MARTINUS RAIL PTY LTD -v- CO-OPERATIVE BULK HANDLING LTD [2025] WASC 373 (11 September 2025)

1. The defendant (CBH) opposes the making of a special costs order.
2. For the reasons that follow, I have decided to refuse Martinus's application.

When an order will be made under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law

1. The Supreme Court has a broad discretion to award costs pursuant to s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) which discretion must be exercised judicially.
2. Order 66 r 51(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (Supreme Court Rules) provides that in a particular action or matter the court may make an order under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law. Section 141 relevantly provides:

(1) The following are regulated by an applicable costs determination -

(a) the taxation of bills of law practices;

(b) any other aspect of the costs charged by law practices.

...

(3) Despite subsection (1), if a court or judicial officer is of the opinion that the amount of costs allowable in respect of a matter under a costs determination is inadequate because of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter, the court or officer may do any or all of the following -

(a) order the payment of costs above those fixed by the determination;

(b) fix higher limits of costs than those fixed in the determination;

(c) remove limits on costs fixed in the determination;

(d) make any order or give any direction for the purposes of enabling costs above those in the determination to be ordered or assessed.

(4) Subsection (1) does not limit the power of a court, a judicial officer or a taxing officer of a court to determine in any particular case before that court, judicial officer or taxing officer the amount of costs allowed.

1. The legal principles concerning when a special costs order may be made under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law were not in dispute in this application and are well established. Those principles were discussed by the Court of Appeal in Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2].[1] Although that case dealt with the now repealed s 280 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 141(3) of the Uniform Law is in identical terms and prior decisions of this court have accepted that the statements made in that case (and other cases determined under the prior legislation) remain relevant.
2. The following principles are relevant to the determination of the present application.
3. In determining whether to make a special costs order, two issues arise for consideration:[2]

(a) first, is the maximum amount allowable under the applicable costs determination inadequate, in the sense that there is a fairly arguable case that, on a taxation of costs, costs may properly be allowed in an amount greater than the maximum amount?

(b) secondly, does the inadequacy of the costs allowable under the costs determination arise because of the 'unusual difficulty, complexity, or importance of the matter'?

1. These elements are to be addressed as matters of impression rather than science or mathematics having heard the matter and being familiar with the way in which the case was conducted and the issues which were litigated.[3]
2. A fairly arguable case of inadequacy will not be established merely because a party incurred greater costs than those allowable under the relevant determination. However, the fact that a party has applied significantly greater legal resources to each step in the litigation than those for which allowance is made, when viewed in the context of the difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter, may sustain the conclusion that there is a fairly arguable case of inadequacy.[4]
3. The fact that a party's counsel or instructing solicitor has charged at a rate higher, or even significantly higher, than the scale does not of itself justify the lifting of the scale.[5] In Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority,[6] Pullin J (as his Honour then was) observed:

... there should be no expectation that, as a matter of course, rates in the costs agreement which are above scale will be ordered to be the rates to apply in taxation as between party and party. There would have to be evidence justifying the higher rate. The whole point of the existing scale is that the rates are struck by reference to what is being charged within the profession. It is true that the hourly rates can only be an average or mean of the upper rates determined in the survey, and there will be some cases where the unusual complexity or importance of the case warrants the special expertise of the practitioner involved and warrants an increase in the hourly rate. In some cases not involving unusual complexity or importance, the higher rates paid will not be recoverable. A party is always entitled to the luxury of retaining the highest paid practitioners in the conduct of their case, but they cannot always expect to recover these costs from the other party. If the hourly rates in the scale are thought by parties or practitioners to be too low for work which is not of unusual complexity or importance, then submissions should be made to the Legal Costs Committee to increase the rates in the scale.

