Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd v Barrett - [2017] NSWCA 243 - NSWCA 2017 case summary — Zoe

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Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd v Barrett

[2017] NSWCA 243

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2017-08-31|Before: Basten JA, Gleeson JA, Adamson J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2017-08-31

Before

Basten JA, Gleeson JA, Adamson J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (60 paragraphs)

[1]

x Mintex Pty Ltd v Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307 Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; [1993] HCA 78 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438; [1981] HCA 41 Gates v The City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 3 Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 Motorcycling Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly (2013) 86 NSWLR 55; [2013] NSWCA 361 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen [2016] NSWCA 88; (2016) 332 ALR 128 State of New South Wales v Briggs [2016] NSWCA 344 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] HCA 3; (1999) 73 ALJR 306 Steinberg v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 134 CLR 640; [1975] HCA 63 Texts Cited: J Dietrich, "Service Guarantees and Consequential Loss under the Australian Consumer Law: The Illusion of Uniformity" (2012) 20 Competition & Consumer LJ 43 R Douglas, "Interaction of the CLA and the TPA/ACL: The Battle Continues!" (2014) 11 Australian Civil Liability 2 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd (ACN 146 628 060) (Applicant) Dean Barrett (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: R Cavanagh SC/J Curtin (Applicant) C Hart/S McMahon (Respondent)

[2]

Solicitors: Colin Biggers & Paisley Pty Ltd (Applicant) Bale Boshev Lawyers (Respondent) File Number(s): 2016/365672 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Civil Citation: [2016] NSWDC 345 Date of Decision: 25 November 2016 Before: Gibson DCJ File Number(s): 2015/12071

[4]

Judgment

BASTEN and GLEESON JJA: The orders proposed by Adamson J should be made, for the reasons given by Adamson J, which deal with the case presented by the appellant in this Court. There were, however, additional problems with the manner in which the case was pleaded, run and determined below, which should not be left without comment.
The plaintiff pleaded his claims primarily by reference to ss 60 and 61 of the Australian Consumer Law, wrongly identified as those sections in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). That pleading required that the plaintiff be a "consumer" as defined in s 3 of the Australian Consumer Law, and not, as pleaded, by reference to the definition in s 51ACA of the Competition and Consumer Act, dealing with industry codes. As limited attention was given to whether or not the plaintiff was a "consumer" acquiring services, pursuant to s 3(3) of the Australian Consumer Law, it would have been appropriate to refer to the presumption in s 3(10).
The primary basis of claim turned on s 60 of the Australian Consumer Law which provides as follows: 60 Guarantee as to due care and skill If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, services to a consumer, there is a guarantee that the services will be rendered with due care and skill. Section 61 involves additional issues and relevantly provides: 61 Guarantees as to fitness for a particular purpose etc. (1) If: (a) a person (the supplier) supplies, in trade or commerce, services to a consumer; and (b) the consumer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the supplier any particular purpose for which the services are being acquired by the consumer; there is a guarantee that the services, and any product resulting from the services, will be reasonably fit for that purpose. … (3) This section does not apply if the circumstances show that the consumer did not rely on, or that it was unreasonable for the consumer to rely on, the skill or judgment of the supplier.
These provisions require careful attention to the "services" which were provided. The statement of claim identified them as "scuba diving" and stated that the services included "the provision of adequate and safe equipment and supervision during the provision of the services." The failure to identify the services with precision caused difficulties in identifying what were relevant breaches of the s 60 guarantee and in demonstrating causation.
The defendant relied upon ss 5G and 5H of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (obvious risk), s 5I (inherent risk), s 5L (dangerous recreational activity), s 5M (risk warning) and s 5N (waiver). In dealing with the relationship between the Australian Consumer Law and the Civil Liability Act, the Court was invited (an invitation which was accepted) to apply the principles identified by Meagher JA in Motorcycling Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly. [1] That was not entirely helpful. That case turned in part on the operation of s 74(2A) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), as then in force, which was not expressed in the terms of a guarantee but in the terms of an implied warranty incorporated into the contract between the supplier and the consumer. That section has been replaced by s 275 of the Australian Consumer Law. Further, the application of State law also depended on the operation of s 68B of the Trade Practices Act, which has been replaced by s 139A of the Competition and Consumer Act. Ultimately, this case did not turn on any contractual exclusion of liability. Because s 74(2A) dealt with breaches of an implied warranty, rather than failure to comply with a guarantee, to the extent that it saved the operation of the Civil Liability Act, it was necessary to have regard to the specific terms of the relevant provisions of the Civil Liability Act with respect to a course of action based on a statutory guarantee, rather than a contractual warranty.
The plaintiff's pleading assumed, no doubt correctly, that the standard set by the guarantee of "due care and skill" could properly be equated with the common law duty to take reasonable care, if the scope of the services was adequately identified. (Negligence was relied upon as an alternative cause of action.) However, a different analysis was required with respect to the guarantee of fitness for a particular purpose, language which was not addressed at the trial. [2] With respect to damages, attention should also be paid to s 267 of the Australian Consumer Law.
In addition, it may be appropriate in some cases to proceed under the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), Pt 3 of which picks up and applies as New South Wales law the Australian Consumer Law. [3] Under s 4(6) of the Fair Trading Act, the Civil Liability Act is "paramount legislation" and in the case of inconsistency prevails over that Act, but not the Australian Consumer Law (NSW). Accordingly, the relationship of the Australian Consumer Law (NSW) with the Civil Liability Act depends on the effect of s 275 of the Australian Consumer Law, operating as State law.
There was also some confusion in the Court below as to the operation of the so-called "good samaritan" provisions in Pt 8 of the Civil Liability Act. Section 57 provides immunity from civil liability for one who "comes to the assistance of a person who is apparently injured or at risk of being injured." [4] The reference to "good samaritan" appeared in a somewhat inarticulate paragraph in the statement of claim alleging a particular of breach of duty in so far as the defendant advised Mr Moore to dive down to alert the plaintiff of his, Mr Moore's, difficulties, thus placing him at risk of injury "for which events the plaintiff would be bound to act as a good Samaritan and/or otherwise come to his aid". The trial judge noted submissions that the plaintiff "may have been a good Samaritan in getting [Mr] Moore out of the water and on board the vessel following the dive" but that "the plaintiff ceased to be a good Samaritan thereafter". These submissions should have been dismissed as incoherent. Nobody had sued the plaintiff; it is a defendant who obtains immunity from liability for acting as a "good samaritan". So far as the plaintiff was concerned, the provisions in Pt 8 of the Civil Liability Act were simply irrelevant.
ADAMSON J: I have had the benefit of reading the joint judgment of Basten and Gleeson JJA in draft. As the matters raised by their Honours were not the subject of argument in this Court and did not require determination for the purposes of the appeal I would prefer not to express a view about them.
By amended notice of appeal filed 6 July 2017, Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd (the appellant, or the defendant), appealed against the orders for judgments in favour of Dean Barrett (the respondent, or the plaintiff) made by Gibson DCJ on 25 November 2016 and 16 December 2016. The grounds challenged the finding of liability and the assessment of damages, in so far as it related to damages for loss of earning capacity.
The following narrative comprises agreed or incontrovertible facts, except where otherwise indicated.

