[2022] WASC 331
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2022-10-03
Strk J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) the relationship of trust and confidence between the two directors of GT Capital has deteriorated to a point where there is an absence of effective stewardship of GT Capital; and
(b) GT Capital is without any working capital, has no available external sources of funding, and therefore is unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due.
(a) as at 24 August 2022, GT Capital had one main bank account (the Primary GT Account), which had a negative balance of $7,036.86;
(b) GT Capital had no funds to pay its debtors, at least in the short term;
(c) there were no finalised financial statements for GT Capital; and
(d) there was potential for the future receipt of funds, but GT Capital had 'aged payables' in the amount of at least $631,788, which included debts of at least $455,860 which had been overdue for more than three months.
(1) A person or entity with a claim, or potential claim (a litigant) approaches GT Capital.
(2) Once GT Capital agrees to fund an action, it enters into a funding agreement with the litigant.
(3) GT Capital creates a special purpose vehicle (SPV) company to act as a trustee. The naming protocol is 'GT Capital SPV [a number from 1 upwards] Pty Ltd' (SPV company). For each SPV company, Mr Graham and Mr Turco are each directors and Mr Turco is the company secretary. Each SPV company is a wholly owned subsidiary of GT Capital.
(4) GT Capital novates/assigns the funding agreement to the SPV company to hold as trustee for the relevant trust. The naming protocol for each trust is 'GT Capital Unit Trust [a number from 1 upwards]'.
(5) The investors pay their money into the Primary GT Account, sign a term sheet and are issued units.
Investor deposits funds into GT Capital Primary Fund - minimum of AUD $50,000.
The Primary Fund is akin to a trust account. Investor funds are not drawn down for a case or otherwise dealt with unless express approval has been obtained.
(a) that on 1 July 2022 he received a letter from Andrew Dunstan of Strategic Accounting that Strategic Accounting had been approached to undertake the future income tax requirements of GT Capital;
(b) that he was informed by Mr Graham of Mr Graham's intention to call a members' meeting of GT Capital so as to remove Mr Turco as a director; and
(c) to the unwillingness of Mr Graham and Andrew Dunstan of Strategic Accounting to communicate with Mr Turco.
My client has invested in a number of actions promoted by 'GT Capital'.
By way of example only, I attach a copy of a unit trust deed and other relevant documentation in relation to one of those investments ...
It has come to my client's attention that monies provided for these investments were deposited not in an account of the trustee of the respective unit trust (by way of example GT Capital SPV 9 Pty Ltd) but, in the bank account of the GT Capital and was mixed with funds of the company's own and other trusts used as vehicles for investments made in other litigation funding opportunities.
In regard to the attached documentation, I draw your attention to clause 20.1 of the attached deed of trust which requires the monies use for these investments to be deposited in the account of the trustee. This seems not to have not occurred.
Given, the common directorships between the trustee and GT Capital, the breach of trust on the part of the trustee must be taken to also have involved not only the common directors but also GT Capital which would therefore be liable to our client for a breach of trust and obliged, depending upon the status of its bank account to account to my client for those monies. Given the nature and state of that bank account one of the remedies available could be a constructive trust over funds in GT Capital's bank account.
(a) current liabilities in the amount of $220,278, which included $40,000 outstanding on GT Capital's corporate American Express card and $180,278 outstanding to trade creditors. In this regard, Mr Graham deposed that the total amount outstanding to trade creditors was correct to the end of July 2022, not the end of June 2022 as recorded, because Mr Graham had accounted for trade creditors paid in July 2022. Mr Graham also deposed that GT Capital was able to meet its current liabilities; and
(b) non-current liabilities in the amount of $2,264,501. In this regard, Mr Graham deposed that the non‑current liabilities were principally costs that may be paid by GT Capital towards the completion of the litigation funded by GT Capital. If GT Capital were to provide that further funding, it may sell unit trust holdings to raise the funds to pay those costs, if necessary, in accordance with its usual business practice. Mr Graham deposed that GT Capital was able to meet its non‑current liabilities.