1. In s 141(3) of the Uniform Law, the word 'unusual' qualifies only the 'difficulty' of the matter, and not its 'complexity' or 'importance'. The word 'unusual' in this context means unusual having regard to what one might describe as the usual run of civil cases determined in the court. That essentially involves the making of a value judgment by the court, having regard to the court's experience of the particular case when compared with the usual run of cases.[7]
2. The reference to 'importance' in this context allows the court to have regard to the significance of the issues that arose in the litigation. Significance can arise either because of the significance of the issues to the parties, or because of the significance of the issues to other prospective parties, or to the public or community generally.[8]
3. Consideration of the importance of the matter requires a qualitative evaluation of the gravity of the issues and controversy before the court. Often the question of importance will be answered as a matter of impression informed by experience. Outside of those relatively rare cases involving matters of public importance, the importance of the matter may be evident in the amount of the claim or the nature of the allegations that are being litigated.[9]

Why Martinus claims that a special costs order should be made Mr Jacobs's evidence

1. Martinus filed an affidavit of Thomas Henry Jacobs (the Jacobs Affidavit) in support of its application for a special costs order.
2. Mr Jacobs is the partner in the firm of solicitors who acts for Martinus who has the conduct of these proceedings on its behalf.[10] He has prepared a draft bill of costs which he attached to his affidavit (the Draft Bill). The total amount claimed in the Draft Bill is $339,132.70.[11]
3. Mr Jacobs deposed to the history of these proceedings, including that they were initially managed together with another set of proceedings between the same parties. He referred to the fact that in late March 2025, I made orders that both sets of proceedings be set down for trial on 3 July 2025 but the proceedings were subsequently 'decoupled' following a successful application by Martinus to amend its defence in the other proceedings, shortly before trial.[12]
4. Mr Jacobs deposed to the fact that the possibility of expert evidence being led was discussed at an earlier stage of the proceedings. He said that he initially briefed an expert to give evidence but that the need for expert evidence fell away when CBH made certain amendments to its defence.[13]
5. Mr Jacobs addressed the steps taken to prepare these proceedings for trial, including the preparation of an agreed statement of facts and a trial bundle. He also referred to the fact that I invited further submissions from the parties when the New South Wales Court of Appeal delivered its decision in Roberts Co (NSW) Pty Ltd v Sharvain Facades Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed).[14]
6. Mr Jacobs said that the management of these proceedings was made particularly complex and unusually difficult by the fact that they needed to be managed together with the other proceedings. He deposed that the close factual overlap between the two proceedings meant that consideration needed to be given to the impact that a decision made in these proceedings might have on the other proceedings. He said that as there were two sets of proceedings, separate documents needed to be prepared for each proceeding.[15]
7. Mr Jacobs also deposed that during the course of the proceedings, six related adjudication applications and a review application were made.[16]
8. In the Jacobs Affidavit, Mr Jacobs said that these proceedings were difficult and complex for the following reasons:

(a) the Building & Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2021 (the Act) is new and the issues under consideration had not been the subject of previous judicial consideration in this State;

(b) the matter required a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the Act, the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Regulations 2022 (WA) (the Regulations), and the Electronic Transactions Act 2011 (WA) (the Electronic Transactions Act);

(c) it was initially considered that expert evidence might be required concerning when an email reaches a recipient's address;

(d) it was necessary to consider various decisions relating to similar matters in Queensland and New South Wales;

(e) the law is developing and continued to develop rapidly as the proceedings unfolded;

(f) the ongoing and concurrent adjudication applications that were made by Martinus resulted in amounts being paid in relation to line items that were the subject of the relevant payment claim that was the subject matter of this litigation, which led to amendments to the proceedings as those amounts were secured and paid;

(g) the proceedings needed to be managed in conjunction with the other proceedings; and

(h) CBH sought to place before the court a significant number of additional documents, none of which were actually referred to at trial including all of the adjudication applications, responses and determinations.[17]

1. The Draft Bill has been prepared using rates that exceed the maximum rates permitted by the Determination. As I have mentioned, Martinus seeks an order that its costs be taxed without regard to the maximum allowable hourly and daily rates for counsel and with an uplift for the scale rates for Mr Jacobs and Mr Stulic.
2. In relation to counsel, the Draft Bill uses the following rates for counsel that exceed the rates permitted by the Determination:

(a) for senior counsel, Mr Scott Robertson SC, $1,200 (ex GST) per hour and $12,000 (ex GST) per day; and

(b) for junior counsel, Mr Darren Pratt, $600 (ex GST).[18]

1. The Draft Bill also includes amounts for work performed by a second junior counsel, Ms Julie Moore of $400 (ex GST), which rate is below that permitted by the Determination.
2. In his affidavit, Mr Jacobs explained that it was originally intended to brief Mr Pratt, who would appear at trial leading Ms Moore. He says that Mr Robertson SC was subsequently engaged because of his particular expertise in cases involving similar legislation in other states.[19]
3. With regard to solicitors, Mr Jacobs deposed to using the following rates for the work performed by solicitors and paralegals in preparing the Draft Bill:[20]

