McGinn v Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

1. In these reasons for judgment I consider whether I should make an order for summary judgment or, in the alternative, an order for default judgment, on the claims for relief the applicant, Ms McGinn, makes in an originating application she filed on 22 October 2025 against the "Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia". In addition, assuming I decide not to grant summary judgment or default judgment, I consider whether I should make directions for the further conduct of the proceeding.

1. On 17 September 2025 Ms McGinn lodged for filing with this Court an originating application (First OA) claiming an order for review pursuant to s 5(1)(e) and s 5(1)(f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) of a decision made on 12 September 2025 by a Review Manager within the office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. That decision related to a request Ms McGinn made to the Ombudsman to review a decision to finalise a request Ms McGinn had made about her "dispute of some of the information provided by the Investigation Officer who handled" Ms McGinn's complaint.
2. The original complaint Ms McGinn made to the Ombudsman was described by the Review Manager in an email she sent to Ms McGinn on 12 September 2025 (Email) as follows:

Your original complaint was about NIB's assessment of your cover, noting that NIB asserted that you had cancelled your cover during a conversation on 18 July 2017 and recommenced cover on 23 March 2018. The reported gap in cover meant that you have been subject to Lifetime Health Cover (LHC) loading, increasing the cost of your health cover. You have advised that, during the conversation on 18 July 2017, NIB told you that it was suspending your cover rather than cancelling it. You viewed that NIB's continued use of the same membership number and a subsequent decision to waive certain waiting periods are both evidence that your cover was suspended by NIB and not cancelled. You indicated you were seeking for NIB to backdate your policy start date to 15 May 2017, the date you first commenced cover with NIB.

1. The Email set out the action an investigation officer (IO) took in response to Ms McGinn's complaint, how the IO addressed Ms McGinn's concerns, and the IO's conclusion, namely, that "NIB appeared to have acted reasonably and in accordance with its policies and legislation, and that further investigation by the [Ombudsman] would not result in a better or different outcome for" Ms McGinn. The Email then set out the basis on which Ms McGinn requested the review of the IO's decision (emphasis added):

It is common knowledge (s144 Evidence Act Matter of Common Knowledge) that contract number must be unique and can not be reused, therefore, I don't have two contracts with NIB as they claimed, only one, and the joined date must be 15 May 2017. Jack acknowledged it is material evidence , but falsely claimed Ombudsman can't undertake merit review, only courts or tribunal can.

1. Finally, the Email recorded the Review Manager's decision as follows (RM Decision):

I have closely considered the information on file relating to your complaint. I have concluded that the Investigation Officer provided your accurate information on this occasion [sic], including the explanation he provided regarding membership numbers. I acknowledge your comment about the uniqueness of contract numbers but I am not satisfied the terms can be used interchangeably. If you remain of the view that your membership number is the equivalent of a contract number and that this has implications under contract law, it is open to you to seek legal advice.

In regards to Jack's advice about merits review, I consider that he was correct in advising that it is not the role of the Ombudsman's Office to conduct a merits review in the manner of a tribunal.

For the reasons outlined above, I have concluded that the Investigation Officer responded to your complaint appropriately and l will not be accepting your review request. This means your complaint will remain closed with our Office.

1. The First OA describes the decision in relation to which Ms McGinn seeks an order for review as follows:

... the decision (Annexure 1) of the Respondent dismissed the Applicant's private health insurance complaint of NIB (PHI-2024-701984) with two false statements that an issue under contract law and merit reviews are outside the jurisdiction of the Respondent.

1. The First OA stated Ms McGinn is aggrieved by the RM Decision because:
   1. The Applicant requested NIB to correct the erroneous join-date of her private health insurance policy as the error resulted in years of LHC loading.
   2. The Respondent has power to review 'any matter arising out of or connected with a private health insurance arrangement'.
   3. The Respondent's reviews under Ombudsman Act are merit reviews.
   4. Therefore, the Respondent's statements are knowingly false.
2. Under the heading "Grounds of application" the First OA states:
   1. S5(1)(e) of AD(JR) Act - that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred under Part IID of Ombudsman Act.
   2. S5(1)(f) of AD(JR) Act - that the decision involved two errors of law.
3. The order the First OA claims is that the "Respondent to recommend NIB to correct the erroneous join-date as it's breach of Privacy Act".
4. By letter dated 26 September 2025 a Registrar (the Registrar) of the Court informed Ms McGinn that she had determined that the First OA should not be accepted for filing (Registrar's Decision). The Registrar purported to make that decision pursuant to r 2.16 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (GFL Rules), which provides as follows:

