Mohammed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. On 10 February 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Subclass 500 Student (Class TU) visa (student visa).
2. By an originating application filed with this Court on 15 March 2024, the applicant sought judicial review of that Tribunal decision. Pursuant to Orders made on 7 July 2025, the application was listed for hearing before me at 10.00 am on 14 October 2025. The applicant did not attend that hearing. On the application of the Minister, I dismissed the originating application pursuant to r 22.04(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements, of and incidental to the application, fixed in the amount of $6,500 (October Orders).
3. On 12 November 2025, the applicant filed an interlocutory application in this Court, by which he seeks orders to reinstate the originating application and stay the effect of the costs order made in the October Orders until such time as the interlocutory application is determined.
4. For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the interlocutory application with costs.

1. It is necessary to provide some context to the applicant's originating application before assessing whether the interlocutory application should succeed.
2. The applicant, a male citizen of India, arrived in Australia in 2016. On 21 October 2021, he applied for a student visa. A registered migration agent, Mr Gauravdeep Singh Madan of Dynamic Learning Partners Pty Ltd T/A APPLY4STUDY, assisted him prepare and lodge that student visa application.
3. On 27 June 2022, the applicant provided the Department with a letter from Torrens University dated 20 June 2022 in which it was stated that the applicant had completed the requirements of the Master of Business Information Systems and was eligible to graduate.[1]
4. On 17 August 2022, the Department issued the applicant with an invitation to comment on adverse information.[2] By that letter, the applicant was informed that:

(a) he had provided the Department with academic documents purportedly issued by Bharath University, bearing a registration number ending in 2011, consisting of a Bachelor degree certificate and academic transcripts for a Bachelor of Technology (Electronics and Communication Engineering);

(b) the Department had attempted to verify those documents by contacting a representative of Bharath University;

(c) Bharath University had advised the Department that a registration number ending in 2011 did not exist in its system;

(d) this discrepancy gave rise to serious concerns regarding the authenticity of the documents;

(e) on the basis of this information, the Department reasonably suspected that the applicant had given, or caused to be given, a bogus document to the Minister; and

(f) he was invited to respond to the adverse information within 28 days after he was taken to have received the letter.[3]

1. On 13 September 2022, the applicant appointed a new representative, Mr Muhammad Ali Sukhera, a legal practitioner, and requested a four‑week extension of time in which to respond to the Department's invitation.[4] Despite that request, no response to the invitation was received by the Department, either within the original period provided for response or within the additional four‑week period sought.[5]
2. On 1 November 2022, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the student visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy cl 500.217 of Part 500 in Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). Relevantly, cl 500.217 required that the applicant satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020 in Sch 4 to the Regulations (PIC 4020). The delegate found there was evidence the applicant had given, or caused to be given, a bogus document to the Minister and there were no grounds to justify waiving the requirements of PIC 4020(1).[6]
3. On 16 November 2022, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.[7]
4. On 14 August 2023, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing scheduled for 4 September 2023. The applicant attended that hearing with his legal practitioner.[8]
5. On 10 February 2024, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision.[9]

1. At [18] of its decision, the Tribunal identified the issue for determination as whether the applicant satisfied PIC 4020 for the purposes of cl 500.217(1). In addressing that issue, the Tribunal noted that the applicant was required to demonstrate that there was no evidence that he had given, or caused to be given, to the Minister a bogus document in relation to the student visa application (PIC 4020(1)). The Tribunal also correctly observed that, if not so satisfied, the requirement in PIC 4020(1) may be waived where compelling or compassionate reasons justify the grant of the student visa (PIC 4020(4)).[10]
2. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Department had received information indicating that the undergraduate certificate and transcripts attributed to Bharath University were not genuine. The Tribunal found that the applicant had not provided any verifiable evidence demonstrating that the documents were genuine. The Tribunal noted that the applicant was also unable to produce any evidence corroborating his claimed attempts to verify the documents, including his assertion that he had contacted the Bharath University by telephone.[11]
3. Having not been satisfied that the certificate and transcripts from Bharath University were genuine, the Tribunal found the applicant knowingly provided bogus documents in support of his student visa application and that the provision of those documents was not the result of error or accident. On that basis, the Tribunal determined that the applicant did not satisfy PIC 4020(1).
4. Turning to whether the requirements in PIC 4020(1) should be waived pursuant to PIC 4020(4), the Tribunal recorded at [33] the evidence given by the applicant at the hearing in support of a waiver. That evidence consisted of the applicant's references to his personal circumstances and his intention to apply for a Subclass 485 Temporary Graduate visa in Australia. After setting out the legislative requirements in PIC 4020(4) and the relevant policy guidance at [27]-[32], the Tribunal concluded that it could not give weight to the applicant's evidence when deciding whether to exercise the discretion to waive the requirements in PIC 4020(1). Accordingly, at [34] the Tribunal determined that the requirements should not be waived.
5. For those reasons, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy PIC 4020 for the purposes of cl 500.217(1) and affirmed the decision under review.[12]