[8]

The prelude to the dive

The front of the vessel was attached to the mooring above the wreck. The persons on the boat arranged themselves in pairs in accordance with the "buddy" system used for scuba diving, whereby scuba divers dive in pairs so that one can keep an eye on the other for safety reasons.
The plaintiff normally preferred to go in last but, as it happened, he jumped in with Mr Moore who was, other than the plaintiff, the last diver to enter the water. They were each other's "buddy" for the purposes of the buddy system. As far as the plaintiff could recall, he did not have any discussion with Mr Moore before jumping into the water on the port (left) side.
Mr Moore was diving with twin tanks which were filled with a combination of nitrogen and oxygen (known as nitrox) which comprised 33% oxygen and 67% nitrogen. He also had what was described as a "pony bottle", which was 50% oxygen and 50% nitrogen and provided an additional source of gas. Mr Moore was also wearing a dive computer on his wrist. Mr Moore was wearing a dry suit or a semi-dry wetsuit. Unlike a wet suit, which absorbs water, a dry suit can alter buoyancy by using the air from the tanks attached to it. Mr Moore also had a GoPro camera which was mounted onto his head, the footage of which has been referred to above.
The plaintiff was diving with a single tank of air, which comprised 21% oxygen, with the balance being mainly nitrogen. He had a dive computer which was attached to his buoyancy control device (BCD). The computer logged the dive and produced a graph showing depth over time. According to the plaintiff, a dive computer sounded an alarm when the controls set by the computer for time of ascent were exceeded.
After the plaintiff and Mr Moore got into the water, they "worked [their] way around to the front". The plaintiff did not notice anything particular about Mr Moore. The water was choppy. When they reached the front of the boat, they gave each other the signal to go down. The plaintiff ducked his head under the water and waited for Mr Moore to begin his descent. He saw Mr Moore descend very fast next to him but he was not alarmed, although such a descent was not normal. The plaintiff followed Mr Moore. When they reached the bottom they found themselves about 10m away from, and in front of, the wreck.
The plaintiff observed that Mr Moore was lying on his side "playing around" with his camera and his mask. The plaintiff helped him upright and they confirmed to each other that they were both "okay" to continue. Notwithstanding that Mr Moore had given the "okay" signal, he continued to "play" with his mask and camera again. Water entered the mask, which Mr Moore endeavoured to clear, without much success. The plaintiff's initial impression was that Mr Moore was slightly unbalanced due to the quantity of gear, including the pony bottle which appeared to be making him fall to the right. The plaintiff noticed that Mr Moore's hood was under the edge of his mask, which was letting water come into the mask. Mr Moore continued to signal to the plaintiff that he wished to continue the dive. After a few minutes, Mr Moore turned his GoPro camera on. The film depicts (and the plaintiff confirmed in his evidence in chief) that the plaintiff took the pony bottle from Mr Moore. The plaintiff said that he believed that this was what was causing Mr Moore to be unbalanced. The plaintiff dropped one of his weights when he was trying to connect Mr Moore's pony bottle to his own gear. Mr Moore picked it up and returned it to him. Mr Moore continued to film the wreck but eventually, after about 15 minutes, he indicated that he wanted to finish the dive because he was having so many problems with his gear.
As they were some distance from the anchor line, the plan was to ascend at a slight angle, following the contours of the wreck. They signalled to each other to confirm that they would head to the line, which was at the other end of the wreck. According to the plaintiff, when they reached the back of the wreck, Mr Moore was still having difficulties with his equipment and began a free (uncontrolled) ascent. The plaintiff grabbed Mr Moore to try to control his ascent. They conferred again by using hand signals and decided that they would go towards the line. On the way, Mr Moore started ascending more quickly and directly to the surface. The plaintiff followed him. The plaintiff's computer sounded alarms to signify that he was ascending too quickly. It appears from the timer on the GoPro that Mr Moore surfaced about 13 minutes after activating the GoPro about 4 minutes into the dive.
When the plaintiff reached the surface, Mr Moore was lying on the surface and did not respond to the plaintiff calling his name. The plaintiff turned him over so that he was facing the sky and towed him about 20m back to the boat. When they reached the boat, the plaintiff handed the equipment to Mr Shorter. The plaintiff opened Mr Moore's airways and then he piggybacked Mr Moore up the steps onto the boat. Mr Shorter may have helped him and Mr Moore, who had regained consciousness, may also have been able to help himself by this stage although the plaintiff could not recall.
Once they were on the boat, Mr Shorter attached Mr Moore to the oxygen supply in the "C" cylinder, using the oxy viva kit, which included a Hudson mask. The plaintiff was asked how long the oxygen supply from the "C" cylinder would last. He made a few guesses (30 minutes, then 10 minutes if two people were using it) and confirmed that there are calculations that can be performed as to how long a "C" cylinder filled with pure oxygen would last.
The plaintiff's evidence was that at some point after he returned to the boat he grabbed Mr Moore's pony bottle which, as referred to above, was 50% air and 50% nitrogen. He said that he did so: "Because there was nothing else available and that's the next best thing."
The plaintiff said that he did not observe any other source of pure oxygen on the vessel. At some stage Mr Moore vomited into a bucket. The plaintiff advised him to keep breathing the pure oxygen from the "C" cylinder. It was about 23 minutes before they left the mooring to return to Port Stephens. According to the plaintiff's evidence in chief, the oxygen ran out not long after they left the mooring. According to the plaintiff, it took about 1½ hours to return to the marina as they were also picking up Mr Moore's equipment which was drifting. The plaintiff's estimate was greatly in excess of estimates given by other witnesses.
When they arrived at the marina, Mr Moore's wife was waiting for them and she drove Mr Moore to the medical centre at Nelson Bay. The plaintiff followed them and accompanied them into the medical centre. He told the doctor what had happened on the dive. The doctor treated Mr Moore. There was no suggestion that the plaintiff thought that he required treatment and no suggestion that anyone else, including the doctor who examined Mr Moore, considered that he required treatment.
The plaintiff said that he did not perceive that he had any symptoms until that evening when he started to get headaches, the like of which he had not experienced previously.
The plaintiff said that a couple of weeks after the incident he visited Mr Moore, who told him that he had been hit on the head by the vessel before he commenced the dive. The plaintiff confirmed that he had not seen this occur on the day and had not been aware of it until Mr Moore told him about it a fortnight later. According to the plaintiff, Mr Moore told him that he had suffered a "near drowning".