A Registrar may refuse to accept a document for filing (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if:

(a) the Registrar is satisfied that the document, on its face or by reference to any other documents filed or lodged for filing with the document, is an abuse of process or is frivolous, scandalous or vexatious; or

(b) the document is lodged in connection with a pending proceeding, the registry is not the proper registry and subrule 2.12(4) has not been complied with; or

(c) the document is lodged electronically and the person lodging the document has not complied with the Court's lodging procedures.

1. The Registrar gave the following reasons for not accepting the First OA:

I note that the meaning of the terms "frivolous", "vexatious" were considered by Justice White in Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 at [27] to [30]. A matter that is frivolous may be described as one that is "without substance or groundless or fanciful" and a matter that is vexatious is an abuse of the process of the Court. The term 'abuse of process' includes an application which has no cause of action properly stated and no prospects of success.

By the Documents, you seek to have the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA) review the Commonwealth Ombudsman's decision not to accept your review request. This decision was set out in an email sent by the Commonwealth Ombudsman dated 12 September 2025, whereby they informed you that it would not be accepting you review request, and as a result, your complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman's office would remain closed.

You seek to have the FCFCOA conduct this review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). For the FCFCOA to have jurisdiction to hear your application under the ADJR Act, there must be a decision that affects your legal rights or obligations (in the sense identified in Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7). A decision by the Commonwealth Ombudsman not to accept your review request does not affect your rights or legal obligations in the sense identified in Griffith University v Tang. As a result, such decisions are not reviewable under the ADJR Act. This point is made clear in Skiba v Commonwealth Ombudsman [2022] FedCFamC2G 216 at [24] and [25] and in Fitzwarryn[e] v Commonwealth Ombudsman [2023] FCA 175 at [40]- [42].

Despite the above, I would nevertheless still not accept the Documents for filing. This is because in your originating application you have not set out any detail regarding 'errors of law' nor how you allege the Commonwealth Ombudsman improperly exercised any power conferred on it. Further, I cannot identify, on the face of the Documents, any jurisdiction the FCFCOA has to deal with your assertion that the Respondent made 'knowingly false' statements about its reviews not being merits reviews.

Having regard to the above, and to the meaning of the relevant terms considered in Ferdinands, I am of the view that the application you seek to bring is an abuse of process because on the face of the documents, the jurisdiction of the FCFCOA has not been invoked. As such, I do not accept the Documents for filing.

I recommend that you seek independent professional legal advice prior to filing any further documents with the Court.

The Documents are returned to you.

