McDevitt & Duchamps [2026] FedCFamC1A 11 (27 January 2026)

Cizek & Mihov (2024) FLC 94-206; [2024] FedCFamC1A 151

Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084

DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26

Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296; [1971] HCA 54

FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

Hannigan & Hannigan (2025) FLC 94-264; [2025] FedCFamC1A 117

Hedlund & Hedlund (2021) FLC 94-065; [2021] FedCFamC1A 84

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378

Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97

Keane & Keane (2021) 62 Fam LR 190; [2021] FamCAFC 1

Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126

L v P [2022] WASCA 40

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28

Morgan & Miles (2007) FLC 93-343; [2007] FamCA 1230

Pierce & Pierce (No 2) (2025) FLC 94-271; [2025] FedCFamC1A 162

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasinghan (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1

Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528

Rigby & Olsen [2021] FedCFamC1A 46

Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550; [2016] HCA 22

Sangha v Baxter [2009] NSWCA 78

Sayer & Radcliffe [2012] FamCAFC 209; (2012) 48 Fam LR 298; [2012]

SCVG & KLD (2014) FLC 93-582; [2014] FamCAFC 42

Tibb & Sheean (2018) 58 Fam LR 351; [2018] FamCAFC 142

U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238; [2002] HCA 36

1. The appeal is hereby dismissed.
2. Within 28 days of the date of these orders, the appellant shall pay the costs of the respondent, in the sum of $4,268.55, and the costs of the Independent Children's Lawyer, in the sum of $7,219.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym McDevitt & Duchamps has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is an appeal from the decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), delivered on 23 June 2025, concerning parenting orders in respect of X ("the child"), born in early 2019. The primary proceedings were initiated by the child's father, Mr McDevitt ("the appellant"), seeking sole parental responsibility and for the child to reside with him in Australia. The child's mother, Ms Duchamps ("the respondent"), sought sole parental responsibility and for the child to reside with her in the United States of America ("USA"). In the circumstances summarised below, both parties and the child were living in New South Wales at the time of trial.
2. The primary judge found that the appellant posed an unacceptable risk to the child due to his history of engaging in family violence - primarily in the form of coercive and controlling behaviour - and his lack of insight into his conduct (at [116], [118] and [134]). In the context of that finding, the primary judge found that the respondent was the parent best equipped to meet the child's needs (at [156]).
3. The primary judge made orders granting the respondent sole parental responsibility and permitting her to live with the child in State J, USA. The orders also provided for structured time arrangements between the child and the appellant, and addressed ancillary matters including communication protocols, international travel, and the removal of the child's name from the Family Law Watchlist ("the Watchlist").
4. The appeal raises issues concerning the findings of family violence, the assessment of risk to the child, and the exercise of discretion in permitting international relocation. Central to the appeal are the factual determinations made by the primary judge regarding the appellant's history of coercive and controlling behaviour, the credibility of the respondent's evidence, and the weight afforded to expert reports and prior judicial findings, including those arising from proceedings in the United Kingdom ("UK").

1. The primary judge detailed the background of the parties to these proceedings (at [3]-[28]). By way of summary, the appellant is an Australian citizen, aged 52 years old, who resides in Sydney. He has international work experience and is the owner of a company. In addition to the child involved in the current proceedings, he is the father of another child, D, from a previous relationship with Ms F.
2. D and Ms F live in England. The care arrangements for D were the subject of protracted litigation in England, during which significant factual findings were made that were adverse to the appellant. In particular, the appellant was found to have perpetrated family violence, coercive control and abuse in his relationship with Ms F.
3. The respondent is an American citizen, aged 30. She holds permanent residency in Australia. She met the appellant in State G in 2017 and initially relocated to Australia in 2019 following the child's birth in State J.
4. Mr E is the respondent's current partner. He is an American citizen and lives in State J. He shares equal care of a daughter from a previous relationship, who is about seven years old. In the first instance proceedings, the appellant raised concerns regarding Mr E's criminal history, which included traffic offences and a drug conviction. The Court found no evidence of violence and accepted that he posed no general risk to the child, subject to certain restraints such as not driving the child (at [158]).