(1) By one of the letters, Mr Graham proposed a course for the ongoing management of GT Capital. The terms of the proposal are set out at [180] below.
(2) By the second letter, Mr Graham made an open offer to buy Mr Turco's 20% shareholding in GT Capital for $400,000, which offer was capable of being accepted for seven days and was only conditional upon the there being no appointment of provisional liquidators before settlement.
(a) clarify the true financial position and affairs of GT Capital, including and with a particular emphasis on the manner in which the company accounts for and treats investor funds;
(b) explain the reasons for the discrepancies between the records relied upon by M2 Assets and Mr Graham respectively, in circumstances where both parties have access to the same information and books and records;
(c) provide supporting information and evidence for figures which have been referred to or relied upon within Mr Graham's second and third affidavits;
(d) identify aspects of Mr Turco's previously filed affidavit evidence containing false, misleading, incomplete and/or inaccurate information or statements;
(e) provide the court with a sufficient factual foundation to determine whether the evidence contained in the affidavits deposed by Mr Turco can or should be relied upon by the court for the purpose of the present application, noting that it is M2 Assets which bears the onus of proving prima facie insolvency; and
(f) provide the court with a sufficient factual foundation to determine whether M2 Assets is acting unreasonably in seeking to have GT Capital wound up in circumstances where other remedies were available but not pursued.
Applicable principles with respect to the appointment of a provisional liquidator
[78] Section 472(2) of the Corporations Act empowers me to appoint a provisional liquidator at any time after the filing of a winding up application and before the making of a winding up order.
[79] Now although I have a broad discretion whether to appoint a provisional liquidator, nevertheless an applicant for the appointment of a provisional liquidator is required to establish two things.
[80] First, the applicant must show that it has reasonable prospects of obtaining a winding up order. As a consequence, there is a significant overlap between the matters relevant to determining whether to wind up a company on the just and equitable ground, and the matters that weigh in favour of the exercise of my discretion to appoint a provisional liquidator.
[81] Second, an applicant for the appointment of a provisional liquidator must show that there is some good reason for intervention prior to the final hearing of the winding up application, for example that the appointment is needed in the public interest or to preserve the status quo or to protect the company's assets and affairs.
[82] Now it has often been said that the appointment of a provisional liquidator pending the determination of a winding up application is a drastic intrusion into the affairs of a company and should not be ordered if other measures would be adequate to preserve the status quo. Now such considerations are important, but they do not of themselves necessarily limit my jurisdiction or exercise of power to appoint a provisional liquidator.
[83] Factors relevant to the exercise of my discretion to appoint a provisional liquidator include:
(a) whether the affairs of the company have been conducted casually without due regard being given to the applicable legal requirements so as to cause me to have no or little confidence that the affairs of the company are being carried out properly;
(b) whether the assets of the company will be dissipated in the interim period between the filing of the application to wind up and the winding up order being made;
(c) whether in the public interest there is a need for an examination of the state of the accounts of the company; and
(d) whether, if the appointment was not made, there was a strong possibility that there would be further acts, omissions or events which would be detrimental to creditors or shareholders.
[84] But unless an applicant can demonstrate that there is a need for interim control of the company pending the winding up of the company, no appointment will be made. It is not by itself enough, for example, that the company has not traded for some time. It is also not enough by itself that a provisional liquidator might be able to undertake investigations which might be fruitful (Allstate Explorations NL v Batepro Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 261 at [37] per Austin J).
[85] But it may be appropriate to appoint a provisional liquidator where the affairs of the company have been carried on casually and without due regard to legal requirements so as to leave me with no confidence that the company's affairs would be properly conducted with due regard for the interests of creditors and shareholders.
[86] Further and generally speaking, it is also necessary to consider the degree of urgency and the balance of convenience.
