Lukeson & Lukeson [2025] FedCFamC1A 40 (14 March 2025)

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55

De Winter and De Winter (1979) FLC 90-605

Hedlund & Hedlund (2021) FLC 94-065; [2021] FedCFamC1A 84

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; [1985] HCA 1

Maviglia v Maviglia [1999] NSWCA 188

Perdicari & Perdicari (2019) FLC 93-914; [2019] FamCAFC 147

1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs of the appeal.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Lukeson & Lukeson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By way of a Notice of Appeal filed on 30 October 2024, Ms Lukeson ("the mother") appeals from interim parenting orders made by a judge in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 2 October 2024 as to X born in 2014 and Y born in 2019.
2. The primary judge delivered ex tempore reasons at the conclusion of a three-day parenting and property adjustment trial and made the interim orders under challenge. Those orders suspend previous interlocutory orders for the children to spend time with the mother for two out of three weekends during the school term and for a block of time during the school holidays, and provide for the mother's time with the children to be professionally supervised at a contact centre on a Saturday and Sunday on the first weekend of each month at the father's cost. The substantive parenting and property adjustment judgment remains reserved.
3. The father, Mr Lukeson ("the father"), and the Independent Children's Lawyer ("the ICL") oppose the appeal.
4. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed. As the appeal raises no question of general principle, these reasons are in short form (s 36(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ("the FCFCOA Act")).

1. X has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD") Level 2, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), and Oppositional Defiant Disorder ("ODD"). She lives with behavioural and social challenges. Y has some speech delay. She was assessed for ASD and ADHD in 2021.
2. The primary judge recorded:
   1. On the mother's evidence, she [(the mother)] was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder ASD Level 2 in early 2020 and with ADHD in 2021. She is on an NDIS plan, which she describes is to support her sensory education and understanding, so that she can operate and participate in life most effectively, while respecting her neurodiversity.
3. The parents married in 2010. The reasons record:
   1. The parties separated [in early] 2022 as a consequence of family violence. On that day the father was charged with driving under the influence. A Temporary Protection Order was made by the Queensland Police Service [in early] 2022, naming the mother as the aggrieved and the father as the respondent. The father then commenced these parenting proceedings on 8 May 2022, around difficulties in spending the time with the children.
   2. On 22 June 2022, Interim Orders were made for the children to spend time with the father. That was initially day time only. On 7 September 2022 orders were made for the change of residence, and [in late] 2022 the final Protection Order was made naming the father as the respondent and the mother as the aggrieved. The term of that order is for five years.

1. On 2 August 2023 further interim parenting orders were made providing for the father to have sole parental responsibility for major long-term decision making for the children and confirming that the children are to live with him. The orders provided for the children to spend time with the mother for two out of three weekends during the school term, and for a limited block time during the school holidays, with changeover to occur at school on a school day, or at a specified McDonald's on a non-school day.
2. At trial the father sought orders for the children to live with him and for the mother's time with the children to be professionally supervised at a contact centre at his cost. It is his case that the mother poses an unacceptable risk to the children arising from the disability or mental health challenges she lives with and her allegations that he has perpetrated sexual abuse upon the children. The mother sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility, and for the children to live with each parent on a week about basis. The ICL sought for orders to be made as sought by the father (Transcript 30 September 2024, p.299 lines 35-39).
3. The reasons for the varied interim spend time with orders now under challenge made pending delivery of the reserved judgment record:
   1. Unlike most interim determinations, I have had the benefit of seeing the cross-examination of the parties at the trial. In reviewing the evidence of the parties, I intend to focus mainly on the parties themselves at this interim level, and the expert evidence.
4. The primary judge accepted the opinion of the Family Report writer that if the children had not been sexually abused, but the mother was asking them questions that suggested that they had been sexually abused, then that occasioned emotional abuse in its own right because of the distrust and fear that it could arouse in the child about the father, noting that each child lives with the father (at [26]). The Family Report writer was supportive of immediately suspending the mother's unsupervised time with the children (at [32]).
5. The primary judge comprehensively identified the risk factors as to violence (from [34]), as to drugs and alcohol (at [44]), as to the mother's challenges, presentation and its impact on the children (at [45]-[54]), and as to child protection and the issue of child sexual abuse (at [55]-[77]). The primary judge made findings that:

(a) The mother holds contradictory views. An example is that she believes that the father sexually abused the children and also seeks on a final basis for the children to spend equal time with the parties (at [51]);

(b) The mother's presentation and symptomology requires treatment, but she is not receiving regular treatment (at [54]);

(c) The mother poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the children as a consequence of her determined belief that the father has sexually abused the children in the face of there being no evidence of that (at [75]);

(d) The mother took photographs of the children's vaginas which were then provided to police, despite initially giving evidence that she had only ever taken photographs of the children's underwear (at [64] and [76]);

(e) The mother's views about technology, including that the father had "interfered" or "tampered" with her technology, are demonstrative of paranoid thinking (at [78]);

(f) There is evidence of serious risks in the mother's care (at [87]) including:

(a) that the mother's coping techniques when she experiences sensory overload may make her unavailable for the children at times, and that is particularly of concern when [X] has her own special needs;

(b) that the mother's determination that the father has sexually abused the children places them at risk of emotional harm;

(c) the mother's evidence that she would have asked the children if the father had abused them places the children at risk of emotional harm;

(d) the police records that reflect the mother has photographed [X's] vagina;

(e) the mother's evidence suggesting her belief that the father was deliberately attempting to poison her;

(f) The mother's evidence suggesting her belief the father tampered with her technology, noting her evidence that she had eight phones; and

(g) the mother's proposal that equal time and equal decision-making should occur in the face of those beliefs and her evidence, makes either her beliefs or her proposals a nonsense.

(g) The magnitude of the risk is such that the children are at a risk of unacceptable harm in the mother's care (at [88]);

(h) X needs to be protected from the dispute and the mother's belief system about the father, and the mother directly engages the child, X, in the conflict between she and the father (at [92]); and

(i) The mother has limited insight into her own conduct (at [93]).

1. The primary judge was not satisfied that there was a risk of harm to the children from family violence perpetrated by the father (at [43]), found that there was no evidence to support that the father has any connection to drug use and that it is not a risk factor for the children (at [44]), found that there was no evidence to support the allegation that he has sexually abused the child (at [82] and [83]), and ultimately found that the children are not at an unacceptable risk of harm in the father's care (at [82]).
2. The primary judge thereafter determined:
   1. I have no confidence that if the mother continued to have unsupervised time with the children, she would not discuss with them what had occurred during the Court hearing; the evidence that arose out of that hearing.
   2. I accept that these children have been too much exposed to these proceedings, and I wish to ensure that that exposure ceases immediately and that they are protected from future emotional harm. I therefore make interim orders as sought by the father.

1. There is a presumption at law that a primary judge's decision is correct, the onus resting on the appellant to show otherwise (Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621). The relevant principles which govern appeals from discretionary judgments such as that under appeal are well known. Error of the type identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 ("House v The King") must be established. An appellant must therefore demonstrate that the primary judge's discretion miscarried by:
   • Making an error in approach or principle;
   • Failing to consider a relevant circumstance and/or considering an irrelevant circumstance;
   • Making an error in the findings of fact such that the finding is unsupported by the evidence; or
   • Making orders that fall so outside a reasonable exercise of discretion that the orders were "unreasonable or plainly unjust".
2. The weight given to evidence in the exercise of discretion in making parenting orders that promote the best interests of children is a matter quintessentially for the primary judge. As identified in Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126:
   1. There is no doubt that in making parenting orders, the Court is exercising a very broad discretion. In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 the majority said "The evidence in residency cases is often such that the same body of evidence may produce opposite but reasonable conclusions." (at [140]). They added:
      1. The evidence in residency cases is often such that the same body of evidence may produce opposite but nevertheless reasonable conclusions from different judges. It is a mistake to think that there is always only one right answer to the question of what the best interests of a child require. Each judge is duty bound to make the order which he or she thinks is in the best interests of the child. But the fact that other judges think that the best interests of that child require a different order does not necessarily prove that the first order was not in the best interests of the child. Best interests are values, not facts. They involve a discretionary judgment in respect of which judges can come to opposite but reasonable conclusions. In G v G [[1985] FLR 894 at 897-898], Lord Fraser of Tullybelton pointed out:

"The jurisdiction in such cases is one of great difficulty, as every judge who has had to exercise it must be aware. The main reason is that in most of these cases there is no right answer. All practicable answers are to some extent unsatisfactory and therefore to some extent wrong, and the best that can be done is to find an answer that is reasonably satisfactory."

1. The burden placed on an appellant seeking to establish that a discretionary decision is unreasonable or plainly wrong is thus a heavy one.

1. The reasons for judgment of the primary judge were delivered ex tempore. It is well established that "[a]n ex tempore judgment should not be picked over" (Maviglia v Maviglia [1999] NSWCA 188 at [1]) and that "[a]ppellate courts make assumptions in favour of an ex tempore judgment, including that a failure to refer to evidence or analyse it fully may be excused on the basis that the currency of the judgment makes it unlikely that it was overlooked" (Perdicari & Perdicari [2019] FamCAFC 147; (2019) FLC 93-914 at [25]). Further, appellate review should avoid an overly critical or pernickety analysis of a primary judge's reasons (AMF v AIS (1999) 199 CLR 160 at [150]).

1. The Notice of Appeal did not identify any recognised grounds of appeal. Instead, it reproduced sections of legislation, including s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), ss 3, 4, and 28 of the Disability Services and Inclusion Act 2023 (Cth), and s 5 and s 6 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
2. The mother's Summary of Argument contained 20 contended errors in the judgment identified by page number or paragraph. Paragraphs 1 to 5 and 8 to 17 of the Summary of Argument contend factual errors, paragraphs 6, 7, 18 and 20 contend errors as to weight, paragraph 19 contends an error as to a failure to afford procedural fairness. As paragraph 19 may be liable to affect the integrity of the trial, it will be considered first (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577).

1. The mother's complaint as to the fairness of the hearing centred upon her assertion that key sensory adaptions were required to manage and engage with her disabilities, including needing others to adjust to different communication styles and to consider her "super sensitivities". She contends this was not done throughout the "3 days of the final court hearing", that she had been "pushed way over into distress", that her disability was "used and abused by the father and [his] barrister", that she was "[d]egraded", and that she was expected to respond to many questions that she didn't understand without being able to use her "everyday communication style". She said it was "dehumanizing [sic] and cruel" to expect her challenges to conform and immediately change to suit court requirements.
2. Procedural fairness requires each party to be given an adequate opportunity to be heard, and to present their cases (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 582). It is only the opportunity to present evidence and argument that the interests of justice requires, not the actuality of it.
3. At the hearing of the appeal the mother said that there was no understanding of how her disability "works", nor sufficient accommodations made for it during the trial. That submission is not accepted. The reasons record:
   1. The mother was a challenging witness. Due to her diagnosis, she struggled in the witness box and required regular breaks. There is no criticism of her for that. She wore headphones throughout the hearing which was clarified to the Court to provide some background music for therapeutic purposes. The Court was assured, and it was apparent through cross-examination, that the mother could hear and respond despite the headphones that she was wearing.
   2. When asked a question, before answering the mother would often pause to breathe out steadily and vocally, which I presume was another management technique. On the third day, she requested and was granted leave to have a drink of Coke in the witness box with her. The mother's cross-examination commenced after lunch on the second day of trial and continued on the morning of the following day.
   3. In relation to her evidence, the mother was challenging. She made long speeches in answer to questions. She went off on tangents and asked questions of the cross-examiner. She advised her cross-examiner and the Court that these were necessary techniques that she used to allow her to process questions and information, but it was very difficult at times to get straight answers from the mother.