1. On 15 March 2024, the applicant commenced proceedings in this Court by way of an originating application. The applicant advanced a sole ground of review (reproduced below without alteration):

I was studying my final subject for Masters of Business Info. Systems, and had applied for Student Visa renewal. Meanwhile, completed my studies. But the decision stated that, I have submitted bogus document, which I was unaware of. I have always been a genuine student and has never made any bogus submissions. All my intentions were to complete my masters irrespective of my physical and mental health. I request the court to accept my application for review.

1. On 22 January 2025, Registrar Downing ordered that the matter be listed for final hearing. The Registrar further ordered that the applicant file and serve written submissions, any amended application containing properly particularised grounds, and any additional evidence on which the applicant sought to rely, no later than 28 days before the hearing.
2. On 17 July 2025, the parties were notified by the Registry that the matter was listed for hearing before me at 10.00 am on 14 October 2025.
3. The applicant did not file any written submissions, amended application, or affidavit evidence prior to the hearing on 14 October 2025.

Dismissal for non-appearance at final hearing

1. The hearing on 14 October 2025 commenced at 10.01 am. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the applicant. My Associate called the matter three times outside the courtroom and there was still no appearance by or on behalf of the applicant. Ms Wilford, appearing for the Minister, sought dismissal of the application pursuant to r 22.04(1)(a)(i) of the Rules.
2. At that hearing, I gave reasons ex tempore for being satisfied that the application should be dismissed. Those reasons are set out below, revised with the benefit of the transcript:

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from Transcript)

1. By an application filed with this Court on 15 March 2024, the applicant seeks review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 10 February 2024, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant the applicant a Subclass 500 Student (Class TU) visa.
2. The background to the application, including aspects of the relevant procedural background to this matter, is set out helpfully at paragraphs [3] to [13] of the first respondent's written submissions filed 25 August 2025. Further, the applicant's address for service in this matter, which includes his Gmail address for email correspondence, is specified in the original application filed with this Court on 15 March 2024. A further notice of address for service was filed on 3 June 2025, and contained that same Gmail address, but a different postal address.
3. By an affidavit of service of Ms Emily Maker on 9 October 2025, I can see that the applicant was served on 25 August 2025 with the first respondent's submissions by email to the applicant's Gmail address, and also by post. Pursuant to correspondence emailed to the applicant by the first respondent on 25 August 2025, the applicant was made aware that, in the event there is no appearance by, or on their behalf at any time - particularly in relation to this scheduled Court event - the application may be dismissed without further notice.
4. I am satisfied the applicant was made aware of the time, date and location of the hearing by way of a variety of correspondence, including emails sent from the Court to the parties, including the applicant to their nominated email address for service on 7 July 2025, 17 July 2025 and 6 August 2025, as well as an email sent from the Minister's representative to the applicant on 25 August 2025.
5. The present time in Court now is 10.12 am, and the applicant is still not present in Court. I am satisfied that the applicant was properly notified of today's hearing time and date by email to their nominated Gmail address for service. Therefore, the applicant has, for whatever reason, chosen not to attend. I am further satisfied that the non-attendance has occurred in circumstances where the applicant was put on notice by the first respondent as to the consequences of failure to attend.
6. In the above-mentioned circumstances, given the applicant's absence from today's hearing, I am prepared to dismiss the proceedings pursuant to rule 22.04(1)(a)(i) consequent upon the non-appearance of the applicant.

