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[2016] WASAT 26
State Administrative Tribunal (WA)
2016-03-17
Justice J
Original judgment source is linked above.
156 Amended paragraph 15 introduced a raft of particulars. Most importantly, the amendments alleged that Dr Woollard's training was incomplete rather than that a supervisor was not present.
157 The Board was plainly aware of issues as to Dr Woollard's training by 13 September 2013 as a result of Dr Clugston's report. No explanation is offered as to why it took nearly two years to file the amendment or why it was not in the original application.
158 In its amended application in relation to Dr Woollard's false representations, the Board alleged that:
18.1 performed 104 coronary angioplasty procedures at the Hospital as the primary operator;
18.2 performed 49 coronary angioplasty procedures at the Hospital as the secondary operator;
18.3 undertaken training in the performance of coronary angioplasty procedures by assisting as a secondary operator in coronary angioplasty procedures carried out at Royal Perth Hospital on over 100 occasions, which cases were additional to those referred to in the document headed 'Secondary Operator' and the document headed 'Primary Operator'; and
18.4 performed significantly in excess of the number of procedures required by the guidelines for achieving competency in coronary angioplasty published by the Cardiac Society.
[Dr Woollard's] letter to Dr Crawford as Chairman of the MAC dated 14 December 2005 stated in reference to the number of coronary angioplasty procedures performed by [Dr Woollard]:
'The number of procedures greatly exceeds the minimum suggested in the Cardiac Society guidelines applicable to cardiologists currently in training.'
19.1 [Dr Woollard] had performed only 35 coronary angioplasty procedures at the Hospital as secondary operator and only 66 coronary angioplasty procedures at the Hospital as primary operator, amounting to a total of only 101 procedures performed by the respondent at the Hospital;
19.2 [Dr Woollard] had not assisted as secondary operator in any coronary angioplasty procedure carried out at Royal Perth Hospital; and
19.3 [Dr Woollard] had not met the requirements of either the 2001 Guidelines or the 2005 Guidelines as to the number of procedures to be performed by a trainee in order to achieve competency in performing coronary angioplasty procedures.
20.1 when he knew that each of those representations was false; and
20.2 for the purpose of misleading Dr Crawford and the MAC in an attempt to achieve accreditation to perform coronary angioplasty procedures at the Hospital without any form of supervision.
159 Amended paragraphs 17 to 20 introduced a completely new and very serious allegation that Dr Woollard had made false representations about his training. These amendments were a substantive change to the case alleged against Dr Woollard. There can be no question that the Board alleges that Dr Woollard's letter is said to be false because that word is used in the Board's written submissions.
160 Again, there is no explanation by the Board as to the reason for the delay.
161 In its amended application in relation to failing to ensure adequate anticoagulation, the Board alleged that:
162 Once again, the Board has not explained the delay.
Dr Woollard's affidavit in support of the s 47(1) application
163 Dr Woollard's interim application was supported by his affidavit of 7 October 2015. The affidavit is set out in full because actual prejudice is so central to Dr Woollard's abuse of process claim. His affidavit states:
Discussions with Dr O'Shea
About cases
164 Dr Woollard was not crossexamined by the Board as to his affidavit and the Board accepts that the factual contents of the affidavit are true.
165 In essence, Dr Woollard identified three areas of prejudice:
166 In determining whether there has been an abuse of process by the Board, different considerations apply to the various grounds alleged by the Board. Accordingly, in order to properly apply those considerations, it is necessary to divide the grounds alleged by the Board into three distinct sections as follows:
167 As stated above, the Chelmsford considerations are:
168 As stated above, four matters need to be considered in relation to prejudice by reason of delay:
169 Matters i) to iii) are common to each of the sections set out above and can be considered together.
170 The delay between the death of Patient B and the filing of the application and the amended application was extremely long. Most importantly, the delay between the complaint by the Widow in May 2012 and the filing of the application and the amended application was two and a half years. There can be no question that there has been a long delay by the Board in filing the original application and the amended application.
ii) The reasons given by the Board to explain or justify the delay
171 The Board has not provided any reasons to explain or justify the delay between the filing of the complaint in May 2012 and the filing of the application in January 2015 and the amended application in July 2015. There is nothing to explain or justify the delay.
iii) Did Dr Woollard have any responsibility for, and past attitude to, the delay?
