McEachern v Alcock

(1) not reducing the unpaid rent by amounts of $1,300.00, $100.00, $703.58 and $1,911.90 (the Rent arrears issues); and

(2) requiring her to pay a plumbing invoice of $770.00 (Plumbing invoice issue)

1. The appellant appeared for herself, assisted by her friend, Mr Timothy Cope, who also assisted the appellant in the hearing before the primary member.
2. Ms Alcock appeared for herself and her husband.

Case management of the appeal and the documents relied on

1. At a call-over of the appeal on 21 February 2025, an application for a stay of the order for the appellant to pay $11,758,03 to the respondents was withdrawn and dismissed and directions were made for the filing and serving of documents on the appeal.
2. Both parties filed and served documents and submissions and, in determining the appeal, we have had regard to the following documents:

(1) The Notice of Appeal lodged on 6 February 2025 and the attached "Grounds pf Appeal" and bundle of documents (AB1);

(2) The respondents' Reply to Appeal and attached documents lodged on 20 February 2025 (RB);

(3) The appellant's further bundle of documents lodged on 11 March 2025 which included the "Appeal Summary" and transcript extracts of the hearing on 18 October 2025 (AB2);

(4) The Tribunal's reasons for decision dated 21 January 2025;

(5) The procedural directions made at the call over on 15 January 2025.

1. Although we were not provided with a transcript of the whole of the hearing below, the appellant obtained a sound recording and had parts of it transcribed and included in AB2. The respondent did not dispute the accuracy of the transcript extracts provided.
2. Save for the transcript extracts and a table prepared by the appellant's accountant summarising records pf payments and rent from 10 July 2023 (at AB2 p 24), which was read as an aide or a submission, the documents provided by the parties were documents that were before the primary member.

1. An appeal to the Tribunal's Appeal Panel does not provide an unsuccessful party in the Tribunal below with the opportunity to run its case again, nor is it sufficient for an appellant to disagree with the outcome and to contend there should have been a different outcome: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10].
2. To succeed in an appeal from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division, an appellant must demonstrate either an error by the Tribunal on a question of law, which may be argued as of right; or that leave (permission) be granted to bring the appeal for a reason under clause 12(1) of Schedule 4 of the NCAT Act.
3. In Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 the Appeal Panel set out at [13] a non-exclusive list of questions of law:

(1) Whether there has been a failure to provide proper reasons;

(2) Whether the Tribunal identified the wrong issue or asked the wrong question;

(3) Whether a wrong principle of law had been applied;

(4) Whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness;

(5) Whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant (i.e., mandatory) considerations;

(6) Whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration;

(7) Whether there was no evidence to support a finding of fact; and

(8) Whether the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would make it.

1. The Appeal Panel in Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 at [25] provided further guidance in relation to what is a question of law. In summary:

(1) A question of law should be articulated with precision;

(2) Absent leave to appeal, the question of law is the subject of the appeal;

(3) A question of law means a "pure question of law" which is not dependent on facts not found and is not dependent on the answer to the question;

(4) A party contending that a question of law was wrongly decided must identify the question in abstract terms;

(5) A mixed question of fact and law is not a question of law, and a question of law must not be hypothetical or arid;

(6) A question of law must be capable of affecting orders the subject of the appeal, not purely the reasons; and

(7) There may be disclosed an error of law but this of itself does not necessarily raise a question of law.

1. Further, and relevant to this appeal, a failure to take into account a "clearly articulated and substantial argument" is a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction as well as an error of law and so constitutes a question of law: Alexandria Landfill PL v Transport for NSW [2020] NSWCA 165 at [8]- [11]; Prakash v Health Care Complaints Commission [2006] NSWCA 153 at [87]- [89]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Robinson [2022] NSWCA 164 at [91].
2. Where the grounds of appeal do not raise a pure question of law, an appellant may seek leave to appeal.
3. The circumstances in which the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal from decisions made in the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act are limited to those set out in cl 12 (1) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act. In such cases, the Appeal Panel must be satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that:

(1) Cl 12(1)(a) - the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(2) Cl 12(1)(b) - the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(3) Cl 12(1)(c) - significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. As explained in Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [84], it is not sufficient merely to show that the Tribunal below was arguably wrong or that there is a bona fide challenge to an issue of fact.
2. In Collins v Urban, the Appeal Panel stated at [76] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of cl 12 (1) of Sch 4 may have been suffered where:

"... there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance."

