Lianos v Inner & Eastern Health Care Network [2001] VSCA 53

Court of Appeal (Vic)|2001-05-02|Before: TADGELL, BATT and CHERNOV, JJ.A.

Accident compensation - Opinion of medical panel - Reasons for the opinion - Admissibility of reasons in proceedings under Accident Compensation Act - Application of s.10 of Administrative Law Act to such proceedings absent a judicial review process - Whether "report of a medical panel" in s.48(1) of the Accident Compensation Act encompasses the reasons for the opinion of medical panel - Accident Compensation Act ss.39, 43, 45 and 68.

I agree with Chernov, J.A. I add some brief observations of my own.

The "certificate" in s.48 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 seems reasonably clearly to be the certificate required by s.68(2). There is no provision relevantly authorising or requiring a report by a Medical Panel.[1] It therefore would seem that the "report" in the collocation "certificate or report" in s.48(1) and also s.48(2)[2] is the opinion as to which a certificate is to be given. This is confirmed by s.104 in the form in which it was substituted in 1994. For sub-s.(6) provided that s.48 applied in respect of "an opinion of a Medical Panel under this section", and s.48 used "certificate or report", and not "opinion". It may be that the use of the word "report" in s.48 was induced by the presence in the simultaneously-introduced s.47 of the expression "medical report", used there in its traditional sense. It is perhaps true that a provision making opinions of Medical Panels admissible is scarcely necessary; but it may have been inserted out of an abundance of caution and, in any event, one should not be surprised to find repetition or over-lapping in an Act such as the Accident Compensation Act. If that is the meaning of "report" in s.48(1), the Panel's reasons are not made admissible by that provision.

The better view of s.10 of the Administrative Law Act 1978 is that, being one of three sections of that Act which refer to inferior courts as well as to tribunals, it is limited, like the other two sections, to prerogative or like review proceedings.[3] The

natural reading of s.10 is that the first part of it is not a fully independent provision but introduces or lays the foundation for its second part, which seems the real object of the section, as the side-note suggests. It is, after all, found in an Act concerned with administrative law.

Even if, contrary to one or other of the conclusions I have so far stated, the reasons of the Medical Panel were capable of being admitted, the magistrate was correct in declining, effectively on the ground of irrelevancy, to receive evidence of the reasons because he was bound by s.45(1)(c) of the first-mentioned Act to adopt the certified opinion for the obtaining of which the medical questions had been referred.

The appellant was born in Greece on 12 January 1954 and emigrated to Australia in 1973. During the latter part of 1987 he was in the employ of the respondent, working as an orderly/cleaner. In or around December 1987, while attempting to pick up a large and heavy container of liquid soap, he suffered an injury to his back. As a result, he found it difficult to work and developed a severe anxiety and depressive state. Due to the incapacity that he suffered from this injury, he was unable to work for various periods. He submitted a claim to the respondent for weekly payments in respect of the injury. The respondent accepted that claim and admitted liability to make weekly payments of compensation and to pay medical and like expenses on the appellant's behalf. By letter dated 28 February 1997, the respondent's authorised insurer gave the appellant formal notice under s.114 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 ("the Act") that the weekly payments of compensation would be terminated on 31 March 1997. One of the grounds on which the insurer gave the notice was that the appellant did not sustain a serious injury and was not totally and permanently incapacitated for work.

7 On 4 June 1997 the appellant filed a complaint in the Magistrates' Court at Melbourne alleging as against the respondent that he was totally and permanently incapacitated and/or was seriously injured within the meaning of the Act. He sought reinstatement of weekly payments of compensation at the rate of 90 per cent of pre-injury average weekly earnings, or alternatively, 70 per cent of pre-injury average weekly earnings. For completeness, I mention that the appellant later abandoned the claim that he had suffered a serious injury.

On or about 14 October 1997, in accordance with the respondent's request, the Magistrates' Court referred four medical questions to a medical panel constituted under the Act for opinion, namely:

"1. Is the Plaintiff totally incapacitated as that term is defined in the Accident Compensation Act? 2. Is the Plaintiff partially incapacitated as that term is defined in the Accident Compensation Act? 3. What is or was the probable duration of the Plaintiff's medical condition relevant to each of the alleged injuries alleged in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim? 4. What is the level of impairment assessed in accordance with the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (2nd edition) having regard to section 91 of the Accident Compensation Act?"