[87] Further, where the company opposes the application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator, the onus on an applicant may not be as heavy as it would be otherwise. If the applicant's affidavits raise matters to which one would expect there to be some answer and there is no answer provided, then that may raise a suspicion that it may well be in the public interest to appoint a provisional liquidator.
Disposition Power to appoint a provisional liquidator
Reasonable prospects of obtaining a winding up order
(1) A person is solvent if, and only if, the person is able to pay all the person's debts, as and when they become due and payable.
(2) A person who is not solvent is insolvent.
[T]he debtor's own moneys are not limited to his cash resources immediately available. They extend to moneys which he can procure by realisation by sale or by mortgage or pledge of his assets within a relatively short time - relative to the nature and amount of the debts and to the circumstances, including the nature of the business, of the debtor.
The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor's position in its entirety and generally speaking ought not be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity. It is the debtor's inability, utilising such cash resources as he has or can command through the use of his assets, to meet his debts as they fall due which indicates insolvency.
(a) Mr Graham's evidence with respect to the solvency of GT Capital was self-serving and contained largely inadmissible opinion evidence,[33] and if admitted into evidence ought be given little weight;
(b) in any event, the further evidence of Mr Turco revealed that Mr Graham's views as to the value of GT Capital's assets were misconceived;
(c) an interlocutory application was not the occasion to resolve factual controversies; and
(d) M2 Assets need only establish that there was a reasonable prospect that at a final hearing it would obtain an order that GT Capital be wound up on the grounds of insolvency, and the evidence adduced on behalf of M2 Assets was sufficient to achieve such end.
First, there needs to be a lack of confidence in the conduct and management of the affairs of the company ... Second, in these types of circumstances it needs to be demonstrated that there is a risk to the public interest that warrants protection. Third, there is a reluctance on the part of the courts to wind up a solvent company.
(a) GT Capital is solvent so it will not be wound up in insolvency;
(b) M2 Assets has not been granted, and will not be granted, leave to wind up the company in insolvency as a contributory because it does not have prima facie evidence of insolvency; and
(c) it is unreasonable for M2 Assets to seek an order winding up GT Capital under the just and equitable ground where an alternative course is available to resolve the dispute and therefore the court should not wind up the company pursuant to s 467(4) of the Corporations Act.
(4) Where the application is made by members as contributories on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up or that the directors have acted in a manner that appears to be unfair or unjust to other members, the Court, if it is of the opinion that:
(a) the applicants are entitled to relief either by winding up the company or by some other means; and
(b) in the absence of any other remedy it would be just and equitable that the company should be wound up;
must make a winding up order unless it is also of the opinion that some other remedy is available to the applicants and that they are acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that other remedy.
(a) the appointment of an independent third director and company secretary to GT Capital, which counsel for M2 Assets submitted would resolve any management deadlock;
(b) the independent third director being required to sign-off on any expenses of GT Capital, which counsel for Mr Graham submitted would provide ongoing oversight of the affairs of GT Capital;
(c) the appointment of Strategic Accounting or another independent accounting firm proposed by M2 Assets and approved by the independent third director, to reconstruct the books and records of GT Capital and undertake a forensic review, including any payments made to the directors of GT Capital since its inception, which counsel submitted would determine whether the directors are entitled to retain those funds; and
(d) if necessary, the appointment of independent solicitors to separately represent GT Capital in recovery proceedings against the directors of GT Capital.
[O]f a type that is often described in these cases as a quasi-partnership. That is to say, although a corporate vehicle has been acquired by the parties to carry on their business, their relationship is essentially one of partners. Accordingly, where the intimate relationship between them breaks down, the court very often considers that it is just and equitable to wind up the company in the same way as it would have wound up their affairs had they chosen the vehicle of a partnership in its strict form.
