1. Vary the permit issued by the first respondent in respect of DA 0472/2024 by substituting the conditions of the permit with the conditions attached to this decision and marked Annexure A.
2. The first respondent issue an amended permit in accordance with this decision within 14 days.
3. Any application for an order for costs in the appeal is to be made in writing with supporting submissions within 21 days. If no application is so filed, each party is to bear their own costs.

Planning and Environment - Planning appeal - Traffic - Parking quantum and design - Tasmanian Planning Scheme - Design of driveway and turning bay - Compliance with Australian Standard AS/NZS 2890.1 - Whether access and parking convenient, safe, and efficient - Assumptions regarding vehicle size.

Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, ss 51 and 61;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, s 10 and Sch 2, Pt 8, cl 12.

2 Elizabeth Bay Road Pty Ltd v Owners - Strata Plan No 73943 (2014) 88 NSWLR 488; [2014] NSWCA 409;

Beauty Point Trading Pty Ltd v West Tamar Council [2023] TASCAT 67;

Boland v Clarence City Council [2021] TASFC 5;

Green v Launceston City Council [2024] TASCAT 27;

H J Heinz Company Australia [2009] VSC 311; (2009) 31 VAR 206;

Hobart City Council v Rich Tapestry Pty Ltd (ACN 667 999 055) [2024] TASCAT 54;

Jacobs v Hobart City Council [2023] TASCAT 27;

Midlands Council [2022] TASCAT 138;

Kent v Gunns Ltd (2009) 18 Tas R 454; [2009] TASSC 30;

Northern Midlands Council v Smith [2021] TASSC 8;

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 6;

Scott v Shire of Numurkah [1954] HCA 14; (1954) 91 CLR 300;

SJM Property Developments Pty Ltd v Huon Valley Council [2025] TASCAT 114;

St Vincent de Paul (Society) Housing Australia t/a Amelie Housing v Hobart City Council [2024] TASCAT 136;

Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 63; (2004) 221 CLR 30;

Wilderness Society (Tasmania) Inc v Wild Drake Pty Ltd (2021) 34 Tas R 341; [2021] TASFC 12.

1. This is an appeal under the _Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 199_3 (LUPAA), s 61(5). The second respondent (the proponent) applied to the first respondent (the council) for approval to use and develop part of the land at 18 Wyett Street and 44 Hill Street in West Launceston (the site). The proponent wishes to build a new two-storey dwelling and construct access to that dwelling using an existing laneway. The appellants appeal against the council's decision to grant a permit on several grounds relating to the design of the driveway and turning bay.

1. Because the appeal relates to parking only, it is unnecessary to describe the proposal in detail.
2. The proposal provides two on-site parking spaces for the new dwelling. The existing dwelling already provides three on-site parking spaces, producing a total of five on-site parking spaces. There are no dedicated visitor parking spaces, but there are available on-street parking spaces in the surrounding area within reasonable walking distance.
3. The right of way is a laneway or driveway serving four existing dwellings which has operated for many years. We will use the terms interchangeably. It is approximately 3.65m wide and slopes downwards from Wyett Street. The distance from Wyett Street to the proposed dwelling is approximately 40m.

1. The applicable planning scheme is the Tasmanian Planning Scheme - Launceston City (the TPS or the scheme). The site is within the scheme's General Residential Zone. Two of the scheme's requirements relating to parking within C2.0 Parking and Sustainable Transport Code (the Code) are in issue. Each is the subject of a ground of appeal.
2. It is convenient to address the grounds of appeal in reverse order.

1. The second ground of appeal relates to C2.5.1, Car Parking numbers, which states:

That an appropriate level of car parking spaces are provided to meet the needs of the use.

The number of on-site car parking spaces must be no less than the number specified in Table C2.1, less the number of car parking spaces that cannot be provided due to the site including container refund scheme space, excluding if:

the site is subject to a parking plan for the area adopted by council, in which case parking provision (spaces or cash-in-lieu) must be in accordance with that plan;

the site is contained within a parking precinct plan and subject to Clause C2.7;

the site is subject to Clause C2.5.5; or

it relates to an intensification of an existing use or development or a change of use where:

the number of on-site car parking spaces for the existing use or development specified in Table C2.1 is greater than the number of car parking spaces specified in Table C2.1 for the proposed use or development, in which case no additional on-site car parking is required; or

the number of on-site car parking spaces for the existing use or development specified in Table C2.1 is less than the number of car parking spaces specified in Table C2.1 for the proposed use or development, in which case on-site car parking must be calculated as follows:

A = Number of existing on site car parking spaces

B = Number of on-site car parking spaces required for the existing use or development specified in Table C2.1

C= Number of on-site car parking spaces required for the proposed use or development specified in Table C2.1

The number of on-site car parking spaces for uses, excluding dwellings, must meet the reasonable needs of the use, having regard to:

the availability of off-street public car parking spaces within reasonable walking distance of the site;

the ability of multiple users to share spaces because of:

efficiencies gained by consolidation of car parking spaces;

the availability and frequency of public transport within reasonable walking distance of the site;

the availability and frequency of other transport alternatives;

any site constraints such as existing buildings, slope, drainage, vegetation and landscaping;

the availability, accessibility and safety of on-street parking, having regard to the nature of the roads, traffic management and other uses in the vicinity;

the effect on streetscape; and

any assessment by a suitably qualified person of the actual car parking demand determined having regard to the scale and nature of the use and development.

