LFX24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 210

1. To obtain assistance in this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is therefore necessary to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal began by identifying the visa decision under review (at [1]-[2]). The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant had appeared before the Tribunal to provide oral evidence and present arguments at hearing (at [3]).
3. The Tribunal set out the applicant's reasons for leaving Malaysia and claiming protection in Australia as per his visa application (at [6]). The Tribunal then outlined the evidence which the applicant gave at the Tribunal hearing, as follows (at [7]-[13]):
   • In 2007, the applicant owned and operated a successful snooker business which he and his family lived adjacent to.
   • In 2016, the applicant brought on a business partner who brought online gambling to the business. The applicant thought everything was running smoothly until the business partner was shot dead.
   • The applicant learned that the business partner had been involved in drugs, and that he must now pay both a cash debt and drug debt to the gang members, else the same fate befall him.
   • The gang members kept disturbing the applicant for 6-7 months. On one occasion, they beat him up, and on another occasion, they brought knives and guns and tore the carpet off the snooker table, and would shout at and threaten the applicant.
   • The gang members threatened the applicant that they would kill his family if he reported them to the police.
   • The applicant eventually decided to close his business as he considered it was not safe and it was not profitable because customers were leaving it.
   • The applicant's wife and children, who remain living at the same house in Malaysia, have never been contacted by anyone in relation to the cash or drug debt, although his wife is concerned about a stranger that sits in front of the shop.
   • The applicant acknowledged that there had been no contact from the gang members in over five years but that they were not to be underestimated.
   • The applicant stated he would be at risk of being tortured if he returned to Malaysia, and that he would be at risk of harm because he is a familiar face in the local community.
   • Gang members could find him anywhere in Malaysia, and the police cannot protect him because the police are corrupt in Malaysia.
4. The applicant agreed with the Tribunal's observation that the harm he feared was directed primarily at him because of his connection with the business partner and the snooker business and not for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (at [10]).
5. The Tribunal then set out the relevant legislative criteria for a protection visa under s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), including the refugee and complementary protection criteria, and the mandatory considerations contained within Ministerial Direction No. 84 (at [14]-[20]).
6. The Tribunal accepted the applicant's evidence, which it found to be credible, noting that the applicant's oral evidence remained consistent with the written claims in his protection visa application five years earlier (at [24]).
7. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had a subjective fear of harm from gang members in Malaysia, but did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of harm from the gang if he returned to Malaysia (at [26]). Specifically, the Tribunal found (at [27]):

The applicant's business partner...was shot dead six years ago. The applicant left Malaysia five years ago. The applicant closed the snooker business. The applicant has had no contact with the gang since he left Malaysia. The applicant's family, despite living across the road from the snooker business (now closed), has not had any contact from the gang. I accept that the applicant's wife may have observed someone strange nearby to the closed business, however I consider after the passage of time and lack of contact the person is not likely to be from the gang.

1. The Tribunal therefore found that the chance of the gang pursuing the applicant to cause harm was remote (at [28]).
2. The Tribunal found that the evidence did not establish a real chance that the gang who shot the applicant's business partner would seek to harm the applicant if he returned to Malaysia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal also found there was not a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to significant harm from the gang as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to Malaysia (at [29]).
3. The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act (at [30]-[32]).
4. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (at [33]).

1. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 23 December 2024 contains five grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
   1. Error in Fact-Finding and Misapplication of Legal Test:

The Tribunal erred in concluding that the applicant does not face a "real chance" of persecution under s 5J(1). The Tribunal failed to adequately consider the applicant's fear of harm as a person associated with Raul's drug-related activities, which persists irrespective of the passage of time.

1. Failure to Consider the Corruption and Lack of Protection in Malaysia:

The Tribunal erred by not properly considering the applicant's claim that Malaysian authorities are corrupt and unable to protect individuals from gang violence, which directly relates to s 5J(1)(c) and s 36(2)(aa).

1. Failure to Properly Apply the Refugee and Complementary Protection Criteria:

The Tribunal's reliance on the passage of time and lack of recent contact with the gang did not account for the applicant's well-documented fear that Malaysian gangs are pervasive and can track individuals over extended periods. This error led to the Tribunal incorrectly concluding that the applicant does not meet the complementary protection criteria under s 36(2)(aa).

1. Procedural Unfairness:

The Tribunal failed to give proper weight to the applicant's credible testimony and evidence, including the systemic corruption in Malaysia and the gang's capability to retaliate against perceived adversaries, which deprived the applicant of a fair assessment of their claims.

1. Failure to Consider Cumulative Risk:

The Tribunal failed to consider the cumulative effect of the applicant's credible claims, including physical harm, trauma, and the inability to obtain state protection, when assessing the complementary protection criteria.

1. The applicant appeared before the Court on 5 November 2025 without legal representation. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
2. The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 19 December 2024 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 5 November 2025), a Court Book numbering 139 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 22 October 2025.
3. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228 at [18]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decision and/or procedure.
4. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Wu Shan Liang)) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);

(e) where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant's claims (or integers of the claims) made (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [111] (SZRKT));

(f) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(g) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and he should attempt to tell the Court why he said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. When invited to address the Court as to what the Tribunal did wrong, the applicant stated that the Tribunal did not understand his problem. When asked to elaborate, the applicant told the Court that he had been targeted by gangsters and had suffered beatings and property damage following the murder of his business partner.
3. The applicant requested the Court allow him "more time" so that his daughters could finish school and avoid spoiling their studies. The Court reiterated that it does not have the power to extend a visa and can only perform the task before it, which is to consider whether or not the Tribunal's decision was affected by error.
4. During the hearing, the applicant advised the Court that he had a speech impediment and found it difficult to speak at times. The Court was mindful of this throughout the hearing and ensured that the applicant was provided with an opportunity to advance further submissions if required. Furthermore, when asked by the Court as to whether he felt like he had an adequate opportunity to present his case at the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he had. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant has had a meaningful opportunity to present his case.