The defendant particularly points to sec. 367(3) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code. It says that, if at the final hearing the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to some alternative relief, the court will not make a winding up order if that other remedy is available and the court considers that the plaintiff is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that other remedy. The defendant points to cases, such as Mincom Pty Ltd v Murphy (1983) 1 ACLC 749; (1982) 7 ACLR 370 and Re Dalkeith Investment Pty Ltd (1985) 3 ACLC 74; (1984) 9 ACLR 247 to reinforce that submission. The argument appears to be that if the plaintiff's case is accepted then he has been oppressed by the defendant and that if he has been oppressed then he could have applied under sec. 320 of the Companies Code and the court could have, under that section, made an order for compulsory acquisition. Therefore, it is argued that on the final hearing of the petition to wind up it will fail because it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to press for any further order. As the final claim will fail, it would be wrong to put in a provisional liquidator. Especially would it be wrong where the consequences of putting in a provisional liquidator would be to paralyse the business and to depreciate the assets because the business may very well come to an end and current assets will shrink in value and a large amount of fees will have to be paid to the provisional liquidator.
The authorities clearly would be that that section gives the court an unfettered discretion as to what it will do, acting in the best interest of the parties concerned, the creditors and the public. Normally the court will not put in a provisional liquidator on the petition of a contributory or creditor, unless there is material justifying the anticipation of a winding up order being made in due course. That, however, is not a rule of law and certainly in the appropriate extraordinary circumstances that might exist the court will put in a provisional liquidator notwithstanding that it is unlikely that the company will be finally wound up: see e.g. Re Tullabong Tin Ltd., Mahoney J, as he then was, 7 March 1973, unreported. However, the point is properly made that ordinarily the court will look to see the final fate of the petition.
As Mr Ireland for the plaintiff points out, it is a rather extraordinary submission to say that if the defendant has been guilty of oppression he is more likely to defeat the winding up petition than if he has not been guilty of oppression. Notwithstanding that rather bizarre result, it does appear to me that sec. 367(3) might produce it in the appropriate case. However, that subsection requires that not only shall some other remedy be available, but also that the petitioner is acting unreasonably in not pursuing that other remedy be available, but also that the petitioner is acting unreasonably in not pursuing that other remedy. In a case as the Mincom case, where the company is clearly able to pay its debts, one can well say that it may be unreasonable to force a winding up, just in the same way as it is unreasonable to wind up a company on the stock exchange on a just and equitable ground because one can just go out into the stock exchange and sell one's shares for a fair value: see the discussion in Callaway on The Just & Equitable Ground at p. 101. Perhaps one also has to bring into the equation the capacity of either party to buy the other out, but I will put that aside for the moment.
It is also necessary before sec. 367(3) can apply, in my view, for it to be shown to the court that the other remedy will effectively give relief. In order to establish that, it would, at the very least, be necessary to show that the money sum that would be available if an alternative order for compulsory purchase were made, would give the plaintiff justice. That is very difficult to establish to a court's satisfaction where there have been informal arrangements (if the defendant is to be believed) for some years, that is, each director would borrow from the company whenever he felt the need and the accounts have not been kept up to date.
Accordingly, it does not seem to me, looking at this stage at the facts, that if the facts remain the same at the hearing as they are now, that the court will be convinced that the plaintiff is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up rather than pursuing any other remedy.
Thus, it seems to me in the instant case if there be a barrier that the plaintiff has to surmount, that he will be successful in the final hearing of the petition, he has surmounted it.
As far as I am aware the only other Australian case that has referred to s 367 is my recent decision of Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Ltd (9 March 1989, Supreme Court of NSW, Young J, unreported). There a company sought to avoid provisional liquidators by saying that even if the just and equitable ground were made out, its directors had so oppressed the plaintiff, the plaintiff must have a remedy under s 320 and, accordingly, had another remedy other than winding up. Naturally enough, that submission was rejected.
[G]iven the serious interference with the affairs of a company involved in the appointment of a provisional liquidator, and the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the degree of likelihood that a winding up order be made is a relevant consideration, and while there is undoubtedly power to appoint a provisional liquidator where some other relief is more likely, the probability that final relief in a form other than a winding up order will be granted is a relevant discretionary consideration which may weigh against appointment of a provisional liquidator and favour some other, less intrusive, form of interlocutory relief.