The number of car parking spaces for dwellings must meet the reasonable needs of the use, having regard to:

the nature and intensity of the use and car parking required;

the size of the dwelling and the number of bedrooms; and

1. The parties agree that the proposal does not comply with Acceptable Solution A1, which requires five parking spaces constituted by four resident spaces and one dedicated visitor space. While the proposal provides five parking spaces, they are all for residents.

1. The first ground of appeal relates to C2.6.2 Design and layout of parking areas, which states:

That parking areas are designed and laid out to provide convenient, safe and efficient parking.

Parking, access ways, manoeuvring and circulation spaces must either:

(i) have a gradient in accordance with Australian Standard AS 2890 - Parking facilities, Parts 1-6;

(ii) provide for vehicles to enter and exit the site in a forward direction where providing for more than 4 parking spaces;

(iii) have an access width not less than the requirements in Table C2.2;

(iv) have car parking space dimensions which satisfy the requirements in Table C2.3;

(v) have a combined access and manoeuvring width adjacent to parking spaces not less than the requirements in Table C2.3 where there are 3 or more car parking spaces;

(vi) have a vertical clearance of not less than 2.1m above the parking surface level; and

(vii) excluding a single dwelling, be delineated by line marking or other clear physical means; or

(b) comply with Australian Standard AS 2890- Parking facilities, Parts 1-6.

Parking spaces provided for use by persons with a disability must satisfy the following:

be located as close as practicable to the main entry point to the building;

be incorporated into the overall car park design; and

be designed and constructed in accordance with Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 2890.6:2009 Parking facilities, Off-street parking for people with disabilities.

All parking, access ways, manoeuvring and circulation spaces must be designed and readily identifiable to provide convenient, safe and efficient parking, having regard to:

the characteristics of the site;

the nature and use of the development;

the likely use of the parking areas by persons with a disability;

the provisions of Australian Standard AS 2890.1:2004 - Parking facilities, Part 1: Off-street car parking and AS 2890.2 -2002 Parking facilities, Part 2: Off‑-street commercial vehicle facilities.

1. The parties agree that the proposal does not comply with Acceptable Solutions A1.1(a)(iii) and A1.1(b). The Acceptable Solutions require a width of 4.5m for the first seven metres from the road when serving 6-20 parking spaces, whereas the right of way is approximately 3.65m wide. The Acceptable Solutions also require compliance with Australian Standard AS 2890 Parking facilities, parts 1-6.

The proposal must be assessed against the Performance Criteria

1. Because the Acceptable Solutions are not met, we need to decide whether the proposal complies with P1 of C2.6.2 (Ground 1) and P1.2 of C2.5.1 (Ground 2). The proponent and council contend that it does comply. The appellants contend that it does not.
2. The interpretation of C2.5.1 is straightforward. We will address it as part of our consideration of the evidence.
3. The interpretation of C2.6.2 is more complex. It is necessary to determine its correct interpretation before considering the evidence. We commence with the clause's reference to an Australian Standard.

1. C2.6.2 P1 incorporates the Australian Standard AS 2890.1:2004 (the Standard). The nature of the Standard and the extent to compliance is necessary to satisfy P1 is in issue. At risk of oversimplification, the appellants say that the Standard must be strictly complied with to satisfy P1. The council and the proponent say that it need not. We prefer the latter.
2. It is convenient to start with some uncontroversial propositions regarding the Standard's applicability. It is, as the council submits, "an industry standard, privately owned and controlled". As Porter J noted in Kent v Gunns Ltd (2009) 18 Tas R 454; [2009] TASSC 30 at [50], in the absence of statutory embodiment, it is merely a guideline without any legally binding effect. Without such embodiment, its relevance "would only be to the extent that there has been expert evidence to which [it] express[es] good practice".
3. Here, P1 incorporates the Standard. But the Standard is not legislative in character and should not be interpreted as if it were a statute. Instead, it should be interpreted in accordance with the plain words of the text having regard to its objectives and purposes: SJM Property Developments Pty Ltd v Huon Valley Council [2025] TASCAT 114 at [14], citing H J Heinz Company Australia [2009] VSC 311; (2009) 31 VAR 206 at [26].
4. In any event, interpreting the Standard as if it were a statute, as the appellants urge us to do, produces the same outcome in this case. On either approach, the focus is the text's plain words while having regard to the context and purpose. See Wilderness Society (Tasmania) Inc v Wild Drake Pty Ltd (2021) 34 Tas R 341; [2021] TASFC 12 (Wild Drake) at [112]-[115].
5. Those objectives and purposes suggest that the Standard should not be given a strict or literal reading. In doing so, we must also have regard to the Code's objectives and purposes.

