The first respondent argued that there was no residential tenancy agreement between the parties and that the applicants purchased the property for the respondents, with the respondents to pay the deposit, mortgage, rates and insurances for the property. The first respondent told the Tribunal that the agreement entered into by the parties for only done so for the purpose of obtaining a tax or Centrelink entitlement.

Held, setting aside and substituting the decision under review:

• The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicants and respondents entered into a residential tenancy agreement;
• This means that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the applicants' application for vacant possession;
• The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondents breached the tenancy agreement when they fell into rent arrears;
• The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to make an order for vacant possession under s 87 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995.

Internal review - Residential Tenancy - Landlord application - Termination and vacant possession - Breach of agreement - Rent arrears

Internal review - Residential Tenancy - Jurisdictional matters - Existence of residential tenancy agreement

Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ss 3, 24, 64

Residential Tenancies Regulations 2010 reg 6

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 46, 70, 82, 83

Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571

Banner v Banner [2023] SACAT 99

Bruno v Bruno [2023] SACAT 78

Cohen v Cohen [1929] HCA 15; (1929) 42 CLR 91

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55

Henderson v Housing Choices South Australia Ltd [2019] SASC 121

McColl v Hearse [2016] SACAT 38

Minda Incorporated v Carman [2024] SACAT 79

Radaich v Smith [1959] HCA 45; (1959) 101 CLR 209

Re AKS [2016] SACAT 19

Street v Mountford [1985] UKHL 4; [1985] 2 All ER 289

Tronnolone v Edwards and Bryan [2016] SACAT 27

Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chillling & Freezing Co Ltd [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429

Mr Hurburgh with Ms Dry appeared for the applicants in person

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 70(6)(c)(i)

1. This is an application by Giuseppe (Joe) and Maria Lombardi (the applicants) for leave to apply for an internal review. It is also the consideration of the application for internal review of an order made by a Tribunal Member on 12 May 2025 in matter number 2025/SH003865 (the original Order).
2. The original Order was made on an application made by the applicants for vacant possession on account of non-payment of rent. Michael Lombardi and Rebecca Lombardi (the respondents) are respectively the son and former daughter-in-law of the applicants.
3. The relevant premises are at Aldinga Beach. The applicants became owners of the premises on 15 May 2017 and the respondents moved in about two weeks later. The respondents are now separated and Mr Michael Lombardi moved out of the premises in October 2024.
4. The Tribunal Member found that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter as there was no residential tenancy agreement between the applicants and the respondents.
5. The applicants were represented by counsel for the review hearing. While initially represented by solicitors, Ms Rebecca Lombardi was unrepresented at the review hearing.
6. It is fair to say that Mr Michael Lombardi took a passive role in these internal review proceedings. He did not attend the hearing. He did not file any submissions or evidence of his own, save for an email to him from the applicants dated 14 July 2025 which purports that "Michael Lombardi is not a current periodic tenant and should not be on the tenancy at all".