A Certificate of Opinion pursuant to s.68(2) of the Act was signed by Mr. David Chamberlain, the presiding member for and on behalf of the medical panel. The document, which is dated by hand, bears the date 9 December 1997 and certifies as follows:

"I certify that the Medical Panel [consisting of Mr. Chamberlain and Dr. Kenny] convened in this matter has examined the [applicant] and taken into consideration all information provided following a reference to Medical Panels for an opinion under section 45 of the Accident Compensation Act. The attachment to this Certificate gives the opinion required under the Act in response to the referral received."

The opinion ("the Opinion") which was attached to the certificate provides the following answers to the above questions:

"1. In the Panel's opinion the plaintiff is not totally incapacitated. 2. In the Panel's opinion the Plaintiff is partially incapacitated. 3. The medical condition appears to specifically date from the episode occurring in 1987. 4. His current level of impairment is 17 per cent whole person impairment in regard to the lower back. There is a Psychiatric impairment which has been assessed at 15 per cent psychiatric impairment but this is secondary to his physical symptoms and not a primary psychiatric impairment and is thus not additional to that impairment. The level of impairment as thus assessed is a 17 per cent whole person impairment."

The solicitors for the appellant obtained from the panel its reasons for the Opinion ("the Reasons") in which the panel stated, inter alia, why it had concluded that the appellant was not totally, but only partially, incapacitated for work within the meaning of the Act. It also stated in the Reasons:

(a) That the appellant was interviewed and examined by two specialist panel members, namely, an orthopaedic surgeon and a psychiatrist.

(b) That it took into consideration, in forming the Opinion, the appellant's history which it had obtained from him, his then medical condition and the 16 medical reports from 13 medical specialists, including a number of psychiatrists, which dealt with the applicant's injury.

(c) That, in forming the Opinion, the medical panel had regard to the definitions in section 5 of the Act of `injury', `partial incapacity', `total incapacity', `suitable employment' and `worker'.

For reasons which are not presently relevant, the hearing of the appellant's case in the Magistrates' Court was adjourned from time to time and then aborted. When it eventually re-commenced before another magistrate on 16 September 1998, counsel for the appellant sought to tender the Reasons on the ground, inter alia, that they showed that the Opinion on the question of the level of the appellant's incapacity for work was based only upon his physical injuries and took no account of his behavioural illness or psychological impairment.

Counsel contended that, although the Magistrates' Court was bound by the Opinion to find that the appellant was not totally but partially incapacitated by reason of his physical injuries, the court was not otherwise bound. Thus, it was said, it was open to the court, after hearing evidence and looking at the Reasons, to find that the appellant was totally incapacitated, taking into account not only his physical injuries but also his behavioural illness and psychological impairment. In other words, counsel sought to have the court reconsider the Opinion in light of the Reasons and come to a conclusion on the issue of the appellant's incapacity for work different from that which was reached by the panel. Counsel for the respondent objected to the tender of the Reasons on the ground that the court was bound to give effect to the Opinion and was not entitled to reconsider it and that, therefore, the Reasons were irrelevant and inadmissible. The magistrate ruled that the course proposed by the appellant would amount to an attempt to review the Opinion and that this was not open to him. I should say for completeness that counsel also argued before the magistrate that it was open to him to find, after hearing evidence, that the appellant was totally incapacitated by reference to the "odd lot" principle developed by the courts. The magistrate also refused to entertain this proposed basis of attack on the Opinion. Although this ruling was challenged by the appellant in the course of his appeal from the magistrate, the issue was not pursued before us and, therefore, I propose to say nothing more about it.

In light of the Opinion, the magistrate dismissed the Complaint and made consequential orders. The appellant instituted an appeal against that decision pursuant to s.109 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 and, on 8 October 1998, the matter came before the Master. So far as is relevant, the Master ordered that the question to be determined on appeal was:

"Whether the magistrate erred ... in failing to admit as evidence the reasons of the Medical Panel's opinion given pursuant to s.45 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985".

The proceeding was heard by a judge of the Supreme Court who, having answered the question in the negative, dismissed the appeal on 27 August 1999. The appellant now appeals against his Honour's decision on the ground that his Honour should have answered the question in the affirmative. His Honour noted that it was common ground before him that the legislative scheme that was applicable to the appellant's claim was that which was contained in the Act as it stood in Reprint No.7 which incorporates amendments as at 20 March 1997. A like position was adopted by the parties before us and, therefore, unless I say otherwise, my reference to the provisions of the Act will be confined to those which are contained in Reprint No.7, and I shall for convenience speak of the provisions in the present tense.

