4.1 The ACC and authorisation of special operations and investigations
21 The applicants' submissions were underpinned by a number of misconceptions as to the nature of the investigation authorised by the Wickenby Determination and the ACC Act. Those misconceptions primarily relate to the degree and nature of collaboration permitted by the Determination and the Act between the ACC and other government agencies participating in the investigation, the permitted purposes of an investigation and of the Wickenby investigation itself, and the purposes for which information and intelligence may be shared with other government agencies. These misconceptions go to the heart of the legislative scheme pursuant to which the Determination was made. As such, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of the ACC Act and its objects.
22 The ACC is established by s 7(1) of the ACC Act. It replaced the National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) (NCA), the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments and the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, the intention being to enhance the capacity for the Australian Government to counteract serious and organised crime. As Finkelstein J explained in AA Pty Limited v Australian Crime Commission (2005) 219 ALR 666; [2005] FCA 1178 (AA v ACC) at 670:
The Federal Government had two major concerns. Complex criminal activity engaged in by skilled criminal syndicates was on the rise. "The globalisation of markets had brought with it the globalisation of crime" is how the Attorney-General put it on the second reading of the Bill... There was also the risk of terrorism.… The new body was designed to play a pivotal role in national law enforcement operations to combat such threats in conjunction with other State and Federal (including Territory) agencies, especially state and federal police forces.
(citations omitted)
(Note:- an appeal against this decision was allowed on grounds not relevant to this point: Australian Crime Commission v AA Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 540; [2006] FCAFC 30.)
23 As will be apparent, the purpose of providing for a collaborative approach between government agencies in addressing serious organised crime is a fundamental plank of the legislative scheme enacted by the ACC Act.
24 The ACC consists of the CEO, the examiners and the members of the staff of the ACC (s 7(2)). Examiners are legal practitioners of at least five years standing who are appointed under s 46B of the Act by the Governor-General.
25 The functions of the ACC under s 7A of the ACC Act are essentially directed towards the gathering, investigation and dissemination of criminal information and intelligence. In particular, they include:
(a) to collect, correlate, analyse and disseminate criminal information and intelligence and to maintain a national database of that information and intelligence;
(b) to undertake, when authorised by the Board, intelligence operations;
(c) to investigate when authorised by the Board, matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity;
(d) to provide reports to the Board on the outcomes of those operations or investigation; …
26 Section 4(1) defines an "intelligence operation" to mean "an operation that is primarily directed towards the collection, correlation, analysis or dissemination of criminal information and intelligence relating to federally relevant criminal activity, but that may involve the investigation of matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity." The phrase "federally relevant criminal activity" is defined in s 4(1) to mean:
(a) a relevant criminal activity, where the relevant crime is an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory; or
(b) a relevant criminal activity, where the relevant crime:
(i) is an offence against a law of a State; and
(ii) has a federal aspect.
27 "Relevant criminal activity", in turn, means "any circumstances implying, or any allegations, that a relevant crime may have been, may be being, or may in future be, committed against a law of the Commonwealth, of a State or of a Territory", while "relevant crime" means, relevantly, "serious and organised crime" (s 4(1), ACC Act). "Serious and organised crime" is defined to include, among other things, tax evasion involving two or more offenders, substantial planning and organisation, the use of sophisticated methods and techniques, and is ordinarily committed in conjunction with other offences of a like kind (s 4(1), ACC Act).
28 The Board of the ACC is established by s 7B and is constituted by the CEO and the heads of various state and federal government agencies, namely, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Secretary of the Department, the CEO of Customs, the Chairperson of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Director-General of Security, the Commissioner or head of each of the State and Territory police forces, and the Commissioner of Taxation (s 7B(2), ACC Act). As such, the Board's decision-making takes into account state/federal interests, the interests of particular police forces and prosecuting authorities, and certain Commonwealth agencies. Furthermore, in performing its functions under the Act, the ACC is required, so far as practicable, to work in cooperation with "law enforcement agencies" as defined in s 4(1), namely, the AFP, a State Police Force, or any other authority or person responsible for enforcing Commonwealth or State laws (s 17(1), ACC Act).
29 Pursuant to s 7C of the ACC Act, the Board's functions include:
(c) to authorise, in writing, the ACC to undertake intelligence operations or to investigate matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity;
(d) to determine, in writing, whether such an operation is a special operation or whether such investigation is a special investigation;
(e) to determine, in writing, the class or classes of persons to participate in such an operation or investigation;
(f) to establish task forces;
(g) to disseminate to law enforcement agencies or foreign law enforcement agencies, or to any other agency or body of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory prescribed by the regulations, strategic criminal intelligence assessments provided to the Board by the ACC...