1. This decision respectfully adopts the following principles articulated by the Deputy President of the Tribunal in Bruno v Bruno [2023] SACAT 78 (Bruno) and Banner v Banner [2023] SACAT 99 (Banner) (all footnotes in this discussion are those cited by the Deputy President).
2. In general terms, under s 24(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (RT Act) the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with disputes arising from either a residential tenancy agreement or a rooming house agreement.[1]
3. A residential tenancy agreement is merely a special form of contract and so ordinary principles of contract law apply subject to the provisions of the RT Act.[2] Accordingly, the first question to consider is whether or not there is a binding contract between the parties - if not, there can be no residential tenancy agreement.
4. The essential elements of a binding contract are:
   • an agreement between the parties - usually this occurs through the process of offer and acceptance;[3]
   • consideration;
   • an intention to create legal relations;[4] and
   • the agreement must be sufficiently certain in relation to the essential terms of the agreement.[5]
5. The fact that the arrangement between the parties is a binding agreement/contract, does not necessarily mean that it is a residential tenancy agreement. The Tribunal may only deal with this dispute if it arises from a residential tenancy agreement.
6. The test is an objective analysis of the evidence as to the parties' intentions.[6]
7. In South Australia, the specific requirements for a residential tenancy agreement are contained in the RT Act.
8. The term "residential tenancy agreement" is defined in s 3(1) of the RT Act to mean "an agreement ... under which a person grants another person, for valuable consideration, a right ... to occupy premises for the purpose of residence".[7]
9. There are two particular requirements to be met if the agreement between the applicants and the respondents is to be properly characterised as a residential tenancy agreement: first, the respondents must have the right of exclusive occupation of the premises; second, they must have agreed to pay rent.
10. In general terms, a person who has been given the right to reside in a property by the owner, will be either a licensee or a tenant. The most significant factor in determining whether or not the occupant has been granted a mere licence to occupy, or the rights of a tenant, is the issue of exclusive possession.[8] The necessity for exclusive possession is recognised by s 64 of the RT Act.
11. The Deputy President observed in the Bruno case that, in many cases, the issue of exclusive possession would not be contentious. However, it should be specifically addressed where there is a parent/child relationship between the parties as this raises the possibility that the occupant may not have been granted exclusive occupation.[9]
12. On the subject of rent, in the matter of McColl v Hearse, his Honour Justice Parker made the following statement about the particular requirements of the RT Act in relation to the issue of rent:
    1. The concept of "valuable consideration" has been defined to mean "some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other". That definition makes clear that valuable consideration may be something other than the payment of money or a promise to pay money.
    2. At common law it was not necessary that rent be paid in money. Rent might be paid by way of services, such as ploughing the owner's land, or the provision of crops or livestock. That definition is somewhat narrower than that of "valuable consideration". Thus, for example, an act of forbearance would constitute valuable consideration but would not appear to be rent at common law.
    3. It is also necessary to consider whether the RT Act has departed from the common law meaning of rent. The term "rent" is defined in s 3(1) to consist of "(a) the amount payable under a residential tenancy agreement for the right to occupy premises for a period of the tenancy". While the definition also includes a paragraph (b), that clearly does not apply in the present situation.
    4. I consider that the meaning of "rent" has been narrowed under the RT Act from that which applied at common law. That is because the reference to "the amount payable" clearly contemplates the payment of money rather than any other form of valuable consideration. If that was not the case, paragraph 5(1)(d) would be largely, if not entirely, otiose.[10]

1. As noted earlier, the Tribunal Member found that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with the application for vacant possession.
2. He found that there was no residential tenancy agreement.
3. The Tribunal Member made the following observations about the evidence:
   1. certain text messages and invoices sent to the respondents by one or more of the applicants relating to rates and the like were invitations or requests to pay that were more consistent with a commercial agreement or family arrangement rather than a tenancy agreement as it would be a contravention of the RT Act to require a tenant to pay rates or other statutory charges (apart from water rates);
   2. other correspondence was suggestive of a loan repayment arrangement;
   3. the considerable expenditure on renovations to the property, including establishing a salon, was not consistent with a landlord/tenant relationship and was more consistent with a commercial agreement or family arrangement;
   4. an email dated 27 July 2022 from Mr Joe Lombardi to Mr Michael Lombardi was consistent with Ms Rebecca Lombardi having a belief that there was a family arrangement/commercial transaction between the parties; and
   5. correspondence between the vendor's conveyancer to Mr Michael Lombardi, concerning matters that a purchaser would have an interest in, is indicative that the respondents were not merely tenants.
4. The Tribunal Member found that payments made by the respondents to the applicants were not rent within the meaning of the RT Act but were better categorised as loan repayments.
5. He found that the intention of Ms Rebecca Lombardi was not to be a tenant pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement but a prospective owner or person with a financial interest in the property under a family arrangement.

The Tribunal's Consideration of the Internal Review Application

1. The applicants' applications are made under s 70 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act). The Tribunal will deal with applications of this nature in two stages. First, the Tribunal will determine whether or not leave should be granted. Second, if the Tribunal grants leave for the internal review application, then the Tribunal will review the decision made at the previous Tribunal hearing.

Issue 1: Should leave be granted for the internal review application?

