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2. The proceedings were anonymised pursuant to section 423A of the Legal Profession Act. After the appeal period for the tribunal decisions had ended, the Practitioner was identified in the citations of the Tribunal’s published decisions. This decision and reasons follow this approach. For convenience, and to avoid confusion given the appeal proceedings, the Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory is referred to in these reasons as the Council, and Mr Ford as the Practitioner.

3. Usually, parties to an application in the tribunal must bear their own costs, except 1 in limited circumstances. However, section 433 of the Legal Profession Act provides that the tribunal may, and in some cases must, order a practitioner to pay costs.

4. In 2021, the Practitioner was ordered to pay the costs of the Council, ‘as agreed or assessed on a party and party basis’ for each of the four related original 2 applications. On 28 July 2023, the Appeal Tribunal ordered the Practitioner to pay the Council’s costs, ‘as agreed or assessed on a party and party basis’, of an 3 unsuccessful appeal from orders made in those proceedings. The parties were unable to agree upon the amount of costs payable under the costs orders.

5. It is a function of the registrar to assess costs previously ordered by the tribunal, (see rule 71 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2024 (the ACAT Rules)). At the time of the Tribunal’s costs orders in December 2021, and the appeal Tribunal’s costs orders in July 2023, rule 71(3) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedures Rules 2020 (now repealed) (2020 Rules) was in the same terms. The registrar’s function is enlivened where the tribunal

1 See ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 s 48 2 Tribunal references OR 12, 13, 14 and 15/2020 3 Tribunal reference AA 64/2021 has made an order under section 48 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (the ACAT Act) or an authorising law for assessed costs, rather than an order that the costs be paid as a fixed amount.

6. After the Practitioner had exhausted his avenues of appeal from the disciplinary orders to the Supreme Court and to the High Court, the Council filed applications for interim or other orders in all of the proceedings, seeking orders that the Practitioner pay its costs of the appeal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings in fixed sums (the Costs Applications). Its apparent intention was to invite the registrar to assess its costs in accordance with the costs orders and to issue an order specifying the assessed costs for the costs order in the amount 4 sought by the Council.

7. In previous cases, the registrar has accepted an application for interim or other orders as a convenient tool for indicating that the parties had not reached agreement about costs, and as a means of bringing a costs issue back before the Tribunal.

8. The Practitioner objected to this approach. The Tribunal’s decision on his application to strike out the Council’s Costs Applications is Ford v Council of the Law Society [2025] ACAT 73. For reasons other than those raised by the Practitioner, the Tribunal dismissed the Costs Applications, finding they were unnecessary. The functions of the Registrar are helpfully outlined in the reasons 5 for that decision: [46] The registrar is required to assess costs in accordance with the tribunal’s orders, by operation of rule 71 of the 2024 Rules (and was previously required to do so by operation of rule 71 of the 2020 Rules). The registrar is subject to that obligation irrespective of any application made by the parties, at least, in the case of an order for costs “as agreed or assessed,” if the registrar has been informed that the parties cannot agree on costs. There is no dispute in this case that such agreement cannot be reached. [47] For that reason, the Costs Applications are not only misconceived, they are otiose.

4 A similar summary of the background is found in Ford v Council of the Law Society [2025] ACAT 73, at [1]-[2]. A more extensive background is set out from [6]-[15] 5 Ford v Council of the Law Society [2025] ACAT 73 ( Ford) at [46]-[49] (citations omitted) [48] Rule 71 provides that the procedure for assessing costs is generally to be determined by the registrar, and allows the registrar to direct the parties to provide evidence or do other things to facilitate the assessment. [49] Unless the tribunal specifies the scale or process for assessing costs, the registrar has power to determine the scale or procedure to be followed to determine the assessed costs and the costs of the assessment. The registrar may decide to conduct a hearing, to require a bill of costs to be prepared, apply a scale of costs, or require the parties to attend a dispute resolution process.

