1. Mr Collins has a very lengthy criminal history involving fraud. This commences in 1973 with a conviction for false pretences which attracted a sentence of one year and six months' imprisonment. He has been convicted of approximately 70 counts of false pretences since.
2. Mr Collins has been convicted of fraud by a person with a power of attorney, fraudulent conversion, improperly using information obtained as an officer of a corporation to gain advantage, managing a corporation having been convicted of serious fraud, false pretences, dishonest dealings with documents, dishonestly take property without the owner's consent and practising law without being a local or interstate practitioner. He has been convicted of knowingly importing cannabis. He has been sentenced to terms of imprisonment adding to over 31 years in the period 1973 to 2012 for these offences.
3. The sentencing remarks of Judge Chapman were provided for seven counts of deception for which he was convicted on 15 October 2019. The sentencing remarks state that Mr Collins induced a person to provide a cheque for the purposes of establishing an international bank, then spent the money for his own purposes. This was conducted through Fountaingate International Corporation Pty Ltd ('Fountaingate'). In a second series of offences, Mr Collins attracted investors for a property development in the United States and provided false information to investors about the property. As a result, he dishonestly obtained $286,000 which he spent. While spending the money he continued to meet with the victims and send fake emails in an attempt to hide the scam.[5]
4. Judge Chapman states that Mr Collins' extensive history in deceiving people was such that no leniency could be extended toward him. He was described as suffering no contrition or remorse, and there being no prospect of rehabilitation. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years from 15 November 2019 with a non-parole period of four years.[6]
5. A report by psychologist Mr Luke Broomhall on Mr Collins for the purposes of sentencing provides a diagnosis of personality disorder with mixed narcissistic and antisocial traits, with the narcissistic traits being a grandiose sense of self-importance, a sense of entitlement, interpersonal exploitation of others and a lack of empathy. The antisocial traits are reported as deceitfulness, consistent irresponsibility, and lack of remorse. Mr Broomhall assessed Mr Collins' risk of recidivism as high.[7]
6. Against this background, much of this matter turns on the explanation for deposits to accounts held by Mr Collins or Ms Mohor or both jointly. Given Mr Collins' extensive history of false pretences and fraud, any explanation given by him should be approached with caution. Ms Mohor did not herself offer explanations for deposits to her accounts.
7. Mr Collins' explanation of the transactions in his accounts was generally unconvincing. For example, he claims that he managed insurance monies paid to Ms Mohor's son for the rebuilding of his home and provided a power of attorney,[8] but declined to call Ms Mohor's son to give evidence. He declined to call other people who he had told AAT1 had deposited money to his bank accounts, including his son Nigel and another person he said deposited money to his account because he was 'in trouble and didn't have any bank accounts'.[9]
8. Mr Collins repeated as an explanation for certain deposits that the deposits were for an investment in a renewable energy project in Papua New Guinea. This was expressly discounted by Judge Chapman who stated that '[t]he jury clearly rejected that you had any real connection to Papua New Guinea as at 2013 and 2014 when you made representations to [one of the victims of the offending]'.[10]
9. I am not satisfied that I can rely on the oral evidence of Mr Collins or documents generated by him unless this is supported by other independent evidence.
10. However, contrary to submissions made by the Secretary, I do not consider a finding about Mr Collins' credibility can be used to establish fraud at large without specific evidence of acts or omissions which are shown to have been made and which are knowingly false, or which are provided recklessly as to whether they are true or false.

1. Mr Collins has been convicted of certain offences leading up to a debt being raised by the Secretary. There are, however, further offences for which he could be charged and convicted under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ('the Act'), the Social Security Administration Act 1999 ('the Administration Act') and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ('the Bankruptcy Act'). He is not represented and says he is representing Ms Mohor.
2. Mr Collins was advised of his right to refuse to answer questions if this may lead to a criminal or civil penalty.
3. Mr Collins chose to give evidence and answer questions asked of him.
4. Ms Mohor has also been charged with criminal offences, however these charges were discontinued. She was also advised of her right not to give evidence if this would expose her to a civil or criminal penalty. Ms Mohor elected not to give evidence. It was not pressed by the Secretary that she could answer specific questions without invoking the privilege.
5. The effect of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination is that no adverse inference can be drawn from Ms Mohor declining to answer questions.[11] However, in many respects this leaves transactions to the accounts unexplained other than in Mr Collin's evidence and submissions.

Were Mr Collins and Ms Mohor overpaid Age Pension and Newstart Allowance?