1. Two relevant observations may be made.
2. First, although the rate used for paralegals in the Draft Bill exceeds the scale, no application has been made for an uplift of the rate used for paralegals.
3. Secondly, the calculation of the percentage uplift set out in the Jacobs Affidavit understates the true percentage of the uplift because the proposed rate used in the Jacobs Affidavit uses an amount which is exclusive of GST. As the scale rate uses an amount inclusive of GST, the proper calculation of the amount of the uplift requires the use of a figure which is inclusive of GST. This makes a material difference to the percentage of the uplift.
4. The proposed rate for a partner inclusive of GST is $825.00. This exceeds the senior practitioner rate in the scale by $253.00 which by my calculation is a 44.23% uplift.
5. The proposed rate for an associate inclusive of GST is $495.00. This exceeds the junior practitioner rate in the scale by $77.00 which by my calculation is a 18.42% uplift.
6. Martinus seeks an order that its costs be taxed without regard to the limits imposed by Table B for items 1(a), 1(c), 4, 6(a), 10(c) and 19 of the Supreme Court Scale of Costs 2024 in Table B of the Determination.

Items 1(a) and (c) - Writ of summons and statement of claim

1. Martinus seeks a scale uplift for the preparation of the writ of summons indorsed with statement of claim, items 1 (a) and (c) in the scale. The scale limit for this item is $7,722 (inc GST), or 13.5 hours.
2. The amount for this item claimed in the Draft Bill totals $12,719 (inc GST).[21] This is comprised of:

(a) 6.4 hours of work performed by Mr Pratt;

(b) 8.5 hours work performed by Mr Jacobs; and

(c) 4 hours work performed by Mr Stulic.[22]

1. Mr Jacobs says that the uplift is sought because of the intricacies surrounding explaining when the email making the payment claim was capable of being retrieved. He says it was also necessary to consider how the relevant law applied to the facts which was complicated by the fact that the point raised was novel. He says that this necessitated the engagement of junior counsel.[23]

1. Martinus seeks a scale uplift for the amendments to the statement of claim, item 1(c) in the scale. The scale limit for item 1(c) is $6,864 (inc GST), or 12 hours.
2. The fees for this item claimed in the Draft Bill total 21.7 hours or $13,569 (inc GST).[24] This is comprised of:

(a) 1.9 hours of work performed by Mr Pratt;

(b) 17.9 hours work performed by Mr Jacobs; and

(c) 1.9 hours work performed by Mr Stulic.[25]

1. Mr Jacobs says that an uplift is sought for the same reasons that an uplift was sought in relation to the writ and statement of claim and because of the need to address the matters raised in CBH's defence. [26]

1. Martinus seeks a scale uplift for its reply to the amended defence, item 4 in the scale. The scale limit for item 4 is $5,720 (inc GST), or 10 hours.
2. The fees for this item claimed in the Draft Bill total 26.8 hours or $19,634.14 (inc GST).[27] This is comprised of:

(a) 7 hours of work performed by Mr Pratt;

(b) 19.7 hours work performed by Mr Jacobs; and

(c) 0.1 hours work performed by Mr Stulic.[28]

1. Mr Jacobs says that an uplift is sought for the same reasons that an uplift was sought in relation to the writ and statement of claim and because preparing the reply involved considering the terms of the relevant contract, the interaction between those terms and the relevant legislation, and conferral with counsel.[29]

1. Martinus seeks a scale uplift for the consent orders including conferral but excluding extraction, item 10(c) in the scale. The scale limit for item 10(c) is $627 (inc GST), or 1.5 hours.
2. The fees for this item claimed in the Draft Bill total 40.8 hours or $12,254 (inc GST).[30] This is comprised of:

(a) 1.9 hours of work performed by Mr Pratt;

(b) 28.8 hours work performed by Mr Jacobs; and

(c) 10.1 hours work performed by Mr Stulic.[31]

1. Mr Jacobs deposes to there being five consent orders filed in total. He says that the preparation of these orders necessitated a considerable amount of back and forth and revisions. He says that the orders were unusually complex because it was necessary to consider the interaction between the orders made and the other proceedings.[32]