1. It is clear that, on the face of C2.6.2 P1, regard must be had to the Standard. However, satisfying Parts 1 and 2 of the Standard is not required to satisfy P1. So much is apparent from the wording of P1:

All parking, access, ways, manoeuvring and circulation spaces must be designed and readily identifiable to provide convenient, safe and efficient parking, having regard to: (j) the provisions of Australian Standard AS 2890.1:2004 - Parking facilities, Part 1: Off-street car parking and AS 2890.2-2002 Parking facilities, Part 2: Off-street commercial vehicle facilities. [Emphasis added]

2. Put differently, the Standard must be considered but compliance with it is not a condition precedent. This is consistent with the Tribunal's approach in Green v Launceston City Council [2024] TASCAT 27 at [108] and the Supreme Court's observations in Hobart City Council v Rich Tapestry Pty Ltd (ACN 667 999 055) [2024] TASSC 54 at [36].
3. We are fortified in that view by the fact that compliance with Parts 1-6 of the Standard satisfies the Acceptable Solution. It would be inconsistent with the orthodox approach to interpreting the TPS to interpret a performance criterion as requiring more than the analogous acceptable solution. While we are not obliged to consider the Acceptable Solution in interpreting P1, it is relevant that compliance with the former will promote the objective underpinning P1. The Full Court considered such an approach to be permissible in Boland v Clarence City Council [2021] TASFC 5 at [19]- [24] (Brett J, Wood and Pearce JJ agreeing). A1.1 must be interpreted as a solution which satisfies C2.6.2's objective. To that end, parking, access, ways, manoeuvring, and circulation spaces that comply with the Standard (which, by definition, satisfies A1.1(b)), are deemed to provide "convenient, safe, and effective parking".
4. We consider this approach to be compatible with Porter AJ's observations on the intended role of an acceptable solution in Wild Drake at [160] and [169]-[170]. We therefore reject the appellants' submission that there is nothing in P1 that invites consideration of A1.1(b). However, that is not the primary basis for our approach to construction. Rather, the text of P1 makes clear that the focus is on "convenient, safe and efficient parking" and that the Standard is but one factor which must be considered in assessing convenience, safety, and efficiency.

1. What, then, do the words 'convenience', 'safety', and 'efficiency' mean? We accept the council's submission that we should not follow slavishly each word's dictionary definition. The New South Wales Court of Appeal cautioned against such an approach in 2 Elizabeth Bay Road Pty Ltd v Owners - Strata Plan No 73943 (2014) 88 NSWLR 488; [2014] NSWCA 409 at [81].
2. We consider each to be a protean word. Conceptually, none is binary. For example, the Macquarie Dictionary relevantly defines 'safe' as "free from hurt, injury, danger, or risk". Defining 'safe' in P1 as "free from risk" would be absurd. Any parking involves some risk. To that end, the focus must be on an acceptable level of risk. Similarly, it is always possible to contemplate a design which would be more 'convenient' or 'efficient'. It does not follow that the relatively less convenient (or efficient) alternative is not convenient (or not efficient). Our task is to assess this proposal against the scheme requirements, not to assess whether a hypothetical alternative proposal would better satisfy those requirements.
3. No party has pointed us to any previous cases which define convenience, safety, and efficiency in the same context as this appeal. The proponent referred us to the Tribunal's consideration of 'efficiency' in Integrity Property Solutions Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council [2022] TASCAT 138 at [40]. That case involved a different planning scheme's reference to 'efficiency' in the context of vehicle manoeuvring space on a driveway. It is of minimal assistance.
4. We accept the following definitions, taken from the Macquarie Dictionary, to provide somewhat of a starting point.

(a) Convenient means "agreeable to the needs or purpose; well-suited with respect to facility or ease in use; favourable, easy, or comfortable for use."

(b) Safe means "secure from liability to harm, injury, danger, or risk" or "free from hurt, injury, danger, or risk". For the reasons explained above, this is of little assistance considering our conclusions regarding the nature of risk.

(c) Efficient means "effective in the use of energy or resources" or "adequate in operation of performance".

Does compliance with the Standard itself satisfy P1?

[M]ere compliance with the technical parameters of Part 1 [of the Standard] will not equate to a parking facility that satisfies the performance criterion. Equally, technical non-compliance with Part 1 will not equate to the performance criterion not being met. It is a matter for judgement requiring a qualitative assessment that considers the performance of the parking facility through a planning lens... The safety, convenience and efficiency of the parking facility must each be evaluated.