9. On 20 October 2025 the Council’s representative wrote to the registrar to ask her 6 to assess the costs of the proceedings. With the delegation of the registrar, I accepted this as a means of informing the registrar that the parties have not been able to agree upon costs, so as to enliven the registrar’s obligation to assess those costs.

10. The original Tribunal and appeal Tribunal orders were for costs as agreed or assessed on a party and party basis, rather than for a fixed amount.

11. It was open to the registrar to decide the scale and procedure to be followed in assessing those costs.

12. Consistent with rule 71 of the ACAT Rules, the matter was listed for directions on 21 October 2025 to progress the registrar’s consideration of costs. At that directions hearing, the Practitioner again raised issues with the costs assessment. Directions were made to allow written submissions on the following preliminary and substantive issues: (a) Whether the tribunal and/or the registrar have jurisdiction to deal with the assessment of costs. (b) Whether the costs assessment and the previous related application is an abuse of process. (c) Whether particular legal representatives may represent the parties to these applications, and whether this issue is relevant for the future progress of the matters.

6 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, ss 113 and 114 (d) Whether the Council's recent correspondence informing the tribunal about the parties being unable to agree on costs constitutes an application. (e) Whether the parties have reached agreement about costs. (f) Whether the costs assessment may be conducted on the papers. (g) Whether the page limit of 20 pages for submissions is sufficient. (h) Any other submissions in relation to the registrar's costs assessment.

13. Directions were also made to require the parties to provide submissions on other aspects of the costs assessment process. A generous timetable was allowed.

Council’s submissions

14. On 24 November 2025 the Council provided the tribunal with submissions in accordance with those directions, and made further submissions in reply to the Practitioner’s submissions on 20 February 2026. The Council submitted that: (a) rule 71(3) confers on the registrar the jurisdiction to assess the costs of the proceedings. The original Tribunal and appeal Tribunal orders which required the Practitioner to pay the Council’s costs have not been overturned and the Practitioner has exhausted his appeal avenues. He cannot now go behind those orders; (b) the Costs Applications were not an abuse of process, and in any event were no longer before the Tribunal. There was no evidence that the Practitioner had been prejudiced by any delay, and in fact he may have been prejudiced if the costs assessment had been sought earlier while litigation was ongoing in the Supreme Court. There was no applicable statutory time limit on seeking a costs assessment in this matter. Any delay had not undermined the finality of the proceedings; (c) there was no evidentiary basis for the Practitioner’s contention that the Council’s legal representatives were not properly instructed. None of the grounds enlivening the Tribunal’s power to stop a party’s authorised representatives from taking further part in a proceeding under rule 45(2) of the ACAT Rules had been made out. In response to the Practitioner’s submissions about the Council and the Law Society, the Council submitted that they were not separate entities and the Council was not precluded from relying on the invoices in support of its request that the registrar make an order for a particular amount of assessed costs; (d) the Council’s correspondence to the Tribunal was not an application but a means of informing the registrar that the costs assessment process should begin; (e) there was no evidence that the parties had reached agreement on costs, and 7 the appeal Tribunal’s earlier decision stated that there was no dispute that agreement could not be reached; (f) the registrar’s assessment should be conducted on the papers, consistent with the objects of the tribunal to ensure its procedures are as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice; and (g) the page limit on submissions was sufficient, particularly given the limited issues before the Tribunal, and the opportunity for lengthy objections to the Council’s costs if required.

15. The Council also made submissions that the costs assessment could be conducted without requiring the preparation of a bill of costs, and without a further oral hearing or dispute resolution process.

16. The Council also identified the amounts sought of the assessed costs of both the original disciplinary proceedings and the appeal Tribunal proceedings, and the costs of the assessment. Relevant invoices and a summary of invoices were attached, which the Council said demonstrated that these costs had been incurred.

Practitioner’s submissions

17. On 5 February 2026 the Practitioner provided the Tribunal with submissions in reply. Although not permitted by the directions of 21 October 2025, on 26 February 2026 the Practitioner also provided the Tribunal with submissions in reply to the Council’s submissions in reply. I have taken those submissions into account.