1. As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains five grounds asserting jurisdictional error. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant's grounds as broadly as possible (per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392).

1. Grounds one and two contend that the Tribunal failed to consider aspects of the applicant's claims with respect to his fear of harm and the alleged corruption and lack of protection from the Malaysian authorities in relation to gang violence.
2. The Minister submitted that these grounds should fail on the basis that the Tribunal had given full consideration to the information provided by the applicant in his visa application, and had further regard to the evidence provided by the applicant when appearing before the Tribunal. Furthermore, the Minister submitted that the above grounds also invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review contrary to the long-standing principle set out in authorities such as Wu Shan Liang.
3. The Court accepts that the Tribunal decision demonstrates thorough engagement with the applicant's claim to fear harm relating to his association with the former business partner's drug-related activities. In its decision, the Tribunal clearly recounted the reasons provided by the applicant in his protection visa application with respect to his claims, as well as the detailed evidence given by the applicant before the Tribunal.
4. As submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal considered the applicant's fear of harm but found that the gang had likely lost interest in pursuing the applicant owing to the passage of time, the closure of the business and the lack of contact from the gang. There is a cogent rationale, on the evidence before it, underlying the Tribunal's rejection that the applicant would suffer harm from the gang who shot his business partner in the event he returned to Malaysia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
5. Furthermore, regarding the applicant's claims concerning police corruption and lack of protection in Malaysia, the Court accepts the Minister's submission that it remained unnecessary for the Tribunal to make a finding in relation to the police, as the Tribunal had found there was no real chance that the applicant would suffer harm from the gang who shot the business partner. That is, it was unnecessary to make a finding on that matter because a factual premise upon which that contention rested had already been rejected (see WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] 236 FCR 593 at [47]).
6. No jurisdictional error arises with respect to grounds one and two.

1. Grounds three and five contend that the Tribunal failed to properly apply the complementary protection criterion pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
2. As submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal identified the statutory task before it and correctly outlined the law relating to the criteria for a protection visa (at [14]-[19]). There is no error in the Tribunal's understanding or application of these requirements. To the extent that the applicant claims that the Tribunal's findings in respect of complementary protection were reliant upon its findings in respect of the refugee criterion, the Court accepts that this approach is permissible (see DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; (2021) 273 CLR 1 at [27]).
3. The Court accepts that the Tribunal had considered the entirety of the applicant's protection claims and found that the gang had ultimately lost interest in pursuing the applicant. This led the Tribunal to reasonably draw a conclusion that the chance of the gang pursuing and causing harm to the applicant was remote.
4. The Tribunal's findings were open to it on the evidence before it and there is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's claims. Whilst the Tribunal acknowledged the credibility and genuineness of the applicant's evidence, ultimately it could not be satisfied that the applicant's claims established there was anything more than a remote chance of harm. Accordingly, there was a rational basis to conclude that the applicant did not meet the complementary protection criterion.
5. No jurisdictional error arises with respect to grounds three and five.

1. Ground four contends that the Tribunal erred in failing to give proper weight to the applicant's testimony and evidence.
2. The Minister submitted that, whilst the applicant and his evidence was accepted to be credible, the Tribunal did not consider that evidence to be relevant given the findings it had made in relation to the applicant not being of interest to the gang.
3. It is well established that the weight to be placed upon any evidence is a matter for the Tribunal (NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]) subject to legal reasonableness. The Court accepts the Minister's submission that the weight given to the applicant's evidence was reasonable, and reveals no procedural unfairness for the reasons advanced by the Minister in their submissions.
4. The Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations in accordance with ss 357A and 360 of the Act by inviting the applicant to attend a hearing to present arguments and provide supporting evidence. The applicant availed himself of that opportunity and the Tribunal duly considered the applicant's arguments as evidence in support of his claims for protection, thereby demonstrating the Tribunal's invitation to attend was not "a hollow shell or an empty gesture" (see Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1759; (2000) 183 ALR 188 (at [31]).
5. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground four.
6. The Court also asked counsel for the Minister whether there were any matters which her client, who is subject to direction to behave as a model litigant, wished to draw the Court's attention in terms of any concerns or doubts about the Tribunal's decision. In response, counsel for the Minister drew the Court's attention to the Tribunal's finding regarding the secure living arrangements of the applicant's family in Malaysia as being one of the cumulative reasons why the Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a real chance of harm. The Minister submitted that, if this were to be considered a ground of review demonstrating illogicality in the Tribunal's reasons, it does not reach the well-established threshold of 'extreme illogicality' required to establish jurisdictional error (see SZRKT at [148]). The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's finding was open to it based on a clear logical connection between the Tribunal's earlier findings and the evidence given by the applicant before the Tribunal. The Court accepts this to be so.

1. The application for judicial review made by the applicant has failed to identify jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.