1. The parties met in 2017 while working in State G, USA, and commenced a relationship shortly thereafter. At the time, the respondent was 21 years old and had recently left college, while the appellant was 43 years old, self-employed and already a parent to his first child. Although they lived in separate countries - he in Australia and she in the USA - the respondent joined the appellant on his international work travels on occasion.
2. The relationship was tumultuous from the outset. It is unnecessary to descend into detail for present purposes. It is sufficient to note that it was common ground at trial that the relationship between the parties ended on numerous occasions, often in highly conflictual circumstances, before resuming. The primary judge notes (at [84]-[98]), by way of one example only, an incident which occurred when the relationship between the parties was intact and the appellant travelled to State J for the child's birth at the request of the respondent. There was conflict at the hospital involving the appellant and members of the respondent's family. Social workers and security became involved, and the appellant left the hospital. He did not remain for the child's birth; rather, he travelled to another city to celebrate his birthday with friends before returning to Australia a week later without seeing the child. He then travelled back to State J for approximately five days in late February 2019 and spent time with the respondent and the child (appellant's affidavit, filed on 10 January 2025, p.22-24).
3. In March 2019, the respondent relocated to Australia with the child to live with the appellant. Within two months, a provisional Apprehended Domestic Violence Order ("ADVO") was issued for her protection. Around the same time, the appellant commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia seeking to place the child on the Watchlist. Despite those proceedings, the respondent obtained a USA passport for the child and returned to State J. The parties reconciled in mid-2019 and the respondent returned to Australia with the child in late 2019.
4. The relationship deteriorated again in mid-2020, prompting another ADVO application for the protection of the respondent from the appellant. The respondent attempted to return to the USA but was prevented from doing so due to the child's placement on the Watchlist. She and the child lived in a women's refuge for a period, and the appellant commenced further proceedings in this Court before the parties again reconciled. On 2 September 2020, the proceedings were discontinued by consent and the provisional ADVO was withdrawn by police in December 2020.
5. In late 2023, the appellant consented to the respondent travelling with the child to State J for approximately one month. The respondent signed a statutory declaration confirming her intention to return to Australia. However, the relationship again broke down, and the respondent did not return with the child. The appellant commenced proceedings in this Court and travelled to the USA in November 2023. The following day, he obtained an ex parte recovery order from a State J court and removed the child from the respondent's care with the assistance of police. The next day, at a hearing in which both parties participated, the child's passports were delivered to the appellant. The proceedings were adjourned to 6 November 2023 so that the respondent could obtain legal advice. Prior to the adjourned date, without notice to the respondent, the appellant returned to Australia with the child and took steps to discontinue the proceedings in the State J court.
6. Following his return, orders were made in this Court on 8 November 2023 for the child to live with the appellant and be placed on the Watchlist. Between late 2023 and mid-2024, the respondent remained in the USA, maintaining regular FaceTime communication with the child. In mid-2024, the respondent returned to Australia and began spending time with the child supervised by the father.
7. Approximately one month later, the respondent made a police report regarding an incident during a supervised visit, resulting in a provisional ADVO being issued for the protection of the respondent and the child from the appellant. Shortly after, the ADVO was varied to remove the child as a protected person. That same day, the respondent attempted to remove the child from school, prompting police intervention. The child was placed in the respondent's care by police. On 31 July 2024, the appellant filed an urgent recovery application, and on 2 August 2024, the child was returned to his care, again with police involvement. Interim orders were made on 2 August 2024 for the child to live with the appellant and spend unsupervised, structured time with the respondent.
8. A Family Report was prepared by Court Child Expert Ms C ("the Family Report writer") on 21 August 2024 and the matter proceeded to final hearing on 13 to 17 January 2025 and 31 March 2025. The judgment was delivered on 23 June 2025 and the orders, now the subject of the appeal, were made.

1. By way of an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 4 July 2025, the appellant raises the following grounds of appeal:
   1. The primary judge erred in law in finding that the proposed relocation of the child to the United States was consistent with the child's best interests, contrary to s60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), in circumstances where the relocation would significantly impair the child's capacity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the appellant.
   2. The primary judge placed undue weight on historical allegations of violence in the appellant's previous relationships as indicative of current or ongoing risk to the child, without sufficient evidentiary foundation and failed to consider the current circumstances as indicative of the appellant's behaviour and parenting.
   3. The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in family violence, in circumstances where the evidence did not support such a finding or where the finding was based on misapprehension of the evidence.
   4. The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, in circumstances where the evidence did not support such a finding, and/or where the finding was made without adequate reasoning.
   5. The primary judge failed to reconcile the finding that the appellant posed an unacceptable risk with the decision to permit the appellant to have contact with the child internationally, without adequate safeguards or explanation, thereby exercising discretion in a manner that was legally inconsistent or unreasonable.
   6. The primary judge failed to give adequate weight to the primary consideration in s60CC(2)(a), namely that child's right to a meaningful relationship with both parents, in circumstances where international relocation would substantially curtail the child's time and communication with the appellant.
   7. The primary judge's discretion miscarried by giving disproportionate weight to the respondent's personal and relational circumstances in the United States, without properly weighing the child's right to a continuing relationship with the appellant and the practical limitations on that relationship post-relocation.
   8. The primary judge made findings of fact not open on the evidence regarding the appellant's capacity to travel internationally to maintain his relationship with the child, and/or the practicality of implementing the proposed time arrangements.
   9. The primary judge erred in finding that the respondent would support or facilitate the appellant's relationship with the child following relocation, where was no, or insufficient, evidentiary basis to support such a finding.
   10. The primary judge failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that relocation was in the child's best interest, in light of conflicting findings about risk, evidence regarding the child's attachment to the appellant, and practical obstacles to ongoing contact.

1. On the day of the appeal hearing, counsel for the appellant acknowledged that Ground 6 was grounded in a legislative provision that had been repealed well prior to the trial. Sensibly, that ground was abandoned (Transcript 28 October 2025, p.26 lines 6-8). Ground 8 was also abandoned (Transcript 28 October 2025, p.3 lines 9-12).
2. The appellant was granted leave to also rely upon a supplementary ground of appeal ("the Additional Ground") set out in his Summary of Argument filed on 16 September 2025, which is as follows:

New Ground - That the primary judge failed to consider the competing proposals of the parties, in particular the proposal of the Appellant that the child continue to live primarily in Australia with the Appellant by failing to follow the statutory requirements mandated by section 60CC of the Family Law Act.

1. A number of the grounds of appeal, including the Additional Ground, generate challenges such as the conflation of disparate categories of asserted error and failing to set out a precise and specific statement of the point to be argued by way of the grounds of appeal. By way of example, the Additional Ground conflates a complaint as to failing to consider the proposals of the parties by reference to applicable principles and, at the same time, contends a failure to consider the mandatory factors identified in s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
2. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the appellant asserts that the primary judge made errors of law (Ground 1 and the Additional Ground). He asserts errors of fact as to family violence and risk (Ground 3 and Ground 4) and as to other matters (Ground 9). He challenges the weight attributed by the primary judge to particular findings (Ground 2 and Ground 7) and the exercise of the primary judge's discretion (Ground 5) and asserts inadequacy of reasons (Grounds 4, 5 and 10). With one exception, it is convenient to consider the various grounds in those broad groupings.
3. The primary judge in this matter exercised a broad discretion in making orders regulating the parenting of the child pursuant to Pt VII of the Act. It is well established that, for an appellant to succeed in an appeal from an exercise of that discretion, they must bring their appeal within one of the recognised categories of appellate intervention identified by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 ("House v The King"), namely the primary judge's discretion miscarried by:

(1) Making an error in approach or principle;

(2) Failing to consider a relevant circumstance and/or considering an irrelevant circumstance;

(3) Making an error in the findings of fact such that the finding is unsupported by the evidence; or

(4) Making orders that fall so outside a reasonable exercise of discretion that the orders were "unreasonable or plainly unjust".