1. The calculator for a person's rate of Age Pension is set out in Pension Rate Calculator A at the end of s 1064 of the Act.[12] This states at s 1064-A2 that people who are members of a couple are treated as pooling their income and assets and sharing them on a 50/50 basis. In the period of the debt, the rate calculator for Newstart Allowance was set out at Benefit Calculator B at the end of s 1068 of the Act.[13] Section 1068-G2 also deems the income of a Newstart recipient to be half the amount of the combined income of the couple.
2. The income of a person can affect the rate of Age Pension[14] or Newstart Allowance[15] paid to the person. To determine if Mr Collins or Ms Mohor was overpaid, their combined income in the debt period must be determined.
3. The term 'income' has a broad definition in s 8 of the Act, and subject to exclusions that do not apply on the material before me, includes any income amount earned, derived or received for the person's own use or benefit. It also includes employment income.
4. Mr Collins claims that he declared his employment income, and that Centrelink have withheld records that show he has declared income. The letters he received from Centrelink during the debt period show that he was considered to have no income other than very small amounts (between 6 to 12 cents per annum) from financial investments and infrequent casual earnings.[16]
5. In Mr Collin's oral evidence and submissions about individual deposits to his bank accounts, he lists several payments to his account as being for accounting work he has undertaken for various people and entities. In the absence of any other evidence to support his assertions, I do not accept that he declared income in the quantum he received it and find that he has received or earned income that was not declared to Centrelink.
6. This income was not taken into account in calculating his rate of age pension, and I am satisfied that the quantum of these payments affects his rate of Age Pension and Ms Mohor's rate of Newstart Allowance. It follows that they have been overpaid.
7. Mr Collins also claimed this was business income stating that 'all amounts are business income under company before bankruptcy [and the] business name after bankruptcy [of] Rob Collins Research and Investigation. Division 1A business income this section allows deduction of expenses. Section 2074 - 1075, all amounts are gross'.[17] He reports that amounts are 'cash for work' under the Rob Collins ABN, and that other sums are 'work accounting', or are 'accounting ABN'.[18] He could not provide a satisfactory explanation for why the income of a separate company with its own bank account would instead be deposited into his personal accounts in the period before his insolvency, and did not provide any other information to support that deductions apply to this income. In the absence of supporting evidence I do not accept that this was business income or that deductions apply to this income.
8. Judge Chapman found in sentencing Mr Collins that he had used money deposited to Fountaingate accounts for his own purposes. In relation to money paid by investors for property in New York, Judge Chapman states that:

You faked emails to the group and you put together information about the non-existent properties. As a result, you managed to dishonestly benefit yourself by about $286,000. All of that was paid into the Fountaingate account by the victims by the end of April 2016, and your offending was complete. After the offences, you proceeded to spend the money. It was spent by January 2015.[19]

1. The amounts of $268,000 found by Judge Chapman to have been taken from Fountaingate and the purported employment income of Mr Collins are income as defined by the Act. This income is of an amount that would affect Mr Collins' rate of Age Pension and Ms Mohor's rate of Newstart Allowance.
2. As a result, I find that Mr Collins and Ms Mohor have been overpaid Age Pension and Newstart Allowance respectively.

1. While examining Mr Collins' and Ms Mohor's income, Centrelink obtained bank account statements for their personal and joint accounts and have attributed deposits to these bank accounts as income. These deposits appear in a table in the documents provided by Centrelink.[20]
2. A review of the bank accounts provided by the Secretary in support of the debt shows that no account statements were provided for a HSBC credit card account. Centrelink attributes several deposits to this account as income, however neither the applicants nor the Tribunal have had the benefit of examining the statements to see if these deposits have been made, or whether they are transfers from another of Mr Collins' or Ms Mohor's accounts.
3. There is evidence that supports Mr Collins' claim that amounts deposited to his HSBC credit card and treated as income by the Secretary were transfers from another account. For example:
   • An amount of $1,500 deposited to the HSBC credit card on 21 September 2015[21] is matched by a transfer of $1,500 to this account from a Bank SA account on 19 September 2015.[22]
   • An amount of $600 deposited to the HSBC credit card on 17 November 2015[23] is matched by a transfer of the same amount from another of his personal accounts on the same date.[24]
   • An amount of $500 deposited to the HSBC credit card on 25 November 2015[25] is matched by a withdrawal of the same amount on 24 November 2015 from another of his personal accounts.[26]
   • An amount of $410 deposited to the HSBC credit card on 21 December 2015[27] is matched by a transfer from another account on the same date.[28]
   • An amount of $500 deposited to the HSBC credit card on 21 January 2016[29] is matched by a transfer of the same amount on the same date from another of his accounts.[30]
4. In the absence of the account statements from the HSBC credit card, it cannot be determined whether these transactions are consistent with funds being transferred from other accounts.
5. On it becoming apparent that Mr Collin's evidence that some transactions were incorrectly attributed as income and that accounts may be missing was plausible, both parties were invited to provide any missing bank account statements.
6. In response, it was submitted on behalf of the Secretary that there is no obligation to assist the applicants establish their case or obtain bank account statements using the Secretary's power to obtain information, and the Secretary did not provide these statements. Section 33 (1AA) of the AAT Act requires a decision maker to use their best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to make a decision and I do not accept this submission. The Secretary has asserted that amounts deposited to the HBSC credit card account are income. If it becomes clear, as in this case, that there is missing information or errors and additional information is required to assist in reaching an accurate decision, the Secretary should assist the Tribunal to make its decision.
7. Mr Collins claims that there are other accounts missing, and also claims that there are account statements that have been withheld by the Secretary. He provided a list of accounts. Several of the accounts he lists are the accounts of associated businesses, and he claims that some of the deposits attributed as personal income are income of these businesses. Mr Collins was provided with the opportunity to summons these accounts. Mr Collins' summons request was impermissibly broad and indefinite, and sought bank account statements for entities he does not control. Considering other errors in the calculations, I did not consider it necessary to further delay this matter by issuing further summons' for information.
8. In evidence before the Tribunal, Mr Collins could point to at least one transaction in the accounts before the Tribunal where an amount of $36,400 was taken by the Secretary to be income but was a cheque that was dishonoured. The deposits and the cheque reversal can be seen in his account statement.[31]
9. Mr Collins gave evidence that there are other transactions that are not income despite appearing as deposits in a bank account. He was provided time to specify any further transactions where amounts had been included as income that were transfers between accounts or bounced cheques. He provided a somewhat unhelpful list of all the transactions taken to be income with his explanation for each transaction, but without a reference to documents that support his assertions about the transactions.
10. However, within his list it could be identified that there are several transactions included as income which are not income, as supported by other entries in the bank account statements. The Secretary conceded that the following amounts were not income as defined by the Act:

1. The Secretary invited the Tribunal to make findings about the specific items in the transactions incorrectly attributed as income and to remit the matter for reconsideration with a list of the items to be excluded but otherwise affirming the decision. It was alternatively submitted that the Secretary would 'accept' a direction to re-examine the list of transactions line by line but otherwise the decisions under review should be affirmed.
2. I do not find either of these courses of action satisfactory. Errors have been identified in a list of over 500 transactions, and there may be further errors. As Mr Collins has established that the calculation of his and Ms Mohor's income is incorrect, all transactions relied on require reconsideration, and merely issuing directions to exclude specific transactions is inadequate. In the absence of any certainty about the amount of the overpayment, it is inappropriate to proceed to decide if an overpayment is a debt due to the Commonwealth, and if so whether any or all of the debt should be waived.

1. Under s 153 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ('Bankruptcy Act'), bankruptcy generally releases the bankrupt from all provable debts incurred prior to the bankruptcy. If a debt is provable in the bankruptcy and is not subject to any exceptions in the Bankruptcy Act, 'the bankruptcy processes of proof of debt and release of provable debts replace the processes of waiver and write off.'[32]
2. A discharge from bankruptcy does not release a bankrupt from certain debts, including a debt incurred by fraud (s 153(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act). This fraud must relate to the conduct of the debtor which causes the debt to come into existence, and not the legal source of the debt.[33] As this applies to Mr Collins and Ms Mohor, this requires fraudulent conduct towards Centrelink and not any fraud in obtaining the original funds. A finding by a Court that the funds in Mr Collins' or Ms Mohor's accounts were obtained by fraud does not establish that the Centrelink payments were obtained by fraud.
3. Under s 27 of the Bankruptcy Act, the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia have concurrent jurisdiction in bankruptcy, exclusive of the jurisdiction of all courts other than the High Court under s 75 of the Constitution, or the jurisdiction of Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court under ss 35 or 35A of the Bankruptcy Act. This includes the Supreme Courts of the States and Territories due to the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth),[34] and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).[35]
4. The definition of bankruptcy in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act in relation to jurisdiction or proceedings means any jurisdiction or proceedings under or by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act.
5. The question is then whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make a finding that a debt was incurred by fraud under s 153(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act when it is not a Court and does not have powers other than those conferred by statute.
6. In previous matters before the Tribunal, it has been assumed that the Tribunal has the power to make a finding that a debt was incurred by fraud, and therefore that the bankruptcy of a person does not affect recovery of a debt incurred by fraud.[36]
7. In Meriton Apartments Pty Limited v Industrial Court of New South Wales[37]('Meriton Apartments') the Industrial Court of NSW declared that a bankrupt had standing to proceed with a matter after the assignment of the chose in action to the bankrupt by the trustee in bankruptcy in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act. Meriton Apartments sought a declaration in the Federal Court that the Industrial Court did not have jurisdiction to make this declaration, claiming that the proceedings had been abandoned because the trustee failed to make an election to continue the proceedings as required by the Bankruptcy Act.
8. The Full Court, comprised of Branson, Greenwood and Perram JJ, raised the issue of the power of the Industrial Court to make a decision given the operation of s 27 of the Bankruptcy Act. The question raised by the Court was (among other things) whether a State Court could make a finding that that the person who brought the proceeding had standing.
9. Branson J noted the distinction between recognising the binding legal effect of the Bankruptcy Act and matters which only particular Courts are empowered to address.[38] Following an examination of the history of jurisdiction in bankruptcy, the majority held that a decision of a State Court that a person has standing to commence or maintain a proceeding is not a decision under or by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act.
10. While the applications in this case arise under the Social Security Act and not the Bankruptcy Act, unless there is a finding that the debt was incurred by fraud under s 153(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, no action can be taken to recover a debt prior to the date of Mr Collins' and Ms Mohor's bankruptcy. Unless there is such a finding, an overpayment that is a debt due to the Commonwealth up to the date of the bankruptcy is released.
11. There is a question about the power of administrative decision makers to find that a debt was incurred by fraud for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. As it applies in cases such as this, to do so would also permit a finding of fraud to be made by administrative decision-makers at a Departmental level.
12. It could also be argued that in making a finding that the debt was incurred by fraud, the Tribunal is merely applying a provision in the Bankruptcy Act in coming to a decision on a matter arising under the Social Security Act.
13. There are specific provisions in the Act that relate to fraud,[39] and this question may rely on the interaction and context of both the Bankruptcy Act and the Social Security Act.
14. As this matter is to be reconsidered by the Secretary, further consideration of this issue is no longer necessary.
15. In addition, there is an absence of specific evidence about how any overpayment was incurred, and I would not be prepared to infer from general findings about credibility that there were instances of fraud that mean that the bankruptcy did not discharge any debt owing to the Commonwealth.