[11]

After the dive

The plaintiff was asked about what he said to Mr Moore, which is recorded in his transcript of the GoPro recording at 28:13: "so what we are going to do is . . . get your wife to take you up to the hospital just for a check up alright, because they're going to have to, so take the oxy with you".
The transcript recorded the plaintiff's action after making that statement as follows: "(Indicates that it is a totally portable unit ie Oxy-viva with "C" size cylinder)."
The plaintiff agreed that the transcript recorded (at 32:42) that Mr Shorter said: "We have plenty of air, plenty of O2". The plaintiff agreed that the boat began its trip back to the marina at 36.21 on the GoPro recording. He agreed that he had a discussion with Mr Shorter, in the course of which Mr Shorter told him about the clinic which was open "24/7". The transcript recorded the following exchange at about 36:51: "AS [Adam Shorter] It's your group, whatever you want. DB [the plaintiff] What do you usually do? AS . . . I would put him in a car and take him up, that would be the cheapest option, an ambulance is going to cost. Mate it's up to you."
Notwithstanding this evidence, the plaintiff did not agree that the "C" cylinder did not run out on the boat. When it was put to him that in the incident report he had recorded (as set out below): "Kept on O2 till arrival at hospital. (Nelson Bay)", he said that it was a "typo" (although he had written it by hand) and that he should have written "nitrox" instead of "O2". When it was put to the plaintiff that at no time had he asked Mr Shorter for any oxygen for himself, he responded, "It's implied". He agreed that he had confirmed to Mr Shorter that he was all right in response to Mr Shorter's inquiry on the boat. The plaintiff accepted that he did not perceive any symptoms while he was on the vessel that he regarded as associated with decompression illness.
The plaintiff agreed in cross-examination that the oxygen delivery from the "C" cylinder through the Hudson mask would be at a concentration of between 40-60% oxygen and that using a regulator to breathe through the pony bottle with its concentration of 50% oxygen and 50% nitrogen would be "about the same".

[12]

