Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 ss 7, 32, 79, 82

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 55A, 55B, 55C, 86

Legal Profession Act 2006 ss 16, 51, 81, 387, 391, 410, 415, 425, 433

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 486E, 486F

Subordinate

Legislation cited: Legal Profession (Solicitors) Conduct Rules 2015 r 19

Cases cited: Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1

APLA v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) [2005] HCA 44

AXY17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2006

B & T Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd v Construction Occupations Registrar and the Owners-Units Plan 3324 [2013] ACTSC 219

BNJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1359

Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 (HL)

Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished)

Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 [2020] ACAT 80

Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 8

Drury v Maloney [2016] FCCA 2434

Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thomson [2018] ACAT 4

Giusida Pty Ltd v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2016] ACTSC 275

Harada v Barnes and Anor [2021] ACAT 66

Law Society of the ACT v Powrie [2017] [2017] ACTSCFC 4; (2017) 12 ACTLR 184

Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2018] ACTCA 19

Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2009] ACTSC 149

Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011 HCA 48

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj 2002] HCA 11

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18

Oneflare Pty Ltd v Chernih [2017] NSWCA 195

Raben Footwear Ply Ltd v Polygram Records Inc [1997] FCA 370

Tam v Du [2019] ACAT 94

V v Elringtons Pty Ltd [2018] ACAT 23

Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44

List of

Texts/Papers cited: Address by McCallum CJ at the opening of the Law Term, 30 January 2023

APPEAL TRIBUNAL: Presidential Member G McCarthy

1. The orders of the original tribunal made on 8 November 2021 and 22 December 2021 are confirmed.
2. The parties file and serve written submissions in relation to costs, limited to 2 pages and indicating any agreed orders as to costs, by 24 March 2023.

1. This appeal arose from findings of the Tribunal (hereafter the original tribunal) in response to charges laid under the Legal Profession Act 2006 (the LP Act) that the appellant (hereafter the practitioner) is guilty of professional misconduct in respect of 22 charges and guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct in respect of 2 other charges. The original tribunal provided the parties with its orders and written reasons for its decision[1] but has not published them, having regard to section 423A of the LP Act.
2. We begin by outlining the framework of the initial proceedings.
3. By four separate applications for disciplinary action which became Tribunal proceedings OR12/2020 (OR12), OR13/2020 (OR13), OR14/2020 (OR14) and OR15/2020 (OR15), the respondent to the appeal (hereafter the Council) laid 28 charges against the practitioner alleging breaches of the LP Act, breaches of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Conduct Rules 2015 (the Conduct Rules), breaches of his common law duty of honesty and candour to the Federal Circuit Court and breaches of his common law duty to inform and assist the ACT Law Society.
4. The Council laid 3 charges in proceeding OR12, 19 charges in proceeding OR13, 3 charges in proceeding OR14 and 3 charges in proceeding OR15. Particulars regarding the charges laid in each application are set out in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the original tribunal's reasons for decision.
5. The original tribunal heard the applications on 15, 16 and 17 March 2021 and 6 May 2021. On 8 November 2021, the original tribunal made orders and provided reasons for its decision.
6. In proceeding OR12, the original tribunal found charge 1 not proved and charges 2 and 3 proved.[2] In proceeding OR13, it found charge 1 not proved and charges 2 - 19 proved.[3] In proceeding OR14, it found charges 1 - 3 proved.[4] In proceeding OR15, it found charges 1 - 3 proved.[5]
7. Arising from the charges found proved, the original tribunal recommended the practitioner's name be removed from the roll of legal practitioners kept by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. On 22 December 2021, the original tribunal ordered the practitioner to pay the Council's costs.
8. By application dated 3 December 2021, the practitioner appealed from the original tribunal's orders on six grounds:

(a) The LP Act "has no jurisdiction in this matter". The practitioner explained this to mean a claim that the LP Act did not govern his conduct that was the subject of the charges.

(b) The "decision of the Law Council was unlawful" and "void ab initio". The practitioner explained this to mean a claim that the Council's decision to cancel his practising certificate on 18 June 2018 was unlawful and void ab initio.

(c) The "decision of the Law Society to refer the matter to the ACAT was unlawful". The practitioner explained this to mean a claim that the Law Society "had no legal authority" to investigate his conduct; that the investigation was "conducted for an improper purpose", that the investigation was "an abuse of process"; and that referral of the matter to the Tribunal was "an unlawful decision".

(d) The "decision of the original ACAT was unlawful", which was later alleged on grounds too many to count.

(e) The "Appeals ACAT has no jurisdiction to hear this matter".

(f) The "ACT Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear this matter".

1. The grounds of appeal were followed by a concluding statement:

There never was a decision to cancel the Applicant's practicing certificate. The applicant is still the holder of a practicing certificate (sic).

1. The practitioner did not state what orders he sought: he simply repeated the grounds of appeal. However, it was implicit that the practitioner sought at least an order that the original tribunal's orders be set aside. The practitioner attached to his application a 29-page document setting out his "reasons for appeal" (the practitioner's preliminary reasons for appeal).
2. In his application for appeal, the practitioner also applied for interim orders that the decision of the Council to cancel his practising certificate on 18 June 2018 be stayed; that he be granted a practising certificate; that the original tribunal's decision be stayed; and that "the appeals ACAT be the subject of a permanent stay". The application for interim or other orders was listed for hearing on 16 February 2022.
3. At a directions hearing on 28 January 2022, the practitioner submitted that the cancellation of his practising certificate was void ab initio.[6] The practitioner relied on the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj[7] to submit that because the decision to cancel his practising certificate involved jurisdictional error, the decision is to be regarded as no decision at all.
4. The practitioner contended that the decision to cancel his practising certificate was void ab initio, notwithstanding his reliance on the cancellation in the original proceedings. He did so, first in support of an interim application that the original tribunal lacked jurisdiction because - by reason of the cancellation - he was no longer an "Australian practitioner"[8] and second, in his submissions on penalty to submit that the cancellation provided sufficient protection of the public and that a fine and retraining were sufficient penalties.[9]
5. The practitioner also stated that on 16 February 2022 he would seek an order that the Appeal Tribunal grant him a practising certificate[10] because the original tribunal's errors of law "were so heinous that it means that there never was a decision";[11] a finding that he had "no case to answer"[12] because the original tribunal's errors of law were jurisdictional errors; and a finding that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to review his conduct.[13]
6. The grounds of appeal and his submissions on 28 January 2022 led the Appeal Tribunal to indicate to the practitioner it was considering whether his application should be dismissed under section 32 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (the ACAT Act) as lacking in substance.
7. In response, on 12 February 2022, the practitioner filed a 39 page document, single-spaced, unsigned, undated and neither paginated nor paragraph numbered, entitled "Submissions on Section 32 of the ACAT Act" (the practitioner's first written submission) in which he made detailed submissions expanding on the grounds of appeal. He also raised many issues beyond the grounds of appeal. Having regard to the practitioner's first written submission, on 15 February 2022 the Appeal Tribunal informed the practitioner it would no longer be considering whether his application should be determined pursuant to section 32. We instead considered the practitioner's first written submission, together with his other submissions written and oral, for the purpose of determining the appeal pursuant to section 79 of the ACAT Act.
8. On 16 February 2022, we heard the practitioner's application for interim orders following which we determined that the appeal proceed as a review of the original decision. We dismissed the application for interim orders, although acknowledging that the original tribunal's decision was implicitly stayed whilst under appeal. We also stated we were prepared to hear argument as to why the cancellation of the practitioner's practising certificate in 2018, or the manner of its cancellation, had a bearing on the lawfulness of the original tribunal's findings and/or decision in 2021.[14]
9. On 23 February 2022, in an unsuccessful effort to enable the appeal to be heard in an orderly manner, the Appeal Tribunal made the following procedural orders, among others:

1. By 11 April 2022 the appellant file and serve:

(a) a list of the errors of fact, errors of law or discretionary errors that affected the decision of the original Tribunal made on 8 November 2021 (the decision); > > (b) any application for leave to adduce further evidence at the hearing of the appeal; > > (c) any document and a statement of any intended evidence to be given by an intended witness which the appellant intends to seek leave to adduce as further evidence at the hearing of the appeal; > > (d) written submissions, using numbered paragraphs, in support of any application for leave to adduce further evidence at the hearing of the appeal; and > > (e) written submissions, using numbered paragraphs, directed seratium to each listed error of fact, error of law or discretionary error.

(a) a 40 page document, unsigned and undated, containing 432 numbered paragraphs, headed "errors of law jurisdictional errors" (the practitioner's second written submission); and

(b) a 102 page document, unsigned and undated, containing 896 numbered paragraphs, headed "list of errors of law ACAT decision jurisdictional errors introduction" (the practitioner's third written submission).

1. In response to orders 1(b) and (c) made on 23 February 2022, the practitioner filed a 4 page document, containing 28 paragraphs, headed "Application for leave to adduce further evidence" to which the practitioner annexed copies of the documents he wanted to adduce.
2. In April 2022, the practitioner caused the Tribunal to issue a subpoena directed to the proper officer of the Council requiring the officer to produce, in summary, all documents concerning the decision to cancel the practitioner's practising certificate on 18 June 2018 including documents which would disclose the names of the members of the Council who made that decision.
3. On 10 May 2022, PM McCarthy, sitting as the Appeal Tribunal, heard and dismissed the practitioner's application for leave to adduce the further documentary evidence that the practitioner had attached to the application for leave. For some documents, leave was not necessary because they were before the original tribunal. For other documents, leave was refused because the documents were not relevant. These documents were newspaper articles quoting the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence and others about the presumption of innocence in circumstances of war; extracts from the Victorian Legal Services Board and Commissioner website commenting on its responsibility for regulation of the legal profession in Victoria; and an extract from the Law Society of NSW website commenting on the right to practice in a federal court or a court exercising federal jurisdiction in NSW.
4. PM McCarthy, sitting as the Appeal Tribunal, also set aside the subpoena directed to the Council on the grounds that the documents the subject of the subpoena were not relevant to the practitioner's appeal from the original tribunal's findings of guilt in relation to the charges found proved.
5. The practitioner did not comply with order 1(c) made on 23 February 2022 requiring him to file a statement of any intended evidence to be given by an intended witness which he intended to seek leave to call. Instead, the practitioner filed a document headed "Intended Witnesses" which stated only the names of three witnesses he intended to call and the following words:

All of the witnesses will be attesting to conversations which they had with [the practitioner]. They will also attest to conversations [the practitioner] had with Ms [R].

1. In relation to the practitioner's stated intention to call the three named witnesses, at the hearing on 10 May 2022 PM McCarthy noted the practitioner had not given any indication of what the intended witnesses' evidence would be about what was said in the conversations. Where the practitioner had not provided a witness statement from any of the intended witnesses, PM McCarthy offered the practitioner further time to do so.
2. On 11 May 2022, the practitioner filed a single page document, unsigned and undated, which stated (in the case of each intended witness) that the witness had overheard conversations between the practitioner and Ms R and had had conversations with the practitioner about what Ms R had told the practitioner. The document stated nothing about was said in any of the conversations. Also, the document was not a witness statement from any of them. This left unanswered questions about why the practitioner did not lead the intended evidence in the original proceedings, why he should be given leave to do so on appeal and the probative value of the intended evidence.
3. On 20 May 2022, PM McCarthy ordered the practitioner's application for leave to call the three intended witnesses be dismissed.
4. On 17 May 2022, the Council filed a document entitled "Respondent's submissions" dated 16 May 2022 in response to the practitioner's second and third written submissions (the Council's written submission).
5. On 6 June 2022, the practitioner filed another 40 page document, unsigned and undated, containing 352 numbered paragraphs, headed "Reply to submissions" (the practitioner's fourth written submission).
6. We have considered the practitioner's submissions, written and oral, and the Council's submissions, written and oral, for the purpose of determining the appeal.

1. Pursuant to section 79(3) of the ACAT Act, a party to an original application may appeal to the Tribunal on a question of fact or law. Pursuant to section 82(1) of the ACAT Act, an appeal may be dealt with as a new application, or as a review of the original decision, as the Tribunal considers appropriate. In this case, the Appeal Tribunal determined that the appeal be dealt with as a review, which should be understood as a rehearing[15] to use a term that has received judicial interpretation and is "tolerably well understood".[16]
2. The Appeal Tribunal's role on an appeal conducted by way of a rehearing is well settled. The principles were set out by President Neate in V v Elringtons Pty Ltd[17] as follows:

In Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thompson, the Tribunal considered the judicial authorities discussing the role of an appeal court or tribunal. It is not necessary to repeat the full discussion in that decision. However, it is relevant to note the following propositions drawn from judgments about the nature of a rehearing:

(a) An appeal court (or an appeal tribunal) must determine whether the decision appealed against is wrong because the court at first instance (or an original tribunal) fell into an error of law, made a finding of fact that is clearly wrong or exercised a discretion on a wrong principle or in a way that is clearly wrong.

(b) Ordinarily, if there has been no further evidence admitted or no relevant change in law, a court in entertaining an appeal by way of rehearing (or an appeal tribunal) can exercise its appellate powers only if satisfied that there was an error on the part of the court below (or an original tribunal).

(c) The appellate court (or an appeal tribunal) will give proper allowance to the advantage of the court of first instance (or an original tribunal) who saw and heard the witnesses, so that, ordinarily, facts found based on the assessment of witnesses will not lightly be overturned.

(d) The appellate court (or an appeal tribunal) is obliged to conduct a real review of the trial and the reasons of the court of first instance (or an original tribunal).

(e) In an appeal by way of rehearing, once error below has been found (after making proper allowance for the advantages of the trial judge or original tribunal), the appellate court (or appeal tribunal) can substitute its own decision based on the facts and the law as they now stand.[18]

1. In short, the practitioner must show that the original tribunal made an error of fact or law and that the error material affected the result.[19]
2. In Harada v Barnes, the Tribunal said:

The onus is on an appellant to show, specifically, where the original tribunal went wrong. Normally, that requires an appellant to point to an error of fact or an error of law in the written or oral reasons for decision of the original tribunal and to explain to the appeal tribunal how that error affected the result.[20]

1. The practitioner's written submissions amounted to lengthy and repetitive narratives alleging literally hundreds of errors of fact and law. The practitioner challenged every finding of guilt and seemingly every material paragraph of the original tribunal's reasons for decision. Most allegations were repeated assertions of jurisdictional error. Many were assertions of "no evidence" to support a finding of fact (notwithstanding the practitioner admitting most facts in the original proceedings), a "failure to take into account a relevant consideration", "taking into account an irrelevant consideration" and the like. The practitioner made repeated claims that the Council's applications were "an abuse of power" and brought for "an improper purpose".
2. The practitioner also repeatedly submitted that the original tribunal "acted for an improper purpose" without identifying the purpose or referring to any material that could justify the allegation.
3. Many of the alleged errors had no connection with the grounds of appeal stated in the practitioner's application for appeal.
4. We have done our best to address the primary alleged errors, the alleged errors in relation to each charge found proven and other alleged errors, where appropriate, but acknowledge that we have not addressed all the minutiae that extends over hundreds of pages of submissions. We concluded it was not necessary to do so because it would not have affected the result.
5. The ratio of the original tribunal's decision is that the practitioner cannot be trusted in respects that are essential to the practice of law; has no insight into, or understanding of, the seriousness of his misconduct; and has no insight into, or understanding of, the importance of honesty and candour in his conduct as a legal practitioner.[21]
6. In his submissions on the appeal, written and oral, the practitioner repeatedly demonstrated that the original tribunal's conclusions about him are correct. It was bewildering to read the practitioner's submissions on appeal that were so lacking in honesty and candour - written in response to multiple findings that the practitioner breached his common law duty of honesty and candour.

Ground 1: the LP Act "has no jurisdiction in this matter"

1. Many of the charges related to the practitioner's conduct in a federal court or a federal tribunal. The practitioner submitted that the LP Act does not govern his conduct in a federal court.[22] He submitted that his conduct in a federal court was governed by provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 (the Judiciary Act) and other Commonwealth Acts that "cover the field"[23] regarding regulation of legal practitioners' conduct in federal courts. He referred to section 55A of the Judiciary Act 1903, which provides:

Right of barristers and solicitors admitted in federal courts to practise in those courts

A person who has been admitted to practise as a barrister or solicitor, or as both, under rules made in pursuance of paragraph (ga) of section 86 of this Act is, subject to those rules, entitled to practise in any federal court as a barrister or solicitor, or as both, as the case may be.

1. The practitioner said the LP Act, being an ACT Act, regulates the conduct of legal practitioners in the ACT only where their conduct is in the ACT Supreme Court or the ACT Magistrates Court.[24]
2. The practitioner submitted that a person who has been admitted to practice as a barrister or solicitor, or both, in any federal court under rules made pursuant to section 86(1)(ga) of the Judiciary Act is, subject to those rules, entitled (without more) to practise in a federal court, as a barrister or a solicitor, or both, as the case may be.
3. The practitioner said that where possible discipline of a practitioner arises consequent upon their conduct in a federal court, the body to adjudicate upon that conduct is a federal court.[25] Accordingly, he said, his conduct in a federal court "is beyond the jurisdiction of the ACT Law Society".[26]
4. The practitioner said his alleged conduct in a federal court or a federal tribunal is also beyond the jurisdiction of the LP Act and, in turn, the Conduct Rules made under the LP Act.
5. The practitioner submitted, for the same reason, he does not need a practising certificate to practise in a federal court. The practitioner said:

Now, the requirement to practice is that, (1) be admitted to practice, not the holder of a practising certificate. If [there was] an intention to cut off people - a requirement for people to hold a practising certificate, then section 55 would specifically make reference to it. Hence, exclusio alterius, the fact that it doesn't refer to the requirement to possess a practising certificate means that you do not need a practising certificate.[27]

1. The practitioner said this confirms that the LP Act -

just has to butt out. It's got no role to play.[28]

1. In support, the practitioner said the NSW Law Society has "stated on its website that to practice (sic) in a Federal Court or a Court exercising federal jurisdiction in New South Wales you only need to be admitted to the Australian legal profession."[29] (emphasis added). This statement about what is written on the NSW Law Society website is simply not true. At [37] of his third written submission, the practitioner quotes (we presume) from the website. It does not state that being admitted to the Australian legal profession is the "only" requirement to practise in a federal court.
2. The need for a practising certificate to practise in a federal court is consistent with a passage the practitioner quoted (we presume) from the Federal Court of Australia website: "A person who is entitled to practise as a barrister, solicitor or as both in the Supreme Court of a state or territory has the same entitlement to practise [in] the Federal Court of Australia provided his or her name appears in the register of practitioners kept by the Chief Executive Principal Registrar of the High Court of Australia".[30] A requirement of an entitlement "to practise as a barrister, solicitor or both in the Supreme Court of a state or territory" is the holding of a practising certificate.
3. The practitioner's submission also caused us to draw his attention to section 16(1) of the LP Act, which provides that a person commits an offence if the person engages in legal practice in the ACT and the person is not an Australian legal practitioner. 'Australian legal practitioner' is defined in the LP Act as someone with a practising certificate. In response, the practitioner relied on section 16(3) of the LP Act which provides that section 16(1) does not apply to legal practice "engaged in under a territory law or a law of the Commonwealth". As the practitioner put it, referring to section 16(3) -

1. The practitioner submitted that because (he said) he was engaged under the Migration Act 1958 (the Migration Act), being "a law of the Commonwealth", when he appeared in the Federal Circuit Court, he did not need a practising certificate to do so. He agreed "entirely"[32] that, on his submission, nobody requires a practising certificate to appear in a federal court.
2. On enquiry as to why he was so anxious to have a practising certificate if he did not need one, the practitioner said -

Ethically, I think that's probably the right thing to do.[33]

