information is prima facie relevant to the making of the decision. Assessable information is the basis for the decision. Any unfairness that an applicant considers arises on reliance upon such information must be dealt with by reference to the weight such evidence is given. That, in turn, will be affected by the extent to which questions as to the reliability of the evidence can be tested in order to enable the Tribunal to reach a state of satisfaction appropriate to the performance of its functions.

(e) The CSPP at s 26(2) specifically states that not all "assessable information" relating to a person is required to be assessed and the fact that the respondent did not assess all "assessable information" does not, of itself, invalidate the working with children check or a decision made in relation to the working with children check. Rather, it appears that the respondent has a discretion to determine the extent of the "assessable information" to which it may have regard;[30]

(f) The documents are, in the main, relevant, particularly the District Court decision;

(g) The primary object of the CSPP is to minimise the risk to children posed by people who work with them and the paramount consideration in respect of the administration, operation and enforcement of the CSPP is the best interests of children having regard to their safety and protection.[31] In my view, the object and paramount consideration weigh heavily in favour of the Tribunal considering all relevant information to ensure that the correct and preferrable decision is made. In any event, concerns about the prejudice of the documents may be addressed by weight. As Senior Member Rugless said it is clear then that "assessable information" will often include information that has not been scrutinised or tested in a criminal or civil court and the scheme of the CSPP clearly contemplates that assessable information may include hearsay or mere allegations of misconduct obtained from diverse sources;[32]

(h) Arguably, although the assessable information was classified by the respondent as assessable information under s 8(1)(j), it is also arguable that the information could fall under s 8(1)(b) as information relating to offences with which the applicant has been charged.

1. Having said that, in my view, it is clear that some of the media articles do not indicate the applicant's involvement as an accomplice during her husband's deceptive activities and, indeed, in one case there is no reference to the applicant whatsoever. I place no weight on the media articles titled 'Man, 81, faces court accused of stealing more than $900k meant for superannuation, investments and loan' authored by Sophie Landau, dated 1 November 2023[33] and media article titled 'Warning after Australia's oldest fraudster was seen at church while on home detention' authored by A Current Affair Staff', undated.[34] I place very low weight on the other media articles. In the main, the media articles refer to the applicant's husband and the articles refer to assertions and opinions from various persons, presumably, without proof of those assertions and opinions.
2. The applicant further submits that the supplementary material ought not be considered by the Tribunal because it is not "assessable information".[35] It appears that the respondent did not consider the material in the Supplementary Book of Documents because it was not before the original decision-maker. In my view, the material in the Supplementary Book is information that falls under 8(1)(b) of the CSPP as "assessable information" because it relates to offences with which the applicant has been charged. The word "relates" in s 8(1)(b) of the CSPP is broad and, in my view, encapsulates civil proceedings relating to alleged criminal law conduct and also would include criminal proceedings relating to a person found to have acted jointly with the applicant. Given the importance of the CSPP and the primary object of the CSPP to minimise the risk to children posed by persons who work with them, in my view, it is appropriate to interpret s 8(1)(b) of the CSPP broadly so that all information related to the charges may be considered by the Tribunal.
3. Further, as this is a merits review, although I can only consider "assessable information" I may consider further material upon review. Indeed, s 34(5)(b) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 provides that a procedure on rehearing will include a consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter. In my view, it is appropriate to consider all relevant material even if it was not before the decision-maker given my task to reach the correct and preferrable decision and the importance of the scheme including its objects and principles to minimise the risk to children posed by persons who work with them. Further, both parties urged me not to remit this matter back to the original decision-maker for reconsideration. I reject the submission that I ought not consider the supplementary material.
4. Having said that, the applicant also argues that the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision, Robert Wayne Collins and Veronika Mohor and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2024] AATA 2776, is not "assessable information". In that case, Deputy President Millar, found that the applicant was overpaid Newstart Allowance.[36] However, I put no weight on that judgment as it appears to have been remitted back to the decision-maker for reconsideration and, somewhat unusually, the applicant's husband was said to be representing the applicant in that case.[37] Given I put no weight on this decision, it is unnecessary for me to consider whether it is "assessable information".
5. In summary, I consider that information related to the applicant's charges and the information as declared by the respondent to be "assessable information" is "assessable information". In addition, given this is a merits review, I have considered further information provided in this case as relevant, including the Supplementary Book of Documents and Second Supplementary Book of Documents filed. However, there are some documents I have placed no weight on including various media articles and the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision.