Mr Moore's version of the dive

Mr Moore was suffering from an unrelated terminal illness at the time of the trial in June 2016. In 2015 he had prepared a statement with the assistance of his own solicitors for purposes unrelated to the present proceedings. The statement was produced on subpoena in October 2015 and access was granted to the parties. On 23 October 2015 the plaintiff uplifted the subpoenaed documents which included Mr Moore's statement. The plaintiff became aware of the contents of the statement a few months before the trial commenced. Mr Moore could not be cross-examined because of his illness. The statement was marked by the trial judge as a "court exhibit" and admitted into evidence. In his statement, Mr Moore said, of present relevance: "5. I asked [the plaintiff] to check the setup of the regulator on my equipment. I was concerned that I had not prepared the regulator correctly. 6. I observed that [the plaintiff] checked the hoses and regulator on my equipment. [The plaintiff] then said words to the effect 'it is connected correctly'. . . . 9. When I arrived at the boat I commenced putting on my diving equipment. A person Rowan said to me words to the effect 'the hoses are not connected correctly'. I then said to [the plaintiff] words to the effect 'I don't want to go ahead with a dive as I don't feel right'. [The plaintiff] replied 'shut up and get ready'. 10. When we arrived at the site of the dive [the plaintiff] entered the water first. 11. I plunged into the water feet first with my equipment on. I endeavoured to find the rope to guide me to the dive area. A swell in the water lifted about the bow of the boat and caused the bow of the boat to strike me on the head. 12. [The plaintiff] had already submerged for the dive without me. 13. After the bow of the boat struck me in the head I said to the staff on the boat that I was aborting the dive. 14. The staff on the boat advised me that I would have to tell [the plaintiff] that I wanted to abort the dive. However [the plaintiff] had already submerged toward the dive site being the Oakland Shipwreck. 15. I submerged for the purpose of locating [the plaintiff] to advise that I wished to abort the dive. I did not feel well and wanted to abort the dive and get to the surface as soon as possible. 16. I felt very unco-ordinated while diving and felt that my balance in the dive was not appropriate. 17. When I located [the plaintiff] he took my pony tank and later my gopro camera. 18. I signalled to [the plaintiff] that I was aborting the dive and returning to the surface. [The plaintiff] did not assist me to return to the surface. I recall that I was making a motion of riding a bike which was something a diver in distress sometimes does. 19. During my ascent to the surface I stopped on the way up but only for a few minutes. I had my computer watch on my wrist. The computer watch is designed to warn a diver if a diver is ascending too quickly. The watch did not give any indication that I was ascending too quickly. 20. I do not recall reaching the surface. I am of the view that I must have lost consciousness. When I came to, someone had manoeuvred me to the ladder of the boat. 21. The staff on the boat were yelling at me 'to get my arse in the boat'. 22. I somehow managed to pull myself up the ladder of the boat and got into the boat. . . . 24. When I gained access to the boat the staff on the boat gave me oxygen. 25. I was still feeling unwell and vomited. I vomited up some blueberries that I had eaten for breakfast that morning. 26. After being ill I sat in the cabin of the boat with the skipper of the boat and Rowan. The skipper of the boat and Rowan had placed an oxygen mask on and I was breathing oxygen. 27. When breathing the oxygen I observed that [the plaintiff] was outside the cabin talking to other people on the boat. 28. I have no recollection of [the plaintiff] asking for oxygen. I am aware that there were other tanks on the boat. I recall [the plaintiff] saying that he was 'okay'. [The plaintiff] was talking with everyone on the boat during the journey back to shore and showed no signs of distress. 29. [The plaintiff] checked on me occasionally whilst I was in the cabin returning to shore. 30. It appeared to me that the staff on the boat were concerned about my physical condition. 31. On return to the marina at Lets Go Adventures, I overheard some of the staff saying to [the plaintiff] words to the effect 'he should be taken to the polyclinic to be checked out'. The suggestion that I attend the polyclinic was not [the plaintiff]'s suggestion but rather that of the staff at the Lets Go Adventures. 32. [The plaintiff] accompanied me to the polyclinic at Nelson Bay. Whilst at the polyclinic [the plaintiff] did not ask for any treatment. 33. I was assessed at the polyclinic by a doctor. I was then observed by camera by a doctor from John Hunter hospital. 34. The doctor from the John Hunter hospital suggested I attend at the Prince of Wales hyperbaric chamber. I was taken by Westpac Rescue Helicopter to the Prince of Wales Hospital. I understand my attendance at the Prince of Wales Hospital was a precautionary measure. I was placed in the hyperbaric chamber at Prince of Wales Hospital for approximately 15 minutes. 35. After being in the hyperbaric chamber for approximately 15 minutes I was advised by the medical staff that I was not suffering from 'bends'. I discharged myself from Prince of Wales Hospital on the next day. 36. During the courses and other dives that I undertook with [the plaintiff] he said to me words to the effect 'I have suffered the bends whilst diving in the Navy'. . . ."

[15]

The incident report form prepared in respect of Mr Moore by the plaintiff on 17 January 2012

Two days later, the plaintiff filled in an incident report form concerning Mr Moore and submitted it to the Professional Association of Diving Instructors (PADI). He identified the extent of injury as "near drowning". His narrative of the incident is reproduced in full below because of its significance as a contemporaneous document prepared by the plaintiff about the dive: "Social Dive to SS Oakland on Sunday 15/1/12. My dive buddy was Mark Moore. We were the last 2 divers in the water as other divers had descended with Go dive guides. Mark was diving in new equipment but has previous twins + deep experience with 100+ dives. Depth was 26.3 mtrs on this dive on 33%. We descended but Mark obviously had problems with gear configuration. On the bottom I removed his sling tank as his weight/balance was awkward. He also had mask problems & task loaded with new equipment including camera & new BCD [buoyancy control device]. He was still showing signs of awkwardness. I removed hood & camera. He was having problems with mask and balance still. I adjusted mask as he was having problems clearing it as his nose was protruding underneath. The dive was then aborted by Mark. He gave the impression of narcosis [decompression illness] but has previously dived to 40 mtrs with me before. We ascended to approx 16 mtrs & swam back along the wreck to the mooring line. He was still swimming awkward & breathing rapidly. We continued towards shot line to do safety stop. We had no deco obligations. When I turned around to check him I observed him rising to service (approx.) 12-8 mtrs. I swam after him trying to vent his and my BCD inflator & slow ascent. We both surfaced without safety stop. I saw he was breathing but not responsive. I attracted Adam Shorter's attention + towed Mark approx 10-15 mtrs to boat while talking to him to keep mouthpiece in as it was choppy to which he did I believe. At the boat I removed my equipment (single tank) & Mark's (twin tank) while Adam held him above water. Inflated & jettisoned the twins for later retrieval. At this period Mark was still unresponsive. I proceeded to lift him out of the water with assistance of Adam up the boat ladder. During this period Mark became responsive and assisted himself up the ladder with us. We laid him down. Put him on O2. He requested to sit up as was ok. Kept on O2 till arrival at hospital. (Nelson Bay) They contacted RPA for advice. Send to RPA by Westpac helicopter as precaution for treatment. Released following day. Has since reported nil DCI's [decompression illness] diagnosed salt water aspiration."