1. There is no automatic right to an internal review.
2. Section 70(1a) of the SACAT Act provides that an application for internal review may only be made with leave of the Tribunal (sometimes referred to as "permission"). The applicant, as the person who has applied for internal review, has the responsibility of demonstrating that the discretion to grant leave should be exercised in her favour.
3. Leave is determined by the Tribunal by reference to the interests of justice, having regard to whether the applicant for leave has a reasonable argument that there has been the unfairness in the process or error in the outcome of the decision sought to be reviewed, and whether there is any significant principle at stake.[11]
4. It is not sufficient for a party to seek the internal review of an order simply because they disagree with the outcome.
5. The Tribunal will adopt the following approach as set out by Justice Parker in Re AKS [2016] SACAT 19 (at para 14) in determining whether or not permission should be granted:

... the overriding principle is always the interests of justice. The ordinary approach is that permission will only be granted where an appeal is reasonably arguable and the subject matter is of sufficient substance to justify consideration.

6. That principle is intended to screen out cases where the disputed question has little or no practical or legal significance and there is no issue of principle nor a potential miscarriage of justice.
7. Therefore, the applicants must establish that their case is reasonably arguable, for example that:
   • there was an error in the original Order;
   • there was a defect in the original hearing that caused the applicant to be denied procedural fairness;
   • there is fresh information which was not reasonably available for the original hearing and which is relevant to the matter.
8. The applicants' counsel submitted in paragraph 3 of the applicants' Outline of Argument that:

... the Tribunal Member at first instance adopted an incorrect approach to consideration of the nature of the relationship between the Applicants and the Respondents. He did so by assessing the nature of the relationship by reference to post-contractual conduct and the subjective intentions and beliefs of the First Respondent, Rebecca Lombardi (Rebecca), rather than performing an objective analysis of what was conveyed by the words and conduct of the parties, and in particular by their conduct in entering into a written agreement that was expressly stated to be a residential tenancy agreement to which the RT Act applied. This meant that the Tribunal at first instance did not have proper regard to, or give appropriate weight to, the written contract between the parties when determining the nature of the agreement between them.

9. Counsel further submitted at paragraphs [26] to [28] (footnotes omitted):

It is well established that the rights and liabilities of parties to a contract are to be determined objectively, and not by reference to the subjective beliefs or intentions of the contracting parties. As the High Court explained in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd: > > This Court, in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas, has recently reaffirmed the principle of objectivity by which the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract are determined. It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. > > The High Court went on to explain that, consistent with the objective approach to the determination of the rights and liabilities of contracting parties, the law attaches great significance to the signing by a person of a contractual document. In a passage which is apposite to the facts of this matter, the High Court observed that the act of signing a document known and intended to affect legal relations is an act which ordinarily conveys a representation that the person who is signing has read and approved the document and is willing to be bound by it. It was observed that such a representation is even stronger where (as in this case) the signature appears below a perfectly legible request to read the document before signing it. > > These principles have been recently reaffirmed by the High Court in Realestate.com.au Pty Ltd v Hardingham. In that case, Gordon J went on to observe that, if a person signs a contractual document which "on its face appears to be a complete contract, it will contain the whole of the contractual terms". In those circumstances "extrinsic evidence" (that is, evidence of matters other than the terms of written agreement) "cannot be adduced to subtract from, add to, vary or contradict those terms, except in limited circumstances." Such an approach is evidence in the general rule that "it is not legitimate to use as an aid in the construction of [a] contract anything which the parties said or did after it was made".

10. In oral submissions, counsel referred to Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd for the principle that a person is generally bound by a document they sign unless induced to do so by fraud, mistake or misrepresentation.[12]
11. The applicants' submissions accord with my understanding of the legal principles involved in the interpretation of contracts. I accept them.
12. The Tribunal Member who made the decision of 12 May 2025 is considerably experienced in hearing landlord and tenant disputes in the Tribunal. He conducted a careful, fair and detailed hearing. He informed himself correctly as to the relevant provisions of the RT Act and the definitions of tenancy dispute and residential tenancy agreement in that Act. He had regard to over 1,100 pages of documents filed by the parties and heard evidence from Mr Joe Lombardi, Mr Michael Lombardi and Ms Rebecca Lombardi. He summarised the documentary and oral evidence in his reasons.
13. The Tribunal Member referred to the parties having signed a residential tenancy agreement on 30 May 2017.
14. I consider that the Tribunal Member inadvertently overlooked the significance of the residential tenancy agreement and therefore did not undertake the objective analysis called for by the principles referred to by the applicants' counsel. I agree with the applicants' submissions that the written contract between the parties was not given appropriate weight.
15. For these reasons, leave will be granted.