2. Except for the appellants' reference to "through a planning lens", we accept that submission. The focus of P1 is on safety, convenience, and efficiency. The items prescribed by (a) - (j) are matters to be considered, not mandatory criteria. However, for reasons to which we will return, we are not persuaded that an analysis of safety, convenience, and efficiency is a planning, as opposed to traffic engineering, concept.

1. Each party called a traffic engineer: Mark Petrusma for the council, Keith Midson for the proponent, and Rebekah Ramm for the appellants. Each made several statements of evidence and was cross-examined. Over the respondents' objections, we admitted two statements of evidence made by Heidi Goess, an urban and regional town planner, for the appellants. Several other documents or bundles of documents were tendered, including, helpfully, a statement of agreed matters signed by the three traffic engineers (subject to one reservation by Ms Ramm). Much of the evidence is not in dispute.
2. It is unnecessary to set out the evidence in detail. The traffic engineers agreed several matters:

(a) "The proposed development will generate low traffic volumes", peaking at approximately 0.8 to 0.9 vehicle trips per hour during peak periods.

(b) There is a very low likelihood of a vehicle on the driveway encountering another vehicle travelling in the opposite direction.

(c) The traffic will be predominately light vehicles associated with residential use. Vehicle movements will be by familiar users (that is, residents and visitors).

(d) The internal dimensions of the proposed garage satisfy the Standard's technical requirements as to width and length. To that end, two vehicles can physically park in and manoeuvre into and out of it.

(e) Similarly, the dimensions between the proposed garage door and the southern edge of the driveway (referred to as the 'apron width') exceed the Standard's minimum requirements.

(f) The first six metres of the driveway does not meet the Standard's gradient requirement, it being too steep. However, the non-compliance is acceptable in the circumstances.

1. Although different to the approach taken by the parties, it is convenient to summarise the appeal into four broad areas of contention.

(a) The first is whether increased use of the driveway will result in an unreasonable increase in safety risk at the interface with Wyett Street. This primarily rates to reversing movements at the access point and was the subject of evidence by each of the three traffic engineers.

(b) The second is whether increased use of the driveway will result in an unreasonable level of inconvenience.

(c) The third is whether the condition proffered by Mr Petrusma in his primary statement of evidence, relating to the design and construction of changes to the driveway, can achieve satisfactory grade transitions and ground clearance consistent with the Standard.

(d) The fourth is whether vehicle manoeuvring into and out of the garage is convenient.

1. Ground one, relating to the number of car parking spaces, must also be considered.
2. At risk of oversimplification, Messrs Midson and Petrusma considered C2.6.2 P1 to be satisfied in that the proposal provides convenient, safe, and efficient parking, but Ms Ramm did not. For reasons which we will endeavour to explain, unless otherwise indicated, we have preferred the evidence of Mr Midson and Mr Petrusma. We consider their methodology to be more compelling (in the sense of it explaining, logically, the quantitative steps, the qualitative conclusions, and the relationship between the two) and consistent with the interpretation of the scheme and the Standard which we have earlier outlined.

1. It is convenient to commence our analysis with the question of a site inspection. Before doing that, it is necessary to explain the way in which we have approached the evidence in respect of C2.6.2 P1. The test relates to convenience, safety, and efficiency, the interpretation of which we considered earlier. The performance criterion prescribes factors to be considered. We have carefully considered each. But it is unnecessary to discuss each separately in stating our reasons.

1. The parties had varying approaches as to the desirability of a site view or inspection.
2. In Scott v Shire of Numurkah [1954] HCA 14; (1954) 91 CLR 300, Dixon CJ, Webb, Kitto, and Taylor JJ said at 313 that:

[a] view is for the purpose of enabling the tribunal to understand the questions that are being raised, to follow the evidence and to apply it, but not to put the result of the view in place of evidence.

3. Given the comprehensive evidence that we received regarding the laneway and the dynamic nature of traffic, we would not have been assisted by conducting a view of the site. It would not have assisted us to understand the issues and the evidence. We therefore decided not to conduct one.
4. It is therefore strictly unnecessary to address the parties' submissions regarding whether a view should be conducted in the presence of the parties' representatives. However, we doubt their presence to be necessary (compared to, for example, considering an experiment or receiving other evidence). The governing principle is procedural fairness. As Gleeson CJ said in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; [2003] HCA6 at [38]:

Fairness is not an abstract context. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice.

5. It is difficult to see how representatives' attendance is necessary to avoid practical injustice where the view is not evidence and evidence is not received. As the proponent points out, requiring their attendance may unnecessarily and unreasonably increase costs for the parties, and may occasion delay, each of which would be inconsistent with the Tribunal's statutory objectives in the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (TASCAT Act), s 10(1)(c) and (d).