30 The authorisation by the Board of a "special ACC operation/investigation" in accordance with its functions under s 7C(c)-(e) is a necessary precondition for the exercise of certain coercive powers conferred by the ACC Act, including, relevantly, the power under s 28 to summon a person to give evidence and produce documents at an examination vested in an examiner.
31 By s 4(1), a "special ACC operation/investigation" means:
(a) an intelligence operation that the ACC is undertaking and that the Board has determined to be a special operation; or
(b) an investigation into matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity that the ACC is conducting and that the Board has determined to be a special investigation.
32 It is apparent from the definition of "intelligence operation" (set out at [26] above) that while the primary focus of an "intelligence operation" is not investigation, nonetheless the functions are not mutually exclusive. As Logan J held in QAAB v Australian Crime Commission [2014] FCA 747 (QAAB) at [15], "[t]he definition of 'intelligence operation' is such that there is no necessary statutory antipathy between such an operation and the asking of questions by the examiner that relate to a 'federally relevant criminal activity'. That is so even though the ACC Act also contemplates (s 7A(c)) that the ACC may, after Board authorisation, directly conduct 'an investigation into matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity'."
33 The term "investigation" is not defined but is used in the Act in contradistinction to the "collecting" of criminal intelligence. This suggests, in my opinion, that "investigation" bears its ordinary meaning, namely, a searching inquiry to ascertain facts (see by analogy Taciak v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1995) 59 FCR 285 at 294; Health Insurance Commission v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544. However, as I later explain (at [143]), I do not consider that this means that intelligence cannot be collected in the course of investigation. The two functions are by their nature not mutually exclusive. Rather the difference between an intelligence operation and an investigation is ultimately a difference in direction or purpose.
34 Section 7C confers power on the Board to determine special ACC operations and investigations, subject to certain conditions:
Special operations
(2) The Board may determine, in writing, that an intelligence operation is a special operation. Before doing so, it must consider whether methods of collecting the criminal information and intelligence that do not involve the use of powers in this Act have been effective.
Note 1: See also subsection 7G(4) for the voting rule that applies in relation to such a determination.
Note 2: See also Division 2 for the examination powers available if there is a special operation.
Special investigations
(3) The Board may determine, in writing, that an investigation into matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity is a special investigation. Before doing so, it must consider whether ordinary police methods of investigation into the matters are likely to be effective.
Note 1: See also subsection 7G(4) for the voting rule that applies in relation to such a determination.
Note 2: See also Division 2 for the examination powers available if there is a special investigation.
35 As I later explain, the reference to "effective" in s 7C(3) has been interpreted as meaning "effective to permit the laying of charges against offenders": X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 (X7) at [146] (Hayne and Bell JJ, with whom Kiefel J agreed); see further at [283] below.
36 The Board cannot determine that an intelligence operation/investigation is a special intelligence operation/investigation unless, exceptionally, at least nine Board members (including at least two Commonwealth Board members) vote in favour of making the determination (s 7G(4)). A determination under s 7C(2) or (3) has immediate effect (s 7C(6)).
37 By s 7C(4), a determination under subsection (2) or (3) must contain certain details, namely:
(a) describe the general nature of the circumstances or allegations constituting the federally relevant criminal activity; and
(b) state that the relevant crime is, or the relevant crimes are or include, an offence or offences against a law of the Commonwealth, a law of a Territory or a law of a State but need not specify the particular offence or offences; and
(c) set out the purpose of the operation or investigation.
38 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Australian Crime Commission Establishment Bill 2002 (the ACC Explanatory Memorandum 2002) highlighted the importance of these conditions on the exercise of the power in s 7C(1) at p. 9, explaining that the threshold tests contained in ss 7C(2) and (3) "provide an important safeguard on the exercise of coercive powers under the Act", while the detail required by s 7C(4) "sets the parameters for the operation of investigation and represents another important safeguard on the exercise of coercive powers under the Act."
39 While, however, the Board has the power to determine that an operation/investigation is a special ACC operation or investigation, and to allocate an examiner to that special operation/investigation under s 46A(3), the coercive powers then available to be exercised are not vested in the Board. Only an examiner is vested with the power under s 24A to conduct an examination for the purposes of a special ACC operation/investigation. Equally, under s 25A(1), the examiner determines how proceedings at an examination are to be conducted subject to certain statutory requirements.
40 Importantly, while the examiner is part of the ACC by reason of s 7(2), the independence of the examiner is apparent from a number of features of the ACC Act. The examiner is not a member of the Board of the ACC, and therefore has no vote, among other things, on a determination that an intelligence operation/investigation is a special intelligence operation/investigation. An examiner is appointed not by the Board but by the Governor-General, holding full time office for the period specified in the instrument of appointment, and his or her appointment can be terminated only by the Governor-General on specified grounds (s 46H). Separate provision is also made under ss 46C and 46D for remuneration and terms of employment of an examiner, and an examiner cannot engage in paid employment outside the duties of his or her office without ministerial approval (s 46G). Examiners also have the same protection and immunity in the performance of their functions and exercise of their powers as a Justice of the High Court of Australia (s 36(1)).