1. He said a practising certificate was "something I think that I should have", but (in response to our enquiry) said he could not explain why.[34]
2. The Council submitted the practitioner's submissions gave rise to two issues. The first was whether the practitioner needs (or needed) a practising certificate to appear in a federal court or tribunal. The second was whether the LP applied to his conduct in a federal court or a federal tribunal.
3. As to the first issue, the Council said it did not arise on the appeal because the practitioner was not charged with engaging in practice without a practising certificate. The Council submitted in any event it would be perverse if section 16(3) had the effect of making section 16(1) redundant. The Council submitted that section 16(3) is directed at a situation where there is a law specifically authorising someone to appear without a practising certificate.
4. The Council also noted the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in Drury v Maloney[35] citing the decision of the High Court in APLA v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW)[36] in which the High Court held that sections 55B and 55C of the Judiciary Act make the right of appearance in a federal court dependent on being admitted to practise in a State or Territory and holding a current practising certificate.
5. As to the second issue, the Council referred to section 391(1) of the LP Act, which provides that the whole of Chapter 4 headed 'Complaints and discipline' applies to conduct "happening in the ACT". The Council noted that all of the conduct of the practitioner that was the subject of the charges happened in the ACT, arguably save for the conduct that became the subject of charge 3 in OR15 which arose from his conduct in the BNJ17 proceeding filed in the Melbourne registry of the Federal Circuit Court.[37]
6. In the BNJ17 proceeding, the practitioner appeared before Judge McNab. The charge related to an alleged misstatement in an affidavit prepared by, and affirmed by, the practitioner on 7 April 2017. In the affidavit, the practitioner provided an ACT address as his address for service. The Council contended that chapter 4 of the LP Act therefore applied also to charge 3 in OR15.
7. In response to the Council's submissions on the first issue and to the High Court's decision in APLA v Legal Services Commissioner, the practitioner submitted -

The High Court is wrong on this matter.[38]

1. He submitted the High Court incorrectly referred to section 55B, and that section 55A is the relevant provision.[39]
2. As to the second issue, the practitioner returned to his claim that practice and procedure in federal courts "is beyond the jurisdiction"[40] of the LP Act. He submitted that the statement in section 391(1) of the LP Act that Chapter 4 of the LP Act applies to his conduct because it happened in the ACT does not mean it does so. The practitioner likened the LP Act to "American legislation [that] tries to regulate sex trafficking in Thailand".[41] The practitioner said:

The fact that it's written down and says that you can't do certain things in Thailand, doesn't mean that it's got jurisdiction in Thailand, it has no jurisdiction in Thailand. The fact that the ACT Legal Profession Act attempts to, purports to, claim jurisdiction [sic] over the Federal Court and the preparation of forms, the lodgment of forms, practice and procedure in the Federal Court, doesn't mean that it does.[42]

1. The practitioner's submissions on both issues were, to say the least, unpersuasive.
2. It was surreal to find ourselves having to say to a legal practitioner that a High Court ruling, which he agreed[43] was directly on point, is binding on this Tribunal: a practitioner needs a practising certificate to appear in a federal court.
3. Referring to the practitioner's reliance on section 16(3) of the LP Act, the practitioner might have referred to the Migration Act when providing migration law services to his clients, but he was not himself "engaged" under the Migration Act: he was engaged by his client under the terms of engagement between himself and his client. Section 16(3) was therefore not applicable.
4. In any event, as the Council pointed out, the first issue did not arise for consideration on the appeal because none of the charges alleged that the practitioner had practised without a practising certificate.
5. As to the second issue, it was similarly surreal to find ourselves responding to a submission from a legal practitioner that his conduct in the ACT is not governed by Chapter 4 of the LP Act, where section 391(1) of the LP Act states that it is. We, as a subordinate tribunal established under statute, have a duty to uphold legislation as stated. Also, the comparison with American legislation governing sex trafficking in Thailand is misconceived. Pursuant to section 391(1), Chapter 4 is stated to apply to conduct happening "in" - not outside - the ACT. We are satisfied that the LP Act applies to conduct of a practitioner that happens in the ACT, irrespective of whether it occurs in a federal courtroom that is in the ACT.
6. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the LP Act and its discipline provisions in Chapter 4 applied when the original tribunal heard and determined the charges concerning the practitioner's conduct as alleged. Ground 1 fails.

Ground 2: "The decision of the Law Council was unlawful. The decision is void ab initio"

1. The second ground of appeal entailed a challenge to the decision of the Council made on 18 June 2018 to cancel his practising certificate pursuant to section 55 of the LP Act. The practitioner submitted that the decision to cancel was void ab initio, notwithstanding his earlier reliance on the cancellation to submit that the Council lacked jurisdiction to investigate and make decisions about the complaints leading to the four applications for disciplinary action.[44]
2. In an effort to capture the substance of the argument, SM Foley put the following proposition to the practitioner:

So, as I understand it, in outline, you're argument, essentially, is this, is that the starting point for your argument is a letter that you received from the Law Society, on 21 June 2018, which was the - I think it's called an information letter, advising you that your practising certificate had been cancelled, and you say, in that letter, and that letter I've reviewed, said, essentially, 'Our investigations into your conduct will continue'.

So you say, as I understand it, to use the vernacular, your assertion is that the Law Society jumped the gun in cancelling your certificate, given that those investigations were continuing and you say cancelling prior to completion of the investigations was unlawful. You say, as I understand it, any further investigation as a consequence of that is unlawful. You say that any finding was void ab initio, and the Briginshaw principle as a consequence and therefore, with respect to these proceedings, therefore the filing of the disciplinary procedures in these matters was similarly unlawful.

What flows from that, the decision of the original tribunal, their decision with respect to finding of guilt and penalty were void, on the basis that there was no jurisdiction, given the assertions that you've made previously. What then flows from that is there's no decision to appeal and this tribunal has no jurisdiction.

I know that reduces it to the bones, but have I captured the essence of that, essentially?[45]

Senior Member ... I must congratulate him for the first time in this matter, coming to grips with the real issue. What you've said is an extremely good summary of what's happened.[46]

1. We were not persuaded that the cancellation of the practising certificate, lawful or otherwise, had any bearing on the lawfulness of the Council bringing its four applications for disciplinary action against the practitioner or the lawfulness of the original tribunal hearing and determining them. Nor did it have any bearing on the Appeal Tribunal's jurisdiction to review the original tribunal's decision for error.
2. As the Council pointed out, section 55(1)(a) of the LP Act (within Chapter 2 of the LP Act) empowered the Council to cancel the practitioner's practising certificate. The Council's decision was conveyed to the practitioner by letter dated 21 June 2018 from Ms O'Hara, Chief Executive Officer of the ACT Law Society.[47] The letter records the Council proceeded pursuant to section 55(1)(a).
3. Section 81(1)(b) of the LP Act entitled the practitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Council to cancel his practising certificate. The practitioner exercised that right of appeal in 2018. Midway through the hearing of his appeal, the practitioner consented to an order that his appeal be dismissed and an order that he pay the Council's costs. As we understood it, the Supreme Court made those orders.
4. The Council submitted that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review a decision made under section 55 of the LP Act: the only pathway for review or appeal from a decision under section 55 is to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 81 - and the practitioner has exercised that right.
5. The practitioner submitted that the outcome in the Supreme Court did not preclude him from challenging, in this proceeding, the lawfulness of the Council's decision to cancel his practising certificate. He noted, and we accept, the Supreme Court did not make any findings about the lawfulness or otherwise of the Council's decision to cancel his practising certificate: his application under section 81 was dismissed by consent. He submitted he was therefore not estopped from raising grounds as to why the cancellation was unlawful and that he had "every right"[48] to raise those grounds irrespective of the Supreme Court's orders. As the practitioner put it:

Now, this [Supreme Court decision] has got no utility in repealing the decision [of the Law Council] and that I'm somehow getting a review via the back door when it should be dealt with by the Supreme Court. That may well be, but the point is that in order for you, the law - the ACAT to make a proper decision, a lawful decision, and one that is in the interests of achieving justice per section 7 of the [ACAT] Act in order for you to make that finding you don't have any choice.

You need to look at the decision of the ACAT - the Law Council and decide if, in fact, it's valid or not. Now, it's not simply the purview of the Supreme Court to do [that]. You're not precluded from doing that by virtue of the fact that the Supreme Court does it. The fact that the Supreme Court can review, it doesn't preclude you from doing it because you cannot review the decision of the ACAT without looking at the initial decision of the Law Council.[49]

1. We accept the general proposition that if cancellation of the practitioner's practising certificate was a jurisdictional precondition to the laying of the charges in proceedings OR12, OR13, OR14 and OR15 and/or their determination, then we would have jurisdiction to consider whether the cancellation was lawful. We would also accept that if the original tribunal relied on the cancellation of the practising certificate for the purpose of determining the charges or any of them, then we would have jurisdiction to review that reliance.
2. The practitioner's submission failed at the first hurdle. The lawfulness of the Council bringing its four applications for disciplinary action against the practitioner was not dependent on the decision to cancel the practitioner's practising certificate in 2018. Nor was the original tribunal's jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges conditional on the cancellation of the practitioner's practising certificate. The practitioner did not refer us to any statutory provision or principle of common law to the contrary. Nor did the original tribunal rely on the cancellation for any purpose. Nor was there any suggestion the practitioner raised the cancellation of his practising certificate or the lawfulness of the cancellation in the original proceedings, save to rely on the cancellation in his submissions on penalty.
3. We agree with the original tribunal's finding that the fact that, during the course of its investigations into the complaints giving rise to the four applications for disciplinary action, the Council exercised its power under section 56 of the LP Act to cancel the practitioner's practising certificate is irrelevant. The right removed was the practitioner's right to practise in the ACT, not his right to remain admitted as a legal practitioner in the ACT.[50]
4. All that can be said is that some of the factual matters giving rise to some of the charges were also relevant to the Council's decision to cancel the practitioner's practising certificate.
5. The original tribunal determined all the charges, including those that involved facts relevant also to the cancellation of the certificate, according to its findings of fact (made by reference to admissions made and evidence presented) and (having regard to the parties' submissions) its application of the applicable law to its findings of fact. The decision to cancel the practising certificate formed no part of its reasons for decision. It was not mentioned, save for an early background comment as part of an overview chronology.[51]
6. Where we were not persuaded that the cancellation of the practitioner's practising certificate in 2018, or the lawfulness of the cancellation, had any bearing on the original tribunal's jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges that were laid or its determination of the charges, it follows that the original tribunal did not err by not considering that decision or the lawfulness of it.
7. For this reason, it was neither necessary nor appropriate for us to engage with the practitioner's lengthy submissions challenging the lawfulness of the Council's decision to cancel his practising certificate. Indeed, where our function under section 79 of the ACAT Act was to review the original tribunal's decision for error and where we were not persuaded that the original tribunal erred by not considering the cancellation of the practising certificate, we (on appeal) had no role to consider the cancellation. Ground 2 fails.

Ground 3: "The decision of the Law Society to refer the matter to the ACAT was unlawful"

1. The practitioner submitted that because the lawful cancellation of his practising certificate was a jurisdictional precondition or in some way underpinned the laying of the discipline charges, and the cancellation was unlawful, it follows that the Council was not empowered "to refer the matter to the ACAT".
2. The practitioner also submitted, seemingly in the alternative, that because his practising certificate had already been cancelled, the Council had "no legal authority to make an application for disciplinary action".[52]
3. The practitioner also submitted that the original tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with matters that were not connected with the cancellation of his certificate. He submitted:

80. A number of new matters were the subject of an application for disciplinary action. The new matters were not however the subject of a decision by the Law Council.

81. .... The ACAT has no jurisdiction to deal with those matters which have not been the subject of a decision of the Law Council.

82. The Law Council made no decision in the matters of C7, CAG18, CAG19 and Short.

83. It was unreasonable for the ACAT to deal with these new matters.

84. The referral of new matters was an abuse of process.[53]

1. The practitioner's submissions were confused and confusing. For the reasons given, we reject the proposition that lawful cancellation of the practitioner's practising certificate had any bearing on the Council's power, and arguably its duty, to lay the charges set out in the four applications or on the original tribunal's findings in response to the charges. It is simply nonsensical for the practitioner to contend the Council could not lay charges arising from the practitioner's conduct if the conduct alleged in the charges had not been previously considered in its decision made years earlier to cancel his practising certificate or in any other decision. The fact that some of the factual matters stated in some of the charges gave rise to the Council's decision to cancel the practitioner's certificate is irrelevant. Ground 3 fails.

Ground 4: "the decision of the original ACAT was unlawful"

1. In his second and third written submissions, the practitioner alleged literally hundreds of errors, mostly characterised as jurisdictional errors. In his second written submission, many alleged errors were bare assertions that there was "no evidence" to support a finding of fact or "no evidence" to support a conclusion in the original tribunal's reasons for decision. On even a cursory examination, many of the alleged errors misrepresented the original tribunal's findings or were factually untrue.
2. In his second written submission, the practitioner also made many allegations that the "ACAT "engaged in an abuse of process"[54] or "acted for an improper purpose"[55] without particularising or substantiating any of the allegations. On the face of the document, the allegations were scandalous.
3. In the last half or so of the third written submission, from say paragraph 514, the practitioner debates the original tribunal's findings and reasons. He frequently interposes comment that he does not recall facts alleged against him (notwithstanding him admitting the facts in the original proceedings), poses rhetorical questions about different person's motives and adds comment about what he says occurred in relation to each charge. Nothing is referenced to evidence that was before the original tribunal, or to submissions made to the original tribunal, in support of an alleged error.
4. The same thing occurred towards the end of the appeal hearing when the practitioner gave a long and generalised claim from the Bar table, without reference to any of the evidence, about what he contended occurred in relation to facts and circumstances that became the subject of charges.
5. The practitioner agreed that much of his account from the Bar table about what occurred was "completely different"[56] from the account he gave in the original proceedings. For example, on the final day of the appeal hearing, in his oral submissions in reply, the practitioner agreed he was advancing a new version of events from the Bar table in response to the Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor[57] (Singh) proceeding that led to charges 2 and 3 in proceeding OR14 that had never been mentioned before.[58] The same thing happened at the close of the practitioner's submissions in reply, in relation to OR15, where he agreed his account of what he says occurred was his "new version of events" and that this was the first time this version had "ever been mentioned".[59]
6. As to why these new versions of events arose for consideration on appeal, the practitioner reverted to an argument that he was not given the opportunity to put his version of events in cross examination contrary (he said) to the rule in Browne v Dunn[60]. For the reasons discussed below, we reject that submission.
7. The practitioner contended it was appropriate for him to proceed in this way because the Tribunal is not a court. He submitted that section 7 of the ACAT Act requires proceedings to be informal and permits him to "just talk from the Bar table"[61] about what he says happened. This led us to ask what we should do with his statements from the Bar table. The practitioner said he was putting these matters as "submissions" or "statements" and that we should deal with them as we liked.[62]
8. In our view, we neither can nor should do anything in response to these submissions. Section 7 of the ACAT Act concerns the Tribunal's procedures. It permits informality "as is consistent with achieving justice" but does not permit the Tribunal to proceed otherwise than according to law. In particular, as discussed above, the Appeal Tribunal's function is to review the original tribunal's decision for error as alleged. That entails a consideration of the alleged error, referenced to what occurred in the original proceeding including evidence provided and tested by the parties, to determine whether error occurred.
9. Where the practitioner advanced no more than a generalised debate about events that were the subject of the charges, without reference to the evidence and including wholly new claims about what occurred, we do not accept it was for us, on appeal, to explore the original tribunal's reasons for decision for error in such a vague manner. To do so would also be procedurally unfair to the Council.
10. From the practitioner's submissions, we have addressed what appear to be the main alleged errors. We have also addressed some of the more precise alleged errors and references to evidence establishing that the alleged errors are not made out as a matter of objective fact.
11. The sheer number of facts asserted in the practitioner's documents and in his statements to us in the course of the appeal hearing, where the facts were plainly otherwise, was extraordinary. We lost all confidence in the correctness of anything the practitioner said or wrote unless it was independently corroborated.

1. The practitioner submitted that pursuant to the rule in Browne v Dunn[63] if a proposition contrary to a person's interests is not put to them in cross examination the proposition cannot later be relied on in submission as to why a finding contrary to the person's interests should be made. The practitioner gave his understanding of the rule as follows:

THE PRACTITIONER: Browne v Dunn says that irrespective of whether I make concessions, irrespective of whether I make any sort of admissions, that the allegation has got to, firstly, be put to the applicant, in cross examination, not at some other point in time, and then further, in cross examination the applicant, myself - - - [64]

THE PRACTITIONER: Further, in addition to that, in cross examination, the applicant has got to be given a chance to explain the matters, in cross examination. Now, if the applicant - that's the second limb of Browne v Dunn. If the applicant is not given the opportunity, in cross examination, to explain the circumstances, irrespective of whether he makes admissions or not, irrespective of whether there were charges or not, the applicant must be given the opportunity to comment on the allegations put to him, in cross examination, not afterwards or not before.[65]

1. The practitioner submitted the Council breached the rule in Browne v Dunn because he had not been given the opportunity, in cross examination, to respond to many of the factual matters that were the subject of the charges. Accordingly, he said, the charges involving factual matters that had not been put to him in cross examination should have been dismissed. Specifically, he said, the Council was precluded from asserting any wrongdoing in the three proceedings (OR12, OR14 and OR15) because none of the alleged wrongdoings in those proceedings had been put to him in cross examination.
2. He further said that while he did not dispute that the allegations the subject of charges in proceeding OR13 were put to him in cross examination, what he characterised as the second limb of the rule in Browne v Dunn was not complied with because he was not given a chance to explain his version of events as alleged in those charges in cross examination. The practitioner said he was denied this chance because he was overborne by the Council's counsel.
3. In response, the Council first noted that each of the charges was particularised in the applications for disciplinary action in considerable detail. It then said that those of the factual matters set out in the charges not put to the practitioner in cross examination were not put because he had previously admitted them. Cross-examination of the practitioner focused on the allegations of fact that were not admitted.
4. The Council said the effect of the practitioner's admission of an alleged fact was that the fact was no longer an "allegation". As such, even accepting the practitioner's "second limb of Browne v Dunn", there was no longer an allegation to which the practitioner must be given a chance to explain his version of events.
5. In response to the Council's submissions, in his third written submission the practitioner said at paragraph 324:

The Applicant does not recall making admissions. If the Applicant did make admissions, then the applicant retracts those admissions.