1. We find that manoeuvring into and out of the garage is convenient. There will always be some level of inconvenience when living in an urban environment. We accept Ms Ramm's evidence that the parking area's design and layout may not be suitably convenient for those who rely on on-site parking for large semi-commercial vehicles. But we prefer the conclusions of Messrs Midson and Petrusma, each based on his own analysis, that the proposal provides an acceptable level of convenient parking for vehicles used by a significant portion of the community.
2. The General Residential Zone, by its stated purpose, seeks to accommodate a range of dwelling types. The provision of housing together with convenient parking is a necessary aspect of communities providing for their social, cultural, and economic wellbeing. Given the diverse range of households and their individual travel needs, we do not consider it necessary that the proposal caters for the maximum potential parking needs. To find otherwise would impose a higher standard than the scheme provides.
3. We accept the evidence of Mr Midson and Mr Petrusma that the proposed dwelling will provide an acceptable level of convenient parking for vehicles used by a significant proportion of the community. It may not be acceptable to or convenient for all, but that is not the test. It is instructive that the relevant considerations in P1 do not refer expressly to deliveries.
4. The appellants contend that while on-street parking may be suitable for visitors in the form of residents' friends and family, it would not be suitable for delivery drivers such as Woolworths home delivery drivers (this was the example relied upon by the appellants). While that may be true (noting that the appellants did not adduce evidence on it), it does not dissuade us from finding that P1.2 is satisfied. The criterion focuses on the "reasonable needs of the use" having regard to the prescribed factors. The word 'reasonable' assumes some importance. As we will endeavour to explain, the Standard does not focus on all needs of the use.
5. The inner-city nature of the surrounding area means that it is reasonable not to have closer, or specific off-street, parking for delivery drivers. That is something about which residents, or prospective residents, are no doubt aware of and something which they consider in choosing a dwelling. To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the nature of inner-city development and would impose a higher standard than is required by C2.6.2. Access to all delivery services is not a necessary requirement of residential use. Moreover, there is a distinction between a visitor and service provider. A delivery driver is, typically, on a specific route with a set task in their role as a service provider. The ability to park in the vicinity of a dwelling to deliver that service will vary significantly as determined by the housing mix, density, and topography. Their service is transient in nature and the scheme does not envisage a specific parking provision.
6. We accept that the swept path diagrams used the appropriate vehicle size assumption, B85 (that is, the 85th percentile based on vehicle sales in 2000). While larger (or, indeed, smaller) vehicles are common, we are satisfied that the assumptions underpinning Mr Midson and Mr Petrusma's swept path diagrams are sound such that their diagrams and conclusions should be accepted. The appellants referred us to several decisions of other tribunals which discussed the appropriate vehicle size assumption, and we received some evidence which suggested that there is a trend towards both larger and smaller vehicles. These do not dissuade us from accepting the swept path diagrams based on a B85 vehicle. Nor does the need to consider the proposal's design life, over which vehicle sizes may increase.
7. In any event, it is apparent that a B99 vehicle could use the garage, albeit with a five-point turn. We consider this to nonetheless be convenient in the circumstances. That the vehicle's doors may not fully open does not dissuade us from that view. Nor does the sloped nature of the driveway or the nearness of the proposed dwelling to the apron. We repeat that convenience is not an absolute or binary concept.
8. Mr Midson gave helpful evidence regarding factors informing convenience. He considered the proposal to provide convenient parking based on residents' familiarity with the garage and the driveway, the likely low speeds, the straight alignment of the driveway and the garage, the ability for pedestrians to find refuge on the side of the driveway (even in the absence of a passing bay), and the overall good visibility. He considered and we accept that these factors result in the parking being convenient. We did not receive detailed evidence or submissions regarding users with disabilities. Based on the limited evidence and submissions that we did receive, we find that, while the driveway is unlikely to be particularly convenient for users with disabilities, that inconvenience does not rise to the level of non-compliance with the performance criterion.
9. We place particular weight on the likelihood that drivers will be familiar with the environment, which militates against the need for corrective movements or other tasks which militate against convenience.
10. Weighing up these matters, we are satisfied that the proposal provides convenient parking.

1. The three traffic engineers agreed that the proposal will generate low traffic volumes. This is reinforced in Mr Petrusma's uncontradicted Poisson distribution calculation, which allows us to find that:

(a) The proposal will increase the average number of encounters from 1.35 to 1.69 per year. An encounter is a situation in which two vehicles travelling in opposite directions meet on the driveway.

(b) This is an extremely low probability event and is unlikely to be experienced in practice by most drivers using the driveway.

(c) Not every encounter would require a driver to reverse back on to Wyett Street which, it seems to be accepted, is the more problematic of the two manoeuvres. A significant proportion of encounters would involve the other driver heading up the driveway needing to reverse back down.

(d) For a vehicle that does need to reverse back up on to Wyett Street, the reversing vehicle would be visible to traffic on Wyett Street who could react to prevent a collision.