Although the appellant's injury occurred before the introduction in 1992 of major legislative changes to the Act [4], because of the transitional provisions in s.93C of the Act, the appellant continued to be entitled to weekly payments under the Act in respect of his injury and incapacity. Under s.93B(3) of the Act, however, the appellant's entitlement to weekly payments ceased after an aggregate period of 104 weeks (whether consecutive or not) unless he established that he:

(a) had a serious injury; or

(b) was totally and permanently incapacitated.

Before dealing with the appellant's arguments, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 39 gives the County Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues such as those raised by the appellant in his complaint and s.43 confers like jurisdiction on the Magistrates' Court where the amount involved does not exceed $40,000 or where the question is in respect of weekly payments. So far as is relevant, the scheme of the Act is that medical panels, which are constituted under Division 3 of Part III of the Act [5], determine medical questions referred to them by the court. Although I will deal with this matter more fully later, it is convenient to note at this stage that the Act contemplates that the opinion of the medical panel on medical questions (as defined) which have been effectively referred to it by the court will be adopted by the court as answers to those questions. Thus, under the Act, the effective decision making process on those issues shifts from the court to the medical panel. The legislation also contemplates that the panels will play a role in the conciliation of disputes under Division 2 and in advising the Minister, but these aspects of their role are not relevant to this appeal and can, therefore, be put to one side.

Section 45(1) of the Act is relevantly in the following terms:

"(1) Where the County Court exercises jurisdiction under this Part - (a) the Court may refer a medical question to a Medical Panel for an opinion; and (b) if a party to the proceedings so requests, the Court must refer a medical question to a Medical Panel for an opinion; and (c) the opinion of the Panel on that question shall, subject to this section, be adopted by the Court as the answer to that question ..."

Section 68 relevantly provides as follows:

"(1) A Medical Panel must form its opinion on a medical question referred to it within 21 days after the reference is made ... (2) The Medical Panel to whom a medical question is so referred must give a certificate as to its opinion. (3) Within seven days after forming its opinion on a medical question referred to it, a Medical Panel must give the ... Court ... its opinion in writing."

Section 48(1) states that "[a] certificate or report given by a Medical Panel is admissible in evidence in any proceedings under this Act."

There were two principal arguments relied on by the appellant in support of his contention that his Honour should have answered the question for determination in the affirmative. First, it was contended that, because of the operation of s.10 of the Administrative Law Act 1978 ("the ALA"), the Reasons form part of the Opinion and thus, part of the material that was required to be placed before the magistrate in accordance with s.68(3) of the Act for adoption by him pursuant to s.45(1)(c) of the Act. In so far as is relevant, s.10 is in the following terms:

"Any statement by a tribunal or inferior court ... of its reasons for a decision shall be taken to form part of the decision and accordingly to be incorporated in the record."

Counsel argued that the medical panel in this case was a "tribunal" and the Opinion was a "decision" for the purposes of s.10 of the ALA and that, therefore, the Reasons formed part of the Opinion and were required to be put before the court. It was submitted that s.10 of the ALA applied to medical panels notwithstanding that no review was sought of the panel's Opinion under the ALA or at all. As I understand it, it was put on behalf of the appellant that, although the magistrate was required to adopt the Opinion, because of the contents of the Reasons, it would be apparent that the panel did not consider sufficiently the appellant's psychological state and that, therefore, the magistrate was entitled to consider further evidence on that issue and conclude that the appellant is totally incapacitated. It was further submitted that, by admitting the Reasons into evidence and construing the Opinion in that context, the magistrate would not thereby be reviewing or reconsidering the Opinion in light of the Reasons. Thus, it was claimed, the magistrate erred in not admitting the Reasons into evidence.

The appellant's second principal argument in support of its appeal was that the Reasons fall within the term "report given by a Medical Panel" for the purposes of s.48(1) of the Act and, therefore, were admissible in evidence in the proceedings. Consequently, it was said for the appellant, it was open for the magistrate to have admitted the Reasons into evidence.