Issue 2: Should the previous decision be affirmed, varied or set aside?

1. Section 70 of the SACAT Act requires the Tribunal to adopt the following approach when conducting an internal review:
   1. it must examine the initial decision in light of the evidence or material before the Tribunal at the time that decision was made;

b. it may, as it thinks fit, allow further evidence or material to be presented to it;

c. it must reach the correct or preferable decision; and

1. it must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the Tribunal at first instance.

1. I have reviewed the copious amount of material before the Tribunal at the time of the original hearing before the Tribunal Member. I have closely perused the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal Member. I have also taken into account the evidence of the parties and their submissions for this internal review hearing.[13] This includes a late statement from Mr Giuseppe Lombardi in answer to some contentions raised by Ms Rebecca Lombardi in the materials she filed for this review hearing.
2. Ms Rebecca Lombardi asserts that the applicants purchased the property in the applicants' names for the respondents and that the respondents paid the purchase deposit and have paid all mortgage payments, rates and insurances for the property. She asserts that the residential tenancy agreement was given to her to sign by Mr Michael Lombardi to enable them to obtain financial assistance of some sort from Centrelink, either rent assistance or "mortgage" assistance.
3. The critical difficulty for Ms Lombardi is that there is no objective, corroborative evidence which supports her assertions. Her assertions are unsubstantiated and were explicitly denied and contradicted by Mr Joe Lombardi and Mr Michael Lombardi in their evidence to the Tribunal Member. They both gave evidence that the applicants and respondents intended from the outset that the respondents would be the applicants' tenants at the premises and that the applicants only ever received payments of rent from them.[14]
4. Ms Lombardi relied almost exclusively on asking the Tribunal to draw inferences supportive of her version of events from the voluminous materials she has provided to the Tribunal. This included bank statements, text messages and emails from the applicants and others to Mr Michael Lombardi. However, those inferences are not reasonably available from that material. The evidence relied upon by Ms Lombardi was ambiguous, unpersuasive and open to interpretation. It is my assessment that Ms Lombardi's interpretation of these materials was substantially influenced by her deep suspicion of the motives of the applicants and her ex-partner and her confirmation bias. I give little to no weight to these materials.
5. I make the following comments about some aspects of Ms Lombardi's assertions and evidentiary materials:
   1. Mr Joe Lombardi provided an adequate and plausible account to explain why the applicants sent Mr Michael Lombardi correspondence about mortgage payments, rates, levies, insurances and the other imposts on homeowners, that is, to inform them about the realistic costs of home ownership when the respondents were considering buying a home. This includes the email of 27 July 2022 referred to in the Tribunal Member's reasons. He and Mr Michael Lombardi reiterated in evidence before the Tribunal Member that the applicants only ever received rent payments from the respondents. Ms Lombardi agreed in her evidence that she was not involved in the making of any payments to the applicants, that her ex-partner did so. I agree with counsel's submissions that Ms Lombardi cannot give reliable evidence about the state of mind or intent of the applicants or third parties when communicating with her ex-partner.
   2. the fact that the respondents undertook renovations to the premises, whether authorised or not by the applicants, is not of itself proof of Ms Lombardi's assertions that the applicants and respondents agreed that the applicants would purchase the land for the respondents. It is not inconsistent with there being a tenancy agreement. In my experience, a provision is often expressly included in tenancy agreements that a tenant may make alterations and additions with a landlord's consent and that consent is sometimes given. Conversely, tenants occasionally make alterations and additions without the landlord's agreement, in breach of the tenancy agreement.
   3. it does not assist Ms Lombardi's case to any significant extent that the vendor's conveyancer communicated directly with Mr Michael Lombardi. This concerned repairs and the like that needed to be done to the premises after the applicants settled with the vendors. It was not unreasonable for the conveyancer to correspond directly with the respondents, as the actual occupants of the premises at that time.
   4. The letters signed by Ms Lombardi's parents, Harold and Teresa Castledine, in February and August 2025 should not be given significant weight. They assert they were told by the respondents that the applicants had "helped them to be able to buy a house which they can have as their own by making the mortgage payments and paying all the utilities" and that this was not contradicted by the applicants at family gatherings. This is hearsay and is contradicted by the oral and documentary evidence. Neither of the Castledines gave evidence to the Tribunal Member or at the review hearing. It is not evident from these letters that they knew about the residential tenancy agreement that the parties signed in May 2017.
6. In any event, Ms Lombardi is relying to a significant extent on evidence of post-contractual conduct, including conduct that occurred a significant time after the 30 May 2017 tenancy agreement. This does not avail Ms Lombardi as it is contrary to the principles for interpretation of contracts that I set out above.
7. I had the advantage of hearing Ms Lombardi give evidence at this hearing under cross-examination. I found Ms Lombardi generally not to be a credible witness. She was evasive, disingenuous and argumentative. For these reasons, I am not prepared to accept her evidence without corroboration. However, as I indicated above, her evidence was not corroborated by objective, credible evidence. The voluminous materials she provided are not probative and/or relevant to the fundamental question that I need to decide in these proceedings.
8. On the objective and corroborated evidence before the Tribunal, I am well satisfied of the following facts:
   1. the applicants desired to buy property for investment purposes. They entered into a contract for sale of the subject land and became the registered proprietors in May 2017;
   2. the applicants paid the deposit of $5,000 due under the contract. They took out a loan from the Commonwealth Bank to fund the purchase;
   3. on 30 May 2017, the applicants and the respondents all signed a residential tenancy agreement (the residential tenancy agreement). Ms Lombardi agreed that she did so in her oral evidence before the Tribunal Member;
   4. the parties used the Consumer and Business Services form made available to the public for the purpose of entering into fixed term residential tenancies. It is a comprehensive and generally unremarkable form. It refers to the applicants and respondents as landlords and tenants respectively; it refers to rent of $400.00 per week and of a bond of $500.00 being payable; it refers to the tenants being liable to water use and supply charges; and refers to the relevant provisions of the RT Act;