1. Martinus seeks a scale uplift for the preparation of its case for trial, item 19 in the scale. The scale limit for item 19 is $74,360 (inc GST), or 316 hours.
2. The fees for this item claimed in the Draft Bill total 316 hours or $214,450.50 (inc GST).[33] This is comprised of:

(a) 30 hours of work by Mr Robertson SC;

(b) 60.6 hours of work performed by Mr Pratt;

(c) 76.9 hours work performed by Mr Jacobs; and

(d) 110.4 hours work performed by Mr Stulic.[34]

1. Mr Jacobs said that an uplift is sought because the case had to be prepared in three months and there was a significant volume of documents to consider.[35]
2. Mr Jacobs said that it was necessary to confer about the contents of the agreed statement of facts and the trial bundle. He said the agreed statement of facts required six rounds of amendment before it was agreed, and that it included:

(a) each adjudication determination (of which there were, at the time, six);

(b) each payment made by CBH to Martinus pursuant to each adjudication determination;

(c) a table that outlined each and every payment claim and payment schedule sent and received by the partis since July 2023; and

(d) a table that outlined each and every payment made by CBH to Martinus pursuant to each adjudication determination for the specific line-items contained in the relevant August 2024 payment claim.[36]

1. Mr Jacobs said that the trial bundle consisted of five lever-arch files and was 'especially complex' and 'time consuming' to create. He noted that at trial none of the documents requested to be included in the trial bundle by CBH's solicitors were referred to by counsel.[37]

1. Finally, in its written submissions, Martinus submitted that it was relevant that the costs it sought to recover were proportionate to the judgment obtained (being less than 3% of the judgment) and proportionate to the significance of the decision.[38]

Why CBH maintains that a special costs order should not be made

1. CBH did not dispute that the matter was important but it did dispute that Martinus had established that there is a fairly arguable case that on a taxation of its costs, costs may properly be allowed in an amount greater than the maximum amount.[39]

1. CBH submitted that a party is not entitled to higher hourly rates simply because it decided to engage more expensive lawyers. It argued that to establish why the maximum hourly rate should be lifted, a party must show that it was fairly arguable that it would have been inadequate for the work to be performed by any counsel working at scale rates.[40]
2. CBH argued that Martinus has not established that it would have been inadequate for the work performed by Mr Pratt to be performed by a counsel working at the scale rate, and noted that the rate charged by Ms Moore fell below the scale.[41]
3. CBH further argued that Martinus had not addressed why it would have been inadequate for the work performed by Mr Stulic to have been performed by a fee earner working at the scale rate, or provided any evidence or submissions about why the rate of that practitioner should be lifted having regard to the alleged unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter.[42]
4. CBH submitted that the matters in dispute were not so complex that it would not have been possible to engage senior counsel charging scale rates. It contended that it was Martinus's choice to engage Mr Robertson SC.[43]

1. CBH submitted that Martinus had not demonstrated that the amount allowable for the writ (item 1(a)) is inadequate because the Draft Bill failed to separately identify the amount claimable for that item.[44]
2. CBH further argued that Martinus had similarly not demonstrated that the amount allowed for the statement of claim was inadequate. It disputed that any amendments that Martinus made to the statement of claim were prompted by the defendant's pleaded case, and argued that the plaintiff's case evolved to rely on different statutory provisions. CBH also relied on the operation of order 66 rule 3(1) of the Supreme Court Rules which provides that the costs of an amendment without leave are to be borne by the amending party, unless the court otherwise orders.[45]
3. CBH submitted that an uplift of item 4 of the scale was unnecessary because the reply and the amended reply were relatively simple.[46]
4. CBH contended that Martinus appeared to seek an uplift of item 6(a) of the scale but failed to address why this should be permitted.[47]
5. CBH argued that the fact that the pleadings were settled by counsel is not a justification for an uplift, and noted that the rate allowed for junior counsel was less than that charged by a senior practitioner.[48]

1. CBH submitted that Martinus had failed to identify the amount claimable in relation to each consent order, and it was therefore unclear whether the amount claimed would exceed the scale maximum. CBH contended that, in any event, Martinus overstated the complexity of the consent orders.[49]