7 Ford at [46]

18. The Practitioner’s submissions may broadly be summarised as follows (re-numbered to align with the directions made on 21 October 2025): (a) The registrar had no power to assess costs because the Tribunal had not made a lawful costs order. Section 48 of the ACAT Act conferred a narrow costs power which did not extend to the costs sought in these matters, and section 434 (and, I assume the Practitioner meant to include, section 8 433(1) ) of the Legal Profession Act did not apply as these proceedings were brought under the ACAT Act and not the Legal Profession Act. (b) The Council’s delay in pursuing the costs assessment was an abuse of process. The Tribunal’s decision was delivered four years ago, and any costs assessment should have been pursued shortly after. This delay was contrary to the Tribunal’s statutory objectives. Although the Practitioner acknowledged there was no ‘codified limitation period’, he submitted that fairness required the prompt exercise of a discretionary process. (c) There is a distinction between the Law Council and the Law Society. The effect of this was that there was no right of appearance by the representatives, and any legal costs were incurred by the Law Society and not by the Council. (d) The previous Costs Applications having been dismissed, the Council’s email asking the registrar to assess costs was not a valid application and not a means of grounding the registrar’s jurisdiction to assess costs. The Council had not discharged its burden of ‘establishing a valid invoking process’. (e) No further direct submissions were made by the Practitioner about whether or not the parties had reached agreement about costs, although it was implied that he did not accept the Council’s view on this. (f) Conducting the costs assessment on the papers risked unfairness given the seriousness of the issues raised.

8 Legal Profession Act, s 433(1): If the ACAT finds an Australian legal practitioner guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the ACAT must order the practitioner to pay costs (including costs of the relevant council and the complainant), unless the ACAT is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist (g) A 20-page limit on submissions was a denial of procedural fairness, and procedural limits could not confer jurisdiction where none existed.

19. I took the following submissions from the Practitioner as objections to the Council’s costs: (a) The Council had only provided invoices, not the costs agreement which formed the basis for the charges. (b) The invoices were not proof that the costs were actually incurred. (c) The information provided is not an itemised account and does not identify the work with sufficient particularity.

Consideration

20. Having considered the parties’ written submissions made in accordance with those directions, on 28 April 2026 I made orders that the registrar’s assessment of costs was to be conducted on the papers, and reserved my decision on the assessed costs and the costs of the assessment. The orders are as follows: In relation to the Registrar's assessment of the costs ordered by the Tribunal: (a) further to the directions made on 21 October 2025; (b) having considered the submissions of the parties; (c) noting that the procedures of the Tribunal must be as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice and while observing natural justice and procedural fairness; (d) noting that the registrar may decide to conduct a hearing of an assessment of costs by any means, including on the papers; and (e) being satisfied that the Tribunal has sufficient information to make an informed decision on the assessment of costs. The Tribunal orders: 1. The registrar's assessment of costs will be conducted on the papers and decided on the basis of documents. 2. The registrar's decision on the assessed costs for the costs order, and the costs of the assessment, is reserved.

21. The reasons for conducting the costs assessment on the papers, other than those noted in the orders above, include: (a) Rule 71(6)(a) of the ACAT Rules specifically contemplates conducting the costs assessment process on the papers: (6) Without limiting the registrar’s power to assess costs, the registrar may decide to do any of the following: (a) conduct a hearing by any means, including on the papers; (b) Although not directly relevant to the costs assessment process, which is not ‘an application’, it is useful to consider the principles in section 54 of the 9 ACAT Act. That provision is a basis for the tribunal to decide an application on the basis of documents: 54 Decisions without hearing (1) The tribunal may, on application by a party or on its own initiative, decide an application on the basis of documents, without the parties, their representatives or witnesses appearing at a hearing. Note The procedures of the tribunal must be as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice and the tribunal must observe natural justice and procedural fairness (see s 7). (c) Section 54 says that the tribunal may: (i) give the parties notice of the proposal; (ii) allow for representations about the proposal; (iii) after considering any representations, satisfy itself that it is in the public interest not to hold a hearing; the tribunal has sufficient information to make an informed decision on the application; and natural justice and procedural fairness has been observed. (d) I was satisfied that each of these considerations had been met. (e) The Tribunal had already conducted three oral hearings during the cost assessment process — two directions hearings and an interlocutory hearing. (f) The remaining issues to consider, as identified in the directions made on 21 October 2025, were considerations which could both conveniently and