1. a bond of $500 was paid by Mr Michael Lombardi shortly afterwards. The bond was lodged with the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs by the applicants;
2. the applicants' financial records indicate that Mr Michael Lombardi made regular payments of rent to the applicants, initially $800 per fortnight, then $840 per fortnight from September 2022, then $900 per fortnight from May 2023;
3. the applicants made all mortgage payments and paid all rates, levies and insurances on the property. The respondents did not reimburse them for those costs, they only paid rent; and
4. Mr Michael Lombardi moved out of the premises in October 2024. Ms Rebecca Lombardi remained in occupation with her children.

1. The applicants submit that the rent paid by the respondents bore no relationship with the applicants' mortgage repayments. This is credible as there is evidence that the applicants' monthly payments to the Commonwealth Bank were over $2000. The applicants gave evidence that they funded the shortfall.
2. I agree with submissions made by the applicants' counsel that the residential tenancy agreement is the primary piece of evidence to determine the relationship between the parties.
3. The residential tenancy agreement satisfies all the criteria set out by the Deputy President in the Bruno and Banner decisions. It constitutes clear evidence of an offer and acceptance; an agreement on the essential terms of the agreement; and consideration. I note that where there is an agreement between family members, the presumption is that it is not intended to be legally binding unless the parties have agreed otherwise. I am satisfied that the residential tenancy agreement evinces the intention that the parties intended to create legal relations when the parties entered into the agreement. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the agreement is a binding contact between the parties.
4. In these respects, the document speaks for itself.
5. Moreover, the agreement demonstrates the usual indicia of a residential tenancy agreement. In particular, it is an agreement that confers on the respondents the right of exclusive possession of premises for the purpose of residential occupation in return for the payment by them of rent. The applicants explicitly conferred the right of exclusive possession in the agreement. By clause 6, the applicants agreed not to cause or allow any interference with the peace, comfort or privacy of the respondents. The applicants could only enter the premises for inspections and other purposes in the restricted circumstances set out in clause 7.
6. I do not accept Ms Lombardi's apparent assertion that the residential tenancy agreement was entered into by the parties for some ulterior purpose related to Centrelink or taxation entitlements. This is inconsistent with the evidence that Mr Michael Lombardi paid a bond to the applicants and the proceeded to pay rent consistently (until more or less the time he vacated the premises when Ms Lombardi took over rent payments). In any event, even if an agreement was signed in hardcopy to provide evidence to Centrelink for benefit purposes or to the ATO, this is not inconsistent with the parties nevertheless having the intention to enter into a landlord/tenant relationship. A tenancy agreement need not be in writing.
7. Also, I consider it implausible that Ms Lombardi did not know what she was signing in May 2017. It is implausible that she did not read at least enough of the document to understand that it was a tenancy agreement. She was an adult person articulate in English with (on her own evidence) a background as a property owner, tenant and businessperson. If she did not in fact read any part of it before signing it, it was a risk she took on herself. The onus was on her to understand its purpose before she signed it, as a reasonable person would. The document does not lie about itself. It is clear on its face that it is a tenancy agreement. I am satisfied that there is no evidence that she was induced to sign the document by reason of fraud, mistake or misrepresentation.
8. I am well satisfied that the overwhelming and unequivocal weight of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the applicants and respondents entered into a tenancy agreement on 30 May 2017.
9. The tenancy agreement later became a periodic tenancy.[15]
10. This means that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the applicants' application for vacant possession.
11. For completeness, I note that this is not a tenancy that is excluded from the RT Act by reason of reg 6(1)(b)(i) or (ii) of the Residential Tenancies Regulations 2010. The premises do not form part of a building in which other premises are let by the landlord to the tenant for the purposes of a trade, profession or business carried on by the tenant nor are the premises situated on land which is let by the landlord to the tenant for the purposes of a trade, profession or business carried on by the tenant.