1. The Appeal Panel in Collins v Uban further stated at [77] to [79]:

[77] As to the particular grounds in cl 12(1)(a) and (b), without seeking to be exhaustive in any way, the authorities establish that:

(1) If there has been a denial of procedural fairness the decision under appeal can be said to have been "not fair and equitable" - Hutchings v CTTT [2008] NSWSC 717 at [35], Atkinson v Crowley [2011] NSWCA 194 at [12].

(2) The decision under appeal can be said to be "against the weight of evidence" (which is an expression also used to describe a ground upon which a jury verdict can be set aside) where the evidence in its totality preponderates so strongly against the conclusion found by the tribunal at first instance that it can be said that the conclusion was not one that a reasonable tribunal member could reach - Calin v The Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 23; (1991) 173 CLR 33 at 41-42, Mainteck Services Pty Limited v Stein Heurtey SA [2013] NSWSC 266 at [153].

[78] If in either of those circumstances the appellant may have been deprived of a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved then the Appeal Panel may be satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because the decision was not fair and equitable or because the decision was against the weight of the evidence.

[79] In order to show that a party has been deprived of a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" of achieving a different and more favourable result because of one of the circumstances referred to in cl 12(1)(a), (b) or (c), it will be generally be necessary for the party to explain what its case would have been and show that it was fairly arguable. If the party fails to do this, even if there has been a denial of procedural fairness, the Appeal Panel may conclude that it is not satisfied that any substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred - see the general discussion in Kyriakou v Long [2013] NSWSC 1890 at [32] ff concerning the corresponding provisions of s 68 of the CTTT Act and especially at [46] and [55].

1. Even if an appellant from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division has satisfied the requirements of cl 12(1) of Schedule 4 by any of the reasons set out in cl 12(1)(a), (b) or (c), the Appeal Panel must still consider whether it should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b).
2. In Collins v Urban, the Appeal Panel stated at [84] that ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand;

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed.

1. In determining an appeal, s 81 of the NCAT Act provides as follows:

"(1) In determining an internal appeal, the Appeal Panel may make such orders as it considers appropriate in light of its decision on the appeal, including (but not limited to) orders that provide for any one or more of the following -

(a) the appeal to be allowed or dismissed,

(b) the decision under appeal to be confirmed, affirmed or varied,

(c) the decision under appeal to be quashed or set aside,

(d) the decision under appeal to be quashed or set aside and for another decision to be substituted for it,

(e) the whole or any part of the case to be reconsidered by the Tribunal, either with or without further evidence, in accordance with the directions of the Appeal Panel.

(2) The Appeal Panel may exercise all the functions that are conferred or imposed by this Act or other legislation on the Tribunal at first instance when confirming, affirming or varying, or making a decision in substitution for, the decision under appeal and may exercise such functions on grounds other than those relied upon at first instance."

1. We shall deal first with the rent arrears issues and then the plumbing invoice issue.
2. We note Ms Alcock indicated that, if we found that the allocation of the $1,300.00 within the rent issue had been an issue in the proceedings, but had not been determined, she wanted us to deal with it.
3. We have adopted that approach to that issue given the small amounts involved compared with the use of the parties' and public resources in remitting the matter to cure any found error.

1. The appellant raised four issues on appeal in respect of the calculation of rent arrears. The effect of each, if successful, would reduce the amount payable by the appellant for rent arrears.
2. First, in circumstances where the respondents' claim for unpaid rent was for $7,291.08, being the sum of invoices for $1,911.90, $1,911.90, $1,911.00 and $1,555.38 (being $1,911.90 less a payment of $356.52), the appellant contended that:

(1) an issue to be considered at the hearing, being whether the evidence showed that an additional amount $1,300.00 ought to have been, but was not, allocated to unpaid rent prior to the final four invoices having been issued, was not considered by the primary member when determining the matter; and

(2) the evidence clearly showed that the $1,300.00 ought to have been allocated to rent arrears.