(c) There is a demonstrated lack of control over the assets of the corporations arising from the intermingling of moneys between the corporate respondents. For practical purposes they have been administered as if comprising a single undertaking operated to suit the whims or purposes of Mr Solomon without due regard to their individual best interests.
(d) No proper records have been kept of the moneys lent to or distributed between the corporate respondents which were received from investments made with Mr Solomon. For example, it appears that investment moneys procured to be invested in taxis and share markets have been diverted to publishing ventures of Mr Solomon and his personal enterprises.
(e) Mr Solomon is the controlling mind and will of the corporate respondents and faces a conflict of interest. He is a debtor to the investors and liable to them in respect of moneys advanced and at the same time he is a creditor of the corporate respondents as result of the on lending to the corporate respondents. They have no doubt received the funds with notice that they were placed by the investors with Mr Solomon for investment in nominated ventures. Mr Solomon proposes to engage in further commercial activities through the corporate respondents and to obtain further credit.
(f) It is essential, in these circumstances, that an independent person is appointed who can ensure that any remaining funds are not further diverted by Mr Solomon for other ventures or intermingled with additional moneys. An independent person would be in a position to realise the assets, determine the claims and administer the remaining funds evenly as between the investors free from any personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome.
(a) there has been a complete breakdown as between the directors in circumstances where Mr Turco (through M2 Assets) and Mr Graham had operated in a manner that might be described as a quasi‑partnership;
(b) there was and remains a management deadlock, meaning that GT Capital was and continues to be unable to take action to address its current financial predicament. The recent actions taken by Mr Graham to put GT Capital into funds were taken without the agreement of Mr Turco;
(c) serious allegations were made against each of Mr Turco and Mr Graham in relation to the misuse of funds and the unauthorised withdrawal of moneys from the Primary GT Account in circumstances where it was alleged by Mr Turco that GT Capital has held investor funds in the Primary GT Account, and there was no evidence that separate trust accounts had been used. In this case, the evidence suggested that there was a need for an independent examination of the state of the accounts of GT Capital by someone other than the directors;
(d) Mr Graham had threatened to remove Mr Turco as a director of GT Capital using his majority shareholding to do so. While that act may remove the deadlock, it would leave Mr Graham as the sole director in circumstances where serious allegations have been made against him; and
(e) there is a real risk that Mr Graham will seek to meet the liabilities of GT Capital and ongoing litigation funding obligations by raising more money from investors in circumstances where there remains a question as to whether investor funds had been managed appropriately and where, if proven, the allegations made against Mr Graham by Mr Turco would constitute breaches of the provisions of the Corporations Act, including, but not limited to, breaches of directors' duties, inadequacy of accounts and inadequacy of record-keeping.
(a) as are conferred on him or her by the Corporations Act or by rules of the court that appointed him or her; or
(b) as the court specifies in the order appointing him or her.
(a) to take possession of, collect and protect the assets of GT Capital;
(b) to receive and collect the debts due to GT Capital;
(c) to discharge rents, wages, salaries and other current expenses but so far only as may be necessary for the purpose of preserving the assets of GT Capital or for the purposes of (d) hereof;
(d) to carry on the business of GT Capital until further order but so far only as is necessary for the beneficial disposal or winding up of that business; and
(e) generally to exercise such of the powers conferred on a liquidator by s 477(2)(a) to (k) of the Corporations Act as may be necessary for the foregoing purposes.
(a) the identification of the assets and liabilities of GT Capital;
(b) an opinion as to the solvency of GT Capital;
(c) an opinion as to the value of the assets of GT Capital;
(d) an opinion as to whether GT Capital has proper financial records; and
(e) any other information necessary to enable the financial position of GT Capital to be assessed.
Sch B - Notice issued pursuant to orders made on 12 September 2022**
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] Second defendant's submissions par 35.
