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[2009] WAIRComm 967
procedural. Application dismissed for want of jurisdiction; the Commission determined the respondent to be a trading corporation and declined to hear the unfair dismissal matter.
The WA Industrial Relations Commission found that Al-Hidayah Islamic School, an incorporated non-profit association, charged tuition fees that were essential to its viability and made up a significant portion of its income (about 19% in 2008). Applying authorities that treat 'trading' broadly, the Commissioner concluded those fee-charging activities amounted to 'trading' of sufficient significance to characterise the association as a trading corporation. Because trading corporations fall into federal industrial jurisdiction, the Commission dismissed the unfair dismissal application for lack of jurisdiction.
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1,887 words · generated 01/07/2026
Michelle Hughes filed an unfair dismissal application in the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission against Al‑Hidayah Islamic Education Administration Incorporated, which trades as Al‑Hidayah Islamic School. The respondent (the Association running the school) challenged the WAIRC's jurisdiction on the basis that it was a trading corporation and therefore within the federal industrial jurisdiction. Commissioner S Wood heard evidence and submissions confined largely to the jurisdictional question and delivered reasons on 6 October 2009 dismissing the application for want of jurisdiction (result stated at headnote and final paragraph) [1], [5].
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The factual evidence relied upon by the respondent came principally from Mr Umar Abdullah, an early organiser of the school. He explained that the school was established after concluding that charging school fees was necessary for viability and continuing independence; government grants alone would not have sufficed [Evidence 1]. The respondent's audited financial statements showed tuition fees of $325,156 in 2008, representing 18.97% of total income of $1,713,815 (with Commonwealth grants 55% and State grants 21.75%) and fees for 2007 representing 12.64% of total income [4]. The school billed parents at the start of each term and operated at or close to capacity [Evidence 3]. The Association's constitution expressly stated as an object that the school aimed to be "financially sound through careful balancing of State and Federal Government Funding with School Fees and other incomes" and that income would be applied solely to promotion of the objects [Considerations 1].
The respondent relied on recent appellate authority (Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc) v Lawrence [No 2] (the ALS case)) and argued the school should be characterised as a trading corporation because it provided education services for fees. The applicant led no evidence and submitted nothing to rebut the respondent's evidence [Evidence 5].
Commissioner Wood analysed the authorities and the respondent's facts and concluded that the direct charging of fees for educational services constituted trading in the broad sense, that the fees were commercially characterised and central to the school's viability, and that the proportion of income from fees (then about 18.97%) was sufficiently significant to classify the Association as a trading corporation. On that basis the Commission dismissed the unfair dismissal application for lack of jurisdiction [4], [5].
The decision turns on characterisation: whether the incorporated association is a "trading corporation" for the purposes of jurisdictional allocation between state and federal industrial tribunals. Commissioner Wood applied the settled legal tests drawn from High Court and appellate authority: trading need not be predominant but must be substantial (a question of fact and degree); trading is a broad concept covering services provided for revenue; profit is not required; and the ends served by trading (for example, public interest or religious ends) are irrelevant to characterisation [Considerations summary of ALS principles recited in text; see quoted ALS paragraph 68 quoted in the judgment at Introduction para 2].
Two features of the respondent's case were decisive for Commissioner Wood:
The manner in which fees are charged: here the school billed fees directly to parents (no statutory fee regime), which the Commissioner accepted had a commercial character (distinguishing Quickenden's observation concerning statutory fee obligations) [Considerations 2, 4]. Quickenden had observed that fees imposed by statute on university students might not be trading in the ordinary commercial sense; by contrast the school's fees were imposed and collected by the school itself and thus had a commercial character [Considerations 2].