12. There is a suggestion in Ms Lombardi's written submissions that the Tribunal should refer this matter to the Family Court because it involves "complex family dynamics, financial manipulation, and emotional abuse". She did not raise this at the hearing and it was not addressed by the applicants' counsel. This may be a reference to the power in s 46 of the SACAT Act for the Tribunal to strike out proceedings if it considers that the matter would be more appropriately dealt with by another tribunal, court or any other person. I indicate that, if this matter had been pressed by Ms Lombardi at the review hearing, I would likely not have exercised that discretion. The Tribunal has exclusive statutory jurisdiction to hear and determine tenancy disputes. This is a tenancy dispute. The appropriate forum for these proceedings is the Tribunal.
13. The decision made on 12 May 2025 must be set aside and the Tribunal must proceed to determine the applicants' application for vacant possession.

1. On 25 March 2025, the applicants served on Ms Lombardi a notice under s 80 of the RT Act on account of rent arrears. The notice directed Ms Lombardi to pay $1,270 in rent arrears by 2 April 2025 or move out of the premises by 3 April 2025. However, it would appear from the applicants' rent records that rent arrears at that time were $3,430. In any event, that payment was not made. If the notice was valid, it would have had the effect that the tenancy would have automatically terminated on 2 April 2025.
2. I am not able to determine if the notice of termination was valid but I am satisfied that the respondents breached the tenancy agreement when they fell into rent arrears. The applicants' rent records indicate that rent had been in arrears for several years but that the arrears increased markedly from about October or November 2024.
3. Therefore, even if the applicants' notice of termination was not valid, the applicants would have been entitled to have their application for vacant possession determined pursuant to s 87 of the RT Act, as a serious breach of the tenancy agreement.[16]
4. The arrears at the time of this hearing are now $5,680 and have been so since late April 2025. This is eleven times the amount of the bond. Ms Lombardi has been making payments of rent since late April, but only rent, so the arrears have remained static.
5. If I were to allow Ms Lombardi to remain in the property, it would be on the basis that she would be paying rent and an additional amount to pay off the arrears as soon as reasonably possible. Ms Lombardi told me that she could afford to pay an extra $50 per week towards the arrears. On my calculations, this would mean that it would take over two years to pay off the arrears. This is unreasonably long. Also, during this time the applicants would remain at risk as the arrears would continue to exceed the bond for the majority of this period.
6. For this reason, I consider that it is appropriate to make an order for vacant possession under s 87. The respondents are in breach of the tenancy agreement and the breach is sufficiently serious to justify termination of the tenancy.
7. The Banner decision was similar to the present matter in that a former daughter-in-law was asserting to have an interest in the property of her former partner's parents, in that case a constructive trust. The Deputy President observed that the question of whether she had any such interest in the land is relevant to the question of vacant possession. She said that if the Tribunal considers there is a reasonable argument that a constructive trust may exist, then the Tribunal may consider whether any other orders should be made, for example, to suspend any order for vacant possession for as long as possible, to allow a person the opportunity to pursue their rights in this regard.
8. I will broadly adopt the Deputy President's approach in this matter.
9. However, I should not be taken as finding that Ms Lombardi has a reasonable argument that she and/or Mr Michael Lombardi have an interest in the land. There is little substantive evidence in support of Ms Lombardi's argument that they have an interest in the subject property. In any event, the Tribunal is not the proper forum to determine such matters.
10. I note also that there is already a caveat on the Certificate of Title of the subject land lodged by Ms Lombardi asserting she has an interest in the land. I understand that Ms Lombardi is also pursuing that matter in Family Law proceedings. Therefore, I am satisfied that steps have already been taken by Ms Lombardi to assert any rights she may have in the subject land.
11. In all the circumstances, I consider that an appropriate order is to suspend the order for vacant possession for 60 days, which is the period suggested by the applicants. But this is on the proviso that the applicants receive rent as and when it falls due. I will allow the applicants to seek a further hearing if any rent payments are missed or not paid in full.
12. For completeness, I have not considered it necessary to make any findings as to whether Mr Michael Lombardi is still a tenant under the tenancy agreement, although there is some suggestion that the applicants have removed him from the tenancy agreement. I note that, in any event, the liabilities and obligations of co-tenants are joint and several. "Joint and several" is a legal term indicating that two or more parties share equal responsibility for an obligation, meaning any one or more of them can be held liable for the entire amount. This is a matter for the applicants.