[2] Second defendant's submissions pars 2(f), 22 - 26; ts 36 - 39 (21 September 2022).
[3] Second Bordi affidavit pars 9 ‑ 12, JWB‑2; third Bordi affidavit pars 12 ‑ 13, JWB‑5.
[5] See also ts 47 - 50 (12 September 2022).
[8] That is, GT Capital SPV3 Pty Ltd, GT Capital SPV5 Pty Ltd, GT Capital SPV6 Pty Ltd, GT Capital SPV9 Pty Ltd and GT Capital SPV11 Pty Ltd, respectively.
[10] Mr Bordi made an earlier affidavit which was filed in this proceeding, which was not read in support of the application.
[13] See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Global SDR Technologies Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 402; (2004) 51 ACSR 42 [50] - [51]; Lubavitch Mazal Pty Ltd v Yeshiva Properties No 1 Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 535; (2003) 47 ACSR 197 [104] - [125]; Maertin v Klaus Maertin Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 588; (2006) 233 ALR 358, which cases were referenced in Ford, Austin and Ramsay's Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 802. See also second defendant's submissions par 6.
[14] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 3.
[15] Supreme Court (Corporations) (WA) Rules 2004 r 6.1(2), Form 8.
[19] Plaintiff's submissions pars 30 - 34.
[20] Bank of Australasia v Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4 CLR 1514, 1528.
[21] Re Universal Management Ltd (1981) 1 NZCLC 95-026, 98,246.
[22] Bank of Australasia v Hall (1527).
[23] Re Bond Corp Holdings Ltd (1990) 1 WAR 465, 474. See also Bank of Australasia v Hall (1554) ‑ (1556); Leslie v Howship Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 133; (1997) 15 ACLC 459, 476.
[24] Bank of Australasia v Hall (1528), (1543), (1554); Rees v Bank of New South Wales [1964] HCA 47; (1964) 111 CLR 210, 218.
[25] Bank of Australasia v Hall (1553).
[27] See, for example, First Turco affidavit pars 4 - 5, MART-1, MART-2; second Turco affidavit par 5; fourth Turco affidavit par 2, MART-88.
[29] Second defendant's submissions par 20.
[30] Second defendant's submissions par 15; ts 23 - 25 (21 September 2022).
[32] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 1.
[33] Counsel stated that: In short, Mr Graham is not a valuer. Even if he was, his opinion evidence does not disclose the facts relied upon to support his opinion nor the intellectual basis for it.
[34] Plaintiff's submissions pars 36 - 43; second defendant's submissions pars 8 - 9.
[35] Plaintiff's submissions par 37, citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 234; (2013) 93 ACSR 189 [20].
[36] Plaintiff's submissions par 39, citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [21].
[37] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AGM Markets Pty Ltd [80].
[38] Plaintiff's submissions par 40, citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [22].
[39] Plaintiff's submissions par 41, citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [23].
[40] Plaintiff's submissions par 42, citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [24].
[41] William Buck (WA) Pty Ltd v Faulkner [No 6] [2013] WASC 342 [145]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers Ltd [124]; second defendant's submissions pars 8 - 9.
[42] As suggested at ts 65 - 67 (12 September 2022) and in the third Graham affidavit par 21.
[44] First Turco affidavit pars 43, 40, 45, 55 and 57, MART-14, MART-19; fourth Turco affidavit par 3, MART-89; sixth Graham affidavit pars 4 - 5, CJG-37.
[45] First Turco affidavit pars 43, 54, MART-19, MART-22; third Turco affidavit par 56, MART-86.
[46] Third Turco affidavit par 8, MART-42.
[47] ts 18 (6 September 2022); ts 53 - 54 (12 September 2022); ts 7 - 8 (21 September 2022).
[48] First Turco affidavit, MART-5, cl 105.2.
[49] See submission made by Mr Graham at ts 41 - 41 (21 September 2022), referring to Citi Project Marketing (Qld) Pty Ltd v VG Projects Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 65; [2018] 1 Qd R 100 [53] - [60].
