austlii:cth/ARTA/2026/266
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2026-02-27
Original judgment source is linked above.
"On today's assessment, she described her pain as a muscle spasm in her right lower back radiating to her right groin and right thigh. She denied any lumbar radiculopathy in the distribution of the sciatic nerve. She also denied any changes to her bowel or bladder function, fall or claudication. On the numerical rating scale, she reported an average pain score of 7/10, which can worsen to 10/10 with physical activity.
She mobilises independently unaided, and she is independent with her personal care. She reports limited walking tolerance and sitting tolerance secondary to pain. Despite this, she tries to remain active; she looks after all the domestic tasks herself, cooks, and manages shopping independently.
On examination, she walked independently unaided and did not present with an antalgic gait. Her right knee reflex was present; however, the left knee reflex was not elicitable. She had manual muscle strength of 5/5 in both her lower limbs, particularly in the right hip flexion L3 myotome). She was able to walk on her toes and heels and did not present with foot drop. There was midline tenderness to her lumbar spine. Lumbar extension was limited to 5 degrees and provoked her right lower back pain and on quadrant testing, she reported pain in the same spot of her lower back. Faber testing also caused lower back pain on both sides, suggestive of SI joint pathology. There was no significant pain in her hip joint on axial loading, and there was also no significant hip joint restriction on Faber testing on either side."[49]
"Her condition is chronic and progressive and had led to joint restrictions and chronic pain with subsequent reduction in mobility, strength, manual dexterity and fatigue."[57]
DO THE APPLICANT'S PERMANENT IMPAIRMENTS RESULT IN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY? (S24(1)(C))
"The Agency did not take issue with the Tribunal's summary of the applicable principles derived from cases such Mulligan and Foster. It is clear that the Tribunal was cognisant of the questions to be addressed in determining whether an impairment results in substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake one or more of the activities specified in s 24(1)(c) of the NDIS Act. The Tribunal acknowledged that the inquiry was focused on a practical examination or assessment of what the person can and cannot do (T [81]), and that an inability to undertake one task forming part of an activity (e.g. the task of toileting as part of the activity of self-care) cannot be treated as a substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake that activity (T [82]). The Tribunal accepted that it was necessary to assess the person's capacity to undertake the various tasks and actions comprising the specified activity as a whole, and referred (without demur) to the Agency's submission that "a person does not necessarily have a substantially reduced functional capacity in relation to an activity because they have difficulty with one task related to that activity": T [83]."
"Nor do I consider that the Tribunal erred by conflating difficulties in completing certain tasks that form part of the activity of self-care, such as showering or bathing, with an inability or incapacity to undertake the activity of self-care. The decision in Foster does not stand for the proposition that s 24(1)(c) can only be met if the person has a substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake multiple tasks or actions forming part of the activity of self-care. While it is necessary to assess the person's functional capacity with respect to "the bundle of tasks and actions forming the concept of 'self-care'" (Foster at [65]), the fact that the person remains capable of carrying out some tasks and actions does not itself prevent him or her from meeting s 24(1)(c).
The Tribunal considered a wide range of tasks and actions forming part of the activity of "self-care". It did not limit its inquiry to a single task (such as showering or bathing, or toileting), nor did it equate Ms Sutherland's impairment with any such task and deem that to be the relevant activity for which functional capacity was to be assessed: cf. Foster at [65]. The Tribunal's reasons reveal that it carried out a "functional, practical assessment" of what Ms Sutherland could and could not do in relation to various tasks and actions within the concept of self-care. The issues arising from Ms Sutherland 's involuntary falls and incontinence were regarded by the Tribunal as "extreme": T [118]. Taken together with the difficulties faced by Ms Sutherland in bathing or showering regularly without someone present to assist her, and the inadequacy of the interim methods used by Ms Sutherland to clean herself, the Tribunal found that this amounted to substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake the activity of self-care."
Does the Applicant have substantially reduced functional capacity in the area of mobility?
Does the Applicant have substantially reduced functional capacity in the domain of self-care?
"Usually requires assistance (including physical assistance, guidance, supervision or prompting) from other people to participate in the activity or to perform tasks or actions required to undertake or participate in the activity."