1. At 10.16 am, having dismissed the application with costs, I adjourned the Court and left the bench.

The applicant's arrival at Court following the dismissal of his originating application

1. At approximately 10.22 am, the applicant presented himself in the Court lobby. My Associates went to the lobby and informed the applicant that the matter had been dismissed due to his non‑appearance, and informed him that he would need to contact the Court's Migration Team by email for further information, including whether he could seek a variation of the orders and apply for reinstatement. The applicant was provided with the email address for the Migration Team.

1. Pursuant to r 25.11 of the Rules, the applicant had 21 days from the date of October Orders to apply for reinstatement. His deadline was therefore 4 November 2025. On 11 November 2025, the applicant lodged an interlocutory application seeking reinstatement, which I nonetheless accepted for filing. The application sought the following orders (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. Pursuant to rule 22.04(03) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div. 2) Rule 2021, the order made on 14th October 2025 dismissing this proceeding be set aside.
   2. That the proceeding be reinstated and relisted for hearing before the Court, I was unable to attend the hearing due to unexpected traffic accident and delay on the Anzac Bridge, Sydney.
   3. That the cost order made on 14th October 2025 be stayed pending the determination of this application.
   4. Reason for late application: - after the date of hearing, I kept checking mail. It went to archieved folder, and I had no idea that I only had 21 days, please excuse.
2. The reinstatement application was accompanied by the applicant's affidavit sworn 11 November 2025. Relevantly, the applicant made the following statements in that affidavit (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. I Abdul Moid Mohammed of 1105/28 Cowper St, Granville NSW 2142, Unemployed, affirm l am the applicant.
   2. My migration judicial-review matter (file SYG 497 /2024) was listed for hearing on 14 October 2025 at the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, 80 William Street, Woolloomooloo.
   3. On that day, while driving to the Court, there was an unexpected traffic accident on the Anzac Bridge which caused heavy congestion and significant delay.
   4. I arrived at the Court approximately six minutes after the scheduled start time. When I arrived, a Court officer informed me that my matter had already been called and finalised in my absence.
   5. I did not intentionally fail to attend and was ready to proceed as soon as I arrived.
   6. I immediately sought information about the dismissal and obtained a copy of the orders made on 14 October 2025.
   7. I have acted promptly and prepared this application as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the dismissal.
   8. The delay was beyond my control and the Minister will not be prejudiced if the matter is reinstated.
   9. I respectfully say that it is fair and in the interests of justice that the Court set aside the dismissal order and reinstate my case so that it can be determined on its merits.
   10. I am ready to comply with all future directions and attend any listed hearing.

1. I listed the interlocutory application for hearing at 2.15 pm on 8 December 2025. I further ordered that the parties file and serve any submissions and affidavit material in relation to the interlocutory application by 4.00 pm on 21 November 2025.
2. On 21 November 2025, the Minister filed written submissions and affidavit material. The applicant did not file any written submissions or affidavit material.

1. The hearing of the interlocutory application on 8 December 2025 commenced at 2.18 pm. Once again, there was initially no appearance by, or on behalf of, the applicant at the commencement of that hearing. The Minister sought dismissal of the matter for non‑appearance, and I was satisfied that the interlocutory application should be dismissed. However, while I was in the course of delivering my ex tempore reasons, the applicant appeared at 2.31 pm. I thereby ceased delivering my reasons and adjourned the Court briefly, for approximately 10 minutes, to allow the applicant an opportunity to settle himself at the bar table.
2. Upon returning to the bench, I took appearances and informed the parties that the hearing of the interlocutory application would proceed that day. I explained the role of the Court and the matters relevant to determining the issue of reinstatement. These included: the applicant's explanation for his absence on 14 October 2025, which led to the dismissal of the proceeding; whether he had an acceptable explanation for filing the reinstatement application seven days late; any prejudice that might be occasioned to the Minister if reinstatement were granted; and the prospects of success of the applicant's case if the proceeding were reinstated. I then heard the parties on those matters and on the question of costs, adjourned the Court at 4.20 pm, and reserved judgment.