The mother's mental health

1. The mother's position at trial was that she has a disability and not a mental health issue. On the third day of trial, which was the second day of the mother giving evidence, after about 45 minutes the mother requested a break which was granted.

2. When the matter was ready to come back on, the mother was not ready to resume. The matter was mentioned in the absence of the mother shortly before 11:00am. The Court was advised that the mother was in the medical room, that she needed to get away from the light, and the lights could not be turned off in the conference rooms. The Court was told that the medical room was the one place where she could get some relief from the impact of the fluorescent lights at Court.

...

1. The Court was advised that the mother was struggling; that she had been lying on the floor in the medical room and a further break was sought. Leave was granted for the mother's legal practitioners to advise the mother of the father's changed position, noting that she was still under cross examination.

2. The matter came back before the court at about 11:50am. The Court was advised that the mother was still in the medical room, that their instructions were to the effect that it was not a mental health issue, but rather a sensory overload. The mother's solicitor and counsel were waiting for the mother's psychiatrist to speak to her, and then they would be in a position to know whether the trial could proceed. The trial did resume at about 12.45 pm. The Court was advised that the mother had spoken to her psychiatrist and they were satisfied that the mother had the capacity to engage and to finalise the hearing.

...

1. I considered during the trial that the mother's symptoms became worse when she was challenged, and when she could not answer a question, or where the answer to a question was not going to be favourable to her. I accept the opinion of [Dr D] as to the mother's challenges and the need for treatment, as that was supported by the mother's evidence and by her presentation in the witness box. Unfortunately, however, her own evidence is that she is not receiving regular treatment as recommended by [Dr D].

1. To further assist the mother's sensory needs, during the trial when requested by the mother, the lights in the court room were turned down (Transcript 25 September 2024 p.213 lines 12-15, p.218 line 39-40).
2. The primary judge was cognisant that the mother's diagnosis generated challenges for her engaging in the court room environment and answering questions in cross-examination. It is acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding litigation and court processes, including cross-examination, was difficult and posed significant challenges to the mother. Nevertheless, the focus of this enquiry on appeal is upon error demonstrated on part of the primary judge.
3. The mother could not identify in the transcript any point during the trial where the primary judge refused or failed to accommodate the challenges she encountered. Neither she, nor her lawyers, made application for an adjournment of the trial or for any other accommodation to facilitate the mother's engagement as a litigant in the trial, including during her cross-examination, other than those recorded in the reasons.
4. The mother was afforded procedural fairness, being the opportunity, with the benefit of counsel and her solicitor, to present her own case and to challenge the case made against her by the father (Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38). The complaint of the denial of procedural fairness is not made out.