1. Secondly, that the primary member should have found that a further amount of $100.00 paid to the respondents should have been allocated to rent arrears.
2. Thirdly, that the primary member should have found that an amount of $703.58 had otherwise been overcharged for rent.
3. Fourthly, that the primary member should have found that $1,911.90 of rent (one month's rent) was not payable for the month after the Lease had been terminated, but before the appellant vacated the Premises.

Payments of $1000.00 and $300.00 allocated to Square Software Equipment

1. The last four rental tax invoices are at pages 27, 28, 29 and 30 of AB 1.
2. They were for $1,911.90 per month with the first including a payment of $356.52 made on 19 January 2024. Taking into account the payment of $356.52, they totalled $7,291.08. That was the amount claimed by the respondents for rent arrears for the period 1 November 2023 to 29 February 2024.
3. The primary member at [116] to [117] of the Decision, in dealing with the unpaid rent claim, stated:

116 Ms McEachern does not specifically dispute the amount claimed in each invoice. In her unsigned statement in response to the claim, she says that the respondents have supplied "false versions of accounts" and that, according to her records, by January 2024, an amount of $42,098.10 had been paid into the STR trust account for rent and, at the time the lease came to an end, $43,973.70 had been paid.

117 These are not answers to the respondents' claim for rent arrears. It is not enough to make assertions about what has been paid. The onus is on Ms McEachern to establish from her records that the rent claim has, in fact, been paid and there are no outstanding amounts. She has not done that. Accordingly, I find that the amount of $7291.08 is payable by Ms McEachern to the respondents.

1. Copies of statements summarising rent invoices issued and payments made are at pages 2 to 6 of AB1.
2. On appeal, the appellant submitted to the effect that at the hearing she had argued that those records and therefore the outstanding rent on the four invoices were inaccurate because they failed to include payments of rent that had been made and could be clearly identified in the general "Payment History" at pages 16,17 and 18 of AB1.
3. More specifically, the appellant submitted that:

(1) On 25 December 2023 she paid $1,000.00 to the respondents for rent, but the respondents allocated it to the payment of "Square Software and Equipment" rather than rent; and

(2) On 15 January 2024 she paid $800.00 to the respondents for rent, but the respondents only allocated $500.00 to rent, with $300.00 allocated to the payment of "Square Software and Equipment" rather than rent.

1. In their Reply to Appeal, the respondents noted in respect of this item, "Not relevant - refer 2024 /00050229001".
2. At the hearing of the appeal, the respondents:

(1) submitted that the ledgers were audited every year;

(2) accepted that the $1,300.00 had been allocated as claimed by the appellant; and

(3) submitted to the effect that it was allocated pursuant to a verbal agreement that it could be taken out of rent.

1. In response to a question as to whether the $1,300.00 was in contest before the primary member, Ms Alcock said she had not read the Decision recently.
2. The Payment History (at AB 16) shows the receipt of $1,000.00 on 25 December 2023 and $300.00 on 15 January 2024 by EFT being allocated towards "Square Software and Equipment".
3. The appellant's bank statements (at AB 27 and 29) record the transfer of amounts of $1,000.00 on 15 December 2023 and $800.00 on 15 January, to the respondents' agent for rent.
4. The transcript extracts relevant to this issue record as follows.
5. At "2 hrs 35":

SM: Where is the evidence of the iPad?

Tim: On page 37, page 36 sorry

Me: On the 15th of January and the 25th of December

Tim Correct...

Me On page 62, my bank statement show I made a payment on Christmas Day towards rent, and then was transferred out under the details of OB square software and equipment, which one of the staff members of the real estate office has claimed she sold to me months before hand"

SM On page 62 I can see the amount on the 25th of December refers to rent, what about the other amount, the $300

Me Um, that was on the 15th January, and that was a payment above it that deposited under the description rent as well.

SM Yes, and what about the other amounts you say were deducted. Did you say something about plumbing.

SM The thing I don't understand um, how is it that $1300 was deducted from the payments to software. What is that all about.

