1. At paragraphs 17 and 18, his Honour stated as follows :

The matters specified in paragraphs 29A(3)(a), (b) and (c) are jurisdictional requirements. This follows from the introductory words 'the Authority may grant the application if it is satisfied' as to the matters set out in paragraphs 29A(a), (b) and (c). Before the Authority may grant the permission sought each of the matters must be satisfied. The requirement in 29A(3)(a) is a jurisdictional fact and is a precondition to the valid exercise of the power to grant the permission.

Applying that construction to the facts here the Applicant must fail as he has not satisfied the Authority as to the existence of the fact specified in s 29A(3)(a). But here the applicant submits that on review the Tribunal is in a different position to the Authority.

1. We pause here to say that it is clear that the Tribunal is standing in the shoes of the Authority and has all the powers that the Authority has and no more unless they are given by the VCAT Act itself or the enabling enactment. This is not a situation where there is any more power.
2. In relation to s 29A(3)(a)(i), it is quite clear that the money has not been refunded. There is still in excess of $33,000 outstanding to the Fund. Therefore, the applicant cannot succeed in that matter.
3. In relation to s 29A(3)(a)(ii), it is provided that where the applicant has agreed to refund all amounts paid out of the Fund in respect of the claim, permission may be given to work in a customer service capacity for a motor car trader.
4. We have already mentioned the agreement which the applicant has proposed ie to pay $50.00 per week. In our view, even if the applicant was to be able to make that agreement, that would not be an agreement within the Act, because we can have no satisfaction whatsoever that the money would be fully paid. Particularly, as it was over such a lengthy period of time, and having regard to the fact that the applicant is unemployed and the age of the applicant as well. However, as the applicant is a bankrupt and is unable to make such agreement, it clearly cannot be said that he has agreed to refund all the monies.
5. Given these circumstances, in our view, the application must fail because the applicant has failed to satisfy us in respect of s 29A(3)(a). We do not need to look at the matters in s 29A(3)(b) and (c). However, it is desirable our views be recorded. We do note the fact that the applicant worked for the motor car trader between June and December 2010 without disclosing that he was a director of a motor car trader whose actions had caused a payment to be made from the Fund and the payment had not been reimbursed. In our view, it makes it very likely that it would be proper for us to conclude that the applicant is not a person where there is a reasonable expectation that he would comply with the Act. We are concerned that the applicant was sent the letter and did not read it - his wife takes the blame for the fact that he did not read it, because she said it was passed on to a private detective. That may or may not be so but it is the applicant's duty and responsibility if he is going to work in the motor car trade to read all correspondence, in particular correspondence that comes from the body that is in fact managing the Act and making sure it is complied with.
6. Given this circumstance by itself, we would say that the applicant would again fail in s 29A(3)(c) as it would be against the public interest. It is necessary to say that the public interest test makes it clear that we are not here to punish the applicant. We are concerned that the public should have confidence in the industry. Further, other members in the industry must be aware that if the Act is breached, there may be repercussions. In our view, where somebody has caused a claim to be made to the Fund, such as the applicant through his directorship, it would not at this stage be in the public interest to allow him to work in customer service. Such circumstances would bring the motor car trading industry into disrepute. Given these circumstances, we find that the decision of the respondent will be affirmed.