9 See also section 23(1) of the ACAT Act: “The tribunal may decide its own procedure at any stage in dealing with an application if no procedure is prescribed for the application under this Act or an authorising law.’’ fairly be decided on the basis of documents, rather than oral submissions or other evidence. (g) Conducting the process on the papers is consistent with the approach taken 10 in previous cost assessment matters and in the costs orders made by the original Tribunal and the appeal Tribunal.

22. My consideration of the parties’ submissions is as follows (corresponding with the issues identified in the 21 October 2025 directions and the parties’ submissions summarised above): Jurisdiction

23. The registrar, and the tribunal more broadly, have jurisdiction to deal with the assessment of costs in these proceedings. (a) The principal difficulty with the Practitioner’s submissions about the costs provisions applying to legal practitioner applications at ACAT is that the original Tribunal and the appeal Tribunal have already made orders that the Practitioner pay the Council’s costs of the proceedings. It is not the role of the registrar when assessing those costs to go behind those earlier orders or to question whether they were validly made.

(b) Had that question been open to me to consider, I would not have been persuaded by the Practitioner’s argument that these applications were made under the ACAT Act and not the Legal Profession Act. An application to the tribunal can be made under an authorising law, and only if an 11 authorising law provides that the application may be made. The occupational discipline applications against the Practitioner were taken by the tribunal to have been made under the Legal Profession Act, and the ACAT Act governed the process by which they were heard and determined. It follows that section 434 of the Legal Profession Act applies, the costs provisions of section 48 of the ACAT Act do not apply, and the Tribunal

10 See Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP 201809 (Charles Filgate Giles) [2021] ACAT 1; Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP 201920 (David Chen) [2022] ACAT 101 11 ACAT Act, s 9 may make an order that a legal practitioner pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.

(c) The related question of whether section 433(1) of the Legal Profession Act applies not only to the original proceeding but also to the appeal proceeding was considered by the appeal Tribunal (in its decision on costs of the 12 13 appeal), who agreed with an earlier decision that section 433(1) applies not only to an original proceeding but also to an appeal proceeding in the tribunal.

(d) The question of the tribunal’s jurisdiction to deal with these proceedings more broadly was raised by the Practitioner before the appeal Tribunal, who were satisfied that the original Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges, and that the appeal Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear 14 the practitioner’s appeal.

(e) Clearly, the Tribunal may order costs against a legal practitioner in proceedings brought under the Legal Profession Act, and in this case has done so.

Abuse of process

24. The primary basis for the Practitioner’s submissions that the costs assessment was an abuse of process was the delay. I acknowledge the tribunal’s objectives to deal with applications quickly. I also acknowledge that proceedings of this nature may have a significant impact on the individuals involved, and this impact lingers the longer some aspects of the proceedings remain unresolved. However, all parties acknowledged that there is no statutory limitation on enlivening the registrar’s costs assessment process after costs orders have been made in occupational discipline applications. Indeed, there is no statutory basis to exercise a discretion to decline to engage with the costs assessment process after a particular period of time. Rule 71 requires that the registrar must assess the costs if the tribunal makes

12 LP 202012 (Hugh Ford) v Council of the Law Society of the ACT (No 2) [2024] ACAT 13 at [19] 13 Legal Practitioner ‘S’ (Steven Gavagna) v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2018] ACAT 12 at [32]-[34] and [42]-[44] 14 LP 202012 (Hugh Ford) v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2024] ACAT 12 at [375]-[378] an order for assessed costs. No other basis for the costs assessment being an abuse of process was established, and I am not persuaded by the Practitioner’s submissions on this point. Legal representatives

25. I agree with the Council’s submissions that the grounds for enlivening the tribunal’s power to stop an authorised representative from taking part in a proceeding have not been made out. I also acknowledge the statutory role of the Council in proceedings for breaches of the Legal Profession Act, such as 15 occupational discipline applications to the tribunal, and the Council’s reference 16 to the comments noted in Hill v The Council of the Law Society of the ACT about the Council and the Law Society, particularly in relation to fees. I note that the original Tribunal and the appeal Tribunal accepted the participation of the representatives for the Council throughout the proceedings, and I have no reason not to do so now.