1. The weight given to evidence in the exercise of discretion in making parenting orders that promote the best interests of children is a matter quintessentially for the primary judge. As identified in Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126:
   1. There is no doubt that in making parenting orders, the Court is exercising a very broad discretion. In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 the majority said "The evidence in residency cases is often such that the same body of evidence may produce opposite but reasonable conclusions." (at [140]). They added:
      1. The evidence in residency cases is often such that the same body of evidence may produce opposite but nevertheless reasonable conclusions from different judges. It is a mistake to think that there is always only one right answer to the question of what the best interests of a child require. Each judge is duty bound to make the order which he or she thinks is in the best interests of the child. But the fact that other judges think that the best interests of that child require a different order does not necessarily prove that the first order was not in the best interests of the child. Best interests are values, not facts. They involve a discretionary judgment in respect of which judges can come to opposite but reasonable conclusions. In G v G [[1985] FLR 894 at 897-898], Lord Fraser of Tullybelton pointed out:

"The jurisdiction in such cases is one of great difficulty, as every judge who has had to exercise it must be aware. The main reason is that in most of these cases there is no right answer. All practicable answers are to some extent unsatisfactory and therefore to some extent wrong, and the best that can be done is to find an answer that is reasonably satisfactory."

1. The burden placed on an appellant seeking to establish that a discretionary decision is unreasonable or plainly wrong is thus a heavy one.

1. As the findings of the primary judge challenged by Ground 3 and Ground 4 were central to the disposition of the proceedings at first instance, we will consider those grounds first.

Ground 3 - The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in family violence, in circumstances where the evidence did not support such a finding or where the finding was based on misapprehension of the evidence

1. The appellant notes that the primary judge began (at [43]) by giving detailed attention to the allegations of family violence made against him.
2. The allegations included claims of violence being committed by the appellant against former partners and the respondent herself. Many were historical, dating between 2005 and 2013. The primary judge acknowledged that a number of these allegations were not directly related to the respondent, and that some had resulted in charges being dismissed or ADVO applications withdrawn (at [49]). In one instance, a conviction for common assault was overturned on appeal (at [50]).
3. However, it was not disputed by the appellant that he was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in June 2015 and that conviction was upheld on appeal (at [57]). The appellant was also involved in two fact-finding hearings in the UK, one in 2019 and another in 2022. After the first of those hearings the court rejected Ms F's allegations of family violence. However, after further evidence was presented, at the second fact-finding hearing, the court accepted the allegations and detailed findings adverse to the appellant were made.
4. Throughout the primary proceedings, the appellant denied perpetrating family violence as alleged by the respondent. Both parties were cross-examined extensively about these allegations.
5. The appellant contends that it is both significant and surprising that there is no challenge by the respondent to the primary judge's findings regarding her credibility. This is despite the evidence establishing that the respondent had lied in documents filed in the UK, in her oral evidence before the UK trial judge, to the Department of Immigration, and had exaggerated matters to NSW Police concerning the appellant's alleged conduct.
6. Despite these findings, the primary judge accepted the respondent's evidence about family violence. The appellant argues that this acceptance was not justified by the evidence and amounts to error.

1. The appellant must establish on appeal that the finding of fact subject to complaint was material and not open on the evidence (Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 at 300). Simply because other findings of fact may also have been open on the evidence does not demonstrate that a finding of fact complained of was thus not open or available. That is not the test. To establish an error of fact, it is necessary for the appellant to establish that the impugned finding of fact was either demonstrably wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony; glaringly improbable; or contrary to compelling inferences (Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 331 ALR 550 at [43]).
2. The primary judge made detailed findings of fact as to both the perpetration of family violence by the appellant against the respondent, and as to his perpetration of family violence against Ms F and other former partners. Those findings may be briefly summarised for present purposes.
3. The relevant findings included the following in respect to the respondent:
   • Pushing the respondent in the shower in 2020, causing her to fall onto their infant child resulting in swelling on the child's forehead (at [100]-[101]).
   • Emotional abuse during her pregnancy, including berating her for revealing the child's gender (at [73]-[74]).
   • Aggressive behaviour at the hospital during the birth of the child, including throwing away a gift from the maternal family and being asked to leave the hospital due to safety concerns (at [86]-[89]).
   • Financial control, such as irregular and insufficient financial support, requiring the respondent to request funds (at [103]-[104]).
   • Undermining her employment by contacting her employer to complain about her work hours (at [105]).
   • Imposing strict limitations on the respondent's FaceTime contact with the child, which were managed by cutting the Wi-Fi to end calls (at [106]).
4. In respect to Ms F, the primary judge accepted the findings from a 2022 UK fact-finding hearing that the appellant had (at [63]-[69]):
   • Monitored Ms F's movements using spyware;
   • Controlled her professional activities, including directing her shows and tours;
   • Verbally abused her with derogatory terms;
   • Physically assaulted her, including forcing her out of a car on a motorway while she was eight months pregnant;
   • Threatened to kill her partner; and
   • Engaged in reputational attacks via social media.
5. The primary judge also considered NSW Police records produced in the proceedings (at [44]-[60]) and found they revealed a pattern of violent behaviour by the appellant towards multiple former partners, including physical assaults such as dragging a partner by her hair, punching a woman in the face, kicking a woman in the chest, attempting to push a woman down the stairs, pulling a woman out of a car causing her to hit her head on the road and putting his hands around a woman's throat. One former partner reported a 2005 assault where the appellant dragged her by the hair, punched her face and ribs and threatened her. The evidence includes police observation of the woman's injuries. Another ex-partner suffered a serious attack in 2013, after which the father was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (his conviction was upheld on appeal).
6. The primary judge also noted that multiple ADVOs were taken out against the appellant protecting different women and that a conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm in 2015 was confirmed on appeal (at [57]).
7. To the extent that the appellant argues that the making of those findings, based at least in part on the acceptance by the primary judge of the evidence of the respondent, was inconsistent with her findings that the respondent had lied, as earlier noted that argument is flawed for three reasons.
8. First, the advantage of the primary judge in the assessment of credibility, and the caution with which an appellate court must approach any challenge to that assessment, is well established in Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [28]-[29].
9. Second, findings as to "overall" credibility are of limited use and application. It is entirely open to a trial judge to believe the evidence of a witness in respect of some disputed facts and not others (Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2000] FCA 1084; (2000) 103 FCR 1 at [118]; Sangha v Baxter [2009] NSWCA 78 at [155]).
10. Third, the contention that a finding that the respondent lied while still in a relationship with the appellant, by denying that he had behaved violently towards her, somehow undermines a subsequent finding that he submitted her to coercive control during that relationship, need only be stated to be dismissed. Far from undermining the latter finding, the former supports it.
11. The appellant has not established on appeal that the findings under challenge by way of this ground were demonstrably wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony; glaringly improbable; or contrary to compelling inferences. Ground 3 is without merit.