172 Dr Woollard has not in any way been responsible for or tolerated the delay. To the contrary, his solicitors, Clayton Utz, pressed the matter on a number of occasions as set out above.
173 The real issue in determining whether there has been an abuse of process is whether there is any proven or likely prejudice to Dr Woollard by reason of delay. Different considerations apply to the three sections set out above.
Prejudice or likely prejudice to Dr Woollard in relation to the original application
174 The Tribunal now turns to a consideration of the actual or likely prejudice to Dr Woollard in relation to the grounds set out in the original application.
175 Dr Woollard's affidavit does not establish that any actual prejudice has arisen in relation to the Board's original application. Dr Woollard was able to resolve the matters in relation to Patient S, M and C, despite the fact that these matters arose in 2007 and 2009.
176 The evidentiary issue of whether Dr Hockings' presence in an adjoining room complied with the supervision requirement of the Medical Advisory Committee (MAC) is essentially limited. There appears to be no real issue as to the relevant facts. The resolution of that question requires a determination of whether the requirement was complied with. This is largely a matter of interpretation.
177 Dr Woollard has made a number of points in relation to the conversation with the Widow concerning the cause of Patient B's death. It is not necessary to set them all out because the essential point made by Dr Woollard, is that there is a conflict of evidence between the Widow and Dr Woollard and memories may be unrealistic after 10 years .
178 However, at the end of the day, the findings the Tribunal will have to make are fairly simple: Who said what and who is to be believed?
179 The effect of the long delay is to make it all the more difficult for the Board to prove the allegation that Dr Woollard deliberately misled the Widow as to the cause of Patient B's death.
180 As Justice Deane noted in Jago in the context of an accused being entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt, the vagueness and uncertainty of memory and evidence which is likely to result from delay is more likely to be damaging to the prosecution than to the defence case'. In essence, the Board's case will turn on a credibility finding related to several short conversations.
181 Although the Board's allegation in relation to Patient B's consent is more complex than a conversation between two people, there is no suggestion that the documents are unavailable.
The prejudice or likely prejudice to Dr Woollard arising from the grounds introduced by the amended application other than the use of anticoagulants
182 The Tribunal now turns to a consideration of the prejudice or likely prejudice to Dr Woollard arising from the grounds introduced by the Board's amended application, other than the use of anticoagulants.
183 Dr Woollard's training had been raised by Dr Clugston's report dated 12 September 2013 which was received by AHPRA on 13 September 2013.
184 The most important area of prejudice is the death of Dr O'Shea. Dr O'Shea died on 15 March 2015. He was a long time business partner of Dr Woollard. He and Dr O'Shea developed an angioplasty training programme and trained together. They acted as primary operators for their own patients and as secondary operators for each other's patients. The details of that training programme are contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of Dr Woollard's affidavit above.
185 In particular, Dr O'Shea and Dr Woollard had regular meetings to discuss cases and patients. Dr Woollard's evidence is that he discussed Patient B with Dr O'Shea.
186 Dr Woollard's evidence is that he discussed the counting of angioplasty procedures with Dr O'Shea and that to the best of Dr Woollard's recollection, Dr O'Shea agreed with Dr Woollard's approach that one stenosis could count as one procedure. These matters are plainly relevant to the allegations in paragraphs 17 to 20 of the Board's amended application. The Board alleges in paragraph 18 of its amended application that, in Dr Woollard's letter to Dr Crawford, Dr Woollard represented to Dr Crawford and the MAC that he had falsely misrepresented the number of procedures he had carried out. It alleged that Dr Woollard had performed only 35 coronary angioplasty procedures.
187 It is clear that a finding as to what Dr Woollard believed to constitute a procedure is an essential element of the allegation that Dr Woollard made false representations.
188 Proof of false representations by the Board requires proof of Dr Woollard's intention. A crucial part of Dr Woollard's defence will be evidence as to his intention.