(a) the application for judicial review filed on 15 March 2024;

(b) the affidavit of the applicant affirmed on 11 March 2024, annexed to which is a copy of the Tribunal's decision;

(c) a Court Book numbering 288 pages (tendered into evidence at the reinstatement hearing before me on 8 December 2025 by the first respondent and marked as Exhibit 1R);

(d) the written submissions filed by the first respondent on 25 August 2025;

(e) the affidavit of Ms Carly Maree Warren affirmed 25 August 2025;

(f) the affidavit of service of Emily Rosalind Dankworth Maker affirmed 9 October 2025;

(g) the interlocutory application filed 11 November 2025 by the applicant;

(h) the affidavit of the applicant sworn 11 November 2025;

(i) the further written submissions filed by the first respondent on 21 November 2025 (MSS);

(j) the affidavit of service of Emily Rosalind Dankworth Maker affirmed on 21 November 2025; and

(k) a document containing details of a Visa Entitlement Verification Online (VEVO) Visa Details Check for the applicant downloaded from the Department's web portal at 10 November 2025 at 9.01 am detailing that the applicant held a Subclass 010 Bridging A (Class WA) visa (bridging visa) that had been granted on 26 March 2024 and was set to cease on 11 November 2025. This document was marked as Exhibit 1A at hearing.

1. Clause 500.217(1) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations provides:

The applicant satisfies public interest criteria 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4010, 4013, 4014, 4020 and 4021.

1. PIC 4020 in Schedule 4 to the Regulations relevantly provides:

(1) There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5-reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:

(a) the application for the visa; or

(b) a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.

(3) To avoid doubt, subclauses (1) and (2) apply whether or not the Minister became aware of the bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular because of information given by the applicant.

(4) The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:

(a) compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or

(b) compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;

Information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:

(a) false or misleading at the time it is given; and

(b) relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information.

Note: For definition of bogus document, see subsection 5(1) of the Act.

1. A bogus document is defined in s 5(1) of the Act as follows:

bogus document, in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:

(a) purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or

(b) is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or

(c) was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly.

1. Rule 24.04(a) of the Rules provides that the Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if it was made in the absence of a party.
2. In MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 at [7], Ryan J stated:

In circumstances where, as in the present case, a proceeding has been dismissed in a party's absence and reinstatement is sought, a discretion falls to be exercised by the court before which the application for reinstatement is returnable. That discretion requires the consideration of three factors, and whether, on balance, they tend for or against the reinstatement. Those factors are:

a) whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party's absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out;

b) the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the court is empowered to grant;

c) whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. As North J said in MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1066 at [18]:

The decision whether to reinstate the appeal depends, however, not only on the existence of a reasonable explanation for the need to adjourn the appeal, but also whether the appeal, if reinstated, has a reasonable chance of success. If not, there is no purpose in reinstatement.

1. In FBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 196 at [50] the Full Court stated that the primary judge is required to consider 'whether or not it was in the interests of justice to reinstate the applicant's application'. The Full Court at [53] added that 'the factors that are often considered are not mandatory relevant considerations but potential aspects of what is in the interests of justice in a particular case'. The Full Court at [60] stated that there was nothing in MZYEZ at [7] which was inconsistent with the Full Court's approach.
2. In CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344 at [4] Mortimer J stated:

As the Federal Circuit Court Judge noted in her reasons, the exercise of that discretion is a broad one, but three factors are consistently considered. They are whether the applicant has an adequate explanation for the non-appearance, whether there is any prejudice to the Minister if the matter is reinstated, and finally whether the applicant has an arguable case on judicial review. The latter consideration is important because if there were no arguable case on judicial review, it is unlikely it could be said that a favourable exercise of the discretion to reinstate would advance the interests of the administration of justice in terms of the effective use of judicial resources, costs to the respondent, and fairness to an applicant. It is not fair to exercise a discretion favourably to an applicant if the Court is not satisfied there is an arguable case, because it can create false hopes in an applicant and an expectation, not grounded in law and reality, that her or his application may be successful.