1. For the practitioner to claim he does not "recall making admissions" was disingenuous.
2. The practitioner admitted the majority of the factual allegations in the four applications in his document entitled "Respondent's Reply to Section 149 Applications" dated 18 September 2020, signed by his solicitor (the practitioner's admissions dated 18 September 2020). He made more admissions in his document entitled "Amended Reply to Section 149 Applications" dated 15 March 2021 (the practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021). Both documents were signed by the practitioner's solicitor and filed in the original proceedings.
3. The practitioner repeated his admissions in his document dated 15 March 2021, save for one, in another document also entitled "Amended Reply to Section 149 Applications" but dated 16 March 2021 (the practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021) filed with the Tribunal which he signed personally.
4. Comparing the practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021 with the practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021 signed by his solicitor the day before, it is clear the practitioner gave precise and deliberate consideration to the allegations he was admitting and those he was not. He made only one change from 'admit' to 'not admit', that being the allegation at paragraph 63(f) of the application for disciplinary action in proceeding OR15 that he commenced the BNJ17 matter with no reasonable prospect of success.
5. The practitioner made further admissions in his document entitled "Respondent's Reply to Applicant's Statement of Facts" dated 8 April 2021 and in his further document entitled "Amended Respondent's Reply to Applicant's Statement of Facts" dated 22 April 2021 filed in the original proceedings (the practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021). In both documents, the practitioner (through his counsel) quotes the text of the Council's document entitled "Applicant's Statement of Facts" dated 26 March 2021 filed in the original proceedings and adds in bold text his responses to the Council's stated facts. Almost every statement of fact is followed by the word "Admitted".
6. With reliance on the practitioner's admissions, the original tribunal said, correctly, "as a result of the amended response, to a very large extent in all four matters, the primary facts are not in dispute".[66]
7. By reference to the above-mentioned documents, most of the material facts in proceedings OR12, OR14 and OR15 were admitted. The bulk of the non-admissions related to allegations of dishonesty, specifically the charges in OR13 involving dishonest conduct in the practitioner's dealings with the Law Society. We reject the proposition that the practitioner "does not recall" making admissions, having regard to his repeated and carefully written documents signed and filed in the original proceedings.
8. Also, for the purposes of the appeal, the practitioner's claimed withdrawal of admissions made is misconceived. Our function on appeal was to consider the original tribunal's decision for alleged error. We were not taken to any reference, orally or in writing, to withdrawal of an admission in the proceeding before the original tribunal. There was no suggestion of any withdrawn admission, save for withdrawal of the admission of the facts alleged in paragraph 63(f) of the application in proceeding OR15.
9. It follows that the original tribunal was entitled to hear and determine the charges with reliance on the admissions made. That the practitioner wished, on appeal, to withdraw admissions made in the original proceedings does not mean the Council or the original tribunal erred by relying on the admissions made and not withdrawn.
10. The practitioner's submissions regarding his admissions in the original proceeding exemplified the mischief of his submissions generally. Having claimed that he does not recall making admissions, at paragraph 326 of his third written submission, the practitioner stated:

The important point is that the admissions occurred after cross examination had been completed, not before.

1. That statement is simply not true. The practitioner's admissions dated 18 September 2020, 15 March 2021 and 16 March 2021 all predate completion of his cross examination which occurred on 17 March 2021 at 3:08pm.[67]
2. In any event, we reject the practitioner's submissions regarding the rule in Browne v Dunn. The rule is essentially one of procedural fairness. The Council directed us to the decision of the Federal Court, per Justice Tamberlin, in Raben Footwear Ply Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (Raben)[68] in support of its submission that the application of the rule depends on the manner in which a case is conducted. In Raben, Justice Tamberlin relied on Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation[69] and other cases when stating "the rule is designed to ensure fairness to the witness so as to enable the witness to deal with the disputed matter and perhaps to give further evidence in corroboration or to contradict any inference which may be sought to be drawn".
3. The obligation of fairness is to give a witness (here the practitioner), when "disputed matters" are put to him, an opportunity to refute what is put or to refute an inference which is sought to be drawn. The practitioner said all matters alleged against him should have been put, not just those matters he disputed. We disagree. The proposition is contrary to the above-mentioned judicial statements about the rule. In Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union,[70] a Full Court of the Federal Court found there is no breach of the rule in Browne v Dunn if the matter in respect of which there was no cross examination was not in issue in the proceeding.[71] We accept the Council's submission that the rule does not require undisputed facts to be put.
4. Perhaps anticipating that his contention as to the breaching of the rule in Browne v Dunn would not be accepted, the practitioner contended that irrespective of the rule, in the interest of fairness more broadly and as required by section 7 of the ACAT Act and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (Li),[72] he should have been cross-examined on the admitted allegations.
5. He said "let's jettison the rule in Browne v Dunn, we're back to Li"[73] which, he said, created an obligation of fairness to put all allegations to him in cross examination even if they were not in dispute. He said his allegations of procedural error in the original tribunal is a 'fairness argument' based on "all three" - the rule in Browne v Dunn, Li and section 7 of the ACAT Act.[74]
6. We were not taken to any passage in Li to support the practitioner's claim. Nor could we find any such passage. Arising from Li, we accept (of course) that a proceeding must be conducted in a procedurally fair manner. That is consistent with section 7(b) of the ACAT Act. Section 7 provides:
   1. Tribunal principles

_In exercising its functions under this Act, the tribunal must - _

_(a) seek to ensure the procedures of the tribunal - _

(i) are as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice; and

(ii) are implemented in a way that facilitates the resolution of the issues between the parties so that the cost to the parties and the tribunal is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter of the proceeding; and

(b) observe natural justice and procedural fairness.

1. However, nothing in section 7, or Li, supports the practitioner's proposition that he should have been cross-examined on facts he had admitted. Indeed, in our view, section 7 supports the contrary view. It is simply nonsensical to think section 7 requires cross examination on facts that are not in dispute.
2. Also, the practitioner's argument simply ignores the comprehensive nature and substance of the pleaded charges, which put him on notice as to what he was alleged to have done. He thus had ample opportunity to put on evidence as to his version of the events surrounding those allegations. That is all the rule required.[75] There was no error of procedure by the Council or by the original tribunal that prevented him from doing so.

1. The practitioner alleged bias on the part of both members of the original tribunal. He alleged that SM Orlov "bullied and intimidated" him and that SM Brennan "appeared to fall asleep".[76] Why these actions, even if true, constituted bias (actual or apprehended) was not stated.
2. We were not persuaded that the claim of bias is made out.
3. First, the practitioner did not take us to any passage of the transcript of the original tribunal proceedings, or any part of the oral recording, in support of his claim. He did not seek to tender a witness statement from someone who observed the members' conduct. To this, the practitioner acknowledged that he "cannot prove"[77] his claims but this "doesn't mean ... these things did not happen". He submitted that "the Appeals ACAT should investigate the claims and come to its own conclusions".[78] He likened himself to a woman who has been sexually assaulted who may "make claims" about what occurred.[79] The practitioner posed the questions, what would a "person in the street" conclude if the person "was told" that SM Orlov yelled at the practitioner or "was told" that SM Brennan fell asleep.[80]
4. The submission is misconceived. The practitioner makes his claim: it is for him to prove. He makes no attempt to do so. It is not for the Appeal Tribunal to conduct an investigation, as the practitioner seeks. Its function is to determine a claim by reference to the evidence put forward in support of it. No evidence was put forward.
5. Second, the practitioner accepted that no allegation of bias was made until after he filed his application for appeal.[81] As best we can ascertain, the first time the practitioner alleged bias was in his written submissions on the appeal filed on 11 April 2022. In this situation, the law of bias is clear. In Vakauta v Kelly,[82] the High Court observed that a party to a civil proceeding cannot "wait to see whether the outcome of a case is favourable to him before raising an objection, the availability of which he was previously aware, on the grounds of bias."[83]
6. In Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls,[84] the High Court confirmed the principle stated in Vakauta v Kelly, noting that if a party to civil proceedings knows of the circumstances that give rise to the claim that a decision-maker should be disqualified on the grounds of bias "but acquiesces in the proceedings by not taking objection, it will likely be held that the party has waived the objection".[85]
7. So it is in this case. If the practitioner or his legal representative in the original proceedings thought the conduct of either member of the original tribunal gave rise to an apprehension of bias, the claim should have been promptly made at that stage. It was not. We are satisfied that the practitioner cannot, now, properly allege bias where the alleged grounds for the claim occurred in his presence during the original hearing and no objection was taken.

1. The practitioner alleged unreasonable delay in two contexts. First, he said there was unreasonable delay on the part of the Council in making the applications for disciplinary action.[86] He further said the original tribunal was guilty of unreasonable delay in that it "took another seventeen months in which to make a decision ... [and as a consequence] the decision is void ab initio because of unreasonable delay."[87]
2. The delay on the part of the Council on which the practitioner relied is the period between when the Council cancelled his practising certificate on 21 June 2018 and when it filed its applications for disciplinary action on 1 July 2020.
3. The practitioner said the effect of this delay on him was to destroy his practice and his health.[88] He cited the High Court's decision in NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs where the Court referred to the "likely effects" of delayed decision-making rather than the delay itself as the relevant consideration.[89] Regardless of whether there was delay on the part of the Council, and whether these effects flowed from that delay, this is simply not a ground of appeal with respect to the decision of the original tribunal.
4. The alleged delay on the part of the original tribunal is simply not true. There was not a delay of 17 months. The original tribunal reserved on 6 May 2021 following 4 days of hearing. It gave its decision on 8 November 2021, a period of 7, not 17, months later. The matter was of considerable factual and legal detail and complexity and generated a myriad array of affidavit evidence and submissions from the parties. The original tribunal's decision was 102 pages in length. In our view, to reserve for seven months was not unreasonable.
5. This ground is not made out on either allegation.

1. The practitioner alleged the applications for disciplinary action were an abuse of process on the part of the Council and/or made by the Council for an improper purpose.[90] The practitioner said the applications did not seek a penalty and in those circumstances the original tribunal could not impose a penalty given that his practising certificate had already been cancelled.[91] The practitioner said the Council made its applications for an improper purpose, namely solely to obtain a costs order against the practitioner. The practitioner said the LP Act only provides for an order for costs in circumstances where the original tribunal has made a finding of misconduct.[92] This, he said, was the Council's sole or prime reason for filing the applications for disciplinary action.
2. As the Council pointed out, the practitioner's claims that the applications for disciplinary action were brought for an improper purpose and were an abuse of process were addressed and dismissed in an interim decision by the original tribunal published on 7 October 2020.[93] The practitioner neither acknowledged the original tribunal's earlier decision nor made any attempt to identify an error in that decision. He simply repeated the claims. We have considered the claims and the original tribunal's consideration of those claims. We see no error in the original tribunal's finding that the Council did not bring the applications for an improper purpose.
3. The purposes of Chapter 4 of the LP Act include, per section 384(c), providing "a means of redress for complaints about lawyers". If the allegations contained in the applications for disciplinary action were made out, the original tribunal was required by section 425(1)(a) to determine if it was appropriate to make one or more orders under sections 425(3)-(5). These included an order recommending that the practitioner's name be removed from the roll pursuant to section 425(3)(a). Given this statutory scheme, there was the upmost utility in determining whether the practitioner was guilty of professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. We are satisfied the applications were brought for a proper purpose.

1. The practitioner alleged the original tribunal erred by not conducting a separate hearing in relation to penalty.[94]
2. The practitioner's counsel made closing submissions on his behalf at the final day of the original tribunal hearing on 6 May 2021. He also filed a document entitled "Submissions on Breach, Characterisation and Penalty" dated 23 April 2021 (practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021). Part 5 of the submissions was devoted to penalty.[95]
3. The original tribunal asked the parties to address it on whether a separate hearing in relation to penalty was required.[96] The transcript records the original tribunal asking the practitioner's counsel if he had a "preference about that"; the original tribunal being "strongly inclined to deal with everything at one time"; in the interests of "efficiency and trying to save costs"; and the practitioner's counsel saying "yes" to those propositions.[97]
4. We are satisfied that the practitioner was allowed ample time and opportunity to make both written and oral submissions as to penalty. A separate hearing as to penalty was not warranted and not sought. This ground is not made out.

1. As part of his fourth ground of appeal, the practitioner submitted there was "no evidence" to support any of the charges proved. We have therefore reviewed the original tribunal's findings by reference to the evidence and the practitioner's admissions of fact in the original proceedings with respect to each of the charges found proved.

1. In proceeding OR12, the Council laid 3 charges against the practitioner arising from his conduct in five different proceedings brought in the High Court, the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court for review of applications for protection visas on behalf of four different clients. More specifically, the Council alleged he repeatedly (on at least 5 occasions) made an argument without merit (charge 1); failed to comply with court orders (charge 2); and knowingly or recklessly misled the Federal Circuit Court in his oral submissions (charge 3). The original tribunal found charge 1 not proved. It found charges 2 and 3 proved.
2. As to charge 2, it was an admitted and objective fact that in the C7 transfer proceeding the practitioner was before the Federal Circuit Court on 26 September 2017 when Judge Neville ordered him to file a transfer application and written submissions in support of the application on behalf of his client. It was also an admitted[98] and objective fact that, contrary to the order, he did not file either document within time or at all. On 2 March 2018, in the absence of a transfer application or written submissions, his Honour dismissed the application in the C7 transfer proceeding.[99] By reference to these admitted facts, the original tribunal found charge 2 proved.
3. As to charge 3, arising from the C7 transfer proceeding, the practitioner admitted that when he was before the Federal Circuit Court on 26 September 2017 he told the Court his client had been living in Darwin for "approximately six months". The practitioner also admitted[100] that, on 10 October 2017, he filed an affidavit on behalf of the first C7 applicant in which the deponent stated "I have lived in Darwin for 4 years".
4. The original tribunal was not persuaded that the practitioner made his oral statement to the Court on 26 September 2017 knowing it was false, but did accept that he made it carelessly and made no effort to correct it.[101] The original tribunal found the practitioner breached rule 19.2 of the Conduct Rules (not correcting a misleading statement) and his common law duty of honesty and candour, and therefore found charge 3 proved.
5. On appeal, the practitioner's first submission was that all the charges in proceeding OR12 were "out"[102] because the original tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with them. This was because, he said, the subject of these charges did not form part of the Council's reasons for its decision to cancel his practising certificate in June 2018 and that he had been "ambushed"[103] by the Council making an application for disciplinary action arising from circumstances not forming part of the earlier decision to cancel his certificate. He made the same submission regarding the applications in OR14 and OR15. For the reasons discussed above, we reject the submission that the Council was confined to matters that were the subject of its cancellation decision in 2018 when determining matters that would be the subject of its applications for disciplinary action.
6. Also, the practitioner's claim that he was not given an opportunity to comment on the matters that became the subject of the applications for disciplinary action prior to the applications being made, and that he was "ambushed", is simply not true. As discussed below, by letter dated 1 July 2020,[104] the solicitors for the Council wrote to the practitioner's solicitor informing the practitioner that the Council had resolved to file applications for disciplinary action and attaching detailed reasons for why it had decided to do so. In any event, the hearing before the original tribunal, by definition, gave the practitioner an opportunity to respond to the allegations.
7. The practitioner's second submission on appeal was that the charges should have been dismissed because the allegations were not put to him in cross examination, contrary (he said) to the rule in Browne v Dunn, even though he had admitted all the facts underpinning the charges. The practitioner submitted that the Council "has admitted" [105] that they breached the rule in Browne v Dunn and was "estopped from pursuing the claim".[106] This is simply not true. The Council made no such admission and, for the reasons set out above, we reject the proposition that the practitioner should have been cross-examined on facts he had admitted.
8. The practitioner's third submission on appeal, regarding charge 2, was that that he was "sacked" by his client on 25 September 2017, the day before the hearing, because (by then) the client had moved back to Darwin and engaged Darwin lawyers. The practitioner submitted that "even though he had been sacked, the client instructed the practitioner to attend the hearing on the next day."[107] The practitioner stated "the client had appointed another lawyer in the matter and that lawyer undertook to lodge the papers for the transfer." He stated he "could not comply with the Court orders because he had been sacked."[108] As the original tribunal pointed out, the practitioner's contention that he could not comply with the Court orders because he had been sacked is inconsistent with his filing of an affidavit in support of the (oral) transfer application on 10 October 2017.[109]
9. The practitioner's submission about what he says occurred is not referenced to any evidence before the original tribunal. Also, as the original tribunal pointed out, there was no evidence as to the date on which his instructions were withdrawn.[110] Decisively, in our view, the practitioner admitted that on 26 September 2017 the Federal Circuit Court ordered the C7 applicants to "file and serve a transfer application and accompanying written submissions by 10 October 2017"; that he "continued to act for the C7 applicants"; and that he "did not file" the transfer application or the written submissions".[111]
10. It is in our view disingenuous for the practitioner, now, to advance an entirely different factual account of what occurred that is contradicted by his admissions in the original proceeding and by the affidavit he filed on 10 October 2017.
11. The practitioner's fourth submission on appeal was that charge 3 in OR12 should have been dismissed because he had never seen his client's affidavit in the C7 transfer proceeding, it was never tendered and it did not exist. The practitioner's submission warrants analysis because it exposes his disregard for honesty and candour that pervades his submissions on appeal.
12. In its application for disciplinary action in proceeding OR12, at paragraph 20, the Council alleged:

On 10 October 2017, the Respondent[112] filed an affidavit made by the first C7 applicant which deposed as follows:

1. In the original proceeding, the practitioner, through his solicitor and personally, admitted the facts pleaded in paragraph 20.[113]
2. Notwithstanding his admissions in the original proceedings, in his third written submission on the appeal, the practitioner states:

The Applicant does not recall making admissions. If the Applicant did make admissions, then the Applicant retracts those admissions.[114]

1. Notwithstanding the practitioner admitting the facts pleaded in paragraph 20, in his first written submission on appeal the practitioner stated:

On 10 October 2017, .... an Affidavit apparently indicates that the client had been living in Darwin for 4 years. The applicant does not recall that Affidavit. The Affidavit which is referred to by the Respondent has never been shown to the Applicant.[115] (emphasis added)

1. In his second written submission, at paragraph 158, the practitioner referred to "this supposed affidavit". At paragraphs 159 and 160, the practitioner stated:

At the heart of this matter was the Affidavit of the client.

The Law Society however did not tender the Affidavit of the client at the ACAT hearing.

1. In his third written submission, at paragraph 461, the practitioner states:

There was supposedly an Affidavit of the client, but the Applicant never got to see the Affidavit. (emphasis added)

1. In his fourth written submission, at paragraphs 225-237, the practitioner stated:

225... the Law Society has admitted that he did not put the Affidavit to the Applicant and give him an opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the matter.

226. The original ACAT also made the same point. The original ACAT stated that the Affidavit had not been presented by the Law Society to the original ACAT.

232. ... The Affidavit which was at the heart of the matter was not produced. The Applicant has never seen the Affidavit and has never had the opportunity to comment on the Affidavit. The Law Society never sent the Affidavit to the Applicant and gave the applicant the opportunity to comment on the Affidavit. The burden of proof has not been discharged.

237. The original ACAT did not afford the Applicant the opportunity to deal with the Affidavit because the Law Society did not tender the Affidavit. The Affidavit does not exist. It is as (sic) figment of the imagination of the Law Society used to fabricate a case against the Applicant.

238. The Law Society has acted disgracefully in this matter.

1. The practitioner's submissions are scandalous and factually untrue.
2. The affidavit of the first applicant dated 10 October 2017 in the C7 transfer proceeding, in which the deponent stated "I have lived in Darwin for 4 years", was exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Robert Reis sworn 6 November 2020. It is identified in an index of documents attached to the affidavit as document 9 and is at page 48 of Mr Reis' affidavit. Mr Reis' affidavit was tendered in proceeding OR12, among other proceedings, and marked as exhibit "A".
3. The affidavit in the C7 transfer proceeding records on its face that it was "prepared by" the practitioner and "filed on behalf of" the first applicant by the practitioner's firm in the C7 transfer proceeding.
4. The original tribunal never "stated" the affidavit in the C7 transfer proceeding "had not been presented by the Law Society to the original ACAT". Plainly, where it formed part of exhibit A, quite the opposite was the case.
5. For these reasons, we reject the practitioner's third submission regarding charge 3. However, and more importantly, the submission was factually untrue. It was bewildering to find ourselves responding to submissions that so seriously misrepresented the facts and made scandalous and unfounded allegations against the Council in an appeal against a recommendation that the practitioner's name be removed from the roll because he cannot be trusted in respects that are essential to the practice of law.[116]
6. The practitioner's fifth submission on appeal, regarding charge 3, was that there was "no evidence" for the assertion of the Law Society that he misled the Court.[117]
7. The practitioner's claim is simply not true. In evidence was the practitioner's statement to the Court on 26 September 2017 that the applicant had lived in Darwin for six months and the applicant's affidavit affirmed on 10 October 2017 deposing that she had lived in Darwin for four years. The charge was found proved by reference to the practitioner's failure to explain or correct the inconsistency.[118]
8. We see no error in the original tribunal finding charge 3 proved. There was ample basis for the original tribunal to find the practitioner was aware of the contents of the client's affidavit that "I have lived in Darwin for 4 years" before 2 March 2018 when the transfer application came on for hearing before Judge Neville. There was ample basis to find he had the opportunity to correct his misstatement and he did not, in breach of his obligation under rule 19.2 of the Conduct Rules and his common law duty of honesty and candour.