I now turn to examine the appellant's first argument. That a medical panel is bound to act fairly and accord natural justice in the performance of its functions and that, therefore, it is a "tribunal" for the purposes of the ALA, is firmly established[6]. Similarly, it is clear that the opinion of a medical panel given under the Act is a "decision" for the purposes of the ALA[7]. Thus, for example, as was held in Masters, the panel is bound by s.8 of the ALA to furnish its reasons to a person in the position of the appellant who has made a request for them. To that extent, the medical panels are "indistinguishable from many other tribunals created by statute who are required to provide reasons for their decisions."[8] It may also be accepted that, for the purposes of the ALA, s.10 operates so as to make the reasons given by the medical panel relevantly part of its opinion or "decision". Consequently, if the appellant had sought a judicial review of the Opinion under the ALA, s.10 would operate so as to enable the basis and the scope of the Opinion to be ascertained by reference to the Reasons as well as its terms. But the appellant has eschewed any suggestion that a review process is sought by him in relation to the Opinion. Hence, the question is whether, absent a review process that is brought pursuant to the ALA, s.10 is relevant to the operation of the Act, including the requirements of ss.68(3) and 45(1)(c). These provisions respectively require the panel to transmit to the court "its opinion on [the] medical question[s] referred to it [by the court]" and that the court adopt that opinion and determine the case accordingly. As I understood him, Mr. O'Loghlen, who appeared with Mr. Sala for the appellant, submitted that, notwithstanding the absence of a review process under the ALA in respect of the Opinion, s.10 operates to make the Reasons part of the Opinion for the purposes of the Act. If that were so, it would follow that both the Opinion and the Reasons should have been transmitted by the panel to the court and that, since this has not occurred, it would be permissible for the appellant to tender the Reasons in evidence.

Mr. O'Loghlen relied on Iveagh v. Minister of Housing[9], Masters v. McCubbery[10] and on Hansford v. Judge Neesham[11] in support of the contention that s.10 also operates outside the context of review proceedings brought under the ALA and that, therefore, it operates to make the Reasons in this case part of the Opinion. In my view, the first two cases do not assist the appellant's argument. They were concerned respectively with a judicial review of a Ministerial decision (Iveagh) and with an application for reasons of a medical panel under s.8 of the ALA (Masters). Neither dealt with the situation for which the appellant contends in this case. Hansford also does not help the appellant. In that case, Phillips, J. dealt with an application for judicial review under O.56 of Chapter I of the Rules in relation to a sentence that was imposed by a County Court judge on appeal which was brought by the Crown from a sentencing order made by the Magistrates' Court by which the person charged (being the applicant for the order) was imprisoned. So far as is relevant, his Honour was concerned with whether relief in the nature of certiorari would go to correct error in sentencing by a County Court judge on appeal from a sentencing order of the Magistrates' Court. After referring to s.10 of the ALA, his Honour recognised[12] that, although the relief contemplated by the ALA [for example, by s.3] was not available in relation to decisions made by bodies that are courts of law, s.10 nevertheless operated in respect of "inferior courts" as well as tribunals. In that context, his Honour said he had been "unable to discover any relevance of inferior courts to the new procedure created by [the ALA] and it seems therefore to follow that the references to such courts ... must be intended to have significance otherwise than in proceedings under that Act". The appellant seized on the words quoted as indicating a recognition by his Honour that s.10 operates beyond merely the purposes of the ALA and can, therefore, be taken to apply in respect of the relevant provisions of the Act. In my view, however, what Phillips, J. said in the above passage of his judgment does not support Mr. O'Loghlen's contention as to the wide operation of s.10 of the ALA. In my opinion, his Honour was saying only that, since s.10 refers to "inferior courts", it must be taken to operate in respect of proceedings for judicial review brought otherwise than under the ALA. His Honour was, after all, considering an application for an order in the nature of certiorari brought under O.56 of Chapter I of the Rules. His Honour said[13] that "according to s.10, `the record' in the case of an inferior court includes any reasons given for the decision, whether in writing or orally".[14] But his Honour did not suggest in the passage relied on by the appellant or in any other passage in his judgment that s.10 applied to decisions of tribunals which were the subject of a proceeding under particular legislation but where it was not sought to have them judicially reviewed.