[23]

Ms Challen's evidence in chief

Ms Challen gave evidence about the defendant's business. She became a dive instructor in 2005 and a staff instructor in 2007, which meant that she was qualified to assist in teaching instructors. She became a master instructor in 2008. In 2006 she became qualified to teach a nitrox course. She was also qualified as a technical deep diving instructor. All her qualifications were issued by PADI except for her qualification as an instructor trainer, which was issued by Scuba Schools International (SSI). In addition to the Tomaree the defendant's business operated another boat, the Dive Away.
Ms Challen's evidence was that there was an oxy viva set with a "C" cylinder attached to it as well as a "D" cylinder and a regulator to go with it on the Tomaree in January 2012. She said that the "D" cylinder was kept in the wheelhouse (also known as the cabin or cab) on top of a bench on a red backpack. Ms Challen explained that each of the cylinders could provide oxygen to two people at once. Ms Challen was not on the boat that day as she was working in the shop.
As far as she could recall the plaintiff had been on the Tomaree about 50 times. Ms Challen confirmed that Mr Shorter's role that day was as coxswain and skipper of the boat. The two other employees of the defendant on the boat, Mr Jeffs and Mr Noble, were both dive masters. Ms Challen estimated that it would take, on average, 20 minutes to get from the marina to the dive site and, at most, 30 minutes if the boat was going into the swell and wind.
Ms Challen received a phone call from Mr Shorter while the boat was still out at sea, as a result of which she telephoned Mrs Moore. When the plaintiff came back to shore she spoke to him briefly in the shop and asked him whether he was all right, to which he responded, "Yeah, yeah, I'm fine." She said that she first became aware that the plaintiff alleged that he had suffered injuries on 15 January 2012 when the defendant was served with the statement of claim.

[24]

The cross-examination of Ms Challen

The way in which the cross-examination of Ms Challen and Mr Shorter was conducted at trial was the subject of criticism by Mr Cavanagh in this Court. In order to appreciate the tenor of Ms Challen's and Mr Shorter's cross-examination it is necessary to extract portions of it.
Ms Challen was asked about whether Mr Moore was suspected of suffering from decompression illness in the following passages. "Q. And Mr Shorter told you, didn't he, that Mr Moore was suspected of suffering from a decompression type of illness when he came onto the surface, correct? A. No, that's not correct. He said to me-- Q. Just a second. Would you mind if I asked the questions? You realise that I act for someone that is adverse to the interests of your company, do you understand that? A. I'm sorry, can you say that-- . . . Q. But it is the case by the end of the day, isn't it, that Mr Moore was suspected of suffering a decompression illness on that dive, correct? A. Yes, as a precautionary he was sent down to Sydney for treatment. Q. I didn't ask you what happened and who decided it was precautionary. I said by the end of the day you knew that Mr Moore was suspected of suffering a decompression illness, is that right or not? A. He may have been I think. Q. I'm just going to try this one more time. Is it the case or is it not the case by the end of that day someone had said to you that Mr Moore was suspected of suffering a decompression illness on that dive. Is that correct or incorrect? A. Nobody said those words to me. I was told Mr Moore has been transferred to Sydney Hospital to the decompression facility there for assessment. Q. Is it the case - are you suggesting that someone would be transferred to a decompression facility because they don't have a suspected decompression illness? Is that what you're suggesting? A. It was-- Q. Answer the question. Are you suggesting that transferring someone to the decompress unit in Sydney, after the dive on your vessel is anything other than a suspected decompression illness? A. It's a possibility. Q. That is a ridiculous proposition and you know it. By the end of this day you were aware through your partner Mr Shorter that Mr Moore was suspected of having a decompression event as he surfaced from the dive, correct? A. It wasn't through my partner, no. Q. Your partner told you that a diver was on oxygen? A. Yes."
Ms Challen was cross-examined about whether she submitted a PADI incident report form in respect of the incident on 15 January 2012. She was asked to look at the PADI General Standards and Procedures - Administrative Procedures: "Q. Go to page 17 under administrative procedures. See that? Paragraph 3? A. Yes, I can see that. Q. Can you read that out please? A. Okay. "Submit an incident report to PADI any time you witness or are involved in a diving accident or incident. This includes all incidents of whether they are training related or recreational or seemingly insignificant at the time. File the report immediately after the incident to ensure that important information is not forgotten." Q. That never happened did it? Did it? A. Yes, Dean Barrett - Q. Excuse me, did you - I'm asking you. You're running this tour. Did you as a recreational tour operator submit an incident report for this event or not? A. 'These general standards and procedures apply to an individual-- Q. I'm just asking you a very simple question. HER HONOUR: Just one moment. Please, just don't talk over each other. Look can you help me out here, you see that gentleman over there with the very impressive, he looks after the legal side of things. All you have to do is just answer Mr Hart's questions. Mr Hart may seem as if he is asking you some terrible questions which are going to ruin your case. The best thing you can do is just answer the questions frankly and honestly, all right? Don't worry, a lot of the way Mr Hart is framing this is designed I suspect to make you do this very thing which is to start arguing with him. Don't argue with him, answer his questions, all right? WITNESS: Yes. HER HONOUR: It will make my job easier. Thank you. HART Q. While you have that in front of you, I'm just going to give you a document and a pen. We're going to go through this together. HER HONOUR Q. Just answer that last question. The answer to that is "Yes, we did make a submission to PADI or we sent off a form to PADI and here it is or no we didn't? A. I made a phone call to PADI and to both SSI to let them know there had been a scenario on the boat where another dive shop was using our boat to dive off- - HART: That's just not responsive, your Honour, I'm sorry. HER HONOUR: Yes, look the answer-- WITNESS: I was advised that as the group-- HER HONOUR Q. No, the thing is this, did you make - it's your question and the answer to that is yes or no. All right, so did you make a - what is it? HART Q. Did you prepare and give to PADI an incident report or not, in writing? HER HONOUR Q. In writing? A. In writing? No, I did not."
Ms Challen was asked about the diving log, which did not record "in", "out" or "BT" (bottom time) times for either Mr Moore or the plaintiff but did contain an entry in the column entitled "Comments" beside the plaintiff's name which read "19 minutes (post dive)".
The cross-examination included the following exchanges: "Q. In the absence of that information on the diving log it is a complete mystery as far as your records are concerned, correct? A. No, you can see in the comment-- Q. I'm going to ask you this one more time. That record for Mr Barrett is completely absent, correct? A. In those fields-- Q. On that log they are not even written on are they? A. In the comments there is a bigger-- Q. Excuse me, I'm just going to ask you this one more time. REYNOLDS: She's answering. HER HONOUR: Just wait a minute. HART Q. Is it not obvious to you that there are no entries for Dean Barrett, in, out, depth or bottom time or can you not see that? A. I can see it. Q. Is there any entry there? A. Under those ones, no. However - Q. Thank you, all right Mr Reynolds can explain all that stuff, that's fine."
Ms Challen was also asked about the photographs of the equipment in the following exchanges: "Q. Assuming that you would have provided them with photographs of all the equipment needed to demonstrate that you were able to deliver O2, 100% oxygen, or medical grade oxygen, from a D cylinder via what we call the pelican case, correct [sic]? A. And as much as we can from-- Q. I didn't ask you any other question. Please allow me to do the questioning, it will take a lot less time. A. Sure. Q. Are you able to show her Honour - I'm just going to hand up those photographs, your Honour, pages 79 to 89, just go through those photographs and tell me where the equipment is that is necessary for oxygen to be delivered from the D cylinder via the pelican case? A. Yep, okay. Physically located in the-- Q. Yes, I want to see. I want you to show the Court all the pieces of equipment that you need in those photos-- A. I might be taking these out of order I'm sorry. Q. --that show the D cylinder is capable of delivering oxygen from the pelican case? HART: The pelican case, your Honour, is not the oxy viva unit, it's the case with the mask and so on with it. WITNESS: So am I able to explain as I-- HART Q. No, I just want you to tell me-- HER HONOUR: Look I tell you what, just let me explain something to you. You see after you finish being cross-examined there's something called re-examination and what I'll do, assuming that - actually we'll be lucky to finish the cross-examination this afternoon. I'll give you a few minutes to have a chat to Mr Reynolds and you might even have the benefit of the transcript overnight and what you can do is you can say I just want to explain this or I just want to clarify that and it'll be up to Mr Reynolds and Mr Reynolds, you don't mind my saying that do you, Mr Reynolds."