What conduct, if any, did the applicant engage in and should the Tribunal adopt in its discretion, any findings, decision or judgment of a court or other tribunal?

1. The charges are set out in the certificate of record and refer to money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences.[38] Ultimately, there is no dispute that all charges against the applicant were dropped.
2. The Brief Overview indicates that between 18 February 2014 and 22 April 2014, the applicant and her husband deceived various persons out of $386,750. Part of the money was then used to purchase two Mercedes Benz motor vehicles valued at $164,900.[39]
3. I accept that the charges equate to a non-proven outcome for the purposes of 6.1.1.2 of the Guidelines.[40]
4. The applicant submits that information relating to offences for which her husband has been charged should not be conflated to offences for which the applicant has been charged.[41] Generally speaking, I agree that there ought to be no consideration to another person's criminal matters in determining a working with children check. However, in this case, there is some suggestion that the applicant and her husband acted jointly. As the Full Court said in response to the applicant's counsel's submission that summary judgment should not have been entered against the applicant because the Judge had erred in treating the applicant and her husband as if the case against them was the same:

The defendants have admitted that the second defendant was present at some of the meetings between the parties and is noted as an attendee in minutes of those meetings. She was copied into relevant correspondence, including the email attaching the signed documents purporting to transfer real estate which was never purchased. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the material before the Court shows that the second defendant has no reasonable basis on which to deny that she was knowingly involved in the contravention alleged for the purposes of the Australian Consumer Law. Moreover, the evidence overwhelmingly established that the defendants were acting jointly and as agents, one for the other, in making the representations.[42]

5. Therefore, in my view, it is appropriate to consider, albeit carefully, some information relating to the applicant's husband as relevant to the applicant.
6. Importantly, when considering unproven allegations, an assessment of its likelihood of occurrence must be undertaken. If the past event is unproven some accommodation must be made for the possibility that it did not occur. If the conclusion is that it did not occur, then that is the end of the matter. It cannot be taken into account. If there is a possibility that the unproven allegations did occur then although the Guidelines allow it to be taken into account, the Guidelines do not allow it to be given the same weight as a proven outcome, and the result must be applied to reach a determination of the extent to which that past event contributed to the finding of an appreciable risk: Marshall v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2023] SACAT 83.
7. Non-proven criminal charges do not obviate the existence of risk arising from the alleged conduct underlying those charges. As President Hughes observed in Badea v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 37 at [44] assessable information does not lose its status as such where a person is subsequently found not to be guilty of an offence with which they have been charged, or have been cleared of wrong-doing, rather assessable information captures allegations and not merely outcomes.
8. The respondent submits that the Tribunal ought to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant engaged in the criminal conduct.[43] On the other hand, the applicant submits that I should not be so satisfied and, further, submits that the allegations do not fall within any risk category of the Guidelines.[44]
9. I accept that the allegations of money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences have not been proven to the requisite standard of beyond reasonable doubt and the charges have been dropped. In relation to allegations of money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences, I cannot be satisfied this occurred on the balance of probabilities. I accept the applicant was charged and the police summary of charges ought to be given weight because it is from a credible source and, presumably, charges would not be laid unless there was some prospect of success. Having said that, the charges were not pursued, and it is unclear why and I cannot discount the possibility the charges were not pursued because they would not succeed. I also cannot be satisfied that the conduct did not occur particularly in light of various civil judgments referring to the applicant's conduct. I also note that the civil judgments refer to fraud and misrepresentation[45] rather than money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences so, in my view, although the civil judgments are highly relevant and suggest the criminal conduct occurred, because they refer to differently named conduct, I cannot solely rely on the civil judgments to find that the alleged criminal conduct occurred. Therefore, I do place some weight on the charges of money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences but not full weight. I would assess that the probability of occurrence of the applicant engaging in money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences is moderate.
10. In relation to allegations of fraud and misrepresentation as found proven through the civil courts, I am satisfied that the applicant engaged in this conduct on the balance of probabilities, and I rely on various judgments of civil courts to make this finding.
11. I note that s 39(1)(b) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 permits me to adopt, in my discretion, as I consider it appropriate, any findings, decision or judgment of a court or tribunal (insofar as may be relevant to the proceedings before the Tribunal). In my view the decisions of the civil courts are relevant and proven to the balance of probabilities. I adopt those findings. In my view, s 8 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 that refers to the Tribunal resolving matters quickly, keeping costs down for the parties, and acting with little technicality also strongly suggest that the Tribunal may adopt findings already made by a Court insofar as they are relevant to the Tribunal's proceedings.
12. In particular, I note the following relevant findings by various Courts that I adopt:

(a) In 2015, a number of persons sought and obtained summary judgment against the applicant and her husband in an amount of $423,656.25.[46] The claim related to fraudulent conduct of the applicant and her husband that caused people to invest and lose a significant sum of money.[47] In Djunaedi & Ors v Collins & Anor [2015] SADC 120, the Court found that:[48]

In the affidavit material before the court based primarily on banking records of accounts operated by the defendants, the payments of numerous sums advanced by the plaintiffs to the defendants, totalling $386,750, are traced into accounts operated and controlled by them. These funds were not applied to the intended purpose and in some cases are demonstrated to have been applied to the repayment of a mortgage, a loan, the purchase of a Mercedes vehicle, and landscaping. That is to say these funds were applied to the personal benefit of the defendants, often in substantial sums. The defendants originally claimed to have transferred all these funds overseas, which is demonstrably not the case.

(b) The applicant and her husband appealed that decision to the Full Court.[49] The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant and her husband were required to pay costs of the appeal. Indeed, in upholding the primary judge's decision that there was no reasonable basis on which to defend the proceedings, the Chief Justice described the proposed defence as "an audacious attempt to perpetrate on the Court the same fraud perpetrated on the plaintiffs"[50] and "Overall the evidence discloses the modus operandi of the fraudster".[51] I also note in the case, it was argued that summary judgment should not have been entered against the applicant because she was inadequately represented in the District Court and the Judge erred in treating the applicant and her husband as if the case against them was the same.[52] The Full Court rejected this argument and concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly established that the applicant and her husband were acting jointly and as agents, one for the other, in making the representations.[53]

(c) In January 2022, an application for taxation of costs was made. The applicant and her husband filed a response to that claim denying liability and opposing any entitlement to costs.[54] Default judgment was entered against the applicant and her husband. In February 2023, Judge Dart set aside this judgment but added that the response by the applicant and her husband was arguably an abuse of process. His Honour said that it was "clearly not a good faith response"[55] and considered $31,000 costs appropriate. His Honour considered it appropriate to allow the applicant and her husband 50% of their costs to set aside default judgment.[56] As to the costs of the taxation process, Judge Dart describes the applicant and her husband's conduct as "The [applicants] have not cooperated particularly in that process. For a long time they asserted that there were no costs payable at all, notwithstanding the fact that there was a costs order. There was at one stage a suggestion that the costs should be allowed in the amount of $5. The respondents have been put to unnecessary expense and delay in relation to what should have been a relatively straightforward taxation of a modest claim".[57] Judge Dart also decided to award costs of the taxation process on a standard costs basis but with a 20 per cent uplift to reflect the Court's disapproval of the applicant and her husband's conduct.[58] The applicant and his wife appealed Judge Dart's decision but were unsuccessful.[59]

(d) However, I also acknowledge and place weight on the submission of the applicant that the District Court judgment demonstrated an untenable claim for costs was pursued against the applicant and the applicant was entitled to indemnity costs in resisting an application for indemnity costs.[60]