1. In proceeding OR13, the Council laid 19 charges against the practitioner arising from his dealings with a migration agent, Ms R, and his subsequent conduct arising from those dealings and in other ways. The practitioner referred to the charges, globally, as charges involving another legal practitioner. The original tribunal referred to the other practitioner as Mr D to preserve his anonymity. We will do likewise.
2. The original tribunal found charge 1 not proved, but the remaining 18 charges proved.
3. The charges found proved were charges that the practitioner recklessly misled the Federal Circuit Court (charges 2 and 3); charges that the practitioner was dishonest to the Law Society in response to its investigation of his conduct (charges 4-13); charges that the practitioner misused trust money and failed to give required cost disclosures to his client (charges 14-16); a charge that the practitioner failed to comply with a court order requiring him to repay costs to his client (charge 17); a charge that he failed to deliver legal services competently and diligently by filing an application in the Federal Circuit Court in circumstances where he knew, or should have known, the application had no reasonable prospects of success (charge 18); and a charge that he made allegations of serious improper conduct against a judge of the Federal Circuit Court in a letter to the Chief Judge of that Court without particularising, justifying or substantiating the allegations (charge 19).
4. The original tribunal devoted a large proportion of its reasons for decision to the charges in proceeding OR13. It doing so is understandable, given that OR13 dealt with charges going to the practitioner's honesty and hence his fitness to practise.
5. Part way through its consideration of the practitioner's dealings with Ms R, at paragraph 114 of its reasons for decision, the original tribunal said:

In the end [the practitioner] admitted that Ms [R] did not instruct him that Mr [D] was assisting her in relation to the AAT matter before the AAT made its decision. We accept that she did not do so. However, the Law Society alleged that [the practitioner] made statements about Mr [D]'s involvement from the very beginning knowing they were false or with reckless indifference as to their truth or falsity. But what would prompt him to do so? What possible motive could he have? It defies logic that [the practitioner] would invent a false factual narrative, out of the air so to speak, and later invite Ms [R] to depose to facts in an affidavit he knew were false, and that he knew Ms [R] would know were false. The allegation that [the practitioner] lied about his instructions to the Law Society and the Tribunal, is an entirely different matter. The motive to lie then is obvious.

1. In his submissions on appeal, the practitioner made much of the statement in paragraph 114 that "it defies logic that [the practitioner] would invent a false factual narrative", but he seriously misrepresents and misapplies what the original tribunal actually said. For example, with reference to paragraph 114, the practitioner said:

At the end of paragraph 114, the ACAT accepts that the Applicant did not create a false narrative in the [Mr D] matter, but then indicates that the Applicant lied in his dealings with the Law Society and the ACAT. The ACAT accepted that the applicant did not lie in the [Mr D] matter.[119]

1. From there, the practitioner submitted the original tribunal "is saying that the decision of the Law Council to cancel his practising certificate] is wrong."[120] From there, he said, the Law Council's decision was void ab initio. And from there, he said -

As the ACAT has accepted that there has been no breach of the Code of Conduct in the matter of [Mr D], this means that there was also no breach of the trust account. No fake file notes. No fake affidavits.

This submission by the ACAT in paragraph 114 completely vindicates the Applicant in the entire matter.[121]

1. Over dozens of pages of written submissions, the practitioner then repeatedly referred to the original tribunal's "finding" in paragraph 114 that he had not invented a false factual narrative in support of a submission that all the charges in OR13 should have been dismissed and that he "did nothing wrong".[122] The practitioner's line of reasoning culminated in submissions such as:

It is clear that the ACAT has accepted that the Applicant did nothing wrong in his dealings with Ms R. The ACAT instead tried to find a breach of the Code of Conduct in some other way which was not related to the [Ms R] matter. The ACAT was however acting for an improper purpose in this regard. The ACAT knew that the case against the Applicant had collapsed, that there was no false factual narrative. There was no false Affidavit. The ACAT then attempted to find some other grounds in order to establish a breach. The ACAT attempted to assert that the Applicant's dealings with the Law Society and the ACAT indicated the Applicant had breached the Code of Conduct.

The ACAT was acting for an improper purpose in this regard. The ACAT was using alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct in respect of his dealings with the Law Society in order to punish the Applicant for his dealings with Ms R. This is completely unlawful because the ACAT has found that the Applicant's dealings with Ms R did not breach the Code of Conduct.

The ACAT was clearly upset at the fact that the Applicant was going to get off. The ACAT could not let that happen, so it just ramped up some other breaches of the Code so that the ACAT could punish the Applicant for his dealings with Ms R.

In light of the above, it is now clear that the Applicant has not breached the Code of Conduct. The Applicant has no case to answer. The ACAT has acknowledged at paragraph 114 that the Applicant did not invent a false narrative or for that matter did not depose to facts that were false.

It is now clear that the Law Council made an error of law when it concluded that the Applicant had invented a false narrative. The ACAT at paragraph 114 of its decision has concluded that the Applicant did not invent a false narrative. This means that the decision of the Law Council is void ab initio because it made a jurisdictional error by concluding that the Applicant invented a false narrative. The ACAT has however declared that the Applicant did not invent a false narrative.[123]

1. The practitioner's submission misrepresents what the original tribunal said, asserts findings it did not make and then builds a castle of consequence which collapses because it is built on statements and findings that the original tribunal never made.
2. In particular, the original tribunal did not "find" that the practitioner did not invent a false narrative, it did not "accept", as a consequence, that there had been "no breach of the Code of Conduct in the matter", it did not "accept" that the practitioner "did nothing wrong" in his dealings with Ms R, and it did not "acknowledge" that the practitioner "did not depose to facts that were false".
3. True, the original tribunal commented that it defied logic that the practitioner would make statements about Mr D's involvement "from the very beginning" (which can be taken to mean a reference to the days prior to him drafting his affidavit filed in the Federal Circuit Court on 6 March 2017)[124] "knowing" his comment about Mr D's involvement was false or with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity. In other words, the original tribunal accepted, as a matter of common sense, that the practitioner's early understanding that Mr D was involved must have come from somewhere. But that is not an answer to the charges, nor does the original tribunal suggest it is. The original tribunal goes on to explain - with reference to subsequent information the practitioner obtained - why the practitioner knew or should have known that his understanding (whatever it was) at the "beginning" about Mr D's involvement was not correct.
4. In particular, Ms R forwarded to the practitioner:[125]

(a) the emails between Ms R and Ms D commencing with Ms R's email to Mr D on 14 February 2017 when she introduced herself and asked Mr D if he could assist with an application to the Federal Circuit Court;[126]

(b) Mr D's email sent on 1 March 2017 advising of his proposed costs ($20,000 plus GST) for making an application to the High Court;[127] and

(c) her concluding email to Mr D sent on 2 March 2017[128] stating that her client, Ms O, was "not sure that you will represent her ... [and] has decided to give her case to another solicitor".[129]

1. In our view, that email chain between Ms R and Mr D made clear or should have made clear to the practitioner that Mr D had no involvement with Ms O's matter at the AAT stage, and that Ms R asked Mr D to file an application in the Federal Circuit Court on behalf of Ms O but he was not retained.
2. We refer in particular to Ms R's email to Mr D on 14 February 2017, correctly described by the original tribunal at paragraph 80 of its decision. We quote the email in full to demonstrate that whatever prior basis the practitioner had for thinking Mr D was involved at the AAT stage of the matter, it should have been dispelled upon him reading that email. The email states:

This is [Ms R] Register Migration Agent, I did my last CPD point course with you around September last year.

I did talk with [J][130] and she did suggest me to send you the following email.

We are in a difficult situation with a client who was refused by the AAT

• my client was an applicant of a PPV 866 widow from Ghana,
• the department refused her application in November 2016
• in December 2016 we did lodge the application for review at the AAT but
• due to a problem with our IT system, the application was not in on time
• application was lodged one day after of the specified timeframe
• we did respond to the tribunal submitting my explanation and evidence the but the tribunal member refused my appeal - under out of jurisdiction-
• the applicant has a BVE until this coming Friday and the last day to lodge the application to the FCC is on the 20 February ...
• I would like to ask if you could representing in this case of [Ms O] my client.
• And me (DLP migration/[Ms R]) will be your client, I am assuming the responsibility of the failure of our IT system, therefore I will pay for all the fees

I am forwarding the history of the client, at least the most relevant information, and if you would be agreed to represent my client/me in the court, please send your fee agreement and your bank account to transfer the money as soon as you might suggested.

I am highly appreciate your attention paid to this email hoping that you can help me in this first time awful situation.

I will forwarding you other emails in relation to this case.

[Ms R][131] [all errors in the original]

1. In our view, if the practitioner read that email, it defies logic that he would still think (if he did previously) that Mr D had any involvement with the matter at all prior to 14 February 2017. By that date, the AAT application had been dismissed and Ms R was seeking help regarding a proposed application to the Federal Circuit Court.
2. In our view, if the practitioner read Mr D's email of 1 March 2017 setting out the fees, he "would charge" to represent Ms O and Ms R's email in reply of 2 March 2017 stating that Ms O had engaged "another solicitor", again it defies logic that the practitioner would still think (if he did previously) that Mr D had been retained.
3. At the least, where Ms R had forwarded to the practitioner the email correspondence between Ms R and Mr D, we see no error in the original tribunal's conclusion that the practitioner proceeded with reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of his representation to the Federal Circuit Court that Mr D was involved where he was on notice that Mr D was not.
4. If the emails were not sufficient to correct the practitioner's understanding at "the beginning" that Mr D was involved, the preparation and settling of Ms R's affidavit in July 2017 should have done so. In particular, the practitioner drafted an affidavit for Ms R that included (at paragraphs 6 and 7) comment about Mr D's inability to lodge papers with the AAT within the prescribed time. Ms R deleted from the draft affidavit all mention of Mr D having any involvement.[132]
5. Charges 2 and 3 arose from the practitioner's failure to take any steps to correct his earlier misleading statements in his affidavit filed on 6 March 2017 and in his submissions prepared on 30 March 2017, filed in the Federal Circuit Court, that Mr D was involved in the failure to lodge papers with the AAT within the prescribed time.
6. It becomes clear that the original tribunal's comment in paragraph 114 about it defying logic that the practitioner would invent a false factual narrative "from the very beginning" was no more than an observation, or perhaps an acknowledgement, that the practitioner might have understood at "the beginning" that Mr D was involved, but that understanding was, or should have been, corrected by the email exchange between Mr D and Ms R that he received from Ms R and by Ms R's changes to the draft affidavit he prepared.
7. It must also be noted that charge 1 was dismissed, not because of a 'finding' that the practitioner did not invent a false narrative but because the original tribunal concluded, contrary to the submission of the Council, that the practitioner's statement in paragraph 7 of his affidavit affirmed on 6 March 2017 is a reference to Ms R asking Mr D to file an application in the Federal Circuit Court on behalf of the client, rather than an application in the AAT. Charge 1 was dismissed because Ms R clearly did ask Mr D to file an application in the Federal Circuit Court.[133] The practitioner's understanding, whatever it was and at whatever time, about Mr D's involvement in the matter had no bearing on the dismissal of charge 1. Nor did the original tribunal's comment in paragraph 114 about it defying logic that the practitioner would invent a false factual narrative.
8. For these reasons, we also reject the practitioner's submission that, upon charge 1 being dismissed, all the other charges should have dismissed with it. There is simply no connection between the original tribunal's reasons for dismissing charge 1 and it finding the remaining charges proved.
9. As well as asserting that the original tribunal had reached a global view regarding all charges derived from the 'Mr D matter', drawn from the phrase in paragraph 114 that "it defies logic that the respondent would invent a false factual narrative", the practitioner put what appears to be a different spin on the last two sentences in paragraph 114. The practitioner said:

Then the very last sentence seals it when the original ACAT says, 'The allegation that the respondent lied about his instructions to the Law Society and the tribunal is an entirely different matter'. An entirely different matter. So the original ACAT is saying, 'He didn't do anything wrong in the matter of [Mr D], but his - the way he acted before the original ACAT is a different matter'. There's no breach in the [Mr D] matter, but there is a breach in the matters that arose at the tribunal, not the [Mr D] matter.[134]

1. The practitioner said these alleged lies relate "simply to "just those three: the trust account, the affidavit and the file notes, and I have complete answers to those three issues".[135] He made the same summation several times in his oral submissions, most succinctly as follows:

What they're saying there is, 'He's done nothing wrong in the [Mr D] matter, and these other matters, that's an entirely different thing, he has done something wrong'. That is what paragraph - the last sentence in paragraph 114 is the most important sentence. It's acknowledging that I did nothing wrong in the [Mr D] matter.[136]

1. The practitioner said this construction was not just on the basis of what he took to be the concession made in his favour in paragraph 114. This paragraph should be seen, he said, in the context of other supportive assertions in "paragraphs 113, 131, 134, 135, 168, possibly 171, and 214".[137]
2. After reviewing all the paragraphs of the original decision to which the practitioner directed us, his submission that the last two sentences of paragraph 114 "seals it", in the sense that he "didn't do anything wrong" in relation to Mr D and that the alleged "lies" relate only to "matters that arose in the tribunal" ignores what the original tribunal actually said. The "lie" to which the original tribunal was referring is a lie "about his instructions". When paragraph 114 is read as a whole, the phrase "lied about his instructions" can only mean the practitioner lied to the Law Society "about his instructions" from Ms R regarding Mr D's involvement in Ms O's matter.
3. As the Council contended, what the original tribunal said is that by the time the Law Society was investigating the matter in 2018 the practitioner may well have had a motive to lie. The original tribunal found (at paragraphs 224-237) that all of the charges relating to dishonesty to the Law Society (charges 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) were made out. All of these charges go to the question of whether the practitioner can be relied upon to tell the truth.
4. On the last day of the appeal hearing, the practitioner said that even if we reached the view that the "concession" in paragraph 114 is limited to charge 1, that charge is the most serious allegation of dishonesty, and this should have been reflected on penalty. We reject the submission. As explained above, the "concession" in paragraph 114 had no bearing on the original tribunal's decision to dismiss charge 1. Also, for the reasons given, there is no connection between the original tribunal's decision to dismiss charge 1 and its decision to find the remaining charges proved.
5. In any event, we reject the proposition that charge 1 was the most serious allegation of dishonesty. It is one thing to file an affidavit and/or submissions that misrepresent a fact or circumstance. It is quite another, and much more serious, not to correct it as soon as a practitioner knows or should know that a fact or circumstance has been misrepresented.
6. In this case, even if he did not read the emails that passed between Ms R and Mr D in February and March 2017, where the practitioner knew or should have known from Ms R's affidavit affirmed on 10 July 2017 that Mr D was not involved, his failure to correct the misrepresentation about Mr D's involvement when the practitioner made submissions to the Court on 19 July 2017 was much the more serious charge. We agree with the original tribunal's finding that the practitioner is guilty of professional misconduct by recklessly misleading the Court in this regard.

1. Charge 2 arose from the practitioner's statements in paragraphs 6 and 10 of his written submissions prepared on 30 March 2017 and filed the following day alleging that Mr D "was unable to get the papers into the [AAT] within the prescribed period" and that Mr D "would be prepared to put on an affidavit attesting to the situation".[138]
2. In the original proceeding, the practitioner admitted that paragraphs 6 and 10 of his submissions dated 30 March 2017 contained false statements in that Ms R did not contact Mr D in relation to the AAT application, and, as such, Mr D could not have been "unable to get the papers into the Tribunal within the prescribed period", per paragraph 6, and was not prepared "to put on an affidavit attesting to the situation" per paragraph 10.[139]
3. In his submissions on penalty, the practitioner said "there can be no doubt that the catastrophic failure of the Respondent to understand his instructions had the consequential effect of misleading the Court and the dogmatic reiteration of the "facts" which were incontrovertibly incorrect aggravated the conduct".[140]
4. With reference to the practitioner's admissions and its earlier findings, the original tribunal found the charge proved.[141]
5. On appeal, notwithstanding his admissions, the practitioner submitted there was "no evidence" to support the findings.[142] This is simply not true. The original tribunal had in evidence the affidavit of Mr D and the affidavit of Ms R in which both denied the practitioner's claims.[143] It also had in evidence Ms R's email of 14 February 2017 to Mr D which (for the reasons explained above) corroborates the sworn evidence of Mr D and Ms R that Mr D was not involved in the AAT proceeding.
6. By reference to the practitioner's admissions and the evidence before it, we see no error in the original tribunal finding charge 2 proved.

1. Charge 3 arose from the practitioner's oral statement to the Federal Circuit Court on 19 July 2017 that Ms R "attempted to elicit the support of ... two very experienced migration lawyers, who unfortunately let the applicant down",[144] thereby attributing responsibility for the delay in filing the application to the two migration lawyers, with reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of the statement.[145]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner (through his counsel) acknowledged (by reference to facts admitted)[146] that his statement to the Federal Circuit Court about migration lawyers who let the applicant down by not filing the application were "incorrect and unfounded".[147]
3. In mitigation, the practitioner's counsel said the practitioner's -

dogmatic insistence on facts now known not to be correct, betrays a temperament or disposition to certainty which, on the facts, was plainly misconceived.[148]

1. The practitioner's counsel sought to explain the practitioner's conduct as driven by the practitioner's -

failure to adhere to ordinary expectations concerning the making and maintenance of records and a willingness to listen, comprehend and then act on those instructions rather than to pursue a 'case theory' driven by his own dogmatic certainty.[149]

1. The original tribunal said in response to these submissions that "these 'insights' into the respondent's character were not based on evidence before the Tribunal."[150]
2. The practitioner's lack of insight and "dogmatic certainty" about what occurred - seemingly blind to the evidence before him - was demonstrated on appeal by his submissions in response to the finding of his guilt in relation to charge 3. For example, the practitioner submitted that the original tribunal had "no evidence"[151] for its "assertions", as he described them, in paragraph 171 of its reasons for decision. He submitted "there was no evidence to suggest that [Mr D] was not in the matter at the AAT stage".[152]
3. In paragraph 171, the original tribunal made three main statements:

(a) That it was satisfied that in his submissions to the Federal Circuit Court on 19 July 2017 and in his earlier written submissions, the practitioner attributed responsibility for the delay in filing the application to the two migration lawyers 'engaged' by Ms R, one of whom the practitioner knew was Mr D, with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of the submission;

(b) that at the time the practitioner made his submissions to the Court (19 July 2017) the practitioner "possessed information that, contrary to his written submissions filed on 31 March 2017, Mr D was not involved in the late lodgement of the application to the AAT"; and

(c) that it is highly improbable that the practitioner did not know, when making his submissions, that Mr D had not been retained in the matter.