[26]

Mr Shorter's evidence in chief

Mr Shorter gave evidence in chief to the effect that he checked the oxygen on the vessel before it departed and confirmed that it included the "C" cylinder, the oxy viva unit and the "D" cylinder with a regulator, and that these items where located in their usual locations. He checked that both cylinders were full. He said that it took about 20 minutes to go from the marina to the dive site on 15 January 2012.
Mr Shorter said that he helped Mr Moore put on his dive gear. While this was occurring Mr Moore told Mr Shorter that he was not comfortable about doing the dive, to which Mr Shorter responded that he did not have to dive if he did not want to. Once the plaintiff and Mr Moore got into the water, Mr Shorter was the only person left on the boat. Mr Shorter said that he then played some music on his phone in the wheelhouse and scanned the horizon. Later he saw the plaintiff and Mr Moore on the surface. When they reached the boat Mr Shorter held Mr Moore by the twin tank valves to keep him up out of the water. He saw the plaintiff help Mr Moore up the ladder. Mr Shorter said that he sat Mr Moore down and connected him to the oxy viva system which was attached to the "C" cylinder. At that stage there were only the three of them on the boat as the other divers had not yet returned from the dive.
After Mr Moore was connected to oxygen, Mr Shorter drove the vessel to collect Mr Moore's gear which had been removed before Mr Moore was helped onto the boat after the dive and was floating behind the vessel. Mr Shorter rang Ms Challen on her mobile phone to tell her what had happened. Mr Shorter noticed that Mr Moore had improved since coming onto the boat. He observed that the plaintiff looked fine and did not show any signs that anything was wrong. Mr Shorter estimated that it took about 15 minutes to get back to the marina as he had the vessel at full speed. Throughout this period, Mr Moore remained connected to the oxy viva unit which was attached to the "C" cylinder. Mr Shorter confirmed that he did not have anything to do with completing the dive log for the dive. He was asked about record-keeping in the following exchange: "Q. Did you complete, and I'm talking about you now, so that you understand I'm clearly directing it to Mr Shorter, did you complete an incident report form of this event? A. No. Q. Why not? A. I didn't have to. Q. Why didn't you have to? A. I wasn't the diver involved in that accident, or incident. Q. I'm talking again about you personally now-- A. Yes. Q. --after you got back to shore did you at any time after that complete any documentation in relation to this incident that happened on 15 January? A. No documentation."