189 Dr O'Shea's evidence as to what he considered a procedure to be, and any discussion with Dr Woollard, would have been very relevant to Dr Woollard's defence and to the Tribunal's determination of Dr Woollard's intent.
190 The Board also submitted that the letter of 14 December 2005 and the two schedules annexed to it were false. Dr Woollard's witness statement dated 29 September 2015 annexed the letter and the two schedules.
191 An extract from the first schedule is set out below:
192 It is clear from a reading of that letter, and the schedules, that Dr Woollard claimed that he was counting individual vessels the subject of an intervention or attempted intervention, rather than whole procedures.
193 In Dr Woollard's letter of 14 December 2005, at page 43, he notes in the 'PS' that the 'complete details of all procedures are contained in a set of individual files kept at my office. I will be happy to arrange for you or a nominee to review the files if necessary'.
194 The Board submits that the presentation of those schedules does not make Dr Woollard's counting method clear because it is only possible to appreciate the counting method by scrutinising the numbers beneath the heading WACS and noticing that the same numbers are repeated. In effect, the Board contends that the schedule is misleading if you do not read it carefully or properly.
195 One would expect Dr Crawford, as Chairman of the MAC at the Mount Hospital, to have read such documents carefully and properly.
196 The submission made by the Board that the letter and the presentation of the two schedules could amount to false representations that is, fraud, is not sustainable.
197 It is difficult to see how a finding of fraud against Dr Woollard could ever be made in the face of the actual terms of the letter and schedule and Dr Woollard's willingness to make his records available. Nevertheless, that is the allegation made against Dr Woollard and the allegation he must defend.
198 Dr O'Shea's evidence, which relates to Dr Woollard's intention may have been critical to Dr Woollard's defence. Dr O'Shea's death constitutes actual prejudice to Dr Woollard.
199 In Dr Woollard's letter of 14 December 2005 he states:
...
Previous Experience.
My initial training in angioplasty commenced well before any Cardiac Society or other guidelines had been drawn up. The experience at that time was as a secondary operator assisting with the angioplasty procedures carried out on my patients at Royal Perth Hospital.
There is no official record of these procedures as there was no reason to keep log books. Exposure took place over several years and involved well over 100 patients.
Management Experience.
The guidelines developed by various specialist bodies for training in angioplasty and other procedures are focused on the training of newly qualified cardiologists with little management experience.
The Cardiac Society has recognised that established cardiologists['] training in coronary angioplasty do not need to follow the same pathway as a newly qualified cardiologist. In my case, I have had management experience (deciding to refer patients for angioplasty and managing them both before and after the procedure) for over 20 years involving well over 2000 patients.
...
Dr Woollard stated in the 14/12/05 letter that he had performed other procedures as a secondary operator whilst working at Royal Perth Hospital, but he did not specify when he claimed to have undertaken that additional training. It is apparent from Dr Woollard's witness statement filed in these proceedings that the training that Dr Woollard contends occurred at Royal Perth Hospital allegedly took place during the 1980s. In paragraph 23 of his witness statement, Dr Woollard refers to the introduction of angioplasty at Royal Perth Hospital in the ''early 1980s''. In paragraph 24 of his statement, Dr Woollard says that ''over a subsequent period of 1-2 years [he] ... was involved with more than 100 angioplasty procedures carried out by Dr Geoffrey Cope at Royal Perth Hospital''. By paragraph [56] of his statement, Dr Woollard says that in addition to the 49 procedures he has counted in his secondary operator log, it was his work with Dr Cope that made up the remaining necessary procedures performed as secondary operator.
201 The Tribunal agrees with the Board's submission that if Dr Woollard had undergone training in coronary angioplasty procedures at Royal Perth Hospital during the 1980s, that training could not be considered relevant to the acquisition of competency after a break of many years.
202 However, it is a long bow to draw from a failure by Dr Woollard to state when his training took place to proof of false representations to MAC. MAC could always have asked. The tenor of Dr Woollard's letters makes it clear that he was not seeking to withhold information, but rather that he was willing to provide further information.