1. The proposition that the original tribunal had "no evidence" to support these findings is simply not true. We need only refer to:

(a) Ms R's email to Mr D on 14 February 2017, in evidence before the original tribunal and in the practitioner's possession prior to him filing his affidavit of 6 March 2017, that makes clear on its face that Mr D was not involved in the matter and knew nothing of the matter prior to that date. The AAT dismissed Ms O's application for review of the Minister's decision to refuse her application for a protection visa on 23 January 2017 and notified Ms O of its decision on 25 January 2017;[153]

(b) Ms R's affidavit affirmed on 10 July 2017,[154] in evidence before the original proceeding and on which the practitioner relied for the purpose of his submissions on 19 July 2017, that makes no mention of a migration lawyer being engaged. Further, in evidence before the original tribunal was the practitioner's draft of Ms R's affidavit. Ms R deleted paragraphs 6 and 7 from the draft, which contained statements about Mr D's involvement in the matter at the AAT stage;

(c) the exchange of emails between Ms R and Mr D on 1 and 2 March 2017 was in evidence before the original tribunal and in the practitioner's possession prior to him filing his affidavit of 6 March 2017. That record Mr D stating the fees he "would charge" for making an application to the High Court and Ms R's reply that the client, Ms O, "has decided to give her case to another solicitor"; and

(d) Mr D's affidavit in which he affirms he "was never retained to act for [Ms R]".[155]

1. The practitioner also submitted, as a fact, that "Mr D was involved in the late lodgement of the application to the AAT". He said, in support: "In the E Mail of 27 February, [Ms R] has stated that [Mr D] and [Ms R] were responsible for miss the AAT date." (sic)[156]
2. The practitioner stated that the original tribunal "failed to take into account a relevant consideration namely the email of 27 February 2017"[157] and identified[158] the email as an email from Ms R to Mr D sent on 27 February 2017 at 6:38pm.[159]
3. The practitioner's submitted that Ms R's email sent on 27 February 2017 "verifies" that Mr D "was in the matter at the AAT stage" and "establishes that [Mr D] and [Ms R] were responsible for the missing of the AAT date back in December 2016".[160]
4. We reject the submission, which is wholly contrary to the evidence. Also, the original tribunal did take Ms R's email into account: it quoted from it at paragraph 85 of its reasons for decision.
5. Of much greater concern for the purposes of the appeal is that the practitioner's reliance on Ms R's email sent on 27 February 2017 at 6:38pm is yet another example of his willingness to misrepresent what was actually said in an effort to secure a forensic advantage.
6. Ms R did not state "that Mr D and Ms R were responsible for miss the AAT date". She stated -

I am accepting the contract will be with me/services, (as we are responsible for miss the AAT date) ....

1. Nor can the phrase "we are responsible" be understood as meaning Mr D and Ms R. Ms R's email of 27 February 2017 was in reply to Mr D's email sent earlier that day in which he stated "we will represent your client - but note our contract for services will be with you ...".[161] That email exchange followed Ms R's earlier email of 14 February 2017 explaining to Mr D her failure to lodge an application to the AAT on Ms O's behalf and seeking his assistance. When the emails are read together, it is unarguable that Ms R's statement to Mr D, "we are responsible for miss[ing] the AAT date", is a reference to Ms R and her agency - not herself and Mr D.
2. The acknowledgement of the practitioner's counsel that the practitioner's submissions to the Court on 19 July 2017 were "incorrect and unfounded" was properly made. We see no error in the original tribunal finding charge 3 proved.
3. What is much more significant, for the purposes of the appeal, is that the practitioner's submissions on appeal demonstrated his ongoing lack of honesty and candour and his ongoing willingness to misrepresent facts. His submissions in relation to charge 3 confirm, in our view, his lack of fitness to practise.

1. Charge 4 arose from the practitioner's email to the Law Society sent on 5 March 2018 stating "Mr [D] acknowledges that he was involved in the appeal to the [AAT]",[162] in circumstances where he had a copy of Mr D's affidavit affirmed on 3 October 2017[163] in which Mr D stated he was never retained. In the original proceedings, the practitioner accepted he could and should have read Mr D's affidavit before sending his email to the Law Society. He acknowledged that his "continuing failure ... to understand and comprehend the direct evidence led him into error and to the misleading; albeit inadvertently, of the [Council's] solicitors and was a clear breach of his obligations."[164]
2. The original tribunal rejected the submission that the false statement was inadvertent. It accepted that the practitioner's statement was made knowing it was false or with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity.[165] It therefore found charge 4 proved.[166]
3. On appeal, in our view demonstrating the practitioner's "continuing failure ... to understand and comprehend the direct evidence", the practitioner submitted there was "no evidence" for the original tribunal's "assertion" that the practitioner made a "knowingly false statement" in his email. The practitioner challenged how the original tribunal could know his intentions.[167]
4. The submission about there being "no evidence" is simply not true.
5. At no time did Mr D "acknowledge" his involvement in the AAT proceeding, and the practitioner had a copy of Mr D's affidavit to the contrary prior to sending his email to the Law Society.
6. The practitioner's submission questioning how the ACAT could know his intentions when he made his false statement is disingenuous. The practitioner had no basis to state Mr D had "acknowledged" his involvement. The practitioner knew at the time he sent his email that Mr D had stated otherwise by means of his complaint to the Law Society and in his affidavit.
7. In any event, the original tribunal referenced its finding that charge 4 was proved to paragraph 186 of its reasons for decision. In that paragraph, with reference to the charge, the original tribunal stated it was satisfied that the practitioner made his statement knowing it to be false "or with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity".
8. The admission by the practitioner's counsel that the practitioner's statements in his email "was a clear breach of his obligations" was properly made. We see no error in the original tribunal finding charge 4 proved.

1. Charge 5 arose from the practitioner's statement in his email to the solicitors for the Law Society sent on 5 March 2018 that "there was never at any time any misrepresentation of the facts by me",[168] in circumstances where he knew or was recklessly indifferent to the fact that four representations by him were misrepresentation of the facts. The charge then referred to paragraph 7 of his affidavit affirmed on 6 March 2017 stating that Ms R had requested Mr D to file the AAT application; paragraph 6 of his submissions dated 30 March 2017 filed in the Federal Circuit Court stating that Mr D was unable to get the papers into the Tribunal within the prescribed time; paragraph 10 of his submissions dated 30 March 2017 stating that Mr D was prepared to make an affidavit in support of Ms O's case; and his submissions to the Federal Circuit Court on 19 July 2017 stating that two very experienced migration lawyers unfortunately let the applicant down in a most unprofessional way.[169]
2. In response to the charge, the practitioner's counsel admitted the breach and submitted:

The continuing failure of [the practitioner] to understand and comprehend the direct evidence led him into error and by reason of his reactivity and dogmatic certainty he did not respond to the Council solicitors and was in breach of his obligations.[170]

1. On the evidence before it, and with reliance on the practitioner's admissions, the original tribunal found the charge proved.[171]
2. On appeal, the practitioner submitted there was "no evidence" for the "assertion" of the original tribunal that the practitioner knew his statement to the Law Society was false.[172]
3. The submission is untenable. As at 5 March 2018 when he contended "there was never at any time any misrepresentation of the facts by me", the practitioner held:

(a) the email correspondence between Mr D and Ms R commencing on 14 February 2017 up to 2 March 2017 discussed above;

(b) Ms R's affidavit affirmed on 10 July 2017 filed in the Federal Circuit Court that had removed all reference to Mr D's involvement, as was present in the draft he provided to her;

(c) Mr D's affidavit affirming he had never been retained; and

(d) Mr D's complaint to the Law Society.

1. All of those documents were in evidence before the original tribunal. Those documents provided ample basis for the original tribunal to find, as a fact, that the four statements made by the practitioner, particularised in the charge, were misrepresentations of the facts.
2. As for the practitioner's knowledge of the misrepresentations, we see no error in the original tribunal relying on the practitioner's admissions and the evidence before it to find the practitioner knew his representations were false at the time he contended to the contrary in his email to the Law Society.
3. We find no error in the original tribunal finding charge 5 proved.

1. Charge 6 related to the practitioner's statement in his email sent on 5 March 2018 that Mr D "withdrew from the matter before the Federal Circuit Court" knowing the statement was false or with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity.
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted his guilt and that there was "no basis" for the statement in his email. The practitioner, through his counsel, pleaded that the practitioner's "reactive" and "defensive" setting of the practitioner's personality led him into error.[173]
3. On appeal, the practitioner retracted everything said to the original tribunal. He submitted that "if" he made that admission then he retracts it; that his statement was not made knowing it was false or with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity; that there was "no evidence" for the original tribunal's "assertion" at paragraph 189 of its reasons for decision;[174] and that Mr D "lied"[175] in his affidavit when stating he was never retained.
4. In support of his claim that Mr D "lied" in his affidavit, the practitioner referred to Ms R's email sent on 27 February 2017 which, he said, "completely corroborates" his claim. He submitted -

It is [Mr D_] who missed the AAT date because_ [Mr D] did not lodge the AAT application within time.

As the [practitioner] has already insulated (sic), on 27 February 2017, the AAT Application was still on foot and [Ms R] was trying to get [Mr D] to help her. [Ms R] wanted [Mr D] to help her with the AAT matter and [Mr D] agreed to help her wit (sic) the AAT matter.[176]

1. As explained above, these statements of fact are simply not true. Even the claim about the AAT application being "still on foot" when Ms R sent her email is not true: the AAT dismissed the application on 23 January 2017.[177]
2. The practitioner also referred to a claim dated 28 February 2017 made by Ms R's client, Ms O, to an insurance company under Ms R's professional indemnity insurance policy in which Ms O stated "Mr D ... had accepted to represent my case at the FCC".[178] With reliance on these documents, the practitioner submitted "how much clearer can the position be?"[179] The practitioner also characterised Mr D's email sent on 1 March 2017 stating the fees "we would charge"[180] as "more evidence that [Mr D] had been retained in the matter".[181]
3. The practitioner's submissions again displayed his willingness to misrepresent facts, and to overlook others, to further an improper forensic advantage.
4. In issue for the purposes of charge 6 was the practitioner's knowledge as at 5 March 2018. Whatever the practitioner thought from Ms R's email sent on 27 February 2017 or Ms O's representation to Ms R's insurer, it was dispelled by Ms R's email of 2 March 2017 to Mr D advising that Ms O had given her case to another solicitor and by Mr D's affidavit affirmed on 3 October 2017 that he was "never retained".[182] The practitioner admits he held Mr D's affidavit and Mr D's complaint to the Law Society at the time the practitioner stated in his email to the Law Society that Mr D "withdrew from the matter", which Mr D could never have done because he had never been retained.
5. The submission on appeal that Mr D lied in his affidavit (when stating he had never been retained) is untenable. In support of this scandalous allegation, the practitioner again relied on Ms R's email of 27 February 2017 and Ms O's claim to the insurer on 28 February 2017, but neither document establishes the allegation.
6. Ms R's email of 27 February 2017 does not state or imply that Mr D was retained: to the contrary, it notes Ms R's acceptance that the contract for services "will be" with her or her agency, not Ms O, and then asks about what Mr D's costs "will be". That is followed by Mr D's email sent to Ms R on 2 March 2017 setting out the fees he "would charge" if he were engaged, his view that any challenge could be made only to the High Court and Ms R's email to Mr D in reply sent on 2 March 2017 advising Mr D that Ms O had decided to "give her case to another solicitor", namely the practitioner. Having regard to that correspondence, it is quite clear - and should have been clear to the practitioner - that Ms O, who plainly had a poor command of the English language, incorrectly stated that Mr D "had accepted to represent my case at the FCC".
7. The practitioner's submission that Mr D's email setting out the fees he "would charge" is "more evidence" that Mr D was retained is equally untenable. The email is, on its face, nothing more than a statement of his fees if he were to be retained - not that he was.
8. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt (through his counsel) to charge 6 was properly made. We see no error in the original tribunal accepting it. We see no error in it finding the charge proved. The evidence to which the practitioner referred us does not establish otherwise.

1. Charge 7 related to the practitioner's statement in his letter to the Council's solicitors sent on 6 April 2018 that he did not "draft or settle" Ms R's affidavit.[183] The charge alleged he failed to be open and frank with the Council in relation to his involvement in drafting part of the affidavit and in providing a full and accurate account to the Council as to that involvement.[184]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said that "the facts clearly support the conclusion that the Respondent did draft the [Ms R] Affidavit".[185] He said that his denial in the letter to the Council had been "reactive, careless and ill considered" but "there was no intent to mislead the Applicant".[186] In his submissions on penalty, the practitioner said "the 'reactive' and 'defensive' setting of the Respondent's personality led him into error and to the careless and incorrect statements".[187]
3. The original tribunal found, with reference to the admissions, the charge proved.[188]
4. Notwithstanding the admissions made and his submissions on penalty, on appeal the practitioner retracted everything said to the original tribunal. He submitted that "if" he made admission then he retracts them; that his statement was not made knowing it was false or with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity; and that there was "no evidence" for the original tribunal's "assertion" at paragraph 193 of its reasons for decision that he made the statement in his letter knowing the statement to be false.[189]
5. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt (through his counsel) to charge 7 was properly made. The evidence was unanswerable. His own email demonstrates that he drafted the affidavit and sent it to Ms R for changes to be made.[190] We see no error in the original tribunal relying on the practitioner's admissions and the evidence before it to find the practitioner knew his statement that he did not "draft or settle" Ms R's affidavit was false when he made it. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 8 related to the practitioner's statement in his letter sent on 6 April 2018 to the Council's solicitor that "my submissions in the [Ms R] matter are accurate" being made, knowing or being recklessly indifferent to the fact that the submissions were inaccurate.[191]
2. The submissions were that Mr D had been "unable to get the papers into the Tribunal [the AAT] within the prescribed time"; that Mr D was prepared to make an affidavit in support of the case; and that "not one but two very experienced migration lawyers [had] let the applicant down in a most unprofessional way".
3. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said "he must have known from the information available to him on 6 April 2018 that paragraphs 6 and 10 of his submissions dated 30 March 2017 were not accurate".[192] He said there was no intent to mislead the Council and he was not recklessly indifferent to the truth. Rather, the response was "reactive, careless and ill considered".[193] In his submissions on penalty he repeated the assertion that "the 'reactive' and 'defensive' setting of his personality led him into error and to the careless and incorrect statements".[194]
4. The original tribunal found the charge proved, noting that the practitioner's closing submissions had admitted as much.[195]
5. On appeal the practitioner sought to retract his admissions made to the original tribunal with respect to the charge. He again submitted there was "no evidence" for the original tribunal's "assertion" at paragraph 193 of its reasons for decision that the submission was knowingly false.[196]
6. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to charge 8 in the original proceedings was properly made. We see no error in the original tribunal relying on the admission, together with the evidence before it discussed above, to find the practitioner knew his statement to the solicitors for the Council that "my submissions in the [R] matter are accurate" was false. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 9 related to the practitioner's statement in his email of 22 May 2018 to the solicitors for the Council that "I did not file any affidavit in this matter" being made, knowing or being recklessly indifferent to the fact that he had filed an affidavit in the matter.[197] The practitioner's statement was made in response to a letter dated 16 May 2018 from the solicitors for the Council in which they stated their understanding "that you filed an Affidavit in the proceedings on 6 March 2017" and requested the practitioner to "provide us with a copy of your final Affidavit".[198]
2. There is no dispute that on 6 March 2017 the practitioner filed in the Federal Circuit Court an affidavit made by him on 6 March 2017 in support of his client's case.[199]
3. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted that "the facts clearly support the conclusion" that he did file an affidavit. He said that there was no intent to mislead the Council, he was not recklessly indifferent to the truth and the response was "reactive, careless and ill considered".[200] In his submissions on penalty he repeated the assertion that "the 'reactive' and 'defensive' setting of the Respondent's personality led him into error and to the careless and incorrect statements".[201]
4. The original tribunal found the charge proved, noting the practitioner's admission in his closing submissions but rejecting the statement it was the product of carelessness. Rather, it accepted the Council's submission that the practitioner made the statement knowing it was false. It found the charge proved.[202]
5. In his grounds of appeal, the practitioner sought to retract admissions made to the original tribunal with respect to the charge. He did not make any specific submissions that relate to the charge in his first, second or third written submissions, save for a global assertion that he has "no case to answer". He said in his fourth written submission that he was "of the honest belief that he had not filed the affidavit ... [that he] did have a very busy practice and many matters were on foot" and if he "did file an affidavit he did not intend to mislead the Law Society".[203]
6. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to charge 9 in the original proceedings was properly made.
7. The practitioner's contention that he had "the honest belief" that he did not file any affidavit is disingenuous. The correspondence from the solicitors for the Council identifies, precisely, the affidavit in question. When writing to the Council's solicitors in the context of an investigation into his conduct and in response to their request for a copy of his affidavit, the practitioner can be reasonably presumed to have reviewed the matter and his role in it. Had he done so, his filing of his own affidavit would have been evident. Had he not reviewed his conduct, the practitioner should at the very least have stated he does not recall filing an affidavit: he did not. We see no error in the original tribunal relying on the admission, together with the evidence before it that unequivocally establishes the falsity of the statement that he "did not file any affidavit in this matter", to find the practitioner knew his statement in his email of 22 May 2018 to the Council was false. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 10 related to the practitioner's statement in his email of 22 May 2018 to the solicitors for the Council sent at 3.50pm stating -

I wanted to tender the affidavit [of Ms R] and put her in the box. Judge Neville however refused to allow the tender of the document and refused to allow her to give evidence.[204]

1. The charge was that the practitioner made the statement dishonestly in that he knew it to be false or was recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity.[205]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said "the facts do not support the conclusion" that the practitioner knew what he was saying was false[206] or that he was recklessly indifferent to the truth when he made his statement to the Council in his email. He said his response was, rather, "reactive, and ill-considered and did not reflect what actually transpired in Court".[207] In his submissions on penalty the practitioner said he "did seek to adduce oral evidence from Ms R but was denied that application on the basis that his Honour had already read the Affidavit".[208] He also repeated the assertion that "the 'reactive' and 'defensive' setting of the Respondent's personality led him into error and to the careless and incorrect statements".[209]
3. The original tribunal rejected the practitioner's submission that the statement was careless.[210] The original tribunal found that the practitioner made the statement knowing it was false. Accordingly, it found the charge that the practitioner breached rules 43.1 and 43.2 of the Conduct Rules and failed in his duty to inform and assist the Council's inquiry proved.[211]
4. On appeal, the practitioner submitted there was "no evidence" for the original tribunal's finding of guilt, saying "the ACAT assert(s) that the statement was knowingly false. The ACAT however has no evidence for such an assertion. The statement was and is a truthful statement".[212] He said in his fourth written submission replying to the Council's submissions of 17 May 2022 (which at paragraph 14.16 particularises the alleged false statements) that "the issue of the Affidavit has already been dealt with".[213]
5. We were not persuaded that the original tribunal erred by rejecting the practitioner's submission that the statement in his email was careless and instead finding the practitioner made it knowing it was false. The transcript of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court on 19 July 2017 records the practitioner's opponent stating that Ms R was not required for cross-examination,[214] the practitioner stating he did not wish to elicit any evidence from Ms R other than what was in the affidavit and the Court acknowledging to the practitioner that he could "take it" that the affidavit was read, as evidenced by the following exchange:

HIS HONOUR: ... so you've heard what [Mr P] has said. [Ms R] is not required for cross-examination. So is there anything else that you would seek to elicit from her other than what is in her affidavit?

PRACTITIONER: No, No, your Honour.[215]

PRACTITIONER: ... all I propose to do now is just very briefly run through [Ms R's] affidavit

HIS HONOUR: ... But you can take it that I've read it.

PRACTITIONER: Yes, yes, I understand that that I just-would just like to ...

HIS HONOUR: ... In the outline of submissions ....