1. I put high weight on the findings from the civil courts' judgments noting that findings were made on the balance of probabilities with the applicant having an opportunity to present her case. I note reference to the applicant being copied into emails, attending meetings and the evidence establishing that the applicant and her husband were acting jointly and as agents, one for the other, in making the representations. I find the conduct of the applicant relating to fraud and misrepresentation concerning. I put significant weight on these findings. In my view, the findings suggest that the applicant is a person who has made representations to others for her own advantage and their disadvantage causing them significant financial loss.
2. I acknowledge the applicant's concern with how the civil proceedings occurred including allegations that "multiple witnesses were conferred with together".[61] However, in my view, it is inappropriate and inefficient for me to look behind the findings of various civil courts. If the applicant has concerns with those findings, the applicant has appropriate appeal mechanisms.
3. In summary, I am reasonably satisfied that the applicant engaged in fraud and misrepresentation. I cannot make a finding on the balance of probabilities that the applicant engaged in money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences but I consider it moderate likely this conduct occurred, and I do place some weight on the criminal charges.

Is the applicant an unacceptable risk to children and should she be permitted to work with children?

1. The CSPP does not define the meaning of "unacceptable risk". However, in GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38, Senior Member Rugless considered what constitutes an unacceptable risk to children. Senior Member Rugless said:

(a) The term 'unacceptable risk' as described in s 26(1) of the CSPP is that there is a risk that, if a person is allowed to work with children, this will not ensure the adequate protection of children;[62]

(b) The task of the CAU (or, on review, of the Tribunal) must be to consider whether, having regard to the likelihood of the person behaving in a certain way in the future, and the behaviour that is likely to occur, the risks or consequences of that behaviour is so unacceptable that it is necessary in the interests of children to ensure that the person does not work with children;[63]

(c) The Tribunal does not need to be satisfied that it is more likely than not that the concerning conduct will again eventuate, but merely that there is risk that if it does it will cause harm to children and that this is unacceptable;[64]

(d) Where the possible future harm is serious then even a minimal chance or possibility that it will occur would usually be sufficient to regard that outcome, or risk to children, as unacceptable;[65]

(e) Behaviour or conduct of adults that may result in the risk of future serious harm to children would include assessable information demonstrating (or giving rise to the reasonable suspicion of) past sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional or psychological manipulation, intimidation or harassment, sexual violence or gross neglect of children or adults;[66]

(f) The term 'unacceptable risk' requires an evaluation of the nature and degree of the risk to children and whether it is acceptable to allow it, i.e. a consideration of the likelihood of offending or conduct occurring in the future and the seriousness of the consequences if the conduct eventuates.[67]

1. The Guidelines provide that when considering a working with children check, the CAU must consider the substance of assessable information and have regard to:

(a) The nature, gravity and circumstances of the information including criminal offences, child protection information and disciplinary or misconduct information and how this is relevant to children or child related work;

(b) The length of time that has passed since the event occurred;

(c) The vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event including the age of the victim, the age of the person at the time of the event, the age difference between the person and the victim and the person's relationship to the victim or position of authority over the victim at the time of the event;

(d) The person's criminal, child protection, disciplinary or misconduct and/or other relevant history, including whether there is a pattern of concerning conduct;

(e) The person's conduct since the event;

(f) All other relevant circumstances in respect of the information including the offending, child protection, disciplinary or misconduct and/or information or other relevant history, and the impact on their eligibility to be engaged in child related work.

1. The Guidelines also prescribe matters that are not to be taken into account in a risk assessment to determine whether a person poses an unacceptable risk to children. Those matters are as follows:

(a) The impact of a prohibited outcome on the person;

(b) The role of the person the subject of the application;

(c) Lived experience.