(e) It follows that the likelihood of a crash is very low and the consequences of a crash would typically be property damage rather than physical injury. This results in a negligible crash risk at the interface with Wyett Street. This is consistent with the crash history, which was in evidence, showing there to be no reported accidents (although we accept that this is not to say that there were no accidents at all, as some may not have been reported).

1. The Standard refers to 'sight distance' as a matter relevant to safety. That is, the sight distance between the driveway and Wyett Street is relevant to whether the access way is safe. In the Standard, sight distance considers "fixed obstructions, not transient obstructions such as parked vehicles": Jacobs v Hobart City Council [2023] TASCAT 27 at [76]. Given that where the driveway meets Wyett Street has few fixed obstructions, the sight distance is adequate and consistent with safety.
2. We reject the appellants' submission that the lack of a dedicated footpath on the driveway renders it unsafe. The factors informing convenience which we have considered above suggest it to be unnecessary. Moreover, the proposal involves an asphalt pavement driveway, which Ms Ramm conceded was an all-weather pavement. We are satisfied that the driveway would be usable in all weather conditions.
3. We are satisfied that the driveway is designed and readily identifiable to provide safe parking. We are satisfied of that even in the absence of a passing bay, which we have nonetheless decided to require as a condition of a permit. We find that the proposal provides safe parking.

1. At issue is the transition in the grade between the driveway and the proposed garage. Given the driveway's slope, this is relevant to ensuring that manoeuvring into and out of the driveway is safe, efficient, and convenient.
2. It is accepted that the proposal in its current form does not meet the Standard's requirements for grade transition. However, all three traffic engineers believed the non-compliance to be acceptable. We accept this uncontradicted evidence.
3. Mr Petrusma proffered a condition of approval to develop a grade change between the driveway and the proposed garage that satisfies the Standard. Mr Midson and Ms Ramm agree with Mr Petrusma that this, if successfully implemented, would meet the Standard.
4. However, the parties disagree as to whether Mr Petrusma's proposed condition can be achieved. This is a question of engineering evidence. It is relevant because imposing a condition which cannot be achieved is tantamount to refusing a permit and therefore impermissible.
5. Mr Midson and Mr Petrusma each gave evidence that the condition could be achieved. Ms Ramm considered that there was insufficient information to conclude that it could be achieved. However, that is different from saying that the condition could not be achieved. As can be seen, two expert witnesses say that the condition can be achieved. The third is unable to so state. But no witness says that it can not be achieved. In those circumstances and having regard to Messrs Midson and Petrusma's considerable experience (and, in the latter's case, considerable detail at [55]-[56] of his primary statement of evidence), we accept that the condition may be achieved.
6. We consider it to be preferable for the driveway's grade transition and ground clearance to meet the Standard. We will return to this issue when considering conditions to impose on the permit. However, we repeat that, as matter of statutory construction, compliance with the Standard is not required to satisfy the relevant performance criterion.

1. We find that the proposal satisfies C2.5.1 P1.2. An appropriate number of car parking spaces is provided to meet the needs of the use.
2. Messrs Petrusma and Midson estimated unreserved parking demand to be up to one visitor space. Mr Midson emphasised that because visitor parking usage is likely to be infrequent and short in duration, the on-street parking is a reasonable solution. We agree. The two experts estimated there to be between 10 and 17 car parking spaces available within 100m of the site at any one time.
3. We repeat that the proposed garage, which provides two parking spaces, satisfies residents' demand. The proposed dwelling has only two bedrooms.
4. We accept Mr Midson's evidence that the surrounding uses are almost entirely residential. Demand for on-street parking is relatively low. Mr Petrusma estimated a practical capacity of 41 on-street car parking spaces. Estimating 15 to be parked at any one time, 17 spaces would remain to accommodate the proposal's visitor demand. While these are estimates, we accept them as the best evidence available.
5. We find two car parking spaces to meet the reasonable needs of the proposal's use, having regard to its nature and intensity, the dwelling size and the number of bedrooms, and the pattern of parking in the surrounding area. C2.5.1 P1.2 is satisfied.

1. We are satisfied that the two performance criteria in issue are met.

1. The parties agree that, if a permit is granted, conditions one through eight as annexed to this decision should be imposed. In addition, there are five additional conditions that are sought by one or more parties but are not agreed by all parties.
2. We commence with the principles relevant to the power to impose a condition or restriction on a permit under LUPAA, s 51. The power is broad and not limited to any matter specified in the relevant planning scheme: Northern Midlands Council v Smith [2021] TASSC 8; Beauty Point Trading Pty Ltd v West Tamar Council [2023] TASCAT 67 at [8]. However, a condition must reasonably and fairly relate to the development permitted and must be imposed for a proper planning purpose: Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd (2004) 221 CLR 30; [2004] HCA 63 at [57] (McHugh J) and [91]-[93] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). The Tribunal's task is to impose the conditions that it considers to be preferable: Northern Midlands Council v Smith at [15] and [23].
3. We are satisfied that two of the five additional conditions should be imposed on the permit. These conditions are directed to achieving the objectives of the scheme provisions that are in issue. We are not satisfied that we should impose the remaining conditions. We consider each proposed condition separately.