[50] First Graham affidavit pars 47 - 50; ts 43 - 44 (21 September 2022).
[51] Third Turco affidavit, MART-45, MART-48, MART-51, MART-54, MART-57 (cl 20.1 of each trust deed); ts 44 - 46, 50 - 51 (12 September 2022).
[52] See ts 44 - 49, 68 (21 September 2022).
[53] First Turco affidavit par 20; third Turco affidavit par 40; ts 52 - 53 (12 September 2022); ts 12 (21 September 2022).
[54] First Graham affidavit, CG-1 (pages 9 - 12, 16 - 17); second Graham affidavit, CG-2 (pages 8 - 11); fourth Graham affidavit, CJG-4 to CJG-6.
[56] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 37, citing Re Cumberland Holdings Ltd (1976) 1 ACLR 361.
[57] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 38.
[58] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 40, citing BAM Property Group Pty Ltd v Imoda Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1192 [83] - [84].
[59] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 41.
[60] In support of this submission, counsel relied upon Cowling v Mekken [2015] VSC 196 and Vigliaroni v CPS Investments Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 428; (2009) 74 ACSR 282.
[61] Second defendant's submissions par 2(f).
[62] Second defendant's submissions pars 22 - 26; ts 36 - 39 (21 September 2022).
[63] Second Graham affidavit par 11, CG-2 (page 13).
[64] Second Graham affidavit par 10, CG-2 (pages 6 - 7).
[65] Second Graham affidavit par 9; second defendant's submissions par 25.
[66] Second defendant's submissions par 26.
[67] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 6; ts 40 - 41 (21 September 2022).
[68] Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Pty Ltd (597).
[69] Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Pty Ltd (597).
[70] Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Pty Ltd (597).
[71] Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Pty Ltd (597) - (598).
[72] Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Pty Ltd (598).
[73] Alessi v The Original Australian Art Co Pty Ltd (598).
[74] As was noted in the plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 11.
[75] Compare the views expressed by Young J in Bernhardt v Beau Rivage Pty Ltd (164) with those expressed by Hansen J in Host-Plus Pty Ltd v Australian Hotels Association [2003] VSC 145 [67].
[76] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 12, citing Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 048; [2018] 3 Qd R 520 [46]; ts 41 (12 September 2022); ts 69 - 70 (21 September 2022).
[77] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 10.
[78] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions par 14, citing Re Bicher & Son Ltd [2020] NSWSC 711; (2020) 147 ACSR 108 [131] ‑ [135].
[79] Plaintiff's supplementary submissions pars 44 - 45; ts 39 - 40, 43 (12 September 2022).
[80] See also the plaintiff's submissions par 45; ts 39 - 40 (12 September 2022).
[81] Second defendant's submissions par 35.
[86] Second defendant's submissions par 28.
[87] Fifth Graham affidavit par 27; ts 58 (21 September 2022).
[88] Fifth Graham affidavit pars 5 - 6, CJG-30.
[89] ts 55, 63 - 64 (21 September 2022).
[90] Second defendant's submissions par 32(a), referring to the first Turco affidavit par 40.
[91] Montgomery Windsor (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ilopa Pty Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 224, cited by Gordon J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) [11] - [18].
[92] Roumanus v Orchard Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1480 [168]; plaintiff's submissions par 47.
[93] National Investment Institute Pty Ltd v Property Corporate Services Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 175; (2004) 48 ACSR 508 [47] - [51].
[94] Lubavitch Mazal Pty Ltd v Yeshiva Properties No 1 Pty Ltd [107] - [110]; Zempilas v JN Taylor Holdings Ltd [No 2] (1990) 55 SASR 103, 107.
[95] Second Graham affidavit pars 23 - 25; ts 70 - 73 (12 September 2022).
(1966) 115 CLR 666
(2006) 233 ALR 358
(1907) 4 CLR 1514
(1990) 1 WAR 465
(1964) 111 CLR 210
(1990) 55 SASR 103