1. In relation to the applicant's conduct, I am concerned that there is a risk that if she is allowed to work with children this will not ensure the adequate protection of children. I place weight on the unproven criminal matters regarding matters concerning money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences and the findings of the civil courts relating to fraud and misrepresentation. In my view, the applicant and her husband were acting jointly and as agents, one for the other, in making the representations which suggest that the applicant is a person who has made representations to others for her own advantage and their disadvantage causing them significant financial loss. I am reasonably satisfied that the applicant has engaged in fraud and misrepresentation. As to money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences, I have not found to the requisite standard that the applicant engaged in this conduct and therefore there must be some consideration that the conduct did not occur and less weight placed on this conduct.
2. I find that the applicant has a lack of insight. I make this finding based on various findings in the civil proceedings and the way those proceedings were conducted but also based on the applicant's evidence before me in which she seemed to take no responsibility for the conduct. The applicant did acknowledge attending various meetings and being involved in court proceedings, but beyond that, claimed she could not recall the charges laid against her, did not recall the number of investors involved, claimed she was not well during the relevant period and that she was not involved with the money. Given I am reasonably satisfied, at least in relation to the fraud and misrepresentation allegations that the conduct occurred, I found her evidence lacking in insight. I cannot say that it is more likely than not that the applicant will engage in the behaviour again, but given her lack of insight, this increases the chance that she will engage in such conduct again particularly in light of her still being in a relationship with her husband. The reason it is relevant that the applicant is still in a relationship with her husband is her previous conduct of acting jointly with her husband in making representations and causing significant financial loss.
3. There was some criticism of the respondent's failure to cross-examine on certain issues including whether the applicant engaged in fraudulent conduct and the then Administrative Appeal Tribunal's proceedings. Given the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, the fact that I have not placed any weight on the then Administrative Appeal Tribunal's judgment, and the findings of the various civil courts, I agree with the submissions of the respondent that it was unnecessary to cross-examine the applicant on whether she engaged in fraudulent conduct and the then Administrative Appeal Tribunal's proceedings.[68] Further, although the applicant was not cross-examined in relation to all matters, she was on notice of the allegations through provision of various materials by the respondent and legally represented and able to make submissions in relation to the conduct. As said by President Hughes "The Tribunal's obligation is to determine the review on the basis of all relevant material as is available and to do so in a manner that is procedurally fair to all parties".[69]
4. In terms of the consequences of her behaviour, I accept there is no evidence of any previous harm to children. I also accept there is no suggestion of any physical or sexual harm to children. However, I am concerned about the applicant's propensity to make false representations and take advantage of people. Children are particularly vulnerable and in order for them to have adequate protection, it is in their interests that the applicant not work with them.
5. I find that if allowed to work with children there is a moderate risk that the applicant will financially take advantage of children or adults known to them causing children financial or emotional harm and that risk is unacceptable.
6. I have had regard to:

(a) The nature, gravity and circumstances of the information and how this is relevant to children or child related work. I acknowledge in the applicant's favour the allegations of non-proven money laundering, knowingly engage in money laundering and theft offences do not fall within any risk category of the Guidelines.[70] Further, there are no allegations of any wrongdoing against children.[71] Further, there is no suggestion of any physical or sexual risk to children.[72] However, in my view, fraud and misrepresentation matters do have the propensity to cause harm to children, in terms of financial harm and emotional harm. I am concerned that the conduct involved a breach of trust, was deliberate and prolonged and occurred while the applicant was an adult. I am also concerned that the applicant has not demonstrated adequate insight and I do not have confidence that she has learned anything from her conduct. This increases the chance that she will engage in similar conduct in the future;

(b) The length of time that has passed since the event occurred. I accept that there has been a lengthy period of time since the criminal and civil allegations. However, I put reduced weight on this factor given the applicant's lack of insight and the fact she was an adult at the time of the alleged conduct. I also find as relevant that the applicant's conduct in the civil proceedings was far from ideal including "an audacious attempt to perpetrate on the Court the same fraud perpetrated on the plaintiffs";