1. While the risk of collision or conflict between vehicles on the driveway is very low, it is not negligible. Needing to reserve into Wyett Street may be somewhat inconvenient. We have decided to add a condition to the permit requiring the construction of a passing bay. The condition will provide a visible and dedicated space, enabling pedestrians and vehicles to pass in a convenient manner. It will also minimise or avoid the need for vehicles to either reverse a long distance or reverse back up to Wyett Street. The condition will ensure that the increased use of the laneway does not result in an unreasonable level of inconvenience. Put differently, if the driveway is designed so that users feel that it is safe and easy to use, a broader range of people, including pedestrians who are sensitive to how safe the driveway may feel, are more likely to use it.
2. While not all parties agree that such a condition is necessary, they agree the condition's wording. We consider this condition to further the relevant objectives of the scheme and to be preferable and appropriate. We will impose it.

1. Based on Mr Petrusma's evidence, we have also decided to add a condition relating to grade and ground clearance. The condition relates to manoeuvrability in and out of the garage, having regard to the driveway's slope. The parties agree the condition's wording, although the appellants maintain that the condition cannot be complied with. Our reasons for rejecting that contention are set out above.
2. We consider this condition to be preferable and appropriate and have decided to impose it.

1. During closing submissions, the appellants submitted that any permit should be conditioned to require the installation of lighting on the driveway. We reject that submission. Neither Mr Midson nor Mr Petrusma considered it necessary. Moreover, the reference to lighting in cl 4.7 of the Standard is directed to carparks and associated pedestrian circulation areas, not residential driveways.
2. While it is unclear whether the appellants press this condition, proposed wording having not been provided, we have addressed it in light of the evidence received and submissions made on the question of lighting.

1. The appellants urge modifications of a fence on Wyett Street to satisfy C2.6.2 P1. The appellants want the fence to be lowered to improve visibility. We are satisfied that P1 is met and that there is no need for the condition. We accept the second respondent's contention that the condition is unnecessary.

1. The appellants seek a condition to require the installation of 'no parking' lines to be painted some 6-7 metres on either side of entrance to the driveway on Wyett Street. The condition is based on the evidence of Ms Ramm given under cross-examination regarding sight lines when entering Wyett Street from the driveway.
2. We do not consider such a condition to be necessary to satisfy C2.6.2 P1. The correct interpretation of sight lines and our finding that visibility is not impeded is set out above. Moreover, the council (not acting as planning authority) is reluctant to install such lines. We accept the council's submission that imposing the condition would therefore be tantamount to refusing planning approval and, it follows, beyond the Tribunal's power. We decline to impose this condition.

1. The parties prepared a draft condition relating to the dimensions of the proposed garage. Although no party opposes the condition's form or inclusion, the proponent considers it to be unnecessary. We agree. The endorsed plans and documents, which are required by the first condition, address the dimensions of the garage. Imposing a separate and additional condition is unduly complicated and unnecessary. It is not preferable. We decline to impose this condition.

1. Neither ground of appeal is made out. The appeal fails. However, we will vary the permit issued by the council to reflect the additional conditions that we consider should be imposed.
2. The presumption is that each party is to bear their own costs: TASCAT Act, Sch 2, Pt 8, cl 12(1). We will afford the parties an opportunity to make any application for costs.
3. We order:

(a) Vary the permit issued by the first respondent in respect of DA 0472/2024 by substituting the conditions of the permit with the conditions attached to this decision and marked Annexure A.

(b) The first respondent issue an amended permit in accordance with this decision within 14 days.

(c) Any application for an order for costs in the appeal is to be made in writing with supporting submissions within 21 days. If no application is so filed, each party is to bear their own costs.

The use and development must be carried out substantially in accordance with the endorsed plans and documents to the satisfaction of the Manager City Development unless modified by a condition of the Permit:

1. Cover, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A000, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
2. Site Plan, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A101, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
3. Shadow Diagrams, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A102, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
4. Survey Data, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A103, Revision I, dated 06/03/2025;
5. Proposed Floor Plan, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A202, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
6. Proposed Elevations, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A301, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
7. 3D, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A401, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
8. 3D with Envelope, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A402, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
9. 3D, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A403, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
10. 3D with Envelope, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A404, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
11. 3D, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A405, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
12. 3D with Envelope, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A406, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
13. View from Kitchen Window 42 Hill St, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A407, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
14. Outside Wheel Path Section 01, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A501, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025;
15. Outside Wheel Path Section 02, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A502, Revision K, dated 15/04/2025; and
16. Driveway Section, prepared by S Group, Drawing No. A503, Revision J, dated 27/03/2025.