1. In the originating application she filed on 22 October 2025 (Second OA) Ms McGinn seeks to set aside the Registrar's Decision. The Second OA states Ms McGinn is a person aggrieved by the Registrar's Decision because:
   1. The Applicant lodged a judicial review application to review Commonwealth Ombudsman's decision dismissing her private health insurance complaint.
   2. Registrar Donovan refused the filing with the reason that the decision: not accepting, is not reviewable, knowing she has no power to refuse on jurisdiction, notwithstanding it is false on the face of the record because her decision not accepting the filing is reviewable under AD(JR) Act.
   3. Registrar Donovan claimed the Applicant's application is abuse of process because 'the jurisdiction of the FCFCOA has not been invoked', knowing jurisdiction is not a ground for abuse of process.
2. Under the heading "Grounds of Application" the Second OA contains the following grounds:
   1. S5(1)(e) of AD(JR) Act - that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by rule 2.16, because jurisdiction is not a ground under r2.16 [sic].
   2. S5(1)(h) of AD(JR) Act - that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision, because there is no evidence of abuse of process.
   3. S5(1)(j) of AD(JR) Act - that the decision was otherwise contrary to law, because Registrar does not have power to determine the question of jurisdiction, therefore, the decision is contrary to law.
3. The Second OA seeks the following orders:
   1. A direction by Chief Justice of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia that the proceedings be heard by the Full Court because the Respondent is FCFCOA and it is in the interests of justice.
   2. The Respondent to set aside Registrar Donovan's decision.
   3. The Respondent to accept the Applicant's Application filed on 17/9/2025.
4. Although the Second OA is directed to the Registrar's Decision, it names the "Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia" (purported respondent) as the respondent; and it specifies "Lionel Bowen Building, 97/99 Goulburn St, Sydney NSW 2021" as the address of the purported respondent. It appears Ms McGinn delivered or caused to be delivered the Second OA to that address, but neither the purported respondent nor any person on its behalf has filed a notice of appearance, or has otherwise taken any step in the proceeding.
5. In these circumstances, on 24 November 2025, being the day before the matter had been listed before me for a first court date, Ms McGinn sent to my Associate's inbox a document titled "Applicant's Application for Summary Judgment" (AASJ) which contained the following:
   1. On 22/10/2025, the Applicant lodged an application for judicial review of Registrar Donovan's decision refusing the filing of the Applicant's application with the excuse 'no jurisdiction', knowing as a registrar, she has no power to refuse filing on jurisdiction.
   2. On 21/11/2025, the Respondent didn't file a response in 28 days as required per rule 8.15 if it wishes to oppose and defend the proceedings.
   3. Accordingly, the Applicant seeks summary judgment per rule 23.08(1)(e), as the Respondent has no prospect of success when it will not defend in the proceedings.
   4. Alternatively, the Respondent is in default per rule 5.09(b)(i): failed to file response in the time required.
   5. Accordingly, the Applicant seeks orders sought on default per rule 5.11(c) for it to take effect on 2/12/2025.
6. Paragraph (e) of r 23.08(1) of the GFL Rules provides that the Court "may order that judgment be given against a party if the Court is satisfied. . . the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding". Rule 5.11 of the GFL Rules provides:

If a respondent is in default, the Court may:

(a) order that a step in the proceeding be taken within a specified time; or

(b) if the claim against the respondent is for a debt or liquidated damages - give judgment against the respondent for:

(i) the debt or liquidated damages; and

(ii) if appropriate, interest and costs in a sum fixed by the Court or to be taxed; or

(c) if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim or an alternative accompanying document referred to in rule 8.04, or if the Court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings - give judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim or alternative accompanying document to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or

(d) give judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed, or any other order; or

(e) direct that an order mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) is to take effect if the respondent does not take a step ordered by the Court in the proceeding in the time specified in the order.

1. Rule 5.09 of the GFL Rules specifies when a party is in default for the purposes of r 5.11:

For the purposes of rule 5.11, a respondent is in default if the respondent:

(a) has not satisfied the applicant's claim; and

(b) does not:

(i) do an act required to be done, or do an act in the time required, by these Rules; or

(ii) comply with an order of the Court in the proceeding; or

(iii) attend a hearing in the proceeding; or

(iv) defend the proceeding with due diligence.

1. Thus, Ms McGinn claims an order in terms of the order provided for by r 5.11(c) of the GFL Rules.
2. At the first court date on 25 November 2025 I ordered that the matter be listed at 10.15 am on 10 December 2025 for the purpose of hearing Ms McGinn's application for summary judgment and, assuming summary judgment is not granted, hearing the claims for relief made in the Second OA.
3. At the hearing on 10 December 2025 Ms McGinn applied that I recuse myself on the ground of actual bias. I heard that application, but dismissed it on the basis of reasons for judgment I delivered ex tempore at the hearing.[1] I then heard Ms McGinn's submissions in support of her application for summary judgment, and in support of the claims for relief she makes in the Second OA.

(a) As the purported respondent has not filed any defence, that will "suffice for the summary judgment because if there is no defence, there is no prospect".[2]

(b) The question whether the purported respondent has no reasonable prospect of success, as provided for by r 23.08(1)(e) of the GFL Rules, does not arise; there "is nothing for the court to assess".[3]

(c) "Even if we find anything that is on the jurisdiction or beyond that, the application should still be allowed to be filed"; and then the Court will have "the power to exercise judicially to dismiss the application on these findings".[4]

(d) Even if the Registrar were to have filed a submitting appearance, Ms McGinn would bear no burden of proof; and would be entitled to the relief she seeks.[5]

(e) The Registrar has no power to determine the question of jurisdiction.[6]