Ground 4 - The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, in circumstances where the evidence did not support such a finding, and/or where the finding was made without adequate reasoning

1. This ground also conflates a complaint as to error in concluding that the appellant poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the child and a complaint of inadequate reasoning as to that conclusion.
2. As a starting point, the Full Court in Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97; (2022) FLC 94-092 identified that assessing whether risk is unacceptable remains a two-step process as to, firstly, the consideration of the conduct allegations by way of applying the civil standard of proof, and secondly, assessing the risk of recurrence which cannot be measured by the civil standard of proof, but rather by reference to realistic possibilities. The conclusion as to unacceptable risk is not the product of an exercise of discretion. There is no obligation to give reasons for why individual pieces of evidence are accepted or rejected (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasinghan (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67]), unless the parties advance conflicting evidence on a matter significant to the outcome, in which case both sets of evidence should be referred to and reasons provided for why the judge prefers one set of evidence to the other so that the reasons explain particular findings of fact which are critical or determinative (DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [130]).
3. The direct expression of the relevant finding of the primary judge is brief. The primary judge simply states:
   1. I accept that the [appellant] poses an unacceptable risk to [the child] in the future, having assessed his past conduct. That risk arises for [the child] in being exposed to family violence by her father in his future relationships, which is adverse to her physical and psychological well-being. That includes the emotional and psychological harm of witnessing acts of violence, being caught up in an incident so that she may be physically injured, or having to cope with police attendances at her home. He provides a poor role model for her future relationships.
4. The appellant seizes on that direct expression of the relevant finding, not least in support of Ground 5 as appears below. While a more expansive expression of the finding might have been preferable, nevertheless, a proper reading of the whole of the primary judgment makes the substance of the finding clear.
5. Properly understood, there are two relevant findings. On a reading of the judgment as a whole, it is clear that the primary judge reached an evidence-based conclusion that the child would be exposed to family violence in the care of the appellant, and that the identified risk was found by the primary judge to be unacceptable if the child was to live primarily in his care and spend necessarily limited time with the respondent.
6. For the reasons already canvassed in relation to Ground 3, the findings of past conduct which informed the findings as to risk were clearly open on the evidence.
7. That point having been established, the further conclusion by the primary judge that the identified risks would be unacceptable were the child to live primarily with the appellant was again reasonably open. The fact that, in the preparation of the Family Report in August 2024, the respondent did not raise immediate concerns about physical abuse in the appellant's care, and, apart from the child saying she felt "sad" or "more upset" when the appellant yelled or got angry when she cried loudly (Family Report dated 21 August 2024, paragraph 79), there was no disclosure of adverse conduct by the appellant that would indicate the child was at risk in his care, does not alter that conclusion so as to make it not reasonably open.
8. Similarly, the fact that, as noted by the appellant, no orders were sought or in place to safeguard the child against such a risk while in his care prior to trial, does not undermine the findings made when considered in the context of the parameters of the litigation set by the parties. It was only once the whole of the available evidence could be presented and tested at trial that the substantive assessment of risk could be properly undertaken. That assessment was, entirely appropriately, informed by the findings made as to the appellant's past conduct.
9. In Hannigan & Hannigan (2025) FLC 94-264 the Full Court stated:
   1. ...Risks are the possibility of future events. A possible future event cannot be described with the same level of particularity as a past event.
   2. When assessing risks, the High Court said in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574 "[p]ast events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability - high or low - of their recurrence". It is obvious that past violence, especially if directed at a family member, is a sound basis for considering future violence to be a significant risk.
10. The primary judge found that the appellant's conduct was not isolated, but part of a long-standing pattern of abusive behaviour in intimate relationships. There was ample evidence to support that finding.
11. Equally, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion of the primary judge that the appellant's established pattern of conduct would likely continue in future relationships.
12. In assessing future risk, the primary judge was entitled to have regard to the fact that the appellant denied or minimised the incidents found to have occurred, often claiming unconvincingly not to recall them (at [60] and [68]). Relevantly in Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528, the England and Wales Court of Appeal explained that in assessing future risk:
    1. ....the court has to consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child, and in particular the effect of the domestic violence on the parent and child, the motivation of the parent seeking contact, the likely behaviour of that parent during contact and the effect on the child, his capacity to appreciate the effect of past violence and the potential for future violence on the other parent and child, and his attitude to his past violent conduct and capacity to change and behave appropriately.