The quantitative and qualitative role of fees in the school's operations: fees were part of the Association's planned financial model (reflected in the constitution), were essential to the viability of the school according to unchallenged evidence, and amounted to nearly 19% of total income in 2008. Commissioner Wood treated that figure as a relative measure of 'substantial' trading, noting that a similar percentage had been treated as substantial in Quickenden and distinguishing authorities (such as Hardeman and the Children's Medical Research Institute example) where identifiable trading revenue was only a small percentage (2.584%) and trading was peripheral [Considerations 3-5].
The combined force of direct fee-charging, the commercial character and necessity of fees, and the proportion of revenue derived from fees led the Commissioner to conclude the Association was a trading corporation. As federal workplace jurisdiction attaches to trading corporations, the WAIRC had no jurisdiction to hear this unfair dismissal claim and dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction [5].
Before this decision: Characterisation of an incorporated entity as a trading corporation depended on an examination of activities, purpose and revenue. The High Court and appellate authority had established core principles: trading is a broad concept; it can include provision of services; profit is not essential; and whether trading is 'substantial' is a question of fact and degree (as summarised in the ALS extract cited in this judgment) [Introduction 2]. Quickenden had dealt with a university where certain fee-like liabilities were statutory, and queried whether those statutory charges constituted 'trading' in the ordinary sense; the case also demonstrated that relative measures of trading revenue could inform characterisation.
After this decision (in the immediate sense): Commissioner Wood applied those established principles and confirmed that a non-profit incorporated association can be a trading corporation where school fees are charged directly and form a reasonably significant portion of income, especially if fees were anticipated and necessary for viability. The decision does not displace the existing doctrinal framework; rather, it applies it to an independent religious school. It reinforces that charging fees directly for educational services can attract the 'trading' label even where the entity is non-profit and serves religious purposes, and that percentages in the high teens (here ~19%) may be sufficient on a facts‑and‑degree analysis [4], [5].
"Mr Abdullah's evidence is unchallenged that the school requires those fees and was established on the understanding that the school fees would be required if the school were to be viable." [Evidence 1]
"Tuition fees for 2008 were $325,156 which was 18.97% of the total income of 1,713,815." [Evidence 4]
"The fees, as Mr Jensen submitted, do have a commercial character to them. The Industrial Appeal Court in the ALS case made it clear that 'trading' is a broad concept. Hence it can include, in my view, the receipt of fees for the provision of educational services." [Considerations 4]
"I find therefore that the respondent is a trading corporation. Given my findings I will issue an order dismissing the application for want of jurisdiction." [Considerations/Conclusion 5]
This decision is engaged when an incorporated body that is not obviously a commercial company (for example, a non-profit association, religious institution, charity or school) is charged with employment disputes and claims to be within state tribunal jurisdiction. Key triggers that point to trading character under this reasoning include:
Practically, similar fact patterns, independent schools, training providers or service bodies charging fees forming a meaningful share of income and integral to operations, will be those most likely to fall within this precedent.
The judgment itself does not catalogue later judicial treatment of this particular decision. It anchors its reasoning in established higher‑court authority (ALS, Quickenden, Adamson, Hardeman and other authorities quoted), applying those principles to the specific facts of an incorporated religious school. For practitioners assessing subsequent treatment they should:
Because the decision is an application of broader High Court principles, its persuasive value will depend on how factually similar future cases are in respect of fee structure, role of grants, constitutional objects and evidence of necessity.
Numerical thresholds: The Commissioner treated ~19% of income as 'sufficiently significant' on these facts, but the law remains that no precise percentage is definitive. What proportion of trading revenue will be enough in other contexts remains a fact‑sensitive inquiry. The judgment reiterates that the question is one of degree, leaving open the boundary cases (for example, single‑digit percentages or mixed revenue streams).
Mixed funding models: Where an organisation receives substantial government funding under statutory regimes (or contractual retransfers) alongside fees, distinguishing between 'statutory' liabilities (as in Quickenden) and commercial fee revenue may be complex. The judgment distinguishes the present facts from Quickenden but does not provide a bright‑line test for borderline statutory/commercial mixes.