Whether adequate explanation or reasonable excuse for non-appearance at hearing on 14 October 2025

1. At the hearing, I explained to the applicant that the matter had been listed for a final hearing on 14 October 2025 at 10.00 am, and that he had been notified of the listing by emails sent by the Court on 7 July 2025, 17 July 2025, and 6 August 2025. I further drew to the applicant's attention that he had been sent correspondence from the Minister's representatives on 25 August 2025 confirming the time, date, and location of the hearing, and a caution that his application may be dismissed with costs if there was no appearance by or on his behalf. I then invited the applicant to explain his failure to attend Court at the scheduled date and time.
2. The applicant submitted that he had departed his residence well in advance of the scheduled hearing commencement time, leaving approximately 20-25 minutes early. He explained that he had travelled via the toll road towards the city and, shortly after exiting the toll road, traffic conditions deteriorated significantly, resulting in a delay of approximately 35-40 minutes. He further submitted that the congestion was caused by a traffic accident on the Anzac Bridge involving a vehicle that was stationary and awaiting towing. This submission was consistent with the applicant's evidence detailed in his affidavit sworn 11 November 2025. Notably, by that affidavit, the applicant deposed that on the date of the hearing, whilst driving to the Court, there was an accident on the Anzac Bridge in Sydney causing heavy traffic and significant delay. He further deposed that he arrived at the Court approximately six minutes after the scheduled start time, was informed that his matter 'had been called and finalised' in his absence, and that traffic congestion was the reason for his late arrival at Court on 14 October 2025.
3. By way of the MSS, the Minister submitted that the explanation (namely, traffic caused by a car accident) was plausible, however noted that the explanation was unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The Minister further noted that the applicant's recall may be affected by time as the transcript of the proceedings on 14 October 2025 indicates that the matter was adjourned at 10.16 am. In any case, the Minister further submitted that the explanation proffered by the applicant was unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the explanation did not account for why, upon learning that he could or would be late to Court, the applicant had not attempted to contact either the Court or the Minister's lawyers by telephone or by email. Second, and relatedly, the Minister submitted it was the applicant's responsibility to ensure that he made arrangements to arrive in Court in good time.
4. By way of reply at the hearing, the applicant submitted that he was unable to provide evidence of the traffic conditions on 14 October 2025 and urged the Court to appreciate that it is not uncommon for Sydneysiders to experience significant traffic delays. He stated that he had been monitoring his travel to Court that morning using an online mapping platform, and only realised while driving that he would not arrive on time. He further explained that it was his first time attending Court and that he was unaware he should have advised either the Court or the Minister's representatives that he would be late. He added that he did not know he was expected to take photographic evidence of the traffic conditions using his mobile telephone in order to demonstrate, at some later stage, the cause of his delay. The applicant also submitted that, even if he had known such evidence would be required, it would have been unlawful for him to use his mobile telephone while driving to make the suggested calls or to take photographs of the traffic conditions.
5. Having considered the parties' submissions and the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant has provided a barely adequate, but nonetheless reasonable, excuse for his non‑appearance at the hearing on 14 October 2025. I acknowledge the absence of corroborative evidence supporting the applicant's explanation; however, I accept the plausibility of his account and his reasons for being unable to provide corroborative evidence in the circumstances.
6. I also recognise the Minister's submission that the applicant did not explain why, upon realising he would be late to Court, he failed to contact either the Court or the Minister's representatives by telephone or email. While that omission is concerning, I am prepared to accept the applicant's explanation. It is not uncommon for litigants‑in‑person in this jurisdiction to have limited understanding of the importance of timely communication with the Court and the Minister regarding the progress of their matter. That said, I agree with the Minister that it was ultimately the applicant's responsibility to ensure that he made appropriate arrangements to attend Court in sufficient time. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that his late arrival on 14 October 2025 resulted from an incident he could neither control nor reasonably anticipate. On that basis, I find that the applicant has provided a barely adequate but otherwise reasonable excuse for his non‑appearance.
7. This factor weighs slightly in favour of reinstatement.