203 There are further disputes about the extent of whether Dr Woollard had any involvement in assisting with angioplasty procedures in the 1980s. There are no records. Over 30 years later, it is now impossible to reach a conclusion in a fair manner.
204 Further, however neatly it may be possible to separate out the allegations concerning the letter in submissions, a decision on each of the Board's allegations in relation to the letter would be intertwined. Any finding the Tribunal made on one part of the letter would inevitably be influenced by its findings on other parts. The absence of Dr O'Shea's evidence in relation what constitutes a 'procedure', potentially impacts on the other allegations the Board alleges concerning the letter.
205 At paragraph 25 of Dr Woollard's affidavit, he notes that his practice is to retain only the clinical notes of his patients for not more than five years and that all the ancillary and administrative files are destroyed (for example, log books) and therefore he no longer has all of the written material in relation to every angioplasty procedure.
206 It is also the case as noted in paragraph 24 of Dr Woollard's affidavit that his secretary collected the procedure reports and Mount Hospital event logs for each angioplasty patient from Dr O'Shea. However, Dr Woollard did not collect all of Dr O'Shea's records. He does not have any of Dr O'Shea's administrative records.
207 After Dr O'Shea passed away, Dr Woollard's secretary informed him that Dr O'Shea's wife and secretary had collected and then destroyed all of Dr O'Shea's administrative records stored at his rooms, for example, log books and accreditation material.
208 Dr Woollard's evidence is that he believed that a complete set of his angioplasty files and records were no longer available.
209 Plainly, Dr Woollard's or Dr O'Shea's records would be relevant to Dr Woollard's training, the number of procedures he conducted and to the allegation of fraud.
210 The death of Dr O'Shea and the loss of the records constitute actual prejudice to Dr Woollard in relation to the amended application, apart from the use of anticoagulants.
211 The allegation in the Board's amended application, paragraphs 23 to 27, related to the administration of anticoagulants during the operation on Patient B on 15 December 2005.
212 The hospital records are available as to the angioplasty procedure and in particular as to the anticoagulants administered. Dr Woollard's affidavit does not identify any prejudice.
213 The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is any proven or likely prejudice to Dr Woollard arising from the anticoagulant ground.
214 The Tribunal now turns to consider whether there has been an abuse of process by the Board arising from double jeopardy.
215 The complaints in relation to Patient B in the Board's original application are, in substance, the same or closely related to those relating to the other patients.
216 The Board's original application related to, in essence, Dr Woollard's procedures during the course of angioplasty. By the time the application was filed in December 2014, Dr Woollard had been subject to six other matters involving angioplasty procedures, all of which had been resolved.
217 The Tribunal is not satisfied that Dr Woollard was entitled to regard the subject of his angioplasty procedures as behind him. He had been notified by the Board of Patient B's complaint in June 2012. Complaints in relation to the patient were still outstanding. The complaints in relation to Patients S, C, M, W, H and A were all resolved without seeking to resolve the complaint about Patient B.
218 A more difficult question is whether the bringing of the proceedings in relation to Patient B can be seen as punitive.
219 There is obviously no direct evidence that the conduct of the Board was punitive. The question is what inferences can be drawn from the Board's conduct.
220 In considering the inferences to be drawn, the Tribunal has borne in mind that:
221 An allegation against the Board, that the bringing of the application in relation to Patient B was punitive is extremely serious. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it should make such a finding. The more probable explanation is that the complaint in relation to Patient B was poorly managed because the Board failed to really appreciate its urgency.
The Board's amended application, other than the use of anticoagulants
222 The Board's written submissions at paragraph 7 make it clear that the grounds raised in the amended application, other than the anticoagulants, are new. Accordingly, double jeopardy does not apply.
223 The use of anticoagulants by Dr Woollard for angioplasty procedures was considered by the Tribunal in Woollard C & H (see, for example, at [59.4] and [59.5]).
224 The Tribunal is satisfied that the grounds in relation to anticoagulants set out in the amended application are, in substance, the same or closely related to those previously dealt with.