Ms Alcock Well, It's not actually software, it's equipment which is square equipment she used for well over 12 months as a point of sale equipment. It's a cash draw, an iPad and I stand that it goes on, and it's connected through the bank, and it belonged to my daughter who sold it to Andrea, who actually never paid for it, who never paid for a lot of things, but in the end she agreed that she would pay for it. When she moved out, she actually left it behind. So I believe, she used it for 12 months thinking that she owned it, if she didn't use it for 12 months then maybe she should claim that she agreed never to buy it

SM: So, did you say it was left behind

Judy It was left behind when she moved out, yes

SM So you got it back

Judy Yes

SM So does that mean that Ms McEachern Should get her $1300 back?

Judy Well, I don't believe so because it's no good to me for any reason, it belonged to my daughter who used it in another retail business, and when that business closed she gave it to Andi to use in the café, on the understanding that she would pay, not even the cost of it which was $1300

SM But why...

Judy But she chose to leave it behind

SM But why was it deducted from the rent

Judy I beg your pardon

SM Why was the Point of sale deducted from the rent

Judy Well, I don't believe it was deducted from the rent. I don't believe the plumbing bill money was deducted from the rent either. I believe that I was entitled to take those costs, that they agreed to out of the monies that she paid before any money is allocated towards rent. Now maybe I was wrong in thinking that about the square equipment, certainly not wrong thinking about the damage from not looking after the grease trap properly. I had no option to pay that myself...

1. It is clear to us from the transcript extracts, the applicant's bank statements, the payments history and paragraphs [116] and [117] of the Decision, that the allocation of $1,300.00 paid for rent to "Square Software and Equipment" was clearly raised and argued as an issue in the proceedings and has not been dealt with in the Decision.
2. Mindful that, as noted above, a failure to take into account a "clearly articulated and substantial argument" is a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction as well as an error of law and so constitutes a question of law, that the allocation of the $1,300.00 has not been considered or dealt with in the Decision, is, in our view, an error on a question of law.
3. Noting that Ms Alcock was not able to point to any entitlement under the Lease for the respondents to allocate the $1,300.00 to a software payment, it also clear, from the evidence before the Tribunal and the parties' submissions, that:

(1) the $1,300.00 was allocated to "Square Software and Equipment" because of a verbal agreement the respondents say the appellant had with them or their daughter in respect of point of sale equipment, including an ipad (the passing reference in the transcript was ambiguous as to who the verbal agreement was said to be with); and

(2) there was nothing in the evidence that suggested that the entitlement of the respondents to allocate $1,300.00 for "Square Software and Equipment" rather than rent arose under the Lease or any other agreement between the respondents and the appellant; and

(3) the evidence before the Tribunal was not capable of establishing any entitlement for the respondents to allocate $1,300.00 to "Square Software and Equipment"; and

(4) the $1,300.00 should count towards the unpaid rent.

1. It follows, in our view, that the evidence that was before the Tribunal clearly shows that $1,300.00 was transferred by the appellant to the respondents by EFT for the payment of rent, the $1,300.00 was instead allocated towards point of sale equipment which the respondents say their daughter had provided the appellant, was recorded as being a payment towards "Square Software and Equipment" without any established basis for that change of allocation from what the appellant instructed, and should have been allocated to rent.
2. Even if not an error of law, we would grant leave to appeal on this issue as there is "an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand" (Collins at [84(2)(c)]) in circumstances where the issue was clearly run at the hearing.
3. The appeal on this item is allowed. In re-determining the matter we find that, having regard to the evidence that was before the Tribunal, the amount the appellant is ordered to pay the respondent for rent arrears should be reduced by $1,300.00 to take into account the correct allocation of that payment. The evidence on payment for the point of sale equipment being agreed and with whom is too uncertain to support a finding.

(1) entries in the Payment history (AB 2 p 20) on 21 August 2024 recording payments of $240.00 to "Enviro Cycle pump out / Grease trap pump" and $500.00 to "Rent for period 09/03/2023 to 31/03/2023 - Shop ..., being a total of $740.00; and

(2) a bank entry (at AB 2 p 25) showing a transfer of $840.00 for rent on 21 August 2024.