Whether adequate explanation or reasonable excuse for late filing of reinstatement application

1. The delay in seeking reinstatement is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the Court's discretion because the reinstatement application was lodged outside the prescribed timeframe: see AYF15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 10 at [8]. As stated above, the proceedings were dismissed on 14 October 2025, and the reinstatement application was filed 28 days later, on 11 November 2025. Accordingly, the application was filed seven days outside the timeframe prescribed by r 25.11 of the Rules.
2. The applicant advanced several explanations for the delay in filing the reinstatement application:

(a) First, in his affidavit sworn on 11 November 2025, the applicant deposed that he had immediately sought information regarding the dismissal for non‑appearance, obtained a copy of the orders made on 14 October 2025, and acted promptly to prepare and file the reinstatement application as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the dismissal.

(b) Second, in the reinstatement application itself, the applicant stated that the Court's orders dismissing the matter for non‑appearance had been sent to his email account but were filtered into his archived folder, with the consequence that he was unaware of the dismissal when it occurred.

(c) Third, at the hearing before me, when asked to explain the late filing of the reinstatement application, the applicant submitted that the delay arose from a misunderstanding of the applicable time limit. He stated that, since first arriving in Australia, he had routinely monitored his visa status through the Department's VEVO service and believed that he was required to take action by reference to the expiry date of his visa, rather than within 21 days of the dismissal of his proceeding. He explained that he checked his bridging visa expiry date because, in the past, that had indicated the deadline by which he was required to lodge an application. He said that, upon checking VEVO, he noted that his bridging visa was set to cease on 11 November 2025 and therefore believed that this was the date by which he needed to file his reinstatement application, rather than the correct deadline of 4 November 2025. When pressed for further explanation, the applicant acknowledged that this belief was mistaken. He explained that, upon receiving the October Orders, he attended the Court in person within two days, was informed that he was required to apply for reinstatement, and completed and filed the application on that day.

1. By the MSS, the Minister submitted that, whilst the delay is, on its face, not significant, it weighs against reinstatement in circumstances where the explanation for the delay is inadequate, and where the applicant, in his sworn evidence, claims to have become aware that his matter was finalised minutes after the hearing concluded. The Minister noted that the applicant deposed in his affidavit that, after being informed by my Associates that his case had been finalised due to his non‑appearance, he 'immediately sought information' about the dismissal, obtained a copy of the October Orders, and acted promptly to prepare the reinstatement application as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the dismissal. By contrast, in the reinstatement application itself, the applicant claimed that after the date of the hearing, he continued to check his email but the Court's correspondence had been diverted to his archived folder and that he had 'no idea' that he only had 21 days in which to apply. The Minister argued that, notwithstanding the inconsistent explanations provided, those explanations were, on either view, unsatisfactory. It was submitted that if the applicant immediately sought information and obtained the October Orders, there was a lack of detail about the steps he took between the date of the hearing - which he said was when he became aware his matter had been finalised - and the date he filed the reinstatement application 28 days later. Further, if the Court's email had been diverted to the applicant's archived folder, it was submitted that this too was a 'totally unsatisfactory' explanation, as it remained the applicant's obligation to check his email, including all relevant folders. In support of that submission, the Minister relied upon BJJ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 197 at [32], and Lu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 1041 at [22]- [23]. Further, the Minister submitted that it was otherwise the applicant's responsibility to be aware of the relevant timeframe and that ignorance of the time limit does not generally constitute a satisfactory explanation for delay. In support of that further submission, the Minister relied upon BKX16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 991 at [9].
2. At the hearing before me, the Minister's representative, Mr Sheedy, addressed the applicant's bridging visa expiry explanation in the following terms:[13]

MR SHEEDY: Thank you, your Honour. I think, in short, I would submit, that even if your Honour was to accept the applicant had a misunderstanding, and thought that somehow the timeframe for seeking reinstatement was tied to the expiry of his bridging visa, it is not a satisfactory explanation. The ignorance of the timeframe for reinstatement is not a satisfactory explanation for the delay. It appears, based on what is known to the court, that the applicant was put in a position to go to the right place to find out details about the timeframe for reinstatement, by your associates referring him to the migration team. And so I think, ultimately, we would say that it is not a satisfactory explanation and weighs against reinstatement.