1. CBH submitted that it is unclear whether the costs being claimed were party/party costs or all of the costs incurred by Martinus, and that it appeared that some solicitor and client costs were being claimed.[50]
2. CBH argued that Martinus also appeared to be claiming counsel's preparation of submissions under this item, which was properly claimed under the item for trial. While CBH accepted that the court should not engage in a quasi‑taxation exercise, it contended that these matters made it unclear whether Martinus's costs would tax out at more than the scale.[51]
3. CBH contended that neither the preparation of the statement of agreed facts nor conferral about it was unusual. It referred to evidence that it had filed that the tables attached were prepared entirely by CBH's solicitors.[52]
4. CBH argued that the preparation of the trial bundle was straightforward, and it referred to evidence that its solicitors had provided copies of many of the documents to Martinus.[53]
5. CBH submitted that the proceedings were not made unusually complex or difficult by either the fact that expert evidence was contemplated, or that adjudications took place in parallel to the proceedings. CBH disputed that the fact that the matter needed to be prepared for trial in three months of itself meant that greater resources were required to prepare it for trial.[54]

1. CBH submitted that Martinus's proportionality argument was not supported by the case law. It contended that the relevant test is not whether the costs are low relative to the judgment but whether the scale limits are inadequate due to the matter's difficulty, complexity or importance.[55]

1. The dispute in these proceedings involved narrow questions of statutory and contractual construction. The primary issue concerned the proper construction of reg 23(d) of the Regulations and s 14 of the Electronic Transactions Act. Depending on the proper construction of those provisions, a secondary issue arose regarding the proper construction of cl 47.4 of the contract between the parties.
2. There were a relatively modest number of relevant decisions to consider.
3. The pleadings filed by the parties were short and, in my view, straightforward. The amended statement of claim was eight pages long. The amended defence was 13 pages long (with an annexure). The reply was three pages long (but one page is just signatures).
4. By my calculation, a total of seven consent orders were filed during the course of the proceeding. All but one of the consent orders were short and mundane, and dealt with matters such as adjournments, the listing of hearings, the extension of deadlines, or the vacation of orders made previously.
5. One of the consent orders was longer and dealt with the programming of the matter through to trial. That order was made after the strategic conference and it had been the subject of significant and extended discussion during that strategic conference.
6. While it is true that at the strategic conference I set the matter down for trial within a matter of months, this decision was heavily influenced by my view that the narrow compass of the matters in dispute meant it would not require significant preparation time. As the dispute principally concerned narrow questions of statutory and contractual construction, it seemed unlikely to me that much (if any) evidence would be required, and that written outlines of submissions could readily be prepared within the time allowed.
7. At the strategic conference, it appeared possible that there might be a single factual dispute concerning when an email could have been accessed. The possibility of the need to call expert evidence was canvassed. In the end, however, that factual issue fell away.
8. I do not consider that the possibility that an expert might have needed to be briefed makes these proceedings unusually difficult, complex, or important. The use of expert evidence in this court is a matter of routine.
9. Nor do I consider that the fact that Martinus elected to make adjudication applications in parallel to these proceedings made these proceedings unusually difficult, complex, or important.
10. There were no factual disputes to determine at trial and the parties filed an agreed statement of facts. The agreed statement of facts set out the uncontroversial factual background and was not difficult or complex. It ran to five pages long and attached two tables. The tables were prepared by CBH's solicitors.
11. Although a trial bundle was filed, little reference was made to its contents during the trial. The relevance of the contents of the trial bundle seemed to be peripheral at best.
12. I have difficulty understanding how it was 'especially complex' or 'time consuming' to prepare the trial bundle, particularly given that CBH's solicitors appear to have provided copies of many of the documents. There was nothing unusual or novel about the trial bundle, and by comparison to the size and complexity of trial bundles routinely seen by this court, it was of a commendably modest size and uncomplex (even if it was of dubious relevance). Nor is it unusual or novel for copies of documents used in court to be made.
13. While it is true that for a period of time these proceedings needed to be managed with another set of proceedings, I do not consider that this made these proceedings unusually difficult, complex, or important. The other set of proceedings were also of narrow compass. That is illustrated by the fact that at least initially it seemed possible that a trial of both proceedings could be concluded in one day.
14. Nor is it apparent to me that the need to consider the strategic impact of decisions made in these proceedings on the other proceeding significantly and materially made it more time consuming to prepare pleadings or these proceedings for trial.
15. I may only make an order under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law if I am of the opinion that the amount of costs allowable in respect of a matter under a costs determination is inadequate because of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter. Consideration of the proportionality between the costs incurred and the amount in issue has not assisted me in that consideration.
16. While it is true that these proceedings raised novel questions of statutory and contractual construction, the resolution of such novel questions is part of the routine work of this court and the barristers and solicitors who appear before it.
17. Ultimately, my overall impression is that there was nothing unusually difficult or complex about the matter. On the contrary, it appeared routine to me.
18. I accept, however, that the matter was important. It involved a significant sum of money, and the proper construction of the statutory provisions, in particular, had a significance that extended beyond the interests of the parties to these proceedings.
19. In my view, the importance of the matter made it reasonable for Martinus to have engaged Mr Robertson SC at the rate that he charged. I also consider that it was reasonable to engage junior counsel to assist him, although I do not consider that the issues in these proceedings reasonably required junior counsel who charged more than the scale rate. Nor is it my impression that the importance of the matter reasonably required the retention of solicitors who charged more than the scale.
20. Given the relatively straightforward nature of both the pleadings and the consent orders, I do not consider that there is a fairly arguable case that at a taxation, costs may be allowed in a greater amount than the maximum allowed under the scale for the work performed.
21. Nor am I of the opinion that there is a fairly arguable case that a greater amount than that provided for in the scale would be allowed for the preparation of the case for trial.
22. As I have already indicated, I consider that while the matter may have been important, it was routine and should not have involved a very significant amount of preparation.
23. Further, as I have also indicated, my impression is that the importance of the matter did not reasonably require the retention of junior counsel or solicitors who charged more than the scale. A scale uplift was also not sought for any work performed by a law clerk charging above scale rates.
24. The Draft Bill also included significant amounts of time for counsel as part of the preparation of the case. In my view, it was unclear that the Draft Bill took into account that item 22(a) of the Determination (which provides for trial) includes three and a half days preparation by counsel. No uplift was sought for item 22(a).
25. For these reasons, I do not consider that there is a fairly arguable case that at a taxation, costs may be allowed in a greater amount than the maximum allowed under the scale for the work performed.
26. Even if I am wrong about this, for the same reasons, it is my opinion that if the costs allowable under the Determination were inadequate, this was not because of the unusual difficulty, complexity, or importance of the matter.