225 However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Dr Woollard was entitled to regard the subject matter of the anticoagulants as behind him. Nor is the Tribunal satisfied that the amendments in relation to the use of anticoagulants on Patient B can of itself be seen as punitive.
226 The public interest in the complaint against Dr Woollard being resolved by a hearing must be balanced against the fairness of the hearing.
227 In relation to the grounds contained in the original application and the use of anticoagulants, the orders made by the Tribunal in Woollard 'S' (S) and Woollard C & H ensure that Dr Woollard will not carry out any angioplasty procedures until at least 12 June 2018. The conduct complained of completely ceased prior to December 2012. It is difficult to see that there is any public interest in making further orders against Dr Woollard in relation to carrying out angioplasty procedures when those orders would only replicate Dr Woollard's existing restrictions in Woollard C & H.
228 In relation to the grounds submitted in the amended application, other than the use of coagulations, in paragraph 30 of its submissions, the Board submits that Dr Woollard's:
are important matters which go to the practitioner's fitness to be registered as a medical practitioner. The first two of those matters represent entirely distinct subject matter to that of any matters previously heard against Dr Woollard. All three of those matters are of relevance to the public interest in respect of Dr Woollard's right to perform other procedures (that is, procedures other than coronary angioplasty) and to [practise] as a consultant cardiologist.
229 Obviously, the allegation of false representations in relation to training is a different allegation and one that goes to Dr Woollard's fitness to practise, rather than his fitness to carry out particular procedures.
230 However, in reaching a conclusion as to whether there is a public interest in proceeding at this point, it is important to bear in mind that Dr Woollard has been in practice for many years. Other than the angioplasty procedures, nothing has come before this Tribunal or its predecessors in relation to his fitness to practise.
231 The Tribunal notes that it was not until the Board's submissions were filed on 2 November 2015 that an allegation of fitness to practise was made (see Cooper Affidavit 4 November 2015 at pages 34).
232 It is also the case that after the allegation was raised in 2013 by Dr Clugston the Board took nearly two years to do anything about it. In those circumstances, it is very difficult to accept any proposition from the Board that there is a public interest in allowing the matters raised in the Board's amended application to proceed.
233 The Widow's original complaint of 22 May 2012 stated:
Perhaps he (Dr Woollard) should not be attempting this procedure, or if so, perhaps he should be under supervision.
234 The orders of the Tribunal ensured that Dr Woollard would not be allowed to do so until at least 12 June 2018. The Widow's request has been met.
235 The Tribunal finds that there is no public interest in the grounds introduced by the amended application, other than the use of anticoagulants, for the proceeding being pursued against Dr Woollard.
236 Accepting for the sake of argument the Board's submissions that it was obliged to refer Dr Woollard to the Tribunal over Patient B, that did not diminish the Board's obligation to proceed fairly. It remains open to the Board to resolve Patient B's case by mediation.
237 Dr Woollard has not established abuse of process by delay in relation to the original application nor the anticoagulants ground in the amended application.
238 The Tribunal is satisfied that, in relation to the amendments identified in the Board's amended application, other than the anticoagulant ground, the issues raised in the amendments should be struck out as an abuse of process. The stage has been reached where the delay in the prosecution of the disciplinary proceedings against Dr Woollard is so prolonged that it is unreasonable. Dr Woollard has suffered actual prejudice. Dr Woollard does not share responsibility for the delay. Dr Woollard can justifiably claim that the application has passed beyond what can be justified in the due administration of justice. There would be no public interest in combining two parts of the proceeding. The Tribunal is satisfied that the continuation of this part of the proceedings would be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process.
239 Dr Woollard has satisfied the Tribunal that the exceptional circumstances justify the Tribunal striking out those paragraphs pursuant to s 47(1) of the SAT Act.
240 By reason of the Tribunal's conclusion on abuse of process by delay, it is unnecessary to consider dismissal for want of prosecution.