Costs application

26. The question of whether a request to enliven the registrar’s costs assessment is an ‘application’ was dealt with by the appeal Tribunal following the interlocutory 17 hearing on this issue. In its email to the registrar asking for an assessment of costs, the Council has adopted a process which follows logically from the appeal Tribunal’s decision and is consistent with rule 71 of the ACAT Rules. I have accepted this as an appropriate means of informing the registrar that the costs assessment process should begin. Agreement about costs

27. It has been evident throughout these proceedings before the registrar that the parties have not reached agreement about costs. Nothing in the parties’ submissions demonstrated otherwise. The appeal Tribunal on a previous occasion

15 Referred to in the Council’s submissions of 24 November 2025. See ss 423(1) and 577 of the Legal Profession Act 16 [2020] ACTCA 3 at [94] 17 Ford concluded that “There is no dispute in this case that such agreement [on costs] 18 cannot be reached.”

Hearing on the papers

28. See paragraph 20 above regarding conducting the costs assessment on the papers. 20-page limit

29. Each of the parties provided submissions within the 20-page limit set by the 21 October 2025 directions. They had the opportunity for submissions which were longer than those they provided, and have chosen not to do so. The submissions they did provide gave me sufficient information to make an informed decision on 19 the application, and I am satisfied that procedural fairness was not denied by imposing this limit. Invoices

30. I acknowledge the Practitioner’s objections to the invoices. However, I have taken the invoices provided by the Council as evidence of the costs incurred. I do not consider it necessary to go behind the Council’s legal representatives’ ostensible authority and require them to give the Tribunal a costs agreement. It is implied by their participation in the proceedings and the preparation of the invoices that such an agreement exists. I acknowledge the Practitioner’s request for additional detail in the invoices. The bundle of documents provided with the invoices does include significant detail, such as time ledgers, information about disbursements and the time details of professional fees and counsel fees. I also note that rule 71 of the ACAT Rules gives the registrar a broad discretion to require further particularisation or a detailed breakdown of costs (for example, by 20 requiring a bill of costs to be prepared). In previous similar costs assessments, the registrar has found it unnecessary to require a process which in itself will incur further costs, and discouraged parties from doing so unless required. I am not persuaded further detail is required to conduct this costs assessment.

18 Ford at [46] 19 ACAT Act, s 54(3)(c)(ii) 20 See Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP 201809 (Charles Filgate Giles) [2021] ACAT 1; Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v LP 201920 (David Chen) [2022] ACAT 101 Assessment of costs

31. The Council claims: (a) $137,919.68 for the costs of the original disciplinary proceedings; (b) $73,528.21 for the costs of the appeal proceedings; and (c) $4,032.64 for the costs of the assessment.

32. At the outset, I acknowledge that this is a significant amount to require an individual to pay. I am mindful of the importance of giving careful consideration to the assessment of the claimed costs.

33. In support of the amounts claimed, the Council provided invoices dating from April 2019 to June 2022, a summary of the invoices, and an explanation within the submissions as to how these figures were calculated.

34. The amounts claimed: (a) are discounted from the amounts the Council could have claimed if it claimed each of the costs to which it was entitled; (b) represent relatively low charge rates; and (c) have already been reduced by 30% when the invoices were rendered and thus represent only 70% of the legal fees charged.

35. The amount of the assessed costs was included in the Council’s submissions of 24 November 2025, together with their intention to claim the costs of the assessment and the proposal for calculating that amount.