(c) The vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event including the age of the victim, the age of the person at the time of the event, the age difference between the person and the victim and the person's relationship to the victim or position of authority over the victim at the time of the event. I accept that there is no proven criminal conduct. However, I have found fraud and misrepresentation occurred. All persons subject to fraud and misrepresentations were adults and there is no evidence of the applicant ever causing harm to children. However, I put reduced weight on this factor as the applicant was also an adult and, yet, still engaged in fraud and misrepresentation. Further, it is concerning to me that the applicant was able to make certain representations to adults and cause them financial harm. I consider that children would be more vulnerable to any misrepresentation made by the applicant;

(d) The person's criminal, child protection, disciplinary or misconduct and/or other relevant history, including whether there is a pattern of concerning conduct. I acknowledge in the applicant's favour and place weight on the fact the applicant has no criminal history, no child protection history, no disciplinary or misconduct history or other relevant matters;

(e) The person's conduct since the event. I acknowledge that the applicant has remained offence-free since the allegations. However, given her lack of insight and her still being married to her husband in circumstances whereby the Full Court said, the evidence overwhelmingly established that the defendants were acting jointly and as agents, one for the other, in making the representations,[73] I do not consider this factor falls in favour of granting her a working with children check;

(f) All other relevant circumstances in respect of the information including the offending, child protection, disciplinary or misconduct and/or information or other relevant history, and the impact on their eligibility to be engaged in child related work. I have considered all material filed, submissions made and evidence provided.

1. The applicant submits it must be remembered that the matters with which the applicant was charged were very much on the public record. Wherever she goes she can be known and accountable and watched accordingly.[74] I reject this submission. It is true that adults may know of the applicant and "watch" her accordingly, but I find it unlikely that children would be able to do so. In my view the objects of the CSPP strongly suggest that people that need to be "watched" and be held "accountable" should not be permitted to work with children.
2. The respondent submits that applicant's actions subsequent to the conduct which formed that basis of the criminal charges are indicative of a lack of insight and accountability.[75] I accept this submission particularly noting her conduct throughout the civil proceedings and also noting her evidence before me.
3. The respondent is critical of the applicant's failure to give evidence in the then Administrative Appeal Tribunal proceedings.[76] I am not critical of the applicant's decision in this regard and place no weight on her decision not to give evidence in the then Administrative Appeal Tribunal proceedings. I also note that the applicant gave evidence before me.
4. The applicant submits that there is no conduct with any appreciable likelihood of future occurrence nor any consequences of such conduct for children. Further, such minimal risk as might theoretically exist in respect of a person whose character has never caused harm to a child in their entire life, is acceptable to allow.[77] I reject the applicant's submission. I am reasonably satisfied that the applicant engaged in fraud and misrepresentation. Further, although I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, I consider that there is a moderate risk that the applicant engaged in money laundering, knowingly engaged in money laundering and theft offence. I acknowledge that there is no previous allegation of harm to children, but in my view, fraud and misrepresentation conduct could harm children financially and emotionally.
5. Given my findings, there is a moderate risk of the applicant engaging in fraud and misrepresentations causing financial and emotional harm to children and, given the applicant's lack of insight and possible reoccurrence, I find there is an unacceptable risk to children.
6. The applicant's conduct demonstrates that for her own gain she would and could abuse a position of trust and disregard the welfare of others including disadvantaging others.[78] While the applicant's conduct was not against children as such, the risk assessment is not limited to any particular type of harm.[79] I accept the submission of the respondent that the applicant's conduct raises concerns about her judgement and decision-making capacity.[80] It is also relevant that there is no material before the Tribunal to suggest that the applicant has learned from her conduct or taken steps to ensure that it does not occur again. It is also relevant how the applicant conducted herself throughout the various civil proceedings and the various findings against her, including "an audacious attempt to perpetrate on the Court the same fraud perpetrated on the plaintiffs." In my view, there is a risk that aspects of the applicant's character that led to the fraud and misrepresentation conduct may manifest themselves again.[81]
7. The Risk Assessment criteria indicates that rejection of responsibility, minimisations of actions, demonstration of little remorse expressed or if expressed aimed at perceived personal benefit demonstrates increased risk of harm to children.[82]
8. The totality of the evidence demonstrates there is a real risk to children under the supervision of the applicant that is neither fanciful nor imaginary. The applicant's conduct suggests a serious lack of integrity and propensity to engage in and tolerate unlawful activities. In environments where children are present, trust and integrity are paramount, as children are particularly vulnerable to breaches of trust.[83]
9. I am reasonably satisfied, based on a review of all the assessable information, that the applicant poses an unacceptable risk to children and should that risk eventuate the consequences of harm to children would be serious.
10. In my view, given the primary object of the CSPP to minimise the risk to children posed by people who work with them the applicant ought to be prohibited from engaging in child-related work. The correct and preferrable decision is to affirm the decision of the respondent.