1. The judgment makes clear that the appellant's past violence was properly considered alongside current factors. In that respect, while acknowledging that he was capable of meeting the child's day-to-day physical needs (at [119]), the primary judge was satisfied that the risk of the appellant continuing to engage in a pattern of coercive and controlling conduct remained. This was in circumstances where the primary judge found the appellant to lack insight into, and accountability for, his past violence which he downplayed or denied (at [134]).
2. The primary judge found that the appellant's evidence that he "could not recall" the various incidents was not credible (at [60]). This included his failure to disclose his 2015 assault conviction. As noted by the primary judge, the Family Report writer opined that if the appellant failed to develop insight and take responsibility for his conduct as a perpetrator of domestic violence, then there would be significant concerns regarding the child's safety in his care (at [134]). The primary judge's findings were reasonably open on the evidence as was her conclusion that the risk of the appellant engaging in a similar pattern of conduct in the future was not mitigated by any appropriate awareness on his part or a preparedness to change.
3. The findings and conclusions of the primary judge are not wrong merely because an appellant can point to some countervailing evidence (Cizek & Mihov [2024] FedCFamC1A 151; (2024) FLC 94-206).
4. The contention by the appellant that the finding that he posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child was unsupported by the evidence is without merit. So too is the contention that the finding was made "without adequate reasoning". Again, the primary judgment must be read as a whole. We have been well able to ascertain the reasoning upon which the conclusions of the primary judge were based (Bennett & Bennett [1990] FamCA 148; (1991) FLC 92-191 at 78,266 ("Bennett")).
5. Ground 4 is without merit.

Ground 9 - The primary judge erred in finding that the respondent would support or facilitate the appellant's relationship with the child following relocation, where was no, or insufficient, evidentiary basis to support such a finding

1. The appellant notes that, in assessing each parent's capacity to meet the child's needs, the primary judge considered the conduct of both parties following the child's birth in 2019.
2. While both parties were subject to criticism, the primary judge appeared to direct more pointed criticism toward the appellant. The respondent's conduct was, to some extent, contextualised by the primary judge as arising from a difficult situation that was largely attributable to the appellant.
3. The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding (at [126]) that the respondent would comply with the Court's orders. This finding, the appellant submits, was contrary to the evidence. Notably, the unchallenged evidence before the Court demonstrated that, despite interim orders providing for the child to reside with the appellant, on 29 July 2024 the respondent enlisted the assistance of the NSW Police to remove the child from the care of her babysitter, rather than seeking appropriate relief through the Court (at [22]).
4. The appellant further challenges the finding at [161], arguing it was not open to the primary judge to find the respondent would promote the child's relationship with him, in light of the respondent's own evidence regarding her inability to communicate with the appellant and the risks she alleged he posed to both herself and the child. It is contended that the undisputed evidence revealed that the extended maternal family did not support the appellant or his relationship with the respondent, and they collectively shared concerns about the risks he allegedly posed to the respondent and the child.
5. It is contended that (at [162]) the primary judge observed that the respondent's complaints about her mother were made in the context of her relationship with the appellant.

1. It is well recognised that there are particular challenges for an appellant in appeals relating to a trial judge's findings of fact where those findings "are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence" (Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55] ("Lee")). Authorities also recognise that the advantage enjoyed by a trial judge in assessing evidence at first instance extends to "inferences drawn by a trial judge from findings of fact, as distinct from findings of fact" (Cheadle & Pointer [2020] FamCA 327 at [30]). That advantage "includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts" (FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236 at [203] referring to Lee (supra) at [55]).
2. The primary judge's conclusion that the respondent would support and facilitate the child's relationship with the appellant following relocation was reasonably open on the evidence. In that respect, the respondent's relocation proposal included detailed and structured arrangements for ongoing contact, including:
   • Regular FaceTime communication;
   • Extended holiday visits in the USA; and
   • Defined periods of time in Australia.
3. The primary judge also directly addressed the appellant's concern that the maternal family in the USA might undermine his relationship with the child. The primary judge acknowledged that negative sentiment existed in both households but expressly accepted the respondent's evidence that she would promote the child's relationship with the appellant and ensure that those around her supported that relationship (at [161]). This finding was supported by the respondent's proposed orders, her evidence and the absence of any credible evidence suggesting an intention on the part of the respondent to undermine the child's relationship with her father.
4. In this case there was evidence, found by the primary judge to be credible, capable of supporting the conclusion challenged by this ground. Therefore, no appellable error has been established.
5. Accordingly, Ground 9 fails.

The Additional Ground - That the primary judge failed to consider the competing proposals of the parties, in particular the proposal of the appellant that the child continue to live primarily in Australia with the appellant by failing to follow the statutory requirements mandated by section 60CC of the Act.

1. The appellant argues that, although the primary judge outlined the legal principles and acknowledged the need to consider both parents' proposals, the reasons for judgment do not directly address whether it would be in the child's best interests to remain living in Australia with the appellant. The appellant contends that the judge failed to properly consider or weigh the advantages of his proposal under s 60CC(3) of the Act, instead focusing mainly on issues of family violence and the benefits of relocation for the child and the respondent.
2. This ground conflates two concepts. A failure to consider the competing proposals of the parties would, if established, amount to an error of law. So too would a failure to consider the matters set out in s 60CC of the Act.