1. There are a number of difficulties in the way of my ordering summary judgment or default judgment.

There is no court known as the "Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia"

1. The first difficulty concerns the nature of the purported respondent. Although there is an Act called the Federal Circuit and Family Court Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFC Act), there is no court that is known as the "Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia". The bulk of the FCFC Act is devoted to changing the names of two federal courts that existed immediately before 1 September 2021 when the FCFC Act came into effect, and which the FCFC Act provides will continue; and to import into the one Act provisions that had existed under two separate Acts that constituted and regulated these two courts.
2. The first of the two federal courts is the Family Court of Australia, which was created by s 21(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth); and the second is the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (this Court). This Court was created by s 8(1) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) as a federal court to be known as the "Federal Magistrates Court". On 12 April 2013, by operation of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth), the Federal Magistrates Court was renamed the "Federal Circuit Court of Australia", and the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) (FM Act) was renamed the "Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth)". Section 8 of the FCFC Act renamed the two federal courts as follows:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(1) The federal court known immediately before the commencement day as the Family Court of Australia is continued in existence as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1).

(2) The federal court known immediately before the commencement day as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is continued in existence as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2).

1. Let it be assumed that the Second OA named this Court as a respondent; and that this Court has defaulted by not filing an address for service. Does that necessarily mean, as Ms McGinn submits, that default judgment or summary must be ordered against this Court? The answer must be answered in the negative.
2. First, under s 137(1) of the FCFC Act, the jurisdiction of this Court "is to be exercised by the Court constituted by a single Judge". It is therefore a legal and logical impossibility for this Court to entertain an application to itself to determine the lawfulness of its own exercise of jurisdiction. The exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction by this Court can only be challenged by appeal to the Federal Court (where Parliament has conferred such right of appeal), or by means of a constitutional writ directed to the Judge of the Court whose exercise of power is challenged on application made either to the High Court pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution, or to the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
3. Ms McGinn appears to recognise there is a difficulty in the Court's entertaining an application for relief against itself; in the Second OA Ms McGinn seeks a "direction by Chief Justice of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia that the proceedings be heard by the Full Court because the Respondent is FCFCOA and it is in the interests of justice". The FCFC Act does not, however, provide for the exercise of any jurisdiction by a "full court" of this Court. As I have already noted, s 137 of the FCFC Act provides that the jurisdiction of this Court "is to be exercised by the Court constituted by a single Judge".
4. Second, the decision that is the subject of the Second OA is not one that is alleged to have been made by a Judge of this Court exercising jurisdiction that has been conferred on this Court. Rather, the decision has been made by a Registrar purportedly pursuant to a power that r 2.16 of the GFL Rules confers on a Registrar, not on a Judge of this Court. Thus, r 2.16 "does not confer judicial power".[7] It is:[8]

the means by which an administrative requirement is expressed that all documents filed in the Registry must not in their form and content (irrespective of any substantive assessment of their merit) be an abuse of the process of the Court or frivolous or vexatious.

1. It follows that this Court cannot be the relevant party to the claim for relief Ms McGinn makes in the Second OA; the relevant party can only be the Registrar.
2. Third, the power to order default judgment pursuant to r 5.11(c) of the GFL Rules, or to order summary judgment pursuant to r 23.08(1)(e), is discretionary: these rules provide that the Court "may", not must, make the orders referred to. Further, there are overwhelming factors against the exercise of the power to order default judgment or summary judgment, namely, that it is legally and logically impossible for this Court to make orders against itself, and that the Court, in any event, is not the legal person who made the decision that is challenged by the Second OA.
3. Fourth, Ms McGinn seeks an order pursuant to r 5.11(c) of the GFL Rules; but that rule would not apply to the circumstances of this case. Although Ms McGinn commenced the proceeding by filing an originating application, the Second OA is not supported by a statement of claim, or by an alternative document provided for by r 8.04 of the GFL Rules. Even if the Second OA were supported by such a document, r 5.11(c) only permits the Court to "give judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim or alternative accompanying document to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled". Given that the Court is not the entity that made the decision that the Second OA challenges, and that this Court cannot make an order against itself, I cannot be satisfied that Ms McGinn is entitled to any judgment against this Court.