1. I will therefore dismiss Martinus's application.
2. I will hear from the parties on the question of the costs of the application if necessary but my preliminary view is that costs should follow the event and Martinus should pay CBH's costs of the application to be taxed if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S) (Sino).

[3] EDWF Holdings Pty Ltd v EDWF Holdings 2 Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 275 (S) [7]; Verdell Pty Ltd v F & G Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 58 (S2) [14].

[6] Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority [2003] WASC 122 (S); (2003) 28 WAR 95, 100 [22].

[9] Blatchford v Laine [2018] WASC 207 (S) [88].

[11] Jacobs Affidavit, attachment 'THJ-01'.

[12] Jacobs Affidavit, [16] - [18].

[13] Jacobs Affidavit, [19] - [29], [31].

[14] Roberts Co (NSW) Pty Ltd v Sharvain Facades Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2025] NSWCA 161; Jacobs Affidavit, [32] - [38], [40] - [42].

[15] Jacobs Affidavit, [44] - [55].

[16] Jacobs Affidavit, [56] - [57].

[18] Jacobs Affidavit, [67] - [69].

[19] Jacobs Affidavit, [71] - [72].

[22] Jacobs affidavit, [73]; Draft Bill, item 1.

[25] Jacobs affidavit, [73]; Draft Bill, item 3.

[28] Jacobs affidavit, [73]; Draft Bill, item 5.

[31] Jacobs affidavit, [73]; Draft Bill, item 2.

[34] Jacobs affidavit, [73]; Draft Bill, item 11.

[36] Jacobs Affidavits, [33] - [34].

[38] Plaintiff's Submissions Pursuant to Section 141(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) dated 2 October 2025 (Plaintiff's Submissions), [34].

[39] Defendant's Submissions in Opposition to the Application for Special Costs Orders dated 16 October 2025 (Defendant's Submissions), [6] - [23].

[40] Defendant's Submissions, [8] - [9].

[41] Defendant's Submissions, [10.1].

[42] Defendant's Submissions, [10.2].

[43] Defendant's Submissions, [10.3].

[50] Defendant's Submissions, [19.1].

[51] Defendant's Submissions, [19.2].

[52] Defendant's Submissions, [20.1], [20.4].

[54] Defendant's Submissions, [20.3] - [20.7].