1. Where Ms R's affidavit was accepted without challenge and the practitioner said there was no other evidence he wished to elicit from Ms R, we see no error in the original tribunal finding the practitioner knew his statement in his email of 22 May 2018 to the Council that he wanted to tender the affidavit of Ms R and put her in the box but Judge Neville refused was false. It is not a matter of interpretation or degree: the practitioner's statements to the Council about what occurred were completely inconsistent with what occurred. That the practitioner said he wished to "run through" Ms R's affidavit is a comment about what he wished to do with evidence that was already accepted, not a comment about evidence he wished to lead but was unable to do so. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 11 related to the practitioner's statement in his second email of 22 May 2018, sent at 5.40pm, that "The affidavit did not summarise the facts. It just attached the decision of the Tribunal".[217] The statement is a reference to the practitioner's affidavit made on 6 March 2017 and filed in the Federal Circuit Court. The charge alleged that the affidavit stated factual matters in paragraphs 1 to 7[218] and that at the time the practitioner made the statement to the Council in his email he knew it to be false or was recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity.[219]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said the contention that his response to the Council was driven by an intention to mislead "is not sustainable ... The alternative conclusion is that the Respondent was being reactive and careless."[220] In his submissions on penalty, he admitted "the affidavit ... did summarise facts but the denial was driven by carelessness of the Respondent to give a considered response which was objectively untrue but not purposely untrue".[221]
3. The original tribunal noted at paragraph 198 of its reasons for decision that it agreed with the Council's submissions that the practitioner made the statement knowing it to be false. The original tribunal noted that the practitioner had admitted under cross-examination that he knew the statement was untrue when he made it. The original tribunal found the charge that the practitioner breached rules 43.1 and 43.2 of the Conduct Rules and failed in his duty to inform and assist the Council's inquiry proved.[222]
4. On appeal, the practitioner sought to retract admissions made to the original tribunal with respect to this charge. However, he did not make any specific submissions that relate to the charge in his written submissions save for a global assertion that he has "no case to answer".
5. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to charge 11 in the original proceedings was properly made. One only has to look at the practitioner's affidavit to see that it states factual matters about events leading to the application to the Federal Circuit Court.[223] We also note the facts stated caused the Court to express its concern "that because of the matters he set out [in his affidavit] the practitioner risked becoming a witness in his client's case."[224]
6. We see no error in the original tribunal relying on the admission together with the evidence before it to find the practitioner knew his statement in his email of 22 May 2018 to the Council that "the affidavit did not summarise the facts" when it clearly did, was false or was made recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 12 related to the practitioner's statement in his second email of 22 May 2018, sent at 5.40pm, that "there was no affidavit of [Ms R] tended to the Court as the Court refused to allow such attender". (sic)[225]
2. As dealt with above, at the Federal Circuit Court hearing on 19 July 2017 Judge Neville told the practitioner he had read the affidavit. His Honour did not refuse the tender of Ms R's affidavit.[226] Charge 12 alleged that at the time the practitioner made the statement in his email of 22 May 2018 he knew it to be false or was recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity.[227]
3. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said the contention that his response to the Council was driven by an intention to mislead "is not sustainable .... The alternative conclusion is that the Respondent was being reactive and careless."[228] In his submissions on penalty, the practitioner said his response was "careless, ill-considered and reactive but not purposely untrue but misconceived".[229]
4. The original tribunal rejected the practitioner's submission that the statement was careless.[230] The original tribunal found the charge that the practitioner failed in his duty to inform and assist the Council's inquiry proved.[231]
5. On appeal, again the practitioner sought to retract admissions made to the original tribunal with respect to this charge. However, he did not make any specific submissions that relate to the charge 12 other than to say the statement was made carelessly and was ill-considered.
6. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to charge 12 in the original proceedings was properly made. In making a statement to the Council in response to a disciplinary investigation that was unarguably false, having regard to the transcript of the Federal Circuit Court proceedings on 19 July 2017, the practitioner was at the very least recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of what he said in his email to the Council.
7. We see no error in the original tribunal relying on the admission, together with the evidence before it, to find the practitioner knew his statement in his email to the Council that "there was no affidavit of [Ms R] tended to the Court as the Court refused to allow such attender" was false or was made recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 13 related to the practitioner's statement in his email of 22 May 2018 sent at 5:40pm that he "wasn't paid" for the legal services provided to Ms O.[232] Where the practitioner had issued an invoice for $6,115 on 6 March 2017 and the invoice was paid in full on 7 March 2017, the charge was that the practitioner made the statement in his email knowing it was false or with recklessly indifference to its truth or falsity.[233]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said the contention that his response to the Council was driven by an intention to mislead "is not sustainable .... The alternative conclusion is that the Respondent was being reactive and careless."[234] In his submissions on penalty, the practitioner admitted his statement was "incorrect and is overall reflective of his defensive and reactive personality and although not intended to mislead the Applicant's solicitors was careless".[235]
3. The original tribunal rejected the practitioner's submission that his statement he "wasn't paid" was careless.[236] The original tribunal found the charge that the practitioner failed in his duty to inform and assist the Council's inquiry proved.[237]
4. On appeal, the practitioner sought to retract admissions made with respect to this charge to the original tribunal. However, he did not make any specific submissions that relate to the charge 13.
5. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to charge 13 in the original proceedings was properly made. We first note the practitioner's statement that he "wasn't paid" was unarguably false, evidenced by his tax invoice dated 6 March 2017 sent to Ms R for $6,115[238] and the NetBank records confirming Ms R's payment of the practitioner's invoice to the account stated on the invoice.[239] In circumstances where the original tribunal could reasonably presume that the practitioner knew he had been paid, when saying he wasn't, or at the least should have checked before making his statement, we see no error in the original tribunal relying on the admission together with the evidence before it to find the practitioner knew his statement in his email of 22 May 2018 to the Council that he "wasn't paid" was false or was made with recklessly indifference to its truth or falsity. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 14 related to the practitioner's failure to deposit trust money in a trust account, namely the sum of $6,115 received from Ms R on 7 March 2017.[240]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said (with breathtaking understatement) in his submissions on penalty that his failure "to maintain adequate, even minimal records concerning the amount of work he had done since the receipt of instructions in this matter undermines the Respondent's credibility". He contended however there was no evidence that the tax invoice had been raised in contemplation of future work, but rather related solely to work done to date.[241]
3. The original tribunal rejected the practitioner's submission that the invoice was for work done.[242] The original tribunal found the charge that the practitioner breached section 22(1) of the LP Act proved.[243]
4. On appeal, the practitioner said there was no basis for the original tribunal to reject his submission that the invoice was for work done.[244] He said "the ACAT simply has no evidence for its assertion that the payment was for future services".[245] The submission is simply not true. We refer to the evidence on which the original tribunal relied at paragraph 150 of its reasons for decision. To that we would add the single descriptor of the work that was the subject of the invoice: "Representation of [Ms O] in the Federal Circuit Court". There is no mention in the invoice of any research work (much less "30 to 40 hours of research") and the practitioner's "representation of Ms O in the Federal Circuit Court" did not occur until 19 July 2017 - more than four months after the tax invoice was paid.
5. In his first written submission the practitioner said "in the case of the Applicant, the Applicant does not have a trust account. The Applicant did not charge for work which had not already been done. Rather the Applicant only charged for work which had already been done".[246] The practitioner further said that in any event he is not subject to "the Code of Conduct", and so cannot be found in breach of the Code.[247] These submissions were inherently implausible, noting no evidence was led regarding any tax invoice for his work done when representing Ms O on 19 July 2017.
6. We saw no error in the original tribunal's findings on the evidence before it to reject the practitioner's submission that the invoice was for work done and as such was not trust money that needed to be deposited in a trust account. We saw no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 15 related to the practitioner's misappropriation of trust moneys by depositing the sum of $6,115 received from Ms R on 7 March 2017 in his office account. The charge alleged he did so either dishonestly with the knowledge that it was received on account of legal services in advance of work done and should have been deposited in a trust account, and/or regardless of any mistaken belief at the time, he consciously intended to deposit the money in his office account.[248]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner said that "the explanation of the Respondent to the effect that he was billing for work already done obviates the necessity for the funds to be treated as trust monies.[249]
3. The original tribunal rejected the practitioner's submission that the invoice was for work done.[250] The original tribunal was satisfied that when the moneys were received, the practitioner had done "some work for which he was entitled to receive payment" but that ordinary people would regard his conduct in taking the benefit of a substantial sum of money for work not yet done as dishonest. The original tribunal found the charge of misappropriating trust moneys proved.[251]
4. On appeal, the practitioner said there was no basis for the original tribunal to reject his submission that the money was for work done.[252] He said the original tribunal cannot simply say it did not believe his evidence. He said as a consequence "the ACT acted unlawfully in this regard because there was no evidence for such a conclusion".[253]
5. For the same reasons that we see no error in the original tribunal's characterisation of Ms R's payment on 7 March 2017 as trust money, we see no error in the original tribunal's finding on the evidence before to reject the practitioner's evidence that the invoice was for work done and, as such, his actions in having the benefit of those moneys in advance of doing the work amounted to misappropriation of trust moneys. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 16 related to the practitioner's failure to disclose to Ms R the cost disclosure requirements set out in section 269 of the LP Act.[254]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted the charge, saying that his "failure to adhere to the fundamentals and expectations as to the conduct of a practitioner constitute[d] a serious traversal of his statutory obligations" under the LP Act.[255]
3. The original tribunal agreed with that characterisation of the practitioner's conduct and found the charge proved.[256]
4. Nothing in the applicant's various submissions on his grounds of appeal suggests he resiled from the admission made before the original tribunal.
5. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to the charge in the original proceedings was properly made. We see no error in the original tribunal relying on that admission together with the evidence before it to find the practitioner knowingly failed to disclose to Ms R the cost disclosure requirements. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 17 related to the practitioner's failure to repay the sum of $6,115.00 to Ms R or Ms O within 14 days, as ordered by Judge Neville in the Federal Circuit Court on 7 September 2017.[257]
2. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted the charge in his submissions on penalty, saying that his "failure to comply with the Court's order was driven, he said, by his lack of funds".[258]
3. The original tribunal noted the assertion of financial need was made without evidence. It accepted the Council's submission that, given the practitioner had no entitlement to retain the money, his failure to explain his conduct suggested the breach was wilful. It found the charge proved.[259]
4. On appeal, the practitioner said (incredibly) that because "the decision of the [Federal Circuit] Court was unlawful, the Applicant was and is under no obligation to repay the money".[260] He made the same assertion in his application for appeal, but said the money was nevertheless repaid to Ms R.[261] We were not taken to any evidence in support of the claimed repayment and note Ms R's affidavit filed in the original proceeding, paragraph 14, in which she affirmed that as at 16 December 2020 the practitioner had not refunded the money[262] in breach of the Court order requiring the repayment by 21 September 2017.
5. In our view, the practitioner's admission of guilt to the charge in the original proceedings was properly made. We see no error in the original tribunal relying on that admission to find the practitioner failed to repay the sum of $6,115 to Ms R or Ms O within 14 days as ordered by Judge Neville. We see no error in the original tribunal finding the charge proved.

1. Charge 18 concerned the practitioner's failure to deliver legal services competently and diligently in circumstances where he filed an application on behalf of Ms O where he knew or should have known that the application had no reasonable prospects of success.[263] Before the original tribunal in his submissions on penalty, the practitioner admitted he did not have a reasonable basis for making the application because he sought orders that the Federal Circuit Court did not have power to make.[264] By reason of the concession, the original tribunal found the charge proved.
2. On appeal, the practitioner said "the application was a competent application"[265] but did not explain why. We note the Court's decision to the contrary.[266]
3. Having regard to the Federal Circuit Court's decision, we find no error in the original tribunal accepting the practitioner's concession and finding charge 18 proved.

1. Charge 19 arose from the practitioner's correspondence to the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Court in which he made allegations of serious improper conduct against a judge of the Court without particularising, justifying or substantiating the allegations.
2. The original tribunal referred to a decision of the NSW Court of Appeal, Griffin v The Council of the Law Society of NSW[267] (Griffith) in which the Court of Appeal described the accusations of bad faith and dishonesty made in a letter from a solicitor to a judge without a "shred of evidence advanced in the letter" as "clearly inconsistent with the minimum degree of trust and civility between legal practitioners and the judiciary that is essential to the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial system".[268]
3. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner (through his counsel) acknowledged that none of the grounds advanced in his letter for making the accusations he did against the judge provided "an objectively reasonable basis for the accusations" and acknowledged that the practitioner's "breach of the rules of propriety driven by the [practitioner's] reactive and offensive personality was impermissibly offensive and discourteous",[269] but on appeal the practitioner would have none of that. His scandalous and unsubstantiated allegations of serious improper conduct against the judge continued at full throttle with claims such as "[the judge's] riding instructions are to dismiss migration cases irrespective of the merits involved"[270] without a shred of evidence in support.
4. With seeming disregard for the observations of the NSW Court of Appeal in Griffin, quoted by the original tribunal in its reasons for decision about the importance of material to justify allegations of improper behaviour, the practitioner submitted:

Further, the fact that a claim is described as being unsubstantiated, does not of itself operate top preclude the [practitioner] form (complaining to the Chief Judge. Tyger are no other avenues of complaint accept the lodge gnoff a complaint with the Chief Judge. (sic)

The complaints which were made to the Chief Judge were substantiated. The [practitioner] does not have to prove his case in order to lodge a complaint. Even if the claims were not substantiated, this does not operate to in some way preclude a person from lodging a complaint. The making of a complaint is not in some way dependent on the claims being substantiated. If this was the case, then no one would ever be able to make a complaint because the person concerned would openly display their bias or for that matter act inappropriately.[271]

1. In his oral submissions in response to charge 19, the practitioner continued to display his dogmatic and misguided belief that he has done nothing wrong, with statements such as -

I do have a reasonable basis for making all the allegations that were contained in the letter to the Chief Judge. And really, irrespective of whether I do have a basis for that, I have every right to write a letter to the Chief Judge.

There's no prohibition on me writing to the Chief Judge. Especially when I have legitimate concerns about the conduct of a number of judges in the Federal Circuit Court. So, the fact that I've written a letter I should not be attacked or vilified because I dare to complain about the conduct of judges in the Federal Circuit Court and especially in those circumstances where [the judge] is a bully and [the judge] intimidates solicitors.[272]

1. The charge did not imply some form of constraint on freedom of communication. Rather, it goes to what is required of legal practitioners in the course of particular types of communications with judicial officers. Relevant to the charge, nothing was advanced by way of material (such as transcript references) in support of the scandalous allegations made in the letter. We find no error in the original tribunal finding charge 19 proved. We agree with its comment that charge 19 alone, and the practitioner's lack of insight into the seriousness of what he wrote, confirmed on appeal, "shows that [the practitioner] is not a fit and proper person to practise law."[273]

1. In proceeding OR14, the Council laid 3 charges against the practitioner arising from his conduct in two matters in the Federal Circuit Court: the CFMMEU v Precision Painting Contractors Pty Ltd[274] (CFMMEU) proceeding and the Singh proceeding. The original tribunal found the charges proved.
2. As to charge 1 arising from the CFMMEU proceeding, the practitioner acted for respondents in a Federal Circuit Court matter brought under the Fair Work Act 2009. On 17 July 2017 the Court ordered the respondents to file, inter alia, a defence. The practitioner failed to do so. On 26 September 2017 the Court again ordered the respondents to file a defence, and noted the respondents were at risk of default judgment if a defence was not filed.
3. The practitioner filed a defence on 3 October 2017 which asserted "the Court does not have legal authority to order the respondents to file a defence"; "the Court has acted ultra vires" and "the respondent is not bound by any statements made in the defence. The defence is irrelevant". The defence did not plead to any of the substantial allegations in the application. The practitioner was plainly convinced a defence was not needed, in spite of the Court ordering him to file one.
4. On the applicant's motion, the Court struck out the defence, entered default judgment for the applicant and ordered the practitioner personally to pay the applicant's costs. His Honour Judge Neville attributed the practitioner's conduct to "lack of knowledge (or refusal to accept) of basic legal principle".[275] The Court provided the Council with a copy of Judge Neville's order and judgment.[276] On 18 June 2018, by reference to his Honour's order and his comments about the practitioner's conduct, the Council raised a complaint against the practitioner the substance of which became the subject of charge 1.
5. As to charges 2 and 3 arising from the Singh proceeding, on 15 September 2015 the practitioner and Mr Singh attended a hearing in the Migration Review Tribunal (the MRT) for review of a decision not to grant Mr Singh a visa. The practitioner admitted that on the previous day, 14 September 2015, Mr Singh's (then) authorised agent (who we will refer to as Mr H) informed the MRT that he would not be appearing on behalf Mr Singh.[277] The record of hearing records that the practitioner was to complete a Notice of Appointment as Mr Singh's agent. He failed to do so. That failure became the subject of charge 2.
6. On 23 September 2015 the MRT affirmed the decision not to grant Mr Singh a visa. The practitioner admitted that Mr Singh's then authorised agent, Mr H, was notified of the MRT's decision.[278] As a consequence of the practitioner's failure to file a Notice of Appointment, the practitioner was not notified of the Tribunal's decision at that time. On 27 March 2017, the AAT forwarded a copy of the MRT's decision to the practitioner at the practitioner's request.
7. On 28 March 2017 (some 18 months after the MRT's decision) the practitioner filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court for review of the MRT's decision and for an extension of time to make it. He affirmed and filed an affidavit in support. In outlining the procedural history of the matter in his affidavit, the practitioner failed to state the whole truth about the circumstances of the delay, in particular his failure to file a Notice of Appointment (so that he could have been notified of the decision) where that failure was well known to him.
8. The matter came before his Honour Judge Neville on 1 September 2017 where Mr Singh was represented by the practitioner's colleague. On 18 May 2018 his Honour refused the extension of time application and raised the issue as to whether the practitioner's affidavit "could (and likely would) constitute misleading the Court".[279] The Court provided a copy of his Honour's order and judgment to the Council. On 18 June 2018, the Council raised a complaint against the practitioner referenced to his Honour's order and judgment. These circumstances became the subject of charge 3.
9. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted all the facts underpinning charge 1.[280] The practitioner also admitted that the defence contained "improper assertions including that the Court had no legal authority to order the filing of a defence and that the defence was irrelevant".[281] The practitioner pleaded in mitigation that in preparing the defence he "prioritised pursuing his personal idiosyncratic notion that a defence was not warranted over advancing and protecting his client's interests".[282] The original tribunal found charge 1 proved.[283]
10. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted[284] failing to file a notice of appointment as he was ordered to do. The original tribunal therefore found charge 2 proved.[285]
11. Before the original tribunal, the practitioner admitted[286] that his failure to complete the notice of appointment as Mr Singh's agent had the consequence that Mr Singh's former agent was notified of the tribunal's decision but not the practitioner and that, as a result of the practitioner's failure, there was a delay in Mr Singh becoming aware of the MRT's decision and a consequential delay in Mr Singh filing his application for review of the decision. The practitioner also admitted that, as a consequence, Mr Singh's application for an extension of time was declined.[287]
12. The practitioner also admitted that he stated in his affidavit that the MRT notified Mr Singh of its decision on 27 March 2017 "without taking steps, or any reasonable steps, to ascertain whether Mr Singh's former agent had been notified of the decision prior to 27 March 2017."[288]
13. The original tribunal found the practitioner, in his affidavit, breached rule 19.1 of the Conduct Rules ("a solicitor must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court") and his common law duty of honesty and candour by suggesting fault for the 18 months delay lay with the MRT and by not revealing his failure to file a notice of appointment, and so found charge 3 proved.[289]
14. On appeal, the practitioner repeated his submission that the Council's failure to cross examine him meant all the charges in OR14 should have been dismissed because the fairness requirements of section 7 of the ACAT Act, Li and the rule in Browne v Dunn were not met. We have explained above why we reject that submission.
15. The practitioner also contended that as OR14 did not form a basis for the Council's decision to cancel his practising certificate in June 2018, the charges should not have been brought before the original tribunal as the ACAT had no jurisdiction to deal with them.[290] We have explained above why we also reject that submission.
16. The practitioner also contended the original tribunal erred in not accepting the 'correct' factual situation when it considered each of the charges.
17. As to charge 1, notwithstanding the submissions on his behalf in mitigation, the practitioner maintained his position that in the Federal Circuit Court "there is no such thing as a Defence" and (seemingly in the alternative) "the applicant mistakenly thought that this meant that a Response was to be lodged and not a Defence", given "the concept of a Response is quite alien to the applicant".[291] As to the content of the Defence he filed, the practitioner said -