In my view, Mr. O'Loghlen's submission that s.10 applies to opinions and reasons of medical panels for the purpose of proceedings under the Act is untenable for a number of reasons. First, the operation of s.10 as contended for by the appellant would be inconsistent with the policy of the Act as to what aspects of the relevant decision of a medical panel must or can be placed before the court for the purposes of such proceedings. The Act requires only that the relevant opinion of a medical panel be provided to the referring court. Not only does the legislation not require that the reasons for that opinion be provided to the court, but it effectively excludes them from the proceedings under the Act. The only purpose in tendering the reasons would be to have the court reconsider the opinion in light of them, but it is clear that such a reconsideration of the opinion would be impermissible. (I put to one side the tendering of the reasons for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity in the language of the opinion.) The judgment of the President in Masters[15] makes it clear that the relevant scheme of the Act is for medical panels to supplant the court in respect of the determination of medical questions under the Act in the sense that the panel's opinion on the relevant questions effectively binds the court. As Phillips, J.A. noted in Isuzu[16], the Act is designed to have medical people answer medical questions in place of the courts. Similarly, Ormiston, J.A. noted in Masters[17]:

"It is abundantly clear from sections such as s.45 of the Act that where a court or tribunal is given jurisdiction to consider a claim arising under the Act that court or tribunal has no power to review, on the merits or for any other reason, an opinion formed by a medical panel to which a medical question has been referred."

And as Smith, J. pointed out in McDonald v. Kotzman[18], after referring to Masters,:

"There is no place under the statutory scheme for the opinion to be reconsidered by the magistrate in the light of any reasons. The Act makes it clear he is to act upon the opinions expressed. If there is any error of law contained in such an opinion which is revealed by the reasons, that is a matter to be taken up in a superior court where application might be made to set aside the opinion ..."

That it is only the opinion of the panel and no other aspect of its decision, such as its reasons, that is to be considered by the court also gains support from the terms of s.68(2) which requires the panel to "certify" its opinion. This requirement suggests that Parliament has introduced a degree of formality relating to the "publication" of the panel's opinion because of its status in determining, for the purposes of the relevant proceedings, the answers to medical questions that have been referred to it. It is only the opinion of the panel that is relevant for the purposes of the proceedings.

Consequently for that reason alone, I would consider that Parliament did not intend for s.10 of the ALA to apply to proceedings under the Act. There are, however, other reasons which also point against s.10 operating in relation to decisions of medical panels in the context of proceedings brought under the Act. For instance, there is nothing in the ALA or the Act which suggests that the ALA has any role to play in determining whether, for the purposes of proceedings under the Act, reasons of a medical panel form part of the relevant opinion. The two pieces of legislation deal with entirely different subject matters; the relevant provisions of the Act are concerned with the resolution of medical questions which arise in the course of, inter alia, court proceedings contemplated by Part III of the Act, while the ALA is concerned with judicial review of decisions of tribunals in order to determine if they were lawfully made. Put another way, the terms of the relevant provisions of the Act constitute, in effect, a self-contained code for the resolution of medical questions in the sense that they provide the steps that must be taken to achieve that end, namely, the reference by the court of the medical questions to the panel, the forming of an opinion by it on those questions, the provision of that opinion to the referring court and the adoption by the court of that opinion. The ALA has no role to play in this process.

Thus, in my view, the first argument of the appellant in support of the appeal must fail.

I now turn to consider the appellant's second principal argument. Section 48(1) was introduced in 1992 by s.10 of Act No.67 of that year. It is not readily apparent from the language of the legislation what work the term "report given by a Medical Panel" is to perform in the context of the relevant scheme of the Act. It is not defined and there is no reference to it in the Second Reading Speech that was made when the section was introduced[19] or in Part III of the Act other than in s.63A. But the latter provision was not inserted into the Act until 1996, some four years after the introduction of s.48. Hence, it is not relevant to the construction of the term in question.

Be that as it may, for the reasons given below, it is my opinion that the reasons of a medical panel relating to its relevant opinion do not constitute or form part of a "report" within the meaning of s.48(1) and that, therefore, they are not admissible in evidence under that provision in proceedings brought under the Act.

The panel's opinion, its associated reasons and its certificate under s.68(2) are all related to the panel's determination of medical questions that have been referred to it by the court under the Act. The legislation is specific in terms of s.68(3) as to the circumstances and the time within which the opinion must be given to the court. Similarly, the Act makes it clear, in s.68(2) and s.48(1), that the certificate issued by the panel in relation to its relevant opinion is admissible in proceedings under the Act. It is also apparent what function the opinion and the certificate perform once they are before the court. The opinion determines the answers to the relevant medical questions and the certificate formally identifies or establishes the opinion. It goes without saying that the certificate would not be capable of being used to contradict the opinion. It is clear, therefore, that the provision of the opinion to the court forms part of the relevant scheme of the legislation and the tendering of the certificate in evidence is not inconsistent with its aims.