I certify that this and the preceding [240] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326
Jago v District Court of New South Wales [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23
Medical Board of Australia and Costley [2011] WASAT 171
Medical Board of Australia and Myers [2014] WASAT 137 (S)
Medical Board of Australia and Woollard [2012] WASAT 209
Medical Board of Australia and Woollard [2013] WASAT 101
The factors which need to be taken into account in deciding whether a permanent stay is needed in order to vindicate the accused's right to be protected against unfairness in the course of criminal proceedings cannot be precisely defined in a way which will cover every case. But they will generally include such matters as [i] the length of the delay, [ii] the reasons for the delay, [iii] the accused's responsibility for asserting his rights and, of course, [iv] the prejudice suffered by the accused: Barker v. Wingo [1972] USSC 146; (1972) 407 US 514; Bell v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1985] AC 937, as explained in Watson (1987) 8 NSWLR 685, and Gorman v. Fitzpatrick (1987) 32 A Crim R 330. ...
Since no time limit has been laid down under the Act, a complaint may be made at any time unless the institution of the proceedings in the circumstances is oppressive and an abuse of process. Nevertheless, while the Act contains no time limitation for lodging a complaint it does not follow that a complainant, with knowledge of the facts, can stand by and allow time to pass. The public interest requires that complaints be lodged and dealt with as expeditiously as possible: see Birkett v James (at 329). A person with reasonable ground for complaint, therefore, should pursue it with reasonable diligence. Memories fade. Relevant evidence becomes lost. Even when written records are kept, long delay will frequently create prejudice which can never be proved affirmatively. As the United States Supreme Court said in Barker v Wingo (at 532) 'what has been forgotten can rarely be shown'. In some cases delay makes it simply impossible for justice to be done: Birkett v James (at 317-318, 327). In R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510 at 517, Lord Hailsham LC pointed out that: 'Where there is delay the whole quality of justice deteriorates.' The difficulties in ascertaining the truth about a matter after time has done its work are vividly portrayed by Street CJ in the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Committal Proceedings Against K E Humphreys (July 1983). His Honour said (at 9-10):
The present case also gives rise to a difficult problem of what is sometimes referred to as a principle or rule against double jeopardy: cf Davern v Messel [1984] HCA 34; (1984) 155 CLR 21 and Cooke v Purcell (1988) 14 NSWLR 51. As Mahoney JA observed in the latter case (at 68) this is a principle that informs rather than states the law, and, when it is invoked in a given case, it may be necessary to address the particular circumstances of its suggested application with some care. In the former case Gibbs CJ (at 33) warned that the rule against double jeopardy is not to be applied as a 'mere fetish', and the judgments of the various members of the High Court contain numerous examples of the wide variety of practical problems that could be grouped under the rubric of 'double jeopardy' and of the differing solutions that have resulted.
It cannot be said that the present case falls squarely within any of the settled particular instances of specific legal rules informed by the principle against double jeopardy. There was no hearing on the merits of the original charges against the claimants. Indeed the original charges, although similar, are not identical to, the present charges. This is not a case where a defence of, or analogous to, autrefois acquit could be raised.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is protective rather than punitive, and such protection runs to both the public and the profession (Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545 at [41] (Craig); Re Maraj (a Legal Practitioner) (1995) 15 WAR 12 at 25 (Maraj); Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Love [2014] WASC 389 (Love) at [19]; Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 (Foreman) at 440G441A - B; Legal Profession Complaints Committee and in de Braekt [2013] WASAT 124 at [24]- [26]; New South Wales Bar Association v Hamman [1999] NSWCA 404 (Hamman) at [21] and [77]).
The appropriate sanction is to be considered at the time of the making of the sanction and not by reference to the date of the unprofessional acts (Legal Profession Complaints Committee and A Legal Practitioner [2013] WASAT 37 (S) ()) at [23]; () at [7]; [2004] HCA l; ; ( [2004] NSW) at [15]; at [16]).
(1991) 25 NSWLR 190
(1986) 6 NSWLR 246
(1989) 168 CLR 23
(1993) 177 CLR 378
(1987) 8 NSWLR 685
(1984) 155 CLR 21
(1988) 14 NSWLR 51
(1979) 46 FLR 386
(2001) 79 SASR 545
(1995) 15 WAR 12
(1994) 34 NSWLR 408
(2004) 216 CLR 253