Prior to commencement of the development, a construction management plan must be prepared and submitted to Council at the satisfaction of Manager of Infrastructure and Development. The plan must detail how access along the Right of Way will be maintained (i.e. remain available) during construction.

Once approved by the Manager of Infrastructure and Development, the construction management plan will be endorsed and will then form part of this permit.

All development and use associated with the proposal must be confined to the legal title of the subject land except construction of access from the street.

The development must comply with the requirements of TasWater as detailed in the Amended Submission to Planning Authority Notice, Reference No. TWDA 2024/01270-LCC dated 19 August 2025, a copy of which is attached to, and forms part of, this permit.

1. Unless otherwise approved in writing by the Manager Health and Compliance construction activities must only be carried out between the hours of:

1. Monday to Friday - 7 am to 6 pm; and
2. Saturday - 8 am to 6 pm.

1. Notwithstanding condition 6 a., construction activities must not be carried out on public holidays that are observed state-wide (Easter Tuesday excepted).

The construction of the development permitted by this permit must not adversely affect the amenity of the site and the locality by reason of the processes carried on; the transportation of materials, goods or commodities to or from the subject land; the appearance of any buildings, works or materials; the emission of noise, artificial light, vibration, smell, fumes, smoke, vapour, steam, soot, ash, dust, waste water, waste products, grit or oil; the presence of vermin, or otherwise.

No burning of any waste materials, including removed vegetation, generated by the development to be undertaken on-site. Any such waste materials are to be removed to a licensed waste disposal facility (e.g. Launceston Waste Centre), reclaimed or recycled.

1. BUILDING ACT 2016 REQUIREMENTS

Prior to acting on this permit, it is recommended that an architect, a licensed building practitioner such as a building surveyor or a building designer be consulted to determine the requirements for any associated building, plumbing or demolition work under the Building Act 2016.

Prior to the commencement of any work, amended plans must be submitted to the satisfaction of Council's Manager of Infrastructure and Development that show:

1. the gradients, grade transitions, and crossfalls for the full length of the right of way and driveway between the centreline of the street to a point not less than 5 metres inside the proposed garage (the location of the vehicle wheels furthest from the garage opening); and

2. that the ground clearance requirements for a B85 vehicle as specified in Appendix C of AS/NZS 2890.1:2004, Part 1 are met.

The amended plans must be accompanied by a statement from a suitably qualified and experienced person that the design of the driveway satisfies the requirements of AS/NZS 2890.1:2004 , Part 1 in relation to residential driveways or, where compliance with the standard cannot be achieved, the proposed design is safe.

The amended plans must include identification information such as updated revision numbers, revision date, and revision description. All changes are to be highlighted in red clouds or a format agreed with the Manager of Infrastructure and Development.

Once approved by the Manager of Infrastructure and Development, the amended plans will endorsed and will then form part of this permit.

Prior to the commencement of any work, amended plans must be submitted to the satisfaction of Council's Manager of Infrastructure and Development that delineate a vehicle passing facility within 18 Wyett Street, specifically, within the existing driveway used to access the car parking spaces that service the existing dwelling on 18 Wyett Street. The passing facility must be at least 2 metres wide by 5 metres long, plus entry and exit tapers, and must adjoin the right of way.

The amended plans must include identification information such as updated revision numbers, revision date, and revision description. All changes are to be highlighted in red clouds or a format agreed with Council's Manager of Infrastructure and Development. Once approved by Council's Manager of Infrastructure and Development, the amended plans will be endorsed and will then form part of this permit.

Prior to the commencement of any work, an easement and covenant as to user must be registered over the area encompassing the approved passing facility for the benefit of the properties at 16 Wyett Street, 44 Hill Street and 46 Hill Street, West Launceston.

Within 30 days of the easement and covenant as to user being registered on title to the site, the owner of the site must give written notice of the location, rights and restrictions attaching to the easement and covenant as to user to the owners of 16 Wyett Street, 44 Hill Street and 46 Hill Street, West Launceston.

a) the 14 day appeal period expires; or

b) any appeal to the Tasmanian Civil & Administrative Appeal Tribunal (TASCAT) is withdrawn or determined; or

c) any agreement that is required by this permit pursuant to Part V of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 is executed; or

d) any other required approvals under this or any other Act are granted.

This permit automatically lapses after a period of two (2) years if not substantially commenced within that period - see section 53 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993. An extension may be granted subject to the provisions of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 by request to Council.

The granting of this permit takes no account of any covenants applicable to the land. The permit holder and any other interested party, should make their own enquiries as to whether the proposed development is affected, restricted or prohibited by any such covenant.

If the proposal is non-compliant with any restrictive covenants, those restrictive covenants should be removed from the title prior to construction commencing or the owner will carry the liability of potential legal action in the future.