The situation thus obtaining in relation to the panel's opinion and certificate is to be contrasted with the lack of expression of legislative intent that the reasons be admissible in evidence. Thus, in contrast to the specificity of the legislative requirement that the opinion be transmitted to the court and that the certificate be admissible in evidence, neither s.48(1) nor any other provision of the Act states in terms that the reasons of the medical panel are to be admissible in proceedings under the Act. In a sense, this is not surprising given that the scheme of the legislation is, as I have said, that the court must treat the opinion as determining the answers to the referred medical questions and cannot reconsider it in light of the reasons or at all. Consequently, as I have said, the tender of the reasons for such a purpose would be inconsistent with that legislative scheme. Put another way, it is difficult to discern why s.48(1) would seek to make the reasons admissible in evidence since, in light of the apparent scheme of the legislation, they would not perform any relevant function even if they were placed before the court. It might be said that the purpose behind the relevant part of s.48(1) was to facilitate the admission of the reasons into evidence for the purpose of clarifying any ambiguity in the language of the opinion. In my view, however, it is unlikely that this could have been the reason for the introduction of the words in question because the reasons could have been properly tendered in evidence absent s.48(1) if they were to be used only for the purpose of resolving any relevant ambiguity.

In the circumstances, therefore, I think it unlikely that Parliament intended, by resort to the somewhat imprecise word "report" in s.48(1), to provide that the reasons of a medical panel be admissible in evidence notwithstanding the legislative scheme to which I have referred earlier. Very clear words would be required to establish that Parliament had such an intention. In my opinion, there is no such language in s.48(1). Ordinarily, mere reasons, without an accompanying conclusion or an opinion which is based on them, do not constitute a "report" and there is nothing in the words of that provision or in any other relevant part of the Act which justify construing "report" in the subsection as including reasons of a medical panel.

Hence, I am of the view that Parliament did not intend to make reasons of a medical panel admissible in evidence under cover of the term "report given by a Medical Panel" in s.48(1).

It follows that, in my view, the appeal should be dismissed.

[1] The reports contemplated by s.63A(2), which was not inserted in the Act until 1996, are of their nature not such as would be tendered in evidence.

[2] It is unnecessary to explore the purpose and effect of this provision.

[3] Cf. generally Perkins v. County Court of Victoria [2000] VSCA 171 at para.68 and cases cited.

[4] The relevant aspects of the 1992 changes are helpfully summarised by Phillips, J.A. in Isuzu General Motors Australia Ltd. and QBE Workers Compensation (Vic.) Ltd. v. Jordon [2000] VSCA 63.

[5] Medical Panels are constituted pursuant to nominations of the Convenor who nominates the members from a list of medical practitioners appointed by the Governor in Council - s.63(1)-(4). The relevant legislative framework and the operation of medical panels pursuant to the Act are dealt with in the judgments of the President and Callaway, J.A. in Masters v. McCubbery [1995] VICSC 209; [1996] 1 V.R. 635 at 642-8 and 655-6 respectively.

[6] Masters v. McCubbery [1995] VICSC 209; [1996] 1 V.R. 635 at 645 per the President, at 651-2 per Ormiston, J.A. and at 656-8 per Callaway, J.A.

[7] Masters at 649 per the President and 658-9 per Callaway, J.A.

[11] (1994) 7 V.A.R. 172 at 179-180, affirmed without reference to the present point: [1995] VICSC 58; [1995] 2 V.R. 233.

[14] Batt, J.A. has kindly drawn my attention to Perkins v. County Court of Victoria [2000] VSCA 171 at [68] (and the cases there cited) where Buchanan, J.A., with whom Phillips and Charles, JJ.A. agreed, seems to have applied the above views of J.D. Phillips, J. in Hansford to the case before that court. See also Redflex Ltd. v. South of the Rif Pty. Ltd., unreported, 18 August 1997, in which Beach, J. held at 4 that, since s.10 specifically includes inferior courts, it operates to enable a decision of the Magistrates' Court to be part of the record for the purpose of judicial review pursuant to O.56.

[19] Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 30 October 1992, vol.409, p.306.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (63 paragraphs)

Parties