Charitable/non‑profit status vs trading character: The Association's constitution and non‑profit rules were not determinative. How courts will treat entities that have strong charity or public‑benefit features but also charge fees remains open; the reasoning suggests charitable purpose alone will not defeat 'trading' classification, but the interplay between charity law restrictions and trading character may be litigated further.
Structural indicators beyond revenue percentages: The judgment referenced staffing allocation and organisational structure in other cases (Hardeman). How future courts will balance organisational form, staffing devoted to revenue generation, and commercial departments against revenue shares needs further elaboration.
Procedural consequences: This decision dismisses a state unfair dismissal application on jurisdictional grounds. An open practical question for litigants is the best way to present evidence on trading character at an early procedural stage, and whether interlocutory challenges to jurisdiction should routinely require detailed financial proof.
Practical takeaway for practitioners: when defending or pursuing state industrial jurisdiction claims against incorporated service providers, assemble full financial evidence, organisational documentation (constitutions, audited accounts), and contemporaneous evidence about the role of fees in viability. Conversely, applicants should be ready to rebut commercial character and demonstrate that fee income is peripheral or statutory, or that trading activities are insubstantial.
AL-HIDAYAH ISLAMIC EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION INCORPORATED TRADING AS AL-HIDAYAH ISLAMIC SCHOOL
CITATION NO. 2009 WAIRC 00967
CatchWords Unfair dismissal - Jurisdiction - Constitutional Corporation - Trading activities - Fees for educational services - Industrial Relations Act 1979, s.29(1)(b)(i); Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss.4, 5, 16
Result Application dismissed for want of jurisdiction
"68 The more relevant (for present purposes) principles that might be drawn from these and other cases are as follows:
(1) A corporation may be a trading corporation even though trading is not its predominant activity: Adamson (239); State Superannuation Board (303 - 304); Tasmanian Dam case (156, 240, 293); Quickenden [49] - [51], [101]; Hardeman [18].
(2) However, trading must be a substantial and not merely a peripheral activity: Adamson (208, 234, 239); State Superannuation Board (303 - 304); Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc [1986] FCA 357; (1986) 19 FCR 10, 20; Fencott (622); Tasmanian Dam case (156, 240, 293); Mid Density (584); Hardeman [22].
(3) In this context, 'trading' is not given a narrow construction. It extends beyond buying and selling to business activities carried on with a view to earning revenue and includes trade in services: Ku-ring-gai (139, 159 - 160); Adamson (235); Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 23; (1982) 150 CLR 169, 184 - 185, 203; Bevanere Pty Ltd v Lubidineuse [1985] FCA 134; (1985) 7 FCR 325, 330; Quickenden [101].
(4) The making of a profit is not an essential prerequisite to trade, but it is a usual concomitant: St George County Council (539, 563, 569); Ku-ring-gai (140, 167); Adamson (219); E (343, 345); Pellow [28].
(5) The ends which a corporation seeks to serve by trading are irrelevant to its description: St George County Council (543, 569); Ku-ring-gai (160); State Superannuation Board (304 - 306); E (343). Consequently, the fact that the trading activities are conducted is the public interest or for a public purpose will not necessarily exclude the categorisation of those activities as 'trade': St George County Council (543) (Barwick CJ); Tasmanian Dam case (156) (Mason J).
(6) Whether the trading activities of an incorporated body are sufficient to justify its categorisations as a 'trading corporation' is a question of fact and degree: Adamson (234) (Mason J); State Superannuation Board (304); Fencott (589); Quickenden [52], [101]; Mid Density (584).
(7) The current activities of the corporation, while an important criterion for determining its characterisation, are not the only criterion. Regard must also be had to the intended purpose of the corporation, although a corporation that carries on trading activities can be found to be a trading corporation even if it was not originally established to trade: State Superannuation Board (294 - 295, 304 - 305); Fencott (588 - 589, 602, 611, 622 - 624); Hughes (20); Quickenden [101]; E (344); Hardeman [18].