DO THE APPLICANT'S PERMANENT IMPAIRMENTS AFFECT HER CAPACITY FOR SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION? (S 24(1)(D))
DOES THE APPLICANT REQUIRE LIFETIME SUPPORT UNDER THE NDIS? (S 24(1)(E))
"In relation to the NDIA's contention as set out in paragraph [117] above and the section of the Access Guidelines underlined in paragraph [116] above, the Tribunal notes that the NDIA appears to have imported into this criterion a further requirement that the supports required by Ms Sutherland are not more appropriately sourced, funded or provided under some other service system. The Tribunal considers that the wording of s 24(1)(e) of the NDIS Act does not support the interpretation contended for by the NDIA. The Tribunal is not bound to apply this section (as underlined in paragraph [116]) of the Access Guidelines, as it considers it to be inconsistent the s 24(1)(e) of the NDIS Act. The Tribunal does not consider that it would be a proper interpretation of s 24(1)(e) to undertake an assessment of whether the supports required by Ms Sutherland could be provided by other service systems in order to decide whether this criterion is met. Rather, the wording of s 24(1)(e) simply requires the Tribunal to satisfy itself as to whether Ms Sutherland will require support under the NDIS for her lifetime, as per the wording of this provision. The Tribunal interprets this to mean that the Tribunal must focus on whether Ms Sutherland will need those supports under the NDIS for her lifetime and that this does not depend upon whether she can acquire the supports themselves elsewhere."[82]
"The error made by the Tribunal in Foster was in finding that s 24(1)(e) was met on the basis that, because the full cost of Mr Foster's catheters was not covered outside the NDIS, the support was not comparable to what would be available under the NDIS: Foster at [95]. The Tribunal's reasoning was also premised on its "erroneous conflation" of the specific task or action of toileting with the activity of self-care, and infected by a flawed approach of asking whether Mr Foster required catheters "for the purpose of improving functioning relating to his self-care": Foster at [97]. The Court implicitly accepted that ss 24(1)(c) and (e) impose separate and cumulative requirements and that, if it is determined that the person has a substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake self-care, it remains necessary to determine whether the person is likely to require support under the NDIS for their lifetime. However, that does not dictate that s 24(1)(e) must be construed as imposing an additional requirement that the person must be likely to require support under the NDIS, in the sense that the person's lifetime support needs are not likely to be met under any other service systems outside the NDIS."
"Accordingly, I do not accept the Agency's submission that s 24(1)(e) "requires the further step of considering whether the support is one which ought to be provided under the NDIS or whether it [is] more appropriately sourced or funded through another system".
It follows that there was no error in the approach that was taken by the Tribunal at T [118]-[120] in applying the requirement under s 24(1)(e) of the NDIS Act. The degenerative nature of Ms Sutherland**'**s impairment was not in dispute and, as the Tribunal noted, there was no evidence to suggest that her medical conditions were likely to improve or that there was a chance that they may resolve: T [118]. The Tribunal accepted that Ms Sutherland's impairment from "spinal injury - severe stenosis" was "degenerative and likely to be lifelong with the symptoms worsening over time": ibid. Having already found that Ms Sutherland had substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake the activity of self-care as a result of that permanent impairment, the Tribunal correctly proceeded on the basis that it was unnecessary to inquire into whether the supports required by Ms Sutherland could be provided by other service systems for the purpose of determining whether she was likely to require support under the NDIS for her lifetime within the meaning of s 24(1)(e): T [119]."
DOES THE APPLICANT MEET THE EARLY INTERVENTION REQUIREMENTS?
"She mobilises independently unaided, and she is independent with her personal care. She reports limited walking tolerance and sitting tolerance secondary to pain. Despite this, she tries to remain active; she looks after all the domestic tasks herself, cooks, and manages shopping independently."[84]
Dates of hearing: 20, 21, 22 October and 3 December 2025
Representative for the applicant: Represented by her daughter
Representative for the respondent: Ms A. Douglas-Baker, Counsel and Ms S Miller, Sparke Helmore Lawyers
[4] The National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No.1) Act 2024, Schedule 1, s 126.
[5] I note s 126 of Schedule 1 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track) Act 2024 provides that the Rules made pursuant to s 27 remain in force.
[6] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at [635].
[7] National Disability Insurance Agency, Our Guidelines - Becoming a participant - Applying to the NDIS, (14 October 2024).
[8] For example, Beezley v Repatriation Commission (2015) FCAFC 165 at [68] (North, Tracey and Mortimer JJ).
[9] Respondent's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SOFIC), at [32].
[11] See Davis at [75] and [131]. See also [158].
[39] T14. In her oral evidence Dr Sarmast indicated this letter was prepared later and should have been dated 15 May 2021.
[82] Sutherland and National Disability Insurance Agency [2024] AATA 411, at [119].
National Disability Insurance Agency v Foster [2023] FCAFC 11
National Disability Insurance Agency v Davis [2022] FCA 1002
National Disability Insurance Agency v Sutherland [2026] FCA 3