[27]

Cross-examination of Mr Shorter

In the early stages of his cross-examination Mr Hart asked Mr Shorter when he was first asked to recall the circumstances of the incident. He had difficulty understanding the question which may be explained by the way it was phrased. Mr Hart then asked him whether he was tired, to which he answered "no". Mr Hart then asked him whether he did shift work, to which he answered "yes". He was asked whether he had had conversations about the case with Ms Challen. He denied that he had had "lots" of conversations about the case. This line of questioning included the following exchange: "Q. You've had those conversations in the presence of your lawyers, haven't you, with Emma? A. No. Q. You deny that do you? A. Well like-- Q. Do you deny having conversations with Emma in the presence of your lawyers about this case during the course of this hearing over the last few days? Do you deny that? A. Okay, I'll make myself clear-- Q. No, I'm asking you a very simple question. This is - what we're trying to do here is get to the truth. I'm asking you a question and I want an honest answer. Have you had conversations in the presence of Emma with your lawyers during the course of this hearing over the last few days or not? A. I've-- Q. Have you or not? A. I've had conversations."
Subsequently, he was asked about Mr Moore's statement in the following exchanges: "Q. Have you been shown Mr Moore's statement? A. No, I haven't. Q. Have you ever been told about what that statement says? A. No. Q. Never? A. Not that I can recall. Q. Are you aware of what Mr Moore alleges what happened on this day or not? A. No. Q. Are you saying that you're sitting in this witness box and your lawyers haven't shown you the version of Mr Moore of this event, is that true? A. That is true. I have not seen Mr Moore's statement. Q. That's incredible. Have you been told about what it says? A. No. Q. So you're sitting there for the first time-- A. I don't know what-- Q. Let me tell you what Mr Moore says. A. I don't know what you're talking about. Q. All right, well I'm going to put it to you? A. Okay. Q. This is what Mr Moore says in his statement. A. Okay. Q. And then we're going to deal with whether it's true or not. Mr Moore says, amongst other things, that shortly after he entered the water he had - his head was struck by the bow or part of the vessel. You never heard that before today? A. No. Q. Never? Are you seriously telling me you've never heard that version? A. Not that I can recall, no. I can't recall that. Q. I'm asking you not whether that happened or not, I'm asking you if you've ever been told that by - that Mr Moore alleged that? Are you telling me you've never been told that? A. By whom? Q. By your lawyers? A. No. Q. Okay. Mr Moore then says in his statement that after he'd struck his head that he spoke to you standing on the vessel and wanted to get out of the water. Has anyone ever told you of that version of Mr Moore's evidence? A. No. Q. Never? And that Mr Moore was told by you that he needed to go back down under the water to catch up with Mr Barrett to tell him because you said to him 'He's your diving buddy, you need to tell him if you're getting out of the water'. You've never been told that Mr Moore alleged that before I've just told you then, is that what you're saying? Is that literally what you're saying? A. Yeah. Q. Well I put it to you that's in fact what happened, that Mr Barrett and Mr Moore were the last to go in the water. The reason was that Mr Moore had quite, I don't know expensive, detailed, difficult equipment to wear. He had a drysuit on, do you remember that? A. No, I don't remember. Q. You don't remember what he was wearing do you? A. I do, in some of it but not all of it. Q. So some things you've forgotten, correct? A. I don't remember him wearing a drysuit. Q. Assume it was a drysuit. Do you agree with me you've forgotten he was wearing a drysuit? A. (No verbal reply) Q. It's a pretty simple question. Do you agree or not agree with the proposition that if he was in fact wearing a drysuit, that as you sit today you've forgotten that? Do you understand that question? A. I do understand that question. Q. What's the answer? Do you agree that you must have forgotten that if that's in fact what he was wearing? A. Well if I don't remember it I can't say that he was or wasn't, I don't remember that. Q. So you have forgotten that and you agree then don't you-- A. That's what you're saying. I don't remember. Q. Do you understand, Mr Shorter, what this case is about or not? A. Clearly, I do. Q. Pardon? A. I do. Q. Do you understand who I represent? A. Yes, I do. Q. Do you think it is a joke? A. No, I don't. Q. Well let's just focus on what I'm asking you and we'll get out of here real quick? A. Okay. Q. Do you agree that if Mr Moore was in fact wearing a drysuit, that you'd forgotten that now or not? A. If he was wearing a drysuit? I can't remember. Q. So you have forgotten that aspect of that event, correct? A. Suppose so. Q. See that shouldn't have been so torturous should it, we don't have to have this argument, let's just get to the facts? A. I'm not arguing, you're the one who is getting aggressive. Q. So this is in fact what happened. I'm going to put it to you this is in fact what happened and you can agree or disagree. What in fact happened was that Mr Moore, shortly after he entered the water, hit his head or was struck by the vessel. He told you that he'd struck his head after Mr Barrett had already started to proceed off. Do you understand those words? A. (No verbal reply) Q. And that you told him that he had to go back down under the water - sorry, and he said he wanted to get back on board and that you told him that he should catch up with Mr Barrett and tell him because he was his dive buddy. Do you deny that happened? A. I do. Q. And it's not possible you've forgotten? A. Not possible. Q. I have to put it to you that you're lying? A. That's your opinion-- REYNOLDS: I object to that. HART Q. No. I am putting it to you that you're being dishonest about it? REYNOLDS: I object to that. HER HONOUR: Look Mr Reynolds, on what basis do you object? He's got to put it hasn't he? REYNOLDS: Hasn't proved he's lying, prove that he was just mistaken or he was wrong. HART: I've already tried to do that, your Honour. HER HONOUR: He's been through that bit. The thing is that the gentleman won't agree he's mistaken. The thing is there is a irreconcilable area of evidence here, he's got to put it. HART: Yes. Q. Do you agree with me that you're lying? A. No, I don't agree with that. Q. Is it possible that you've forgotten? Is it possible that you forgot that happened? Is it possible that you have forgotten that that in fact happened? REYNOLDS: Could my friend let the witness answer-- HER HONOUR: Look, please, Mr Reynolds, there's been no answer, that's why he keeps asking. Q. Yes, I'm sorry, sir, you have to answer the question. Just put the question again. HART Q. Mr Shorter-- WITNESS: I'm just finding him confronting. HER HONOUR: Mr Shorter, that's what cross-examination is all about. WITNESS: Okay, well he doesn't need to get cranky."
It was subsequently put to Mr Shorter that the plaintiff's coughing after the dive was an indication of breathing distress. Mr Shorter agreed that it "might be". He denied that coughing necessarily indicates potential decompression illness.
Mr Shorter was also cross-examined about the "D" cylinder by reference to the GoPro footage in the following exchange: "Q. It's not even there is it; you can't see it anywhere can you? A. What I - looks like to me it is."
Mr Hart did not take the opportunity to press Mr Shorter to indicate where the "D" cylinder could be seen on the GoPro footage. I reject his submission in this Court that one could infer from the GoPro footage that there was no "D" cylinder on the boat, when Mr Shorter identified it in the passage set out above.