1. The appellant submits to the effect that an amount of $100.00 (the difference between the $840.00 and the $740.00) ought to have been allocated towards rent, but was not, and that the primary member erred by not reducing the rent payable by the further amount of $100.00.
2. The respondents' in their reply state that "The transaction amount of $100.00 was owed to Judith Alcock personally and was erroneously paid by Ms McEachern into the rental trust account".
3. We were not taken to any transcript extract where this issue was dealt with at hearing or any other document that was before the Tribunal that clearly raised this issue. Although the appellant's bank records show a payment of $840.00 on 21 August 2023, unlike the situation with the $1,300.00 there is no evidence of how the relevant $100.00 was allocated or how it was argued before the primary member that it should be allocated.
4. In the absence of evidence of this item having been argued at the hearing or records showing what the apparently missing $100.00 was paid towards, or any other record that was before the Tribunal in respect of the $100.00, we are not satisfied that any error has been in the primary member's determination.
5. Leave to appeal in respect of this item is therefore refused.

1. The appellant relied on a summary that she says was prepared by her accountant that summarises the rents payable and the rent paid over the last 25 months of the tenancy (AB 2 p 24) and submits that, when the invoices and ledgers are compared, putting to one side the other claims, there is still an over payment of $703.58.
2. We were not taken to any transcript extract where this issue of an overcharging of rent of $703.58 was dealt with at the hearing or any other document that was before the Tribunal that clearly raised this issue or identified how the alleged overcharging was calculated.
3. We are therefore not satisfied that any error has been demonstrated in the primary member's determination. Leave to appeal in respect of this issue is therefore refused.

Rent claimed for period after notice of termination.

1. The appellant submitted to the effect that she disputed the last four weeks' rent that was claimed because she says she was unfairly evicted, didn't owe what the respondents claimed and spent time packing and moving out which meant that she could not trade and therefore did not earn any money.
2. We were not taken to a transcript extract of where this was dealt with but have regard to findings of the primary member that are not challenged:

(1) At [39], on 28 January 2024, the respondents emailed a notice to terminate the Lease to the appellant, noting that the Lease had not been renewed and had therefore continued on a month to month basis and giving one months' notice of termination to 28 February 2024;

(2) At [40], on 28 February 2024, the appellant informed the respondents that she had done her best to have everything out of the cafe and requested a further 7 days to facilitate the "removal of the coffee machine and finish patching/painting/cleaning etc..."

(3) At [43], that the respondents agreed to a further 7 days (until 6th March) for the appellant to compete her exit".

(4) At [115], that rent was claimed for the period 1 November 2023 to 29 February 2024.

1. It appears then from [45] to [46] of the Decision that the appellant completed the removal of items and any make good by 6 or 7 March 2024.
2. The Lease provides that rent shall be paid on the first day of each calendar month and the amount of the last rent instalment shall be calculated on the monthly rent instalment pro rata for the number of days from the beginning of the last month of the lease until the date the lease ends. The rent claimed was only up to 29 February 2024, but the appellant was still removing items and making good up to 6 or 7 March 2024, which was an obligation on the appellant, under clause 11 (c) of the Lease, at the end of the lease.
3. For the foregoing reasons, we are not satisfied that that any error has been demonstrated in the primary member's determination in respect of this item.
4. Leave to appeal in respect of this issue is therefore refused.

1. In summary, the appellant argued that a tax invoice for $770.00 from a plumber was not payable by her and that the primary member erred by finding that it was.
2. The relevant invoice (at AB2 p 45) from "John Groom - Plumber" to "Judy Alcock" is dated 13/02/2023 (being 17 months after the lease commenced on 1 September 2021 (Decision at [3])) and states:

Job details,

Installation of septic filter on septic pump out line; top dressing of irrigation bed; investigate smell from hand basin

Price $770.00.

1. The primary member, having made a detailed summary of the background facts at [3] of the Decision, noted at paragraph [23] that:

From at least February 2023, Ms McEachern was falling behind in rental payments and payments for plumbing charges for servicing the grease trap. At the end of April 2023, outstanding rent amounted to $5,247.60".

1. Relevant to the plumbing invoices specifically, the primary member noted and found at [120] and following:

120 An invoice, also issued in February 2023, is a charge of $770 inclusive of GST to install a septic filter on the septic pump out line, for the top dressing of the irrigation bed and to investigate a smell from the hand basin.

...