1. On the face of it, this matter involves a routine determination of whether Mr Collins or Ms Mohor were overpaid social security payments, and if so whether this is a debt to the Commonwealth that should be recovered. However, the conduct of the parties and intersection of the Social Security Act and the Bankruptcy Act has added considerable procedural and legal complexity.
2. This matter fails at the hurdle of determining whether any overpayment is correctly calculated, and as correct information is required to decide the remaining issues, the decisions under review must be remitted for reconsideration.

1. The decisions under review are set aside and remitted for reconsideration in accordance with directions that:
   • The amounts considered by the Secretary to be income of Mr Collins and Ms Mohor are reviewed; and
   • Items that are not income are removed; and
   • Any resulting overpayment is recalculated.

I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision of Deputy President K Millar

...[sgnd]...............................................

[3] Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ss 1064-A2 and 1068-G2.

[4] As confirmed by Mr Collins in a letter to the Tribunal received 2 November 2023.

[9] Ex A4, Mohor and Collins and Secretary, Chief Executive Centrelink (Social Services First Review) 19 October 2021, [81] - [90].

[11] Dolan v the Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1992] FCA 202 at [58] - [61].

[12] Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 55.

[13] Ibid s 643.

[14] Ibid s 1064-A1.

[15] Ibid s 1068-A1.

[16] T16, file no. 2021/8078. For example, at T16, 1774 combined annual income of $150.18 is recorded; at T16, 1782 in the period 23 October 2012 - 5 November 2012 casual income of $350 was reported from Bute Hotel; at T16, 1805 an amount of $75.09 annual income from financial investments; and at T16, 1807 $350 casual earning reported 25 February 2013.

[20] T11, file no. 2021/8078; T13, file no. 2021/8079.

[31] T12, file no. 2021/8079, 1129-1131.

[32] Secretary, Department of Social Security v Southcott [1998] FCA 323; (1998) 82 FCR 100, 111.

[33] Barodawala v Perinparajah [2022] VSCA 198.

[34] Truthful Endeavour Pty Ltd v Condon (Trustee), in the matter of Rayhill (Bankrupt) [2015] FCAFC 70.

[35] Meriton Apartments Pty Limited v Industrial Court of NSW [2008] FCAFC 172.

[36] See, for example, Civitareale and Department of Family and Community Services [1999] AATA 486; Secretary, Department of Social Security and Malaj [1993] AATA 181; Secretary, Department of Social Security and Southcott [1998] FCA 323; (1998) 82 FCR 100; Re Cook and SDEWR [2007] AATA 1690; SGNZ and SEEWR [2009] AATA 721; Re Dodd and SDEEWR [2009] AATA 451; Re Fode and SDFHCSIA [2011] AATA 543; Fletcher v SDFHCSIA [2013] AATA 633.

[37] [2008] FCAFC 172.

[38] Meriton Apartments Pty Limited v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 172, [8], [18].

[39] For example, a debt cannot be taken to be irrecoverable at law if it was incurred by fraud (s1236(1B)(c) of the Act), or there is a criminal offence where payment is obtained through fraud (ss 216 and 217 of the Administration Act).