[30]

Associate Professor Simon Mitchell

Associate Professor Simon Mitchell was an accepted expert in diving and hyperbaric medicine. He opined that oxygen therapy was not definitively indicated for the plaintiff on 15 January 2012 and said in his report: "Specifically, if a diver makes a slightly rapid ascent from a dive with the no decompression limit and exhibits no symptoms it is not considered mandatory to treat them with oxygen."
Although he accepted that the decompression sickness was a possible consequence of the dive, he considered the risk to be "small". Associate Professor Mitchell analysed the data relating to the symptom latency (time between incident and reporting of symptoms) and opined: "In contrast, with the exception of headache (which I return to below), the latency of [the plaintiff]'s various symptoms appears to be measured in months rather than hours. Indeed, [the plaintiff] felt well enough to continue diving over the weeks immediately after the event and I am inclined to the view that his actions over the immediate post-incident period are a better indicator of his perceived state of health at that time than subsequent claims written in the context of a legal action."
On the question of causation, Associate Professor Mitchell addressed the following question concerning the difference oxygen therapy would have made to the plaintiff: "What difference the receipt of oxygen therapy immediately following the incident would have made to the plaintiff's current condition had he asked for it. The question presupposes that [the plaintiff]'s "current condition" is explained partly or wholly by decompression sickness. As discussed above, I do not believe that this is likely, and the answer would therefore be that oxygen would have made no difference. If we consider a hypothetical scenario in which [the plaintiff] did suffer decompression sickness and in which first aid oxygen was administered then there is certainly potential for it to have ameliorated the symptoms. However, first aid oxygen delivered at the surface may not be as effective in improving outcome in decompression sickness as is often assumed. A 2007 study is the only one to ever directly address this issue. The authors compared outcomes for divers receiving or not receiving first aid oxygen before recompression for decompression sickness and found no difference in final outcome between the two groups, though the drivers receiving first aid oxygen required fewer recompression treatments to achieve maximum recovery (Longphre et al 2007). Thus, it certainly cannot be claimed that administration of first aid oxygen would have guaranteed a better outcome in [the plaintiff]'s case. Though obvious, it must be pointed out that the intervention most likely to improve outcome in any case of serious decompression sickness is recompression and hyperbaric oxygen administration (see Question 9 below). Unfortunately [the plaintiff], of his own volition, did not report his post dive symptom (headache), and was not therefore not evaluated for recompression."
Associate Professor Mitchell also considered the relative benefit of the nitrox which the plaintiff was inhaling compared with the oxygen which was administered to Mr Moore as follows: "What effect the plaintiff's use of EANx50 had on his condition. Ironically, by breathing 50% oxygen through a demand valve Mr Barrett was probably inspiring a higher fraction of oxygen than Mr Moore who was receiving oxygen therapy via a Hudson mask. For the reasons articulated above it is impossible to gauge the effect this would have had on his outcome if he really was suffering from decompression sickness."
Associate Professor Mitchell was also asked to opine about Mr Moore's condition. Mr Hart put to Associate Professor Mitchell in cross-examination that the symptoms Mr Moore exhibited on the dive, as depicted in the GoPro film, were consistent with concussion. While he could not completely exclude concussion, he said "On the balance of probabilities this was not concussion".

[31]

The plaintiff's case at trial

On appeal in this Court Mr Hart confirmed the appellant's analysis that, in substance, the plaintiff formulated his case against the defendant at trial in the following three ways: 1. As a result of Mr Shorter directing Mr Moore to inform the plaintiff that he wanted to abort the dive, when he knew that Mr Moore had hit his head, the defendant was responsible for all the consequences of the dive, including the decompression illness caused by the fast ascent at its conclusion (the Moore Head Injury Case). 2. The plaintiff suffered physical injury when he helped Mr Moore get back into the boat on the ladder after the dive, which could have been averted if alternative means had been used (the Lifting Case). 3. Because the defendant did not have an oxygen supply on the boat which was available to the plaintiff when he came back from the dive, the decompression illness which the plaintiff suffered as a result of the dive was not cured, as it would have been had the oxygen been available (the Oxygen Supply Case).
The plaintiff pleaded these three cases on two bases: the tort of negligence; and breach of the guarantee implied by s 60 of the Australian Consumer Law, which is contained in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (ACL), to exercise care and skill in the provision of services. The case in (1) above was included by way of amendment to the statement of claim that was proposed on 15 June 2016, the fourth day of the hearing. The amendment added the following particular of negligence to the allegation at [12] of the pleading: "By the Defendant's servant, advising Moore to continue to dive down from the surface, shortly after Moore entered the water, when the Defendant's servant knew, or ought to have known, that Moore had been struck in the head by the bow of the vessel and had requested to abort the dive, such advice giving rise to a risk of injury to the Plaintiff, in so far as Moore was at risk of both uncontrolled descent and ascent ("the risk events"), for which events the Plaintiff would be bound to act as a Good Samaritan and/ or otherwise come to his aid in