1. For these reasons, Ms McGinn's application for default judgment must be dismissed. So too must Ms McGinn's application for summary judgment be dismissed, because that application is premised on the purported respondent not having filed a response to the Second OA.

1. The next question to consider is whether I should permit Ms McGinn to file an amended Second OA in which she correctly identifies the Registrar as the respondent. The determination of that question turns on whether the Second OA, if amended to include the Registrar as a party, would disclose a reasonable claim for relief under the ADJR Act. Before I consider that question, it will be necessary to refer to the nature of the power r 2.16 of the GFL Rules confers on a Registrar.

1. A number of cases have considered equivalent provisions to r 2.16; and it would be convenient if I refer to the following passage from the judgment of the Full Federal Court in Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland:[9]

[6] Rule 2.26 has its predecessor in O 46 r 7A of the rules as previously in force. In Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; (2003) 128 FCR 353 the Full Court said, of the former rule (at [15]):

The rule in its current form removed a clog on the Registrar's discretion to act by permitting the Registrar to refuse to accept or issue a document without the Registrar being required to obtain authority from a Judge so to act. The first point to note in the construction of the rule is that O 46 is directed to administration of registries of the Court. The purpose of r 7A is to assist the Registrar to maintain efficient operation of a registry and, thereby, the Court. Even without a rule in the terms of r 7A it may be thought that it would be implied that a Registrar would have the power, or be under a duty, to protect court procedures from abuse by refusing to accept a document for lodgement or filing which, on its face, would be an abuse of court process or frivolous or vexatious.

[8] And, as the primary judge correctly observed, the function of the Registrar is to ensure "compliance with procedural requirements, by refusing to accept for filing documents which on their face are frivolous or vexatious or would be an abuse of the Court's process": Ferdinands v Cridland (at [12], original emphasis). The primary judge went on to observe that the words "frivolous" and "vexatious" were not defined in the dictionary contained in the Rules. In respect of their meaning, his Honour said this:

1. ... However, the term 'vexatious proceeding' is defined in s 37AM(1) of the Federal Court of Australia 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act) for the purposes of Pt VAAA of the Act. That section provides:

vexatious proceeding includes:

(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b) a proceeding instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c) a proceeding instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and

(d) a proceeding conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

1. As is apparent, that definition is not an exhaustive definition. It indicates, however, that a proceeding will be vexatious if, amongst other things, it is instituted or pursued without reasonable cause.
2. In Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808, McKerracher J discussed the meaning of the terms 'vexatious' and 'frivolous' appearing in r 26.01(1) of the FCR. His Honour said:

[35] The expressions 'scandalous', 'vexatious' and 'frivolous' can be used either separately, or in conjunction, or interchangeably, with the expression 'abuse of process of the court' ...

[36] A matter is 'frivolous and vexatious' where the 'cause of action is one which on the face of it is clearly one which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide, and contend that he had a grievance which he was entitled to bring before the court'...

[37] In relation to the term 'frivolous':

(a) a matter that is 'frivolous' may be described as one that is 'without substance or groundless or fanciful' ...;

(b) a proceeding will be 'frivolous' where, despite whatever attempts are made to discern a cause of action in the case, it is still not arguable ...; and

(c) 'frivolous' may also describe a situation where a party is trifling with the Court or wasting the Court's time ...

[38] In relation to the term 'vexatious':

(a) a 'vexatious' proceeding is one without foundation, which cannot succeed, or is brought for an ulterior and collateral purpose. 'Vexatious' might also describe proceedings that are seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging ...;

(b) proceedings may also be described as 'vexatious' where they impose on a respondent party an unnecessary injustice in the form of a burden other than, and additional to, the burden necessarily imposed on a party to litigation instituted on reasonable grounds for the purpose of obtaining relief within the scope of the available remedy ...;

(c) a proceeding is to be regarded as 'vexatious' where:

(i) it is instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom the proceeding is brought; or

(ii) it is brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which it gives rise; or

(iii) irrespective of the motive of the litigant, the proceeding is so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless ...; and

(d) 'vexatiousness' is a quality of the proceeding rather than a litigant's intention, so that the question is not whether the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously but whether the legal proceedings are in fact vexatious ...

(Citations omitted)

1. As is apparent, a proceeding will be frivolous and vexatious if, amongst other things, it is based on a cause of action which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide or if it is without substance, groundless, or fanciful. ...