The Law Society appears to be concerned about the contents of the Defence as opposed to the Defence being lodged late. The fact that the Applicant challenged the legal authority of the Court to order a Defence is a totally legitimate thing to do.[292]

1. As to charge 2, the practitioner contended he was "under no legal obligation to file a Notice of Appointment". The practitioner said "he does not recall being asked by the Tribunal [the AAT] to file a Notice of Appointment".[293] This is despite of him admitting he failed to file a notice.
2. As to charge 3, the practitioner said that even if he had completed a Notice of Appointment he would not necessarily have been notified of the adverse decision of the MRT on 23 September 2015.[294] The practitioner said it was only when the client visited him much later to "ask what was happening with the Tribunal decision" that he rang the AAT, obtained a copy of the decision and made the review application the next day on 28 March 2017.[295] He said it "was and is a truthful statement"[296] that he told the Federal Circuit Court that "the AAT notified the Applicant of its decision on 27 of March 2017".[297]
3. The practitioner characterised the issue of the completion of a notice of appointment as "purely hypothetical" and submitted that the "hypothetical completion of a notice of appointment by him "was and is an irrelevant consideration which should not have been taken into account".[298] From there, he submitted the original tribunal's finding of guilt in relation to charge 3 was "unlawful".
4. The practitioner's submissions displayed the same troubling conduct that led to many of the charges.
5. Regarding charge 1, the content of the defence is self-explanatory as to why the practitioner (through his counsel) admitted all the facts underpinning the charge and pleaded only circumstances in mitigation.
6. Regarding charges 2 and 3, notwithstanding all that has occurred, the practitioner seems still to be convinced that he was under no obligation to provide in his affidavit the full circumstances giving rise to the delay when the likely effect of what he stated, and (more importantly) did not state, was that the Court would be misled.
7. Even now, the practitioner does not address the substance of the charge, namely that in his affidavit filed in the Federal Circuit Court for the purpose of obtaining an extension of time he stated that he and his client first became aware of the AAT's decision on 27 March 2017 but did not state that Mr H (Mr Singh's agent) was notified or that the practitioner did not complete a Notice of Appointment or that, as a consequence, the AAT was unable to advise the practitioner of the decision at the time it was made. By omitting that information, the practitioner conveyed an impression that fault for Mr Singh not been notified of the decision lay with the AAT, not him. Far from being an irrelevant consideration, the failure to inform the Court in his affidavit of his failure to lodge a notice of appointment with the AAT was a critical "consideration" underpinning the charge.
8. We find no error in the original tribunal finding each of the three charges in OR14 proved.

1. In proceeding OR15, the Council laid 3 charges against the practitioner arising from his conduct in two separate migration matters.
2. In the first matter (before the AAT), on 1 September 2016 the practitioner appeared (remotely) before Member Short on behalf of an applicant (his client) seeking review of a decision to refuse a protection visa. Arising from his conduct before Member Short, the practitioner was charged that he repeatedly interrupted the Member, was discourteous to the Member, directed his client not to answer the Member's questions and left the hearing before its conclusion (charge 1).
3. In the second matter, the BNJ17 proceeding (before the Federal Circuit Court), on 27 April 2018 the practitioner appeared (in person) before Judge McNab on behalf of an applicant (his client) seeking review of a decision to refuse a protection visa. Arising from his conduct, the practitioner was charged that he certified the matter had reasonable prospects of success knowing it did not (charge 2), and that he breached rules 19.1 and 19.2 of the Conduct Rules and his common law duty of honesty by knowingly filing an application that contained false information or with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of its contents (charge 3).
4. In response to charge 1, in the proceeding before the original tribunal, the practitioner stated:

The Respondent's conduct and in particular his comments to the Member was grossly discourteous and without a proper basis. As such, the Respondent did not act in the best interests of the client and failed to deliver legal services competently and diligently.[299]

1. In response to charge 2, the practitioner stated:

The failure to conduct the proceedings in a manner reflecting a satisfactory degree of competence is a clear breach of rules 4.1.1 and 4.1.3.[300]

1. In response to charge 3, in the proceeding before the original tribunal, the practitioner stated:

This breach is admitted and arises due to the Respondent's failure to document his instructions and to understand what his instructions were. The breach was driven by carelessness and was not a purposeful misleading of the Court nor was the conduct driven by reckless indifference to the truth.[301]

1. The original tribunal found all three charges proved.[302]
2. On appeal from these findings of guilt, the practitioner repeated his global submissions that the charges should have been dismissed because they did not form part of the decision to cancel his practising certificate in 2018; that the Council breached the rule in Browne v Dunn; that the original tribunal did not accord procedural fairness required under section 7 of the ACAT Act; and that the original tribunal proceeded in a procedurally unfair manner per the High Court's decision in Li.[303] We reject those submissions for the reasons given.
3. The practitioner also alleged that the charges should have been dismissed, notwithstanding his acceptance of guilt before the original tribunal.
4. As to charge 1, the practitioner contended his legal services were delivered "competently";[304] that "any practitioner in these circumstances would have done the same thing";[305] and that "the Law Society knows full well that [he] has done nothing wrong here".[306] The practitioner said the client gave him specific instructions to seek the recusal of Member Short. He said he sought two adjournments to seek clarification of those instructions which were confirmed each time. He described his conduct before the AAT as "competent",[307] and that all the grounds he put for recusal were relevant.
5. The practitioner contended it was the conduct of Member Short that brought the profession into disrepute, not his,[308] and that the member "is a disgrace".[309] In response to charge 1, the practitioner described himself as "a fit and proper person."[310]
6. The practitioner wrote a lengthy submission as to why the decision of the AAT to dismiss his client's application for review of the decision to refuse the protection visa "was unlawful".[311]
7. As to charge 2, the practitioner wrote a lengthy submission as to why the Federal Circuit Court "was wrong"[312] to find his client's application to the Court for review of the AAT's decision had no prospects of success and why the Court "acted unlawfully"[313] when it ordered the practitioner personally to pay costs. The practitioner submitted -

The imposition of a personal costs order on me by Judge McNab is an act of bullying and intimidation. It is a breach of the Fair Work Act.[314]

1. In relation to charge 2, the practitioner submitted -

It is the conduct of the Court in this matter which is likely to prejudice confidence in the administration of justice.[315]

1. The submission was not particularised, justified or substantiated.
2. As to charge 3, the practitioner stated he was being "completely honest" to the Court" [316] and that the original tribunal should have dismissed the charge.
3. The practitioner's submissions display the same extraordinary lack of insight into his conduct that pervades the whole appeal.
4. In relation to charge 1 regarding the conduct of the practitioner before Member Short, the original tribunal quotes some of the exchange between the practitioner and the Member.[317] It is bewildering to think the practitioner could read the exchange quoted in the original tribunal's decision and then contend that his legal services were delivered "competently" and that "any legal practitioner ... would have done the same thing". The transcript makes plain that the original tribunal was correct to find the practitioner was grossly disrespectful to Member Short and that the practitioner lacked an understanding of "basic ethical rules governing practices as an advocate before a court tor tribunal".[318]
5. We see no error in the original tribunal accepting the practitioner's admission (through his counsel) that his conduct before Member Short "was grossly discourteous and without a proper basis",[319] and finding the charge proved.
6. The practitioner's additional submission in response to charge 1 was that the Law Society knew "full well" he had "done nothing wrong" and was "engaging in an abuse of process, and further, it was acting for an improper purpose".[320] Such as submission, without evidence and without articulating the alleged improper purpose, was scandalous.
7. In relation to charge 2, the original tribunal agreed with the practitioner's concession in his closing submissions that he failed to conduct the proceeding in a manner reflecting a satisfactory degree of competence, in breach of rules 4.1.1 and 4.1.3. It therefore found the charges proved.[321] Material to the Court's finding and the practitioner's concession (through his counsel) was the practitioner's untrue representation that a registered migration agent had been involved and the absence of any evidence in support of the application to the Court.[322] In such circumstances, it is not appropriate for us to engage in debate, on appeal, about the Federal Circuit Court's finding that the application before it had no reasonable prospects of success. We were not persuaded that the original tribunal erred in finding charge 2 proved in circumstances where the practitioner accepted that his conduct was "a clear breach" of rules 4.1.1 and 4.1.3 of the Conduct Rules.
8. Charge 3 arose from the practitioner, on 10 April 2017, filing in the Federal Circuit Court an application for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a decision of the AAT alleging fault on the part of a migration agent who "kept the applicant in [the] dark"[323] about her option to apply for reinstatement of her application to the AAT and caused her to lose her opportunity to appear before the AAT.
9. The application for judicial review prompted the Minister's representative to point out to the practitioner that the AAT file contained no indication that a migration agent had been involved at any time prior to the AAT making its decision.[324] This prompted the practitioner to file an amended application substituting "migration agent" with "a friend", and again certifying he had reasonable grounds for believing the application had reasonable prospect of success.
10. Having regard to the practitioner's submissions before the original tribunal, the question arising in relation to charge 3 was whether the practitioner's statements in the application to the Federal Circuit Court about the role of a migration agent, later changed to "a friend", were made with reckless indifference to the truth. The original tribunal concluded that whatever else may have occurred, the practitioner did not make "even the most basic inquiries to confirm that there was a proper basis to make the allegations [that he did] about the migration agent's involvement."[325] On that basis, the original tribunal found the practitioner made the statements with reckless indifference as to their truth and, in so doing, breached rules 19.1 and 19.2 of the Conduct Rules and his common law duty of honesty and candour to the Court by recklessly misleading the Court and failing to correct the misleading statements as soon as possible.[326]
11. Once the substance of charge 3 is understood, the practitioner's submission on appeal that he was "completely honest" with the Court is disingenuous. Just the fact that he filed an amended application, substituting "migration agent" with "a friend", and the Court's exchange with the practitioner[327] demonstrates that he was not "completely honest".
12. His earlier submission on appeal that his substitution of 'a migration agent' with 'a friend' "does not mean that [he] was in some way misleading the Court" and that "the title of the person" had no bearing on the outcome and was "an irrelevant consideration" is equally disingenuous. As Judge McNab pointed out, which the practitioner accepted when it was pointed out,[328] an error by a paid representative is "a different species of error to a layperson attempting to help someone and messing it up ... that is a different species of error and is treated differently by courts".[329] Judge McNab explained the seriousness of the error, and why he therefore made a cost order against the practitioner, personally, in his ex tempore reasons for judgement that were subsequently published.[330]
13. But for the Minister's representative pointing out to the Court that a migration agent had never been involved, and the practitioner then filing an amended application to remove the claim, the Court would have been seriously misled. Far from being an "irrelevant consideration", the claim that a migration agent (rather than a friend) had failed the applicant regarding proceedings in the AAT was an important consideration when assessing the alleged error.
14. We see no error in the original tribunal finding charge 3 proved by reference to the practitioner's reckless indifference as to the truth of that claim.

Ground 5: "the Appeals ACAT has no jurisdiction to hear this matter"

1. Ground 5 built upon the practitioner's submission that the decision of the Council to cancel his practising certificate was unlawful and that the lawfulness of the cancellation was a jurisdictional precondition to the original tribunal hearing and determining the disciplinary charges.
2. The submission was as follows:

The failure of the Law Council and the original ACAT to determine their own jurisdiction was and is a jurisdictional error. The decisions of the Law Council and the ACAT are void ab initio.

Because the original ACAT did not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the appeals ACAT (sic) also does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter.[331]

1. The practitioner's submission repeated his contention that the LP Act does not regulate the conduct of a practitioner in a federal court.
2. Where we are satisfied that the LP Act regulated the practitioner's conduct as charged, it follows the original tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges. We were also satisfied that we, as the Appeal Tribunal, had jurisdiction to hear the practitioner's appeal. Ground 5 fails.

Ground 6: "the ACT Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear this matter"

1. As we understood it, ground 6 built upon the practitioner's earlier submissions that the LP Act did not apply to him; that the decision to cancel his practising certificate was void ab initio; that the Council acted unlawfully when filing its applications for disciplinary action; that the original tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the applications; and that we, as the Appeal Tribunal, therefore had no jurisdiction to hear his appeal. For the purposes of ground 6, the submission seemed to be that, by extension, the Supreme Court "has no jurisdiction to hear this matter".
2. It was, in our view, somewhat ambitious to submit that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear an application concerning the conduct of a practitioner of the Court. Also, we have no role or jurisdiction to determine such a claim: it is for the Court to decide what is and is not within its jurisdiction.
3. In any event, where we reject the layered propositions underlying the practitioner's claim, ground 6 fails.

1. The parties before the original tribunal agreed it was appropriate to characterise the practitioner's conduct globally rather than separately in respect of each charge or each discipline application.[332] We agree with that approach.
2. Given most of the charges found proved were extremely serious, we agree with the original tribunal's conclusion that the practitioner's conduct should be regarded as professional misconduct.
3. The practitioner's conduct had many of the hallmarks of the zealous advocate, but without regard to his overriding duty of honesty and candour to a court or tribunal. He voiced this in the appeal proceeding before us, making statements such as "justice ... has a much wider connotation than simply acting lawfully."[333]
4. It is apparent from his conduct before courts and tribunals that the practitioner's approach has ramifications that are gravely negative. His mode of practice flies in the face of his overriding duty of honesty and candour to the courts and tribunals in which he appeared.
5. Not only was this a theme running through many of the charges, it continued to be much on view in the proceedings before the original tribunal and in the appeal proceeding before us. It was extraordinary to observe the practitioner make statements that were misleading or untruthful in an appeal against findings of guilt arising from his misleading or untruthful conduct. His whole approach was to manipulate or misrepresent facts and the law in the interests of trying to obtain a forensic advantage. We have given many examples but give another that occurred in the course of the appeal.
6. Section 410 of the LP Act provides that after finishing an investigation of a complaint against a person, the Council must (i) dismiss the complaint, (ii) take action under section 413 involving summary conclusion of the complaint or (iii) make an application to the Tribunal.
7. Section 415 of the LP Act provides that the complainant and the person about whom the complaint is made are entitled to receive a statement of reasons from the Council if it decides to dismiss the complaint or to make an application to the Tribunal. In this case, arising from the complaints received, the Council decided to make four applications to the Tribunal.
8. On day 2 of the appeal hearing, the practitioner said:

I have not been provided with a statement of reasons and it would appear for the purpose of section 415 that in the circumstances where the matter is going before the original ACAT that the Law Council has got to provide me with a statement of reasons.[334]

1. On the following day, the practitioner was shown a letter dated 1 July 2020 from the Council's solicitor addressed to the practitioner's solicitor which began:

... at its December 2019 meeting, the Council resolved to file four applications for disciplinary action in the [Tribunal] against your client. Pursuant to section 415 of the Act, we enclose four Statements of Reasons for the decisions.[335]

1. Four lengthy Statement of Reasons each dated 17 June 2020, each headed "Statement of Reasons provided pursuant to section 415(b) of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) for the decision of the Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory made on 9 December 2019", were attached to the letter. This exchange then took place about the letter and the attached statements of reasons:

SENIOR MEMBER FOLEY: Just one other question, .... Now having looked at it, have you seen it before?

THE PRACTITIONER: Well, when the Law Council cancelled - made its decision to cancel pursuant to section 56, they said, 'We're writing to advise you that your certificate has been cancelled,' and attached to that was, I believe, this document.

THE PRACTITIONER: I have seen this document before. I believe it's the same document as the document in section 56.[336]

1. The practitioner's responses were nonsensical, given that his practising certificate was cancelled in June 2018 two years prior to the date of the letter. When this was pointed out to him,[337] we asked why he told us the previous day he had never received a statement of reasons for the purposes of section 415. The practitioner replied:

Because a statement of reasons has a particular format and that document there is not in the format of a statement of reasons.[338]

1. The exchange typified the practitioner's lack of understanding even as to what honesty and candour is, much less the importance of it. His response, at best, was to overlook the difference between stating he did not receive a statement of reasons pursuant to section 415 and a submission that the statement he received did not comply with the section. The practitioner's claims would have led us into error regarding the Council's compliance with sections 410 and 415 of the LP Act, but for the Council's correction of the fact on the following day by producing the letter and the attached statements of reasons.
2. In our view the practitioner's first instinct, when seeing an opportunity for possible forensic advantage or when placed at a potential forensic disadvantage, is to be untruthful.
3. The seriousness of the practitioner's misconduct cannot be understated. In Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the ACT,[339] the Court of Appeal said:

72.There are numerous statements which detail the role played and position occupied by a solicitor in the proper administration of justice. It is clear that the system for administration of justice relies heavily upon the integrity of the profession and the discharge of the duties falling upon members of the profession. Members must be able to command the confidence of all the participants in the administration of justice. Elements of that confidence are that the word of the member must be able to be trusted to be true and that the member will not make false statements or create misleading impressions.

73.The conduct engaged in by the appellant, justifies a finding that the appellant is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. This is so whether the conduct is measured directly against the statute or the test derived from conduct which "would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency." (Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750).[340]

1. Likewise, in Law Society of the ACT v Powrie, a Full Court of the Supreme Court said:

88.We consider the finding by the ACAT that the practitioner knowingly misled the Magistrates Court in his application for an adjournment of the proceedings before that Court to be the most serious finding (Ground 2A). In Brett v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2014] EWHC 2974 (Admin); [2015] PNLR 2, Lord Thomas CJ said, at [111]:

[M]isleading the court is regarded by the court and must be regarded by any disciplinary tribunal as one of the most serious offences that an advocate or litigator can commit. It is not simply a breach of a rule of a game, but a fundamental affront to a rule designed to safeguard the fairness and justice of proceedings. Such conduct will normally attract an exemplary and deterrent sentence. That is in part because our system for the administration of justice relies so heavily upon the integrity of the profession and the full discharge of the profession's duties and in part because the privilege of conducting litigation or appearing in court is granted on terms that the rules are observed not merely in their letter but in their spirit. Indeed, the reputation of the system of the administration of justice... and the standing of the profession depends particularly upon the discharge of the duties owed to the court.[341]

1. These authorities were cited by the Tribunal in Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner v 201920 (David Chen).[342]
2. Remarks of Chief Justice McCallum on 30 January 2023 at the opening of the 2023 Legal Term are, we think, apposite:

Next, and this should go without saying, the Court expects honesty. In a speech on the occasion of an admission ceremony last year, Justice Mossop said that the temptations to be other than scrupulously honest are so great that this point has to be made expressly and often. His Honour said:

"The operation of the legal system generally, and the court system in particular, is fundamentally dependent upon the honesty of lawyers. It is the fundamental value behind your appointment as an officer of the court. If there is nothing else you understand about being an officer of the court it is that you can be depended upon to be honest. Scrupulously honest."

Justice Mossop concluded by commending "four words" you should understand about being a lawyer, "Be honest. Don't lie".

1. The practitioner's conduct underpinning all the charges, and during the appeal, confirmed for us that he is a practitioner who cannot be trusted to tell the truth. On Day 2 of the appeal hearing, the following exchange occurred with the practitioner about his duty of honesty and candour:

SENIOR MEMBER FOLEY: ... so we talked this morning about you agreeing that you had an obligation during the course of the Law Society - the Law Council's investigations - an obligation of candour and honesty.