1. Having considered the parties' submissions and the evidence, I am not satisfied that the applicant has provided an adequate explanation or reasonable excuse for the late filing of the reinstatement application. In circumstances where the applicant became aware that his originating application had been dismissed only minutes after the dismissal occurred, and was then directed by my Associates to the relevant Registry staff for further information about making a reinstatement application, it is less than satisfactory for him to attribute the (albeit short) delay to his inattention to his email inbox and his ignorance of the Rules prescribing the time limit for reinstatement.
2. I acknowledge the short delay in the filing of the interlocutory application and the plausibility of the applicant's explanation that he mistakenly believed the deadline for reinstatement corresponded with the expiry date of his bridging visa, noting the difficulties commonly faced by non‑citizens who seek to make further visa applications after ceasing to hold a valid visa. Those difficulties often arise due to the operation of various provisions of the migration legislation, including those contained in Schedule 3 to the Regulations. However, this aspect of the applicant's explanation is likewise unsatisfactory, as it evinces an erroneous substitution of the Rules with unrelated legislative requirements and information concerning the cessation of his bridging visa. That approach demonstrates the applicant's ignorance of the Rules governing reinstatement and the time limit they prescribe. It was incumbent upon the applicant to inform himself of the applicable timeframe, and there is insufficient evidence that he did so, or that he attempted to do so and was thwarted in that endeavour.
3. I find this factor weighs slightly against reinstatement.

1. The Minister accepts that there is no specific prejudice to him and that any prejudice could be cured by an award of costs.[14] However, the Minister correctly identifies that the absence of prejudice is not in itself sufficient to warrant reinstatement of the application: see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1268 at [17] citing Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; FCA 176. Further, there is a significant public interest in the finality of administrative decisions: see Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491; HCA 67 at [15]-[17].
2. I find this factor neither weighs in favour of, nor against, reinstatement.

Whether arguable case or arguable prospects of success on judicial review

1. By his sole ground of review, the applicant contends that he had nearly completed his Master of Business Information Systems and applied to renew his student visa. He took issue with the Tribunal's decision, stating: 'But the decision stated that, I have submitted bogus document, which I was unaware of'. The applicant further contends that they were a genuine student, never submitted bogus documents, and had been committed to completing his degree despite physical and mental health challenges.
2. The applicant did not provide any written submissions prior to the reinstatement hearing. However, at hearing before me, the applicant expanded upon his sole ground of review by submitting that he had always intended to complete the single course for which he originally came to Australia, and that although his studies were interrupted due to health issues, he applied for medical visas on two occasions and resumed the same course once able. He stated that he had never sought to remain in Australia by enrolling in multiple or alternative courses, and that he had consistently attempted to stay 'on track' and act genuinely. He maintained that he had no reason to provide a bogus document, submitting that he had the maturity and capability to undertake studies in Australia - by which, at its highest, I understood him to mean that he had no reason to engage in the provision of non‑genuine documents relating to his Indian academic history in order to gain entry to an Australian university or obtain a student visa. He further explained that he had been in Australia for eight or nine years and had not travelled overseas for the past seven years, making it difficult to obtain evidence from his university in India. He said he had attempted to contact his university in India, including during the Tribunal proceedings, but was unable to obtain assistance.
3. By the MSS, the Minister contended that the merits of the originating application, whether assessed at an impressionistic level or on a more detailed analysis, lacked the requisite degree of sufficiency to warrant reinstatement. Two key submissions were advanced in support of that contention:

(a) First, in relation to PIC 4020(1), the Minister submits that the applicant's claim that he 'never made any bogus submissions' is no more than a bare assertion. It amounts to an emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal's decision and does not disclose any jurisdictional error. Rather, it impermissibly invites the Court to engage in merits review: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; HCA 6 at 272. The Minister further contended that the Tribunal's finding that the applicant provided bogus documents was plainly open to it. This was particularly so given the applicant's failure to provide any credible evidence to address or contradict the Bharat University's letter stating that registration number ending in 2011 did not exist in the university's system. The Minister argued that it was incumbent upon the applicant to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to establish the relevant facts: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214; FCAFC 61 at [76].