1. The question to be determined is whether the Second OA raises a reasonably arguable case that in purporting to exercise the power under r 2.16 of the GFL Rules not to accept the First OA application the Registrar:

(a) improperly exercised the power conferred by r 2.16 because jurisdiction is not a ground under r 2.16 of the GFL Rules (as claimed in ground 1 of the grounds of application of the Second OA); or

(b) there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision because there is no evidence of abuse of process (as claimed in ground 2 of the grounds of application of the Second OA); or

(c) the Registrar's decision was otherwise contrary to law because the Registrar does not have power to determine the question of jurisdiction (as claimed in ground 3 of the grounds of application of the Second OA).

1. That question is to be answered in the negative.
2. As to grounds 1 and 3, it is not reasonably arguable that r 2.16 of the GFL Rules does not permit a Registrar to conclude that a document that is presented for filing is an abuse of process, or is frivolous, or vexatious, on the ground that this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the claims or a claim made in the document. A document making a claim that does not on its face engage the jurisdiction of this Court would be among the clearest grounds for concluding that a document is an "abuse of process" or "frivolous" or "vexatious" (as the meaning of those expressions have been explained in the passages from Ferdinands), because it would be so "obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless".[10]
3. As to ground 2 of the Second OA, it is not reasonably arguable there is no evidence that the claims made in the First OA are an abuse of process. It is apparent from the face of the First OA that it does not identify the alleged errors of law Ms McGinn alleges the Ombudsman made. Further, the Second OA does not explain how the Ombudsman improperly exercised any power conferred on the Ombudsman; it does not identify any connection between the assertion that the Ombudsman knowingly made false statements and the jurisdiction this Court has to entertain applications for review under the ADJR Act. The Second OA also does not identify "a legal right or obligation or other identifiable interest sufficient to evidence [Ms McGinn's] status as a person aggrieved".[11] The absence of these matters constitute evidence on the basis of which it was reasonably open to the Registrar to conclude that the claims made in the First OA are without substance, or are groundless, or fanciful.
4. For these reasons, there would be no utility in granting Ms McGinn leave to file an amended Second OA in which the Registrar is substituted for the purported respondent as the respondent.

1. During the hearing Ms McGinn made the following submission: [12]

Because the court is neutral, it could not just pull up - I'm not sure if that's your intention - pull up Registrar Donovan's letter and go through paragraph by paragraph, become a full protagonist to defend for her.

1. By this I understand Ms McGinn intended to submit that, in the absence of a contradictor, it is not open to the Court to consider the lawfulness of the Registrar's decision; and that is because, if the Court were to do so, it would become a protagonist in favour of the Registrar's decision. If that is the submission Ms McGinn intended to make, I would not accept it.
2. Having applied for orders for default and summary judgment, it is for Ms McGinn to satisfy this Court she was entitled to the orders she sought; and it is for the Court to determine whether it is satisfied that Ms McGinn was entitled to the orders she sought on the grounds on which she relies. The Court's consideration and determination of Ms McGinn's claims cannot reasonably be characterised as the Court acting as a protagonist of the Registrar's decision to which the Second OA is directed.
3. In any event, there are a number of cases where the Federal Court has heard applications under the ADJR Act for review of decisions of Registrars not to accept for filing originating applications where the Registrar did no more than file a submitting appearance, and where no contradictor appeared.[13]

1. I propose to order that Ms McGinn's application for default judgment and summary judgment be dismissed; and that the Second OA also be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Manousaridis.

[1] McGinn v Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia [2025] FedCFamC2G 2179.

[7] Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80, at [7] (Charlesworth, Burley, and Cheesman JJ) (speaking of r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), being equivalent to r 2.16 of the GFL Rules.

[8] Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75, at [38] (Barker, Banks-Smith, and Colvin JJ).

[9] Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80.

[10] Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808, at [38].

[11] Fitzwarryne v Commonwealth Ombudsman [2023] FCA 175, at [39] (Rares J).

[13] See, for example, Ferdinands v Registrar Burns [2024] FCAFC 105; Kant v Principal Registrar, Federal Court of Australia [2025] FCA 1622; Dunkerley v Registrar Bird [2025] FCA 1515.