1. There can be no doubt that the primary judge was required to identify and consider the competing proposals of the parties (U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238; Sayer & Radcliffe [2012] FamCAFC 209; (2012) 48 Fam LR 298 at [48]).
2. The primary judge did just that. In this case, the litigation was framed by the parties around two mutually exclusive proposals - the appellant's case proposing orders that the child should live with him in Australia and spend time with the respondent; and the respondent's case proposing orders that the child live with her in the USA and spend time with the appellant. Those proposals were clearly identified, as were the competing positions whereby each party sought sole parental and decision-making authority (at [29]-[31]).
3. In doing so, the primary judge referenced relevant authorities (at [41]), which state that international relocation cases are determined like any other parenting dispute - the Court is "required to consider the competing proposals of both parents on the merits, with the overarching consideration being the best interests of the children" (at [41] citing Morgan & Miles [2007] FamCA 1230; (2007) FLC 93-343 at [72] and Sayer & Radcliffe [2012] FamCAFC 209; (2012) 48 Fam LR 298).
4. The primary judge acknowledged the child's close connection with her father and the significant time she spent in his care, recognising the benefit of that relationship. However, after considering extensive evidence - which included findings of the appellant having engaged in a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour including physical violence - the primary judge concluded that leaving the child in his primary care posed an unacceptable risk to her safety and emotional wellbeing.
5. Comparatively, the primary judge found that the respondent could provide a safer, more stable environment for the child in the USA, and that properly tailored contact arrangements, such as regular video calls and extended visits, would preserve the child's relationship with her father (at [160]).
6. The consideration of the party's respective proposals through the prism of the child's future safety was entirely appropriate and consistent with the statutory guidance set out in ss 60CC(2)(a), 60CC(2)(e), 60CC(2A) and s 60CG of the Act.
7. As noted by the Full Court in Pierce & Pierce (No 2) (2025) FLC 94-271:
   1. The construction of Pt VII of the Act subsequent to the 2024 amendments places a consideration of the safety of a child or another person as a focused starting point in the considerations being weighed in determining a parenting regime that best promotes the best interests of the child...
8. In this case, the primary judge gave due consideration to the appellant's proposal that the child remain living with him in Australia, including its advantages. The primary judge acknowledged that the child, then aged six, had, by the time of the trial, spent approximately 19 months in the appellant's primary care (from November 2023 to June 2025). The primary judge acknowledged the Family Report writer's opinion that there was a "close relationship and connection" between the child and her father (at [35]) and accepted that the child had thrived in each parent's care to date. The primary judge found that both parties demonstrated the ability to meet the child's physical and cultural needs, and that the appellant capably provides for the child when she is with him. The primary judge also referred to evidence from the parents of the child's friend corroborating that the appellant is an effective caregiver (at [119]).
9. However, the primary judge found that the appellant's proposal, to keep the child in Australia under his primary care, was not in the child's best interests when weighed against the risks associated with the child living predominantly in his care. In that respect the primary judge concluded (at [118]) that the appellant's history of family violence and coercive behaviour presented an "unacceptable risk" to the child's safety and emotional welfare if she remained living with him full-time in Australia. As already noted, that conclusion was clearly open on the evidence.
10. To the extent it is contended that the primary judge failed to consider the matters set out in s 60CC, the contention is without merit as a fair reading of the full judgment makes clear. The Full Court has made it clear that the requirement to "consider" each factor does not mean each must be discussed, especially where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion, as it did in this case by way of the conclusion as to the appellant posing an unacceptable risk to the child's safety should she live with him in Australia (SCVG & KLD [2014] FamCAFC 42; (2014) FLC 93-582).
11. Hence, "the obligation to consider a factor does not mean that the factor must be discussed in a trial judge's reasons. The necessary content of judicial reasons alters depending on the context in which the reasons are required" (L v P [2022] WASCA 40 at [62]). The Full Court said in Tibb & Sheean [2018] FamCAFC 142; (2018) 58 Fam LR 351:
    1. ...the circumstances of the case and the overt manifestations of what has been "considered" will emerge from the proposals of the parties; their evidence; the manner in which they have run their case and, for example, matters canvassed during the trial. In turn, those matters will inform what is, and what is not, included in the reasons.

1. In any event, the primary judge also addressed practical considerations that undermined the viability of the appellant's proposal noting that overseas travel "has been a feature of [the appellant's] working life for many years" and found it "unclear... how, other than through nannies or babysitters, the father [could] manage his work travel with care of [the child]" if the child lived with him full-time (at [160]). Again, these findings were reasonably open on the evidence.
2. In contrast, the Court found that the respondent's proposal for the child to relocate to the USA to live primarily with her adequately protected the child's safety and provided for her welfare while still preserving her relationship with the appellant (at [163]). In that respect, it was reasonably open for the primary judge to conclude that the child would benefit from living with the mother in the USA, where she would be cared for by the respondent - whom the Court noted was "particularly vulnerable" (at [154]) but devoted to addressing the child's needs and supported by a loving step-family and extended maternal family.
3. The primary judge found that some level of negative sentiment existed in both households where each parent had, at times, disparaged the other, but rejected the submission that the respondent or her relatives in the USA would undermine the child's bond with the appellant father stating (at [161]) "I accept that the mother will promote the relationship... and ensure those around her support her relationship with her father."
4. Far from "failing to consider" the appellant's proposal, the primary judge weighed it on its merits against the respondent's proposal. In doing so, it was reasonably open for the primary judge to conclude that living with the respondent in the USA would provide the child with an emotionally safer, more stable upbringing that was free from exposure to domestic violence. At the same time, the primary judge found that the utilisation of modern technology such as FaceTime and structured visits could largely mitigate the reduction in day-to-day contact with her father, such that she could maintain and develop a relationship with him (at [160]).
5. In summary, the primary judge identified each party's proposal and properly evaluated each proposal against the best interests considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act with particular focus on the child's safety
6. The Additional Ground is without merit.

Ground 1 - The primary judge erred in law in finding that the proposed relocation of the child to the USA was consistent with the best interests, contrary to s 60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), in circumstances where the relocation would significantly impair the child's capacity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the appellant

1. This ground may be dealt with briefly. Nothing that could be properly characterised as an error of law is identified. It is not suggested that the primary judge applied incorrect legal principles or misinterpreted the legislation. Nor is it expressly suggested that the primary judge drew an inference which could not be drawn from proven facts.
2. We respectfully agree with the submission of the respondent and the Independent Children's Lawyer ("the ICL") that, in substance, this ground essentially amounts to a disagreement with the primary judge's best interests assessment. Separate challenges to the exercise of discretion are dealt with in relation to other grounds. We do not propose to extrapolate or infer an intended challenge to the exercise of discretion under this ground when it expressly asserts an error of law without any such error being identified.
3. Ground 1 is without merit.