(8) The commercial nature of an activity is an element in deciding whether the activity is in trade or trading: Adamson (209, 211); Ku-ring-gai (139, 142, 160, 167); Bevanere (330); Hughes (19 - 20); E (343); Fowler; Hardeman [26]."
(1) (a) To establish and operate a School or Schools for Muslim students and non Muslim students who, with the cooperation of their parents, will be prepared to conduct themselves according to the principles of Islam and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A. W.); and according to School rules and guidelines;
(b) to run the School(s) according to the Principles of the Holy Quran and Hadith in order to establish an harmonious Islamic atmosphere in which the Muslim children will develop the attitudes and gain the knowledge necessary for them to take their place in Australian society as unified, practicing Muslims and in which the non Muslim children will develop an appreciation and an understanding of the religion of Islam;
(c) to strive for excellence through the establishment of the best possible School environment and offering the highest standards that can be provided in both Religious and Secular studies by;
(i) ensuring that the Islamic nature of the School(s) takes precedence above all other considerations relative to the day to day running of the School(s);
(ii) a) employing motivated, suitably qualified, experienced Principal(s) who will be Muslim and b) employing motivated and suitably qualified Teachers and Staff;
(iii) providing for the Primary and Secondary educational needs of the students using English as the medium of instruction in all subjects both religious and secular with appropriate Islamic emphasis where applicable through the development of an integrated Religious/Secular curriculum.
(2) To be financially sound through careful balancing of State and Federal Government Funding with School Fees and other incomes. The property and income of the School shall be applied solely towards the promotion of the Objects of the Association and no part of that property or income may be paid or otherwise distributed, directly or indirectly, to members of the Association, except in good faith in the promotion of the Objects of the Association.
(3) To be non-aligned with and independent from any and all political, nationalistic and ethnic groups and organizations.
(4) To be independent from, but run in cooperation with other educational institutions throughout Australia."
**"**Overall, the majority of respondent's activities concentrate on its central activity of children's medical research: it being a medical research establishment. The trading activities, as identified, are peripheral to these research responsibilities. The respondent's 2006 Annual Report and its submissions indicate that most of the respondent's organisational resources are used for and in relation to the activities of medical research. The organisational structure of five research units and of five divisions responsible for administration, operations, bioservices, education and the director's office, does not give any indication of any identifiable division or unit where the significant focus is devoted to trading activities. There is no indication from the Annual Report, organisational structure, staff arrangements or the objects of the respondent that gives rise to the impression that trading activities are engaged in to a "substantial", "not insubstantial" or "sufficiently significant" degree, to use the various adjectives utilised by the High Court in R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League [1979] HCA 6; (1979) 143 CLR 190 (Adamson).
[23] We note that the allocation of staff and staffing duties devoted to trading activities is unknown. A perusal of the 2006 Annual Report gives some indication that a very small proportion of staff have duties relating to trading activities. The majority of staff have duties in medical research and administration. It appears that less than five in an organisation of 161, and of that number no more than three, appear to engage in identifiable trading activities on more than a part-time basis. Only one staff member is identified in the 2006 Annual Report as a "fundraising assistant". Two staff are listed as having specific duties pertaining to the Jeans for Genes campaign generally, but to the extent this relates to the actual "auction" is unknown. Seven Animal Attendant/Technicians are listed but their exact duties in relation to provision of animal services was not made out.
[24] Further, when comparing the revenue arising from its identifiable activities with the respondent's total revenue, it cannot be said such a proportion is substantial or significant, it is an insubstantial percentage amount, being 2.584 per cent."
(1986) 19 FCR 10
(1982) 150 CLR 169
(1985) 7 FCR 325
(1979) 143 CLR 190
Application dismissed for want of jurisdiction; the Commission determined the respondent to be a trading corporation and declined to hear the unfair dismissal matter.