The contended factual errors - Paragraphs 1 to 5 and 8 to 17

1. The factual errors contended in paragraphs 1, 4, 8, 10, and 13 of the mother's Summary of Argument are historical, being as to the date the parties met, when they moved to Queensland, whether the mother's time with the children has increased or decreased by way of the interlocutory orders made on 7 September 2022 and 2 August 2023, whether the mother lived in a alternative accommodation or her current residence at the time she took photographs of the children's vaginas, and as to the domestic violence proceedings in another court. The focus of these enquiries turns to the materiality of the errors and whether it impacted the ultimate exercise of discretion so as to impugn the result of the case (De Winter and De Winter (1979) FLC 90-605). The mother did not establish on appeal how these findings were material to the ultimate determination. The factual errors subject to complaint in these paragraphs of the mother's Summary of Argument are not accepted.
2. In paragraph 2 the mother asserts factual error as to what is said to be a finding that the father spent overnight weekend time with the children between the first tranche of interlocutory interim orders made in June 2022 until the orders placing them in his care were made in September 2022. The primary judge did not make the finding constructed by the wife. The time spend during this period of slightly over two months, more than two years ago, was found (at [14]) to be day only on weekends. The mother misstates the primary judge's reasons. The paragraph is misconceived.
3. Paragraph 3 contends an error as to recording that the orders made 7 September 2022 provided for children to live with the father and spend weekend time with the mother. The reasons unequivocally record the terms of the orders made on 7 September 2022. The complaint of the mother by way of this paragraph is a failure of the primary judge to find that the children did not live with the father in a 24-hour cycle. Her complaint as to factual error in paragraph 3 is wholly misconceived and fails.
4. Paragraph 5 contends an error as to the date a final protection order was made (at [14]). The father concedes the order was made in late 2023, not in late 2022. Paragraph 9 contends a note the mother posted recorded and incorrect date as to the father being "caught for DVO". The mother did not demonstrate that these complaints were material to the exercise of the discretion. The primary judge considered the conduct underscoring the fact of the Protection Orders made and the determinations in the Magistrates Court upon each party being charged with breaches of Protection Orders, concluding that the children were not exposed to a risk of family violence by the father (at [43]). Paragraphs 5 and 9 fail.
5. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the mother's Summary of Argument complain about the subject matter, being that the primary judge erred in finding:
   1. Whilst it is not in her material, and she did not raise it with the Family Report writers or the psychiatrist, the mother gave evidence that she believes the father sexually abused the children. This is also reflected in the subpoenaed material, as was confirmed by cross-examination.
6. The mother did not identify at the hearing of the appeal where the allegations of sexual abuse occasioned by the father were raised in her affidavit material in the appeal book. In cross-examination, the mother was taken to Exhibit #F4, being her Notice of Risk filed 16 May 2022. It made no allegation of a risk posed by way of sexual abuse. It was put to her that an allegation of sexual abuse perpetrated by the father was not identified by her to either of the Family Report writers, Ms E and Ms F, or the single expert psychiatrist, Dr D (Transcript 24 September 2024, p.142 lines 8-47). A reading of the Family Report does not reveal any allegation that the mother contends sexual abuse was perpetrated by the father upon the children, or a risk of he posing a prospective risk of sexual abuse to them.
7. The finding of the primary judge at [58] is supported by the reasoning at [63] and [72], being:
   1. In cross-examination, when it was put to the mother that she had not raised sexual abuse with the experts in these proceedings - that is, the Family Report writers and [Dr D] - her answer was that if it had come up in conversation, she would have brought it up. She gave evidence that she could not help it if it was not there, and that there were things that she raised with the experts that were not in the reports. She also confirmed that she had brought it up with the GP and with the police.

...

1. The mother would not concede that if she had a genuine concern it would be in her affidavit. Her evidence was that she had tried to take it up with the relevant people, being police and child services. She gave evidence to the effect that she got nowhere with them so there was no point in putting it in the affidavit.