**Ground 2 - The primary judge placed undue weight on historical allegations of violence in the appellant's previous relationships as indicative of current or ongoing risk to the child, without sufficient evidentiary foundation and failed to consider the current circumstances as indicative of the appellant's behaviour and parenting

Ground 7 - The primary judge's discretion miscarried by giving disproportionate weight to the respondent's personal and relational circumstances in the [USA], without properly weighing the child's right to a continuing relationship with the appellant and the practical limitations on that relationship post-relocation**

1. As already noted, the factual findings of the primary judge as to family violence were open on the evidence. The suggestion in Ground 2 to the contrary is without merit. So too is the proposition that the primary judge failed to consider the "current circumstances as indicative of the appellant's behaviour and parenting." To the contrary, the primary judge expressly acknowledged various positive aspects of the father's parenting. Against the background of the various findings made, the implied proposition that an absence of evidence as to current violent behaviour as at the time of trial somehow rendered those findings moot, is also without merit.
2. Ground 7 is also a challenge as to weight.
3. Complaints as to the weight or importance afforded to evidence are matters that are essentially for the primary judge. That an appellate court may have given them some, less, or more weight does not establish error of the kind identified in House v The King unless the outcome is unreasonable or plainly unjust, which is not the case here (Hedlund & Hedlund (2021) FLC 94-065 at [37]).
4. Ground 2 and Ground 7 fail.

Ground 5 - The primary judge failed to reconcile the finding that the appellant posed an unacceptable risk with the decision to permit the appellant to have contact with the child internationally, without adequate safeguards or explanation, thereby exercising discretion in a manner that was legally inconsistent or unreasonable

1. The relevant submissions of the appellant in respect to this ground are set out in his Summary of Argument as follows:
   1. Notwithstanding the finding of unacceptable risk at [118] of the Reasons, the primary judge proceeded to make Orders for the child to spend time with the Appellant on an overnight and unsupervised basis.
   2. Orders 7 to 10 of the Orders made by the primary judge provide for the time the child is to spend with the Appellant prior to the relocation to the USA on 7 July 2025. These Orders do not contain any safeguarding orders or orders that would mitigate the unacceptable risk that the primary judge found the Appellant posed.
   3. The Orders are inconsistent with the finding and vice versa. There is a complete lack of reasons provided by the primary judge to explain this inconsistency.

1. The consideration of this ground is assisted by reflecting upon the spend time with and communication orders that were actually made. By way of summary, the orders provided for the following spend time regime:

(a) Unsupervised time until the respondent and the child move to the USA

(i) The orders provide that the child live with the respondent and spend unsupervised overnight time with the appellant on the following basis:

(A) Week 1: 3.00 pm on Friday to 9.00 am on Monday; and

(B) Week 2: 3.00 pm on Thursday to 9.00 am on Friday.

(b) Supervised time once the child is in the USA and until the orders are registered in the USA

(i) All time between the child and the appellant shall take place in the USA and will be supervised until the Australian orders are registered in the USA. Supervision must be provided by a professional supervision service.

(ii) The child will spend three blocks of time per year with the appellant during the school holidays being:

(A) Winter holidays

(B) Summer holidays

(C) Christmas holidays

(iii) Each block consists of five consecutive days, from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm, or as facilitated by the contact service.

(c) After the orders are registered in the USA

(i) After the USA registration of orders, and until 2 January 2028, the child will spend:

(A) Three periods of five consecutive nights per year with the appellant as agreed and if not agreed in the same school holiday periods as specified above.

(B) All time will occur in the USA.

(C) Changeovers will occur at a professional supervision centre, chosen and arranged by the respondent.

(D) Costs of supervision will be shared equally.

(d) Post-2028 arrangements

(i) From 3 January 2028, the child will spend:

(A) Two blocks of seven consecutive nights per year with the appellant in the USA.

(B) One block of 10 consecutive nights per year with the appellant in Australia.

(C) These will be unsupervised, but subject to detailed conditions, the provision of appropriate notice and detail of proposed travel arrangements.

1. As earlier noted, the finding of risk in this matter was not in respect to the child spending time with the appellant per se but, rather, the prospect of the child living permanently in the primary care of the appellant given, what was found to be, his past history of engaging in coercive and controlling conduct, including acts of family violence.
2. Moreover, a finding of unacceptable risk does not mandate the termination of arrangements for a child to spend time, or even unsupervised time, with a parent. To the contrary, once a finding of unacceptable risk is made, the task of the trial judge becomes to consider measures that provide for a child to have a relationship with the non-resident parent while mitigating against the identified risk. Those mitigating measures must be proportionate to the identified risk (Keane & Keane [2021] FamCAFC 1; (2021) 62 Fam LR 190 at [83]-[84]).
3. That is exactly what the primary judge did in this case. The orders made by the primary judge established a staged spend time regime designed to mitigate the identified risks.
4. Having characterised the identified risk as one relating to the child continuing to live in the primary care of the appellant, rather than being "inconsistent," the approach adopted by the primary judge reflects the proper exercise of discretion in making orders that strike a balance between providing for the child's safety while maintaining her relationship with the appellant.
5. In that respect, the primary judge explicitly noted the need for "specific and careful" conditions to the orders given the potential for disruption to the child and affirmed that sufficient contact was important for the child's development and security, given her close attachment to the appellant (at [169]-[170]).
6. To reiterate, there was no finding of the child being at immediate risk by simply spending time in the appellant's care. The risk was limited to the child being exposed to family violence in the appellant's primary care. That risk was identified as being substantial and found to warrant the change in the child's primary care to the respondent. The identified risk was balanced against the importance of having regard to the child's circumstances which include that the child had been in the appellant's care for 19 months and would subsequently move to a different country. The orders made by the primary judge provide for the child to transition from the appellant's care into that of the respondent, whilst in the long term mitigating against the risk of the child being exposed to family violence in the appellant's care.
7. Specifically, the primary judge balanced the risks of the child being exposed to family violence in the appellant's care for up to 15 nights a year until 2028 and 24 nights each year thereafter, with the importance of the child having an ongoing relationship with the appellant.
8. There was no inconsistency in the primary judge's approach and, accordingly, Ground 5 fails.