124 The lease provides for Ms McEachern to pay as outgoings, 25% of the outgoings for the building of which the premises form part. The disclosure statement, however, estimates Ms McEachern's Annual share of outgoings for the building to be $250, which, according to the disclosure statement, represents 25% of common area lighting. However, none of the amounts claimed are for outgoings.

125 Relevantly, the least provides that the grease trap is to be cleaned no less than once per year... and you clean and service it on a regular basis... The lease also provides that Ms McEachern is responsible for maintaining and servicing and keeping in a good state of repair at her expense any plant or machinery located within and exclusively servicing the premises...

126 The respondents say that Ms McEachern failed to comply with her obligations under the lease requiring that the grease trap be checked out or pumped. Her failure to do so is said to have caused the grease trap to explode and contaminate the entire septic system. That the grease trap did explode is not in dispute.

...

128 Ms McEachern claims that she was never supplied with the plumbing invoices "until the last day" which I assume means the last day of the lease. As I understand it, Ms McEachern also claims to have overpaid for the plumbing expenses.

129 In some of the text messages from Alcock to Ms McEachern, Ms McEachern Is asked to make payments towards plumbing costs that have been incurred and invoiced. It appears from this correspondence and her response to the claim that Ms McEachern does not deny liability for these plumbing expenses but rather is questioning the amounts claimed, or whether they have been paid, by her, or both.

130 It was open to Ms McEachern to provide evidence to show that the amounts charged by the plumber were unreasonable or that any of the invoices for the plumbing work had been paid. However, she did neither.

131 I am comfortably satisfied that Ms McEachern had an obligation under clause 2 of Annexure A and clauses 6(b) and (f), Annexure B to maintain the grease trap and UV water filtered system. I am also comfortably satisfied on the evidence presented that she failed to do so and is, therefore, required to reimburse the respondents for the plumbing invoices.

132 Accordingly, I find that the amount of $3785.50 is payable by Ms McEachern less GST.

1. In her "Appeal Summary", the appellant contended to the effect that:

(1) she disputes the invoice for $770.00 in February 2023 should be awarded to the respondents, that it appears months before any grease trap issues, the respondents' expense spreadsheet (AB2 p 38) shows the septic was serviced in November 2022 and there is no evidence the appellant had caused any septic issues;

(2) the respondents rely on hearsay to attribute the appellant with any wrong doing, with no invoice or expert report to support their opinion; and

(3) the respondents rely on a back-dated agency agreement to reflect the installation of the UV and the installation of the water filter by 6 months.

1. The appellant did not include any transcript extracts relevant to this issue and did not identify the "hearsay" evidence that she says the respondents relied on.
2. The respondents contended, in their Reply to Appeal, that the appellant did not dispute her liability to the respondents for plumbing invoices and that the plumbing invoices (including the $770.00 invoice dated 13 February 2023), were all for plumbing work which was required and "were all lawfully deducted from rent ...".
3. At the hearing of the Appeal, the respondents submitted that the invoice was paid to have the system serviced and because of a smell from the basin which the appellant had asked to be investigated, that the smell was from the appellant's grease trap, that a filter and septic line were installed to get rid of the smell and that they had told the appellant at the time that it was a lessee cost.
4. In reply, the appellant submitted that there was no evidence that the plumbing invoice had anything to do with the appellant's business.
5. We have not been taken to any transcript extract on this issue or, save for the invoice, any other evidence on the issue. As already said, the appellant submitted that there was material before the primary member which was relied on by the respondents (albeit, according to the appellant, "hearsay"). It appears arguable that, on the face of the invoice, it relates to the appellant's business
6. Taking the foregoing into account, the appellant has not identified any error in the primary member's decision in respect of this issue and the primary member's findings in respect of the plumbing invoices appear open on the evidence.
7. Leave to appeal in respect of this issue is therefore refused.

(1) To the extent required, leave to appeal is granted.

(2) The appeal is allowed in respect of the allocation of $1,300.00 paid by the appellant to "Square Software and Equipment" (being Item 6 in the "Grounds of Appeal" and Item 1 of the Appeal Summary filed 11 March 2025).

(3) Order 2 made 21 January 2025 is varied to $10,458.03.

(4) Save as provided above, leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.