1. The Tribunal grants leave for the internal review.
2. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the application for vacant possession as it concerns a tenancy dispute in respect of a residential tenancy agreement.
3. The Tribunal sets aside the order dismissing the vacant possession application that was made on 12 May 2025 in matter number 2025/SH003865 and substitutes the following orders instead:
   1. The tenancy will terminate at midday on 27 October 2025. If the respondents do not move out this order may only be enforced by the Tribunal bailiff.
   2. The respondents must pay the ordinary weekly rent as and when it falls due. If any payments are missed or not paid in full, the applicants may make a written request to the Tribunal for an urgent hearing to bring forward the date of vacant possession.
   3. On 27 October 2025 all outstanding rent becomes immediately due and payable.

[1] There is no suggestion that the arrangement between the parties is a rooming house agreement.

[2] Tronnolone v Edwards and Bryan [2016] SACAT 27 at [14].

[3] Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (8th Australian Edition) at para 3.2.

[4] Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571; Cohen v Cohen [1929] HCA 15; (1929) 42 CLR 91.

[5] Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429.

[6] Street v Mountford [1985] UKHL 4; [1985] 2 All ER 289.

[7] A residential tenancy agreement does not need to be in writing.

[8] Radaich v Smith [1959] HCA 45; (1959) 101 CLR 209 at p 213 (Dixon CJ), 214 (McTiernan J), 217 (Taylor J), 221 (Menzies J), 222 (Windeyer J).

[9] See also Peek J in Henderson v Housing Choices South Australia Ltd [2019] SASC 121 at [85] - [88].

[10] [2016] SACAT 38 - without footnotes.

[11] Minda Incorporated v Carman & Anor [2024] SACAT 79 at [7].

[12] Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55 at [33].

[13] I note that the applicants' submissions and Book of Documents for the internal review hearing was served on the respondents by the Tribunal on 29 July 2025 and that Ms Lombardi's several tranches of submissions and documents, totalling over 800 pages, were served on the applicants' solicitors by the Tribunal.

[14] This was supported by evidence of the Applicants' bank statements since the commencement of the tenancy.

[15] I agree that it is not necessary to address Ms Lombardi's unproven and disputed allegation that she did not sign a 12-month extension to the initial fixed term agreement. It does not change the outcome. If such an extension were signed by all parties, the tenancy would have become periodic on its expiry. If it were not signed, the tenancy would have become periodic when the initial fixed term expired.

[16] See ss 82 and 83 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.