Ground 10 - The primary judge failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that relocation was in the child's best interest, in light of conflicting findings about risk, evidence regarding the child's attachment to the appellant, and practical obstacles to ongoing contact

1. The appellant acknowledged that it is accepted that a trial judge is not required to refer to every aspect of the evidence adduced.
2. It was submitted that the principles concerning the adequacy of judicial reasons are well established (Bennett; Rigby & Olsen [2021] FedCFamC1A 46 at [38]). The sufficiency of reasons must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the case. However, reasons will be inadequate where the appellate court is unable to discern the basis for the decision, or where it appears that justice has not been seen to be done.
3. The appellant referenced Bunting & Stanzler [2024] FedCFamC1A 67 where, by reference to the decision of Mahoney JA in Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 385-386, it was observed that:
   1. The parameters as to what constitutes adequate reasons is, however, defined by the manner in which the parties conduct their case. Specifically, the primary judge is entitled to focus his or her reasons on those issues the parties identify as requiring adjudication...
4. It is contended by the appellant that the primary judge's reasons are deficient in their assessment of the parties' competing proposals. In particular, it is contended that the reasons fail to explain how the orders permitting relocation, and the associated parenting time arrangements, were determined to be in the child's best interests.

1. The consideration of this ground substantially overlaps with the consideration of the appellant's Additional Ground. While not here repeated, our reasons in respect to that ground should be read as being relevant to our consideration here of Ground 10.
2. Reading the reasons of the primary judge as a whole, there is no merit in the assertion that those reasons were inadequate.
3. On the contrary, the primary judgment clearly explains the primary judge's reasoning in allowing the respondent to relocate with the child while managing the identified risks. The primary judge's reasons adequately address each relevant issue raised by the parties. This included the conflicting evidence about risk, the child's attachment to the appellant and the practical challenges of long-distance contact. Having addressed those principal issues, the primary judge explained why, in the exercise of their discretion, and having regard to the totality of evidence, they determined that relocation with the respondent to the USA was in the child's best interests.
4. In doing so, the primary judge made reasonably available findings and explained how those findings factored into the ultimate conclusion that relocation with the respondent was in the child's best interests.
5. In that respect, the primary judge made extensive factual findings about the appellant's past family violence and coercive, controlling behaviour. The primary judge articulated why, under the appellant's primary care, the child would be at risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm, whether by witnessing further violence, being involved in a violent incident, or suffering trauma from police interventions.
6. At the same time, the primary judge acknowledged the appellant had been a caring parent in many ways but ultimately determined that the magnitude of the risk he posed outweighed other factors. The primary judge's reasons for so concluding are clearly spelled out with reference to the relevant evidentiary foundation for each finding.
7. The primary judge expressly recognised the child's deep bond with the appellant and appropriately acknowledged that relocation would curtail daily contact and could be emotionally difficult for the child. The primary judge gave the child's attachment to the appellant "significant weight," when explaining why the orders made provided for the preservation of the relationship between the father and the child as much as safely possible. In that respect, for example, the primary judge emphasised that the child's time with the appellant "needs to be sufficient to allow [her] to develop her relationship with her father", noting their close connection and the importance of maintaining it for her security (at [170]).
8. Contrary to the appellant's submission, the judgment provides adequate reasoning, noting the significance of the child's relationship with the appellant. The reasons explain that the primary judge weighed this relationship as a key factor but ultimately concluded that this relationship could be appropriately protected through a modified spend time regime, rather than by the child being in the primary care of the appellant.
9. In respect to consideration of the practical obstacles to contact, the primary judge adequately addressed how the child's relationship with the appellant would continue after relocation. The primary judge acknowledged the appellant's argument that distance might impair the "meaningful relationship" between himself and the child. The reasons show the primary judge was alive to the appellant's concern, took this concern seriously, and explained why the primary judge concluded that for "electronic communication to be meaningful it is important that he is able to discuss matters such as [the child's] education" (at [173]).
10. The primary judge also explained why the detailed orders she made for ongoing communication between the child and the appellant were intended to mitigate against the impact of distance. This included regular electronic communication such as video calls twice a week and annual in-person holiday blocks. These measures were explained by the primary judge to preserve and foster the child's bond with her father while she lives abroad.
11. Contrary to that which is submitted by the appellant, the primary judge's reasoning is internally consistent. There is no unexplained leap from 'risk' to 'relocation with contact'.
12. In summary, the primary judge gave reasons adequately addressing the relevant issues that were the subject of controversy. The reasons identified the applicable legal principles and explained the factual findings and conclusions based on those findings consistently with the Court's obligation to consider the best interests considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act.
13. The parties, and this Court, were well able to ascertain the reasoning upon which the primary judge's decision was based (Bennett at 78,266).
14. Accordingly, there is no merit in this ground. Ground 10 fails.

1. As all grounds of appeal are without merit, the appeal is dismissed.
2. In those circumstances, senior counsel for the appellant appropriately conceded that costs should follow the event. Both the respondent and the ICL have filed costs certificates reflecting costs being assessed in accordance with the relevant schedule of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). We are satisfied those costs as sought are logical, fair and reasonable and make an order that the appellant pay both the costs of the respondent, in the sum of $4,268.55, and the costs of the ICL, in the sum of $7,219.30.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-four (124) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice McClelland and the Honourable Justices O'Brien and Campton.