1. The decision of the respondent to prohibit the applicant from working with children is the correct and preferrable decision.
2. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

[1] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 18 March 2025, paragraph 15.

[2] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, paragraph 25.

[3] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 174.

[4] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 217.

[5] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 174.

[6] Second Supplementary Book of Documents filed 18 March 2025, pages 1-3 and 7-21.

[7] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 205.

[8] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 17; Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 212.

[9] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 212.

[10] Second Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 18 March 2025, page 22.

[11] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 18 March 2025, paragraph 6.

[12] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 18.

[13] Second Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 18 March 2025, page 7.

[14] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 12.

[15] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 26-40.

[16] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 126-127.

[17] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 128-130.

[18] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 131-132.

[19] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 133-137.

[20] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 138-141.

[21] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 72.

[22] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, paragraph 19.

[23] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 18 March 2025, paragraph 9.

[24] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 18 March 2025, paragraph 10.

[25] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 13; Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 163.

[26] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 163.

[27] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 14 and 15

[28] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, paragraph 6.

[29] Respondent's Further Submissions, dated 4 April 2025, paragraph 10; Badea v Department of Human services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 37 at [102].

[30] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 19.3.

[31] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 19.1; CSPP Act, s 3.

[32] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [83].

[33] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 131-132.

[34] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, pages 138-141.

[35] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 16.

[36] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 74.

[37] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 72.

[38] Second Supplementary Book of Documents filed 18 March 2025, page 7.

[39] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 122.

[40] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 213.

[41] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 11.

[42] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 39; Collins & Anor v Djunaedi & Ors [2016] SASCFC 48 at [72].

[43] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 9.

[44] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 21.

[45] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 9.

[46] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 75.

[47] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 49.

[48] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 62.

[49] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 26.

[50] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 35.

[51] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 35.

[52] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 37.

[53] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 39.

[54] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 49.

[55] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 49 and 50.

[56] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 50.

[57] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 50.

[58] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 51.

[59] Supplementary Book of Documents, filed 12 February 2025, page 59.

[60] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, paragraph 21; Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 42.

[61] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, paragraph 21.

[62] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [104].

[63] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [105].

[64] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [106].

[65] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [107].

[66] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [108].

[67] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [113].

[68] Respondent's Further Submissions, dated 4 April 2025, paragraph 18.

[69] Badea v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 37 at [101].

[70] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 21.

[71] Clark v Department of Human Services [2022] SACAT 10 at [46].

[72] Clark v Department of Human Services [2022] SACAT 10 at [46].

[73] Book of Documents, filed 9 December 2024, page 39; Collins & Anor v Djunaedi & Ors [2016] SASCFC 48, [72].

[74] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 30 March 2025, paragraph 45.

[75] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 81.

[76] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 82.

[77] Applicant's Outline of Argument, dated 13 February 2025, paragraph 24.

[78] Clark v Department of Human Services [2022] SACAT 10 at [44].

[79] Clark v Department of Human Services [2022] SACAT 10.

[80] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 79.

[81] Griggs v Department of Human Services [2023] SACAT 60.

[82] Book of Documents, page 182; Table 2 - Risk assessment, Row 2, Colum 3, lines 1-2.

[83] Respondent's Outline of Argument, dated 25 February 2025, paragraph 84.