1. The finding subject to complaint was open on the evidence. The mother disagrees with it. That does not demonstrate error. Paragraphs 11 and 12 fail.
2. Paragraphs 14 and 15 make complaint as to the finding that the mother was not receiving ongoing treatment as recommended by the single expert psychiatrist (at [52] and [53]) being not reasonably open on the evidence. There was no challenge to the primary judge's finding at [54] accepting the opinion of Dr D as the single psychiatric expert as to the mother's challenges and the need for treatment. The mother did not identify on appeal why the findings were not open except to say that she has been a patient of Dr G, a psychiatrist, since 2021. The mother was unable to say how often she attended upon, and when she last saw, her psychiatrist. She said that she did not see him if his receptionist said he did not need to speak to her. She said her therapist was also X's therapist. She was unable to say how often she attended upon that therapist. The primary judge found the mother's own evidence established that she was not receiving regular treatment as recommended by the single expert psychiatrist. The complaints fail.
3. Paragraph 16 contends that the primary judge's finding at [92] that the Child Safety records reflect concern that the mother was using the child X as a confidante, was erroneous. The report of Child Safety report records that the children, and especially X, are disproportionately protective of the mother given their age and developmental stage, which "appeared to indicate a level of coaching". The finding was open. The complaint is forlorn.
4. Paragraph 17 contends errors in the primary judge's conclusions as to an incident of the father "hog-tying" X whilst both the mother and X were having "meltdowns". The primary judge recorded at [85] that the father was extensively cross-examined about these allegations, that he made sensible concessions, and his evidence was accepted on that subject matter. The primary judge at [40] found the "hog-tying" was a "one off event" when the father was trying to simultaneously deal with the challenges presented by both the mother and X, and was satisfied that he had sought and obtained the necessary supports for both himself and the children to ensure he deals with any similar issues in the future appropriately (at [40] and [86]). The primary judge found that the children have been in the father's care for two years without any incidents or concerns, other than those raised by the mother, which were found to be unsubstantiated. At the hearing of the appeal the mother made a complaint that a transcript in other proceedings relevant to this incident was not adduced into evidence before the primary judge. She did not however point to anywhere in the transcript in which she sought that such document be adduced. The mother's complaint was not that the findings of the primary judge were not reasonably open on the evidence but is that her case on this subject matter was not accepted. That does not establish error. Paragraph 17 fails.
5. No material error of fact is demonstrated by the submissions. The contentions as to factual error are not accepted.

Errors as to weight - Paragraphs 6, 7, 18, and 20

1. Paragraph 6 of the mother's Summary of Argument is a complaint as to an intermediate conclusion that X's behaviour has "settled" at [24]. She implicitly asserts the finding was not open on the evidence, identifying the fact of X's suspension from school in 2024. Paragraph 7 makes complaint as to the intermediate conclusion that the father has developed consistent routines with the children. Paragraph 18 makes complaint that the views of the child, X, were not adequately taken into account. In reality, these complaints of the mother are directed to the weight placed on different evidence by the primary judge. That an appellate court may have given them some, less, or more, weight does not establish error of the kind identified in House v The King, unless the outcome is unreasonable or plainly unjust, which is not the case here (Hedlund & Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84; (2021) FLC 94-065 at [37]). Even if it was, it would fail. The appealed orders were mutually promulgated by the father and the ICL and were consistent with all of the expert opinion evidence. The orders were clearly made within the bounds of a reasoned exercise of discretion.
2. Paragraph 20 makes a complaint as to the primary judge's assessments of the mother's oral evidence, including that the mother was "challenging", "made long speeches to answer questions", "went off on tangents", "asked questions of the cross-examiner" and that it was difficult to get a straight answer from her. The mother said that the children must not be "taken away just because they or their parents are disabled". She misapprehends the cogent reasoning of the primary judge. The mother's disagreement with the assessment of her evidence does not impugn the validity of the primary judge's observations and findings. The complaints identified in paragraph 20 are an essential part of the judicial function for the primary judge to form impressions, at least in so far as they affected findings then made about the mother's reliability as a witness and her parenting capacity, as relevant to the factors prescribed by s 60CC of the Act.
3. The challenges by way of paragraphs 6, 7, 18 and 20 fail.

1. In the event the appeal failed the ICL did not seek any order for costs. The mother and the father conducted the appeal without legal representation. The father sought costs of the transcript he obtained of $10,200.
2. An order for costs requires the Court to be satisfied, in all of the circumstances, that such an order is just. In considering that, the Court must take into account the matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act.
3. Both the mother and father are in receipt of Commonwealth government benefits. They each seek adjustment of the proceeds of sale of their home of slightly more than $200,000 in the reserved property judgment. Neither has any other assets of significance. Each contend they have familial liabilities to fund their legal fees to date. The father conceded that he sought to obtain a copy of the transcript for his own purposes, before the mother filed her appeal. His application to seek the mother now pay for it when he did not seek it for the purposes of the appeal is opportunistic. A consideration of these matters does not justify a costs order. The father's application for costs will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Campton.