SENIOR MEMBER FOLEY: Was that obligation, in your mind, carry over to the disciplinary proceedings?

PRACTITIONER: I don't know. I don't think I can answer that question. I simply don't know.

SENIOR MEMBER FOLEY: You're uncertain whether you have to be candid and honest.

PRACTITIONER: Well, I don't know if that might - well from a legal point of view, it seems that the duty of candour seems to apply to your dealings with the Law Society, right? But I don't know whether it applies to proceedings in an ACAT. I'm just simply saying I'm not aware of what the legal position is about these duties of candour, right?

PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER MCCARTHY: You don't know whether a legal practitioner should be candid at the tribunal?

PRACTITIONER: Well, I think - I believe [if] I was under oath. And so therefore if I was under oath then I'm under a duty to tell the truth.[343]

1. There is something to be said for the insights of the practitioner's counsel in the proceedings before the original tribunal. He identified "the aggravating features of [the practitioner's] temperament and personality [as] lead[ing] him into error".[344] He captured those features by saying the practitioner has "a dogmatic certainty that whatever he says [is] correct".[345]
2. This was reflected in the following exchange during the appeal hearing, which seemed to be about sections 486E and 486F of the Migration Act 1958 to which Judge McNab referred in his decision, AXY17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2006 at [33] - [56]:[346]

THE PRACTITIONER: - if you take a case to court without any prospect of success, you are liable for a personal costs order. And I should say, as an aside, that provision is drafted to attack me only. It was drafted to attack me only. I know that's a big call, but I've worked in the Department for a long time - - -

PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER McCARTHY: I'm sorry, what was drafted to attack you?

THE PRACTITIONER: The Migration Act was amended to stop migration lawyers from representing refugees in the Federal Circuit Court, with a personal costs order. It's an extreme disincentive, which is relied on by the government to stop people representing refugees in the court. At the time the Minister for Immigration was most concerned about my representation of refugees in the court and made every effort to try and stop me from representing refugees in the court and introduced this law, about personal costs orders, to destroy my career.

PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER McCARTHY: You say Commonwealth legislation was amended to address you personally and no-one else.

THE PRACTITIONER: Yes. Unfortunately there are five legal practitioners in Australia who are the best migration lawyers in the country. I'm one of them and ministers, successive ministers, have been very concerned about people like me abusing the process and taking - - -

1. These comments prompted us to note the observation of Judge McNab in the BNJ17 proceeding:

27. [The practitioner] was given an opportunity to be heard in relation to the [proposed] costs orders.[347] amongst other things, he submitted that because the costs order had been made against him personally by Judge Neville on this Court sitting in Canberra, he was being subjected to workplace bullying in breach of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). He also asserted that the [Minister's] solicitor was acting in breach of codes of professional conduct (bullying) by seeking a cost order against him personally. I reject these submissions.

28. He also stated that he was a practitioner with particular expertise in the field of migration law and had been a leader in the field for about 30 years. That comment was made in response to a comment from the Court that he should consider obtaining some assistance from his professional body in relation to his approach to practising.[348]

1. The practitioner's misconduct has gone beyond that which might be remedied by retraining and supervision. The practitioner's conduct might once have been amenable to redirection in a collegiate practice structure, rather than his essentially solo method of practice, but that opportunity has long gone. There is no evidence of remorse, let alone insight, as might suggest retraining or supervision could ever work.

1. We are satisfied there is no error of fact or law made by the original tribunal in its recommendation under section 425(3) of the LP Act that the practitioner's name be removed from the roll of legal practitioners kept by the Supreme Court of the ACT. We think that recommendation is appropriate.
2. The appeal is dismissed. Pursuant to section 433, the practitioner must pay the Council's costs of the appeal unless we are satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist. We will give the parties until 24 March 2023 to explore any agreed order as to costs and, if no agreement is reached, to file written submissions regarding costs.

[1] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished)

[2] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [66] - [68]

[3] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [214] - [268]

[4] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [291] - [297]

[5] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [324] - [332]

[6] Transcript of proceedings, 28 January 2022 page 28, lines 14 - 17

[7] [2002] HCA 11

[8] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 [2020] ACAT 80

[9] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [356]

[10] Transcript of proceedings, 28 January 2022 page 28, lines 14 -17

[11] Transcript of proceedings, 28 January 2022 page 28, lines 44 - 46

[12] Transcript of proceedings, 28 January 2022 page 29, lines 4 - 39

[13] Transcript of proceedings, 28 January 2022 page 32, lines 30 - 43

[14] Transcript of proceeding, 16 February 2022, page 28, lines 20 - 23

[15] See Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2009] ACTSC 149 at [67] - [78]; B & T Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd v Construction Occupations Registrar and the Owners-Units Plan 3324 [2013] ACTSC 219 at [12]

[16] Giusida Pty Ltd v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2016] ACTSC 275 at [13]- [14]

[17] [2018] ACAT 23

[18] V v Elringtons Pty Ltd [2018] ACAT 23 at [23]

[19] Tam v Du [2019] ACAT 94 at [22] citing Giusida Pty Ltd v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2016] ACTSC 275 at [29]- [39] (per Refshauge J); Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thomson [2018] ACAT 4 at [46]- [55]

[20] Harada v Barnes and Anor [2021] ACAT 66 at [8]

[21] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [353] and [357]

[22] Practitioner's third written submission at [32]

[23] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 43, lines 25-28

[24] Practitioner's third written submission at [30]

[25] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 43, lines 34 - 39

[26] Practitioner's third written submission at [32]

[27] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 42, lines 22-27

[28] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 115, lines 35-36.

[29] Practitioner's second written submission at [8]

[30] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 114, line 45 - page 115, line 2

[31] Transcript of proceedings, 28 January 2022, page 39, line 45

[32] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 45, line 26

[33] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 45, line 34

[34] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 45, line 46 - page 46, line 3

[35] [2016] FCCA 2434

[36] [2005] HCA 44

[37] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [307] - [319]

[38] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 78, line 23

[39] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 78, lines 22-25

[40] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 77, line 13

[41] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 77, lines 31 - 32

[42] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 78, lines 22-25

[43] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 78, lines 15-20

[44] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 [2020] ACAT 80

[45] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 13, line 36 - page 14, line 12

[46] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 14, lines 14-16

[47] A copy of the letter is attached to the affidavit of Mr Robert Reis, sworn on 25 August 2020 in the original proceedings, see paragraph 8 and pages 28-36. Mr Reis' affidavit was in evidence in response to the practitioner's application for interim or other orders dated 5 August 2020 in the original proceedings. See Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 [2020] ACAT 80 at [8], fn 1

[48] Transcript of proceedings, 10 May 2022, page 19, lines 46-47

[49] Transcript of proceedings, 10 May 2022, page 19, lines 4-16

[50] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 [2020] ACAT 80 at [34] - [38]

[51] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [7]

[52] Practitioner's third written submission at [249]

[53] Practitioner's third written submission at [79] - [84]

[54] Practitioner's second written submission at [71] and [73]

[55] Practitioner's second written submission at [76], [102], [137], [233], [325] and [381]

[56] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 208, line 24

[57] [2018] FCCA 1081, Exhibit G in the original proceeding, pages 55-87

[58] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 86 line 6 - page 87, line 28

[59] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 86, line 38 - page 87, line 28

[61] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 208, line 41

[62] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 208, line 24 - page 209, line 36

[64] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 55, lines 17-21

[65] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 55, line 42 - page 56, line 2

[66] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [30]

[67] Transcript of proceedings before the original tribunal, 17 March 2021, page 198, line 30

[68] [1997] FCA 370

[70] [2013] FCAFC 8

[71] [2013] FCAFC 8 at [111] and [134]

[72] [2013] HCA 18

[73] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 56, lines 39 - 40

[74] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 57, lines 27 - 30

[75] Oneflare Pty Ltd v Chernih [2017] NSWCA 195 at [42] - [45]]

[76] Practitioner's third written submission at [344] and [338]

[77] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [211]

[78] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [211]

[79] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [212]

[80] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [213] - [215]

[81] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 270, line 19

[82] [1989] HCA 44

[83] [1989] HCA 44 at [10]

[86] Practitioner's third written submission at [233] - [243]

[87] Practitioner's second written submission at [105]

[88] Practitioner's third written submission at [242]

[90] Practitioner's third written submission at [244] - [260]

[91] Practitioner's third written submission at [244]

[92] Practitioner's third written submission at [247] - [248]

[93] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [7.2]; Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 [2020] ACAT 80 at [20], [28] and [30]-[35]

[94] Practitioner's third written submission at [268] - [272]

[95] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [8.1] - [8.5]

[96] Council's submissions on appeal dated 16 May 2022 at [8.2]

[97] Transcript of proceedings before the original tribunal, 17 March 2021, page 209, lines 14 - 32

[98] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021 and Practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraphs 16-22 of the application in OR12. Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [28] - [38]

[99] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021 and Practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraphs 16-22 of the application in OR12. Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021at [28] - [38]

[100] Respondent's admissions dated 15 March 2021, Respondent's admissions dated 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraphs 16-22 of the OR12 application. Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [28] - [38]

[101] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [72]

[102] Respondent's fourth written submission at [25] - [26]

[103] Transcript of proceeding, 14 June 2022, page 82, line 34

[105] Respondent's fourth written submission at [27]

[106] Respondent's fourth written submission [27] - [34]

[107] Practitioner's first written submission, page 7

[108] Practitioner's first written submission, page 9

[109] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished)at [49]

[110] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [49]

[111] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021, Practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021; Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [31] - [32]

[112] "the Respondent" means the practitioner in the context of the application for disciplinary action

[113] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021, Practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021, Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [33]

[114] Practitioner's first written submission at [324]

[115] Practitioner's first written submission, page 8

[116] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [357]

[117] Practitioner's first written submission, page 5

[118] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [72]- [73]

[119] Practitioner's third written submission at [495]

[120] Practitioner's third written submission at [501]

[121] Practitioner's third written submission at [503] - [504]

[122] Practitioner's third written submission at [546]

[123] Practitioner's third written submission, at [595] - [602]

[124] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [94]

[125] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [92]

[126] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [80] and [92]

[127] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [88]

[128] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [91]

[129] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [91]

[130] We used a pseudonym "J" to protect the person's anonymity

[131] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 21

[132] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [155] and [156]

[133] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [94], [97], [212] and [214]

[134] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 27, lines 23-29

[135] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 27, lines 38-39

[136] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 38, lines 12-16

[137] Transcript of proceedings, 14 June 2022, page 28, lines 16-17

[138] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [101] and [215]. The reference in [215] to the submissions filed on "31 July 2017" is a slip and should refer to submissions filed on 31 March 2017.

[139] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [78]

[140] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.5]

[141] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [101]

[142] Practitioner's second written submission at [311]; Practitioner's third written submission at [674] - [678]

[143] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [108] and [112].

[144] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [164]

[145] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [171], [174], [175] and [221]

[146] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.6]

[147] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [222]; Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.7]

[148] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [222]; Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.7]

[149] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished)at [222], Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.7]

[150] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished)at [223]

[151] Practitioner's third written submission at [729]

[152] Practitioner's second written submission at [225]

[153] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [74] - [76]

[154] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, pages 185-187

[155] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [108]

[156] Practitioner's third written submission at [730]

[157]Practitioner's second written submission at [133]

[158] Practitioner's third written submission at [529] - [531]

[159] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, pages 25 and 26

[160] Practitioner's third written submission at [530]

[161] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [84]

[162] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 115

[163] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [108]

[164] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.9]

[165] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [186]

[166] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [229]

[167] Practitioner's third written submission at [763]

[168] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 115

[169] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [133]

[170] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.11]

[171] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [187] and [230]

[172] Practitioner's third written submission at [764]

[173] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.14] and [4.15]

[174] Practitioner's third written submission at [752]

[175] Practitioner's third written submission at [755]

[176] Practitioner's third written submission at [746] - [747]

[177] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [74] - [76]

[178] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [87]

[179] Practitioner's third written submission at [752]

[180] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [88]

[181] Practitioner's third written submission at [753]

[182] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [108]

[183] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [191]. Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 201

[184] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [137 (h)(i) - (ii)]

[185] [Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [138]

[186] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [138]

[187] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.19]

[188] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [193]

[189] Practitioner's second written submission at [365] - [368]

[190] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 215

[191] See application in proceeding OR 13 at [139(b)(i)-(iii)]

[192] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.21]

[193] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [138]

[194] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.23]

[195] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [193] and [232]

[196] Practitioner's second written submission, at [365] - [368]

[197] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [141(b)]; see also Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 238

[198] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 237

[199] Application in proceeding OR 13 at paragraph 141(a). Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [94]. Exhibit B in the original proceeding, pages 247 - 248

[200] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [138]

[201] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.26]

[202] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [194] and [233]

[203] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [317] - [318]

[204] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 238

[205] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [143(e)]

[206] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [144]

[207] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [144]

[208] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.29]

[209] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.30]

[210] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [195]

[211] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [234]

[212] Practitioner's second written submission at [369] - [370]

[213] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [334]

[214] Transcript of proceeding, CAG 13,2017, 19 July 2017, page 8, line 23 - 24; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 267

[215] Transcript of proceeding, CAG 13,2017, 19 July 2017, page 8, line 36 - 40; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 267

[216] Transcript of proceeding, CAG 13,2017, 19 July 2017, page 9, line 5 - 10; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 268

[217] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [145(a)]; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 240

[218] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [145(c)]

[219] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [145(e)]

[220] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [148]

[221] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.33]

[222] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [235]

[223] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [94]; Exhibit B in the original proceeding at pages 247-248

[224] AXY v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2006 at [20]; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 42

[225] Application in proceeding OR13 at [146]; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 240

[226] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [146(b) - (c)]

[227]Application in proceeding OR13 at [147(d)]

[228] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [148]

[229] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.34]

[230] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [198]

[231] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [236]

[232] Application in proceeding OR13 at [148]; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 240

[233]Application in proceeding OR13 at [149(a) - (d)]

[234] Practitioner's amended reply to facts dated 22 April 2021 at [148]

[235] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.36]

[236] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [198]

[237] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [198] and [237]

[238] Affidavit of Ms R affirmed 16 December 2020 at [7]; Exhibit F in the original proceeding, page 5

[239] Affidavit of Ms R affirmed 16 December 2020 at [8] - [9]; Exhibit F in the original proceeding, pages 6 and 7

[240] Application in proceeding OR13 at [150]

[241] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.39]

[242] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [150]

[243] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [150] and [242]

[244] Practitioner's second written submission at [333]

[245] Practitioner's second written submission at [333] - [345]

[246] Practitioner's first written submission, page 31

[247] Practitioner's first written submission, page 31

[248] Application in proceeding OR 13 at [151(a) - (b)]

[249] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.41]

[250] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [150]

[251] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [247]

[252] Practitioner's second written submission at [333]

[253] Practitioner's first written submission, page 36

[254] See application in proceeding OR 13 at [152]

[255] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.43]

[256] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished)at [249] - [250]

[257] Application in proceeding OR13 at [153(a) - (e)]

[258] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.45]

[259] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [252] - [253]

[260] Practitioner's first written submission, page 35

[261] Practitioner's preliminary reasons for appeal, page 29

[262] Exhibit F in the original proceeding, page 3

[263] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [172] - [173] and [254] - [257]

[264] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.47]

[265] Practitioner's first written submission, page 35

[266] AXY17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [20 - 17] FCCA 2006 at [42]; Exhibit B in the original proceeding, page 29

[267] [2016] NSWCA 364; Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 at [261]

[268] [2016] NSWCA 364 at [108] and [111]

[269] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.53] - [4.54]

[270] Practitioner's third written submissions at [769]

[271] Practitioner's third written submission at [774] - [775]

[272] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 198, line 47 - page 199, line 10

[273] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [269]

[274] [2018] FCCA 1152; Exhibit F in the original proceeding, pages 1 - 54

[275] CFMMEU v Precision Painting Contractors Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 1152 at [59]; Exhibit F in the original proceeding, pages 1 - 54

[276] CFMMEU v Precision Painting Contractors Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 1152 at [22]; Exhibit F in the original proceeding, pages 1 - 54

[277] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 and 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraph 28 in application OR14.

[278] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 and 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraph 33 in application OR14

[279] Singh the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2018] FCCA 1081 at [22]; Exhibit G in the original proceeding, pages 55 - 87

[280] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 and 16 March 2021

[281] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [5.3]

[282] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [5.6]

[283] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [288] - [291]

[284] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 and 16 March 2021

[285] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [292] - [294]

[286] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 and 16 March 2021

[287] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 and 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraphs 53(d) - (e) in application OR14

[288] Practitioner's admissions dated 15 March 2021, Practitioner's admissions dated 16 March 2021, with reference to paragraph 53(f) in application OR14

[289] Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP202012 (unpublished) at [295] - [297]

[290] Practitioner's first written submission, page 11

[291] Practitioner's first written submission, page 12

[292] Practitioner's first written submission, page 14

[293] Practitioner's first written submission, page 14

[294] Practitioner's first written submission, page 15

[295] Practitioner's first written submission, page 13

[296] Practitioner's first written submission, page 15

[297] Practitioner's first written submission, page 13

[298] Practitioner's first written submission, page 17

[299] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [6.2]

[300] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [6.4]

[301] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [6.5]

[302] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [320] - [332]

[303] Practitioner's first written submission, page 16

[304] Practitioner's first written submission, page 19

[305] Practitioner's first written submission, page 19

[306] Practitioner's first written submission, page 19

[307] Practitioner's first written submission, page 19

[308] Practitioner's first written submission, page 20

[309] Practitioner's first written submission, page 22

[310] Practitioner's first written submission, page 22

[311] Practitioner's first written submission, page 23

[312] Practitioner's first written submission, page 24

[313] Practitioner's first written submission, page 25

[314] Practitioner's first written submission, page 25

[315] Practitioner's first written submission, page 25

[316] Practitioner's first written submission, page 25

[317] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [301]

[318] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [324]

[319] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [322]

[320] Practitioner's fourth written submission at [344]

[321] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [325] - [327]

[322] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [316] - [317]

[323] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [310]

[324] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [311]

[325] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [331]

[326] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [331] - [332]

[327] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [316].

[328] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [316]. Exhibit H in the original proceeding, page 35; transcript, page 14, line 19

[329] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner LP 202012 (unpublished) at [316]. Exhibit H in the original proceeding, page 35

[330] Exhibit H in the original proceeding, pages 76 - 85

[331] Practitioner's third written submission at [23] - [24]

[332] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [7.1]

[333] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 300, lines 17 - 18

[334] Transcript of proceeding 15 June 2022, page 176, lines 13 - 16

[336] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 14, lines 12 - 27

[337] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 15, lines 5 - 27

[338] Transcript of proceedings, 16 June 2022, page 15, lines 37 - 38

[339] [2018] ACTCA 19

[340] [2018] ACTCA 19 at [72] - [73]

[341] [2017] ACTSCFC 4; (2017) 12 ACTLR 184

[342] [2020] ACAT 31 at [46] - [47]

[343] Transcript of proceedings, 15 June 2022, page 194, lines 27 - 40

[344] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [4.1]

[345] Practitioner's submissions on penalty dated 23 April 2021 at [7.4]

[346] Exhibit B in the original proceeding, pages 54 - 62

[347] The proposed orders were that that the practitioner, personally, pay the Minister's costs, that any costs incurred by his client were not payable to the practitioner and that the practitioner repay any costs already paid by his client

[348] BNJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1359 at [27] - [28]; Exhibit H in the original proceeding, page 85