36. The original Tribunal and appeal Tribunal costs orders allow for recovery of costs on a party and party basis. I accept that the Council has already taken this into account and discounted the invoices provided in support of their claim for assessed costs. The Council relies on the discounted figure in seeking the orders set out in their submissions provided as directed in this costs assessment. I accept that had the Council been required to prepare a bill of costs, even if no further costs had otherwise been sought, that process would have necessarily resulted in additional costs accruing which would likely have been recoverable from the Practitioner.

37. The Practitioner had an opportunity to respond to the amount claimed for assessed costs. I am not persuaded that the Practitioner’s submissions in this regard provide any basis for reducing the costs payable to the Council.

38. I reviewed each of the invoices provided by the Council and found as follows: (a) the earliest invoices date from April 2019, prior to the filing of the tribunal applications. As the Council pointed out in its submissions, in a previous costs assessment the registrar found that the Council was entitled to claim costs incurred before the commencement of a disciplinary proceeding. These were not costs of the investigation or an assessment of the complaints, but the costs of preparation for the proceedings such as drafting the application for disciplinary action. On this basis, I consider that the costs that relate to the 2019 and 2020 invoices pre-dating the lodging of the applications do form part of the costs assessment; (b) each of the invoices appear to relate to the tribunal proceedings and the appeal proceedings commenced by the Practitioner; (c) the invoices include counsel’s fees for preparation and for appearing at the tribunal hearings. Although the amounts are significant, I accept that significant preparation may have been necessary for the four related original applications and the tribunal appeal. I consider counsels’ fees including disbursements (exclusive of GST) are payable in full for the invoices; (d) disbursements include tribunal filing fees and hearing fees; transcripts; courier fees; and flights for witnesses (invoice of 23 April 2021), each of which I accept as reasonable amounts and reasonably incurred; and (e) there does not appear to be any obvious error within the invoices.

39. I considered the submissions of the parties about the amounts claimed and was satisfied that there was a proper basis for the amounts sought. I have formed the view that the invoiced amounts were reasonable amounts and were reasonably incurred.

40. On 14 May 2026, in response to a request for additional information from the registrar, the Council identified the amounts sought for the costs of the assessment.

41. On 15 May 2026 the Practitioner gave the Tribunal a document which appeared to be additional submissions. I took from these submissions that the Practitioner objected to the costs claimed for the assessment. The submissions do not appear to specifically address the particular amounts of the claimed costs, but contain general objections to the costs assessment as a whole, for example, on the basis that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to assess the costs.

42. The registrar’s decision on assessed costs was reserved on 28 April 2026. Apart from the invitation to the Council to provide information about the amount claimed for the costs of the assessment, the parties were not permitted to give the Tribunal further information. Once a hearing has concluded and the Tribunal reserved its decision, parties cannot provide additional documents, evidence or submissions about the case, unless specifically allowed or requested by the presiding member or registrar. On that basis, I did not take into account the Practitioner’s submissions of 15 May 2026.

43. Having said that, even if I had considered those submissions, I would have come to the same conclusion. The matters raised in the submissions are a repeat of, or very similar to, the issues raised in the initial submissions by the parties. My consideration of, and decision about, those issues is outlined above.

44. The Council claims $4,032.64 for the costs of the assessment. The claimed amount: (a) is supported by invoices, redacted to exclude unrelated amounts; (b) does not include any claim for disbursements; and (c) represents 70% of the costs charged.

45. Similar to the consideration of the assessed costs, I considered the parties’ positions on the amounts claimed for the costs of the assessment. I was satisfied that there was a proper basis for the amounts sought. I have formed the view that the claim for the costs of the assessment is a reasonable amount and represents charges which were reasonably incurred. The costs of the assessment are awarded in the amount of $4,032.64.

Orders The Tribunal orders that: 1. The assessed costs for the costs orders made by the tribunal and the appeal tribunal are $211,447.89. 2. The costs of the assessment are $4,032.64. 3. The total amount which the respondent is to pay the applicant is $215,480.53.

……………………………….. Deputy Legal Registrar E Steel

Date of hearing: On the papers Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr S Harper, Thomsons Respondent: Self-represented