41 The independence of the examiner has also been described as "an important safeguard to the exercise of the coercive powers": ACC Explanatory Memorandum 2002 at p. 16. In light of the legislative scheme and in particular, the provisions to ensure the independence of examiners, the power relevantly of an examiner to summon a person to appear to give evidence on oath is, in my opinion, exercisable by the examiner solely in the exercise of his or her independent discretion. Indeed all parties proceeded on this premise. If so, it would seem to follow in my view that, in exercising those powers, he or she does not act as an employee of the ACC: see by analogy Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 626. Nor can he or she act, as the applicants allege, at the dictation of another. Conversely, an examiner cannot decide to give examination material to any particular body or agency. That discretion is vested in the CEO and his or her delegates.
42 It may also follow from the fact that the examiner gathers such evidence in the exercise of an independent statutory discretion that the record of the examination and associated documents are not in the ACC's possession until the examiner has given that record to the head of the special ACC operation/investigation on conclusion of the examination in accordance with s 25A(15) notwithstanding that he or she is part of the ACC. If so, it is only at that point that the record of the examination is thereby potentially liable to be disseminated to other agencies under s 59(7) of the ACC Act by the CEO. However, that is not a question put in issue.
43 At the relevant time, s 59(7) of the ACC Act imposed conditions on the exercise of the power to disseminate information in the ACC's possession in the following terms:
The CEO may give to:
(a) any law enforcement agency; or
(b) any foreign law enforcement agency; or
(c) any other agency or body of the Commonwealth, a State or a territory prescribed by the regulations;
any information that is in the ACC's possession and that is relevant to the activities of that agency or body if:
(d) it appears to the CEO to be appropriate to do so; and
(e) to do so would not be contrary to a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that would otherwise apply.
44 It was not in issue that the ATO was an agency of the Commonwealth prescribed by regulations for the purposes of s 59(7) at all material times: see reg 9 and Sched 6, Part 1, item 113, Australian Crime Commission Regulations 2002 (Cth).
45 Subsequently the ACC Act was amended in 2012 and s 59(7) of the AAC Act was substituted by a new provision, s 59AA, which, with other provisions, was intended to make it express that the Commission's power to disseminate material to law enforcement agencies and the Commission's obligation to provide admissible material to prosecuting authorities in s 12, were subordinate to the obligation to make appropriate non-publication directions under s 25A(9).
46 These provisions of the ACC Act are complemented by s 355-70(1) of Schedule 1 to the TAA which creates an exemption in prescribed circumstances to the prohibition under s 355-25(1) on disclosure by a taxation officer of "protected information", being information disclosed or obtained under a taxation law relating to an entity which identifies the entity (s 355-30(1)). Relevantly, the section exempts disclosure to "a Project Wickenby officer, or a court or tribunal" where disclosure "(a) is for or in connection with a purpose of the Project Wickenby taskforce; and (b) is made before 1 July 2015, or a later prescribed day": s 355-25(1)(b); item 3. The "purposes of the Project Wickenby taskforce" are defined in s 355-70(9) as being to:
(a) detect; and
(b) deter; and
(c) investigate; and
(d) enforce the law relating to;
the promotion of or participation in arrangements of an international character, or purported international character, that relate to one or more of the following:
(e) tax avoidance or evasion;
(f) breaches of laws regulating financial markets and corporations;
(g) criminal activity in the nature of fraud or obtaining benefits by deception (including deceiving investors or creditors);
(h) money laundering;
(i) concealing income or assets.
47 An entity is a "Project Wickenby officer" if the entity holds an office in, or is employed in, or is performing services for a Project Wickenby taskforce agency or supporting agency and performs duties that relates to a purpose of the Wickenby taskforce (s 355-70(6), Schedule 1, TAA). "Project Wickenby task force agency" is defined to mean the ATO, the ACC, the AFP, ASIC, the CDPP and prescribed agencies. Item 3 of s 355-70 therefore provides a mechanism whereby information obtained by the ATO may be provided to the ACC and other Wickenby taskforce participants without breaching the general prohibition in s 355-25(1) on disclosure by a taxation officer of protected information.
48 Finally, where the ACC obtains "admissible evidence" through an ACC operation or investigation of an offence, it is required to provide that evidence to the State or Commonwealth Attorney General (as the case may be), the relevant law enforcement agency, or any other person or authority authorised to prosecute the offence: s 12(1), ACC Act. Plainly where the immunity in s 30(5) has been invoked by a person giving evidence at an ACC examination, the examination information will not be "admissible evidence" and s 12(1) will not apply.