(b) Second, in relation to PIC 4020(4), the Minister submitted that, in circumstances where the applicant did not provide any evidence indicating the existence of compassionate or compelling circumstances affecting the interests of Australia or of an Australian citizen or permanent resident, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the requirements of PIC 4020(1) should not be waived. The Minister contends that the Tribunal correctly found that the applicant's personal circumstances, including his asserted 'medical issues', were not matters that could be taken into account under PIC 4020(4).[15]

1. At the hearing, for the assistance of both the applicant and the Court, Mr Sheedy explained the Tribunal's decision, highlighting each of its key findings, outlining the reasoning supporting those findings, and identifying their evidentiary foundation within the Court Book. He submitted that the Tribunal's reasons disclosed no jurisdictional error. In reply, the applicant did not contest the Minister's submissions but instead sought to re‑argue the merits of his case before the Tribunal, expressing confusion as to why the Tribunal had found his academic documents to be bogus when those same documents had previously been provided to the Department and to his Australian university, and a student visa had been granted on an earlier occasion.
2. Having considered the applicant's sole ground of review, together with the parties' submissions and the evidentiary material before the Court, I regard the applicant's ground and his oral submissions at the hearing as amounting to no more than an impermissible invitation to engage in merits review. It is not uncommon for litigants‑in‑person in migration proceedings in this Court to advance grounds or submissions of that nature. Nevertheless, I have considered the applicant's case at its highest and examined the Tribunal's reasons to determine whether there is a reasonably arguable case or any arguable prospect of success in relation to the originating application.
3. I am persuaded by the Minister's submissions and am not prepared to conclude that the applicant has a reasonably arguable case to advance. From my impressionistic review of the Tribunal's reasons, the Tribunal did not misapprehend the nature of the applicant's submissions or evidence as they related to the requirements in PIC 4020(1) and PIC 4020(4). The Tribunal's reasons are coherent and logical, and nothing in the material before the Court suggests the presence of legal unreasonableness, a denial of procedural fairness or any other form of jurisdictional error.
4. On that basis, I agree with the Minister that the originating application, whether assessed impressionistically or at a more considered level, that there is neither an arguable case nor arguable prospects of success on judicial review.
5. I find this factor weighs heavily against reinstatement.

1. In all of the foregoing circumstances, and as I am particularly not satisfied that there is either an arguable case or arguable prospects of success on judicial review for the applicant, I do not consider it to be in the interests of justice to reinstate the originating application. Accordingly, the interlocutory application must be dismissed.

1. At the conclusion of the hearing, I invited submissions from the parties on the question of costs in relation to the interlocutory application. Mr Sheedy submitted that the Minister sought costs in the amount of $3,000 and that this amount was reasonable having regard to the work undertaken by the Minister's representatives in responding to the interlocutory application which included considering the application, taking instructions from the Minister's Department, preparing and filing submissions and affidavit evidence, as well as preparing for and attending the hearing on 8 December 2025. Mr Sheedy further submitted that the amount was reasonable as it was lower than the scale amount of $4,533.02 prescribed by Item 2, Division 1, Part 3 in Schedule 2 to the Rules. In reply, the applicant did not oppose the amount sought by the Minister.
2. Having considered the parties submissions, I am satisfied that costs should follow the event and that the amount sought by the Minister is fair and reasonable. I will so order that the applicant pay the Minister's costs fixed in the amount of $3,000.

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Papadopoulos.

[1] Court Book (CB) 226; see also Affidavit of Carly Maree Warren affirmed 25 August 2025.

[13] Transcript of Court proceedings, 8 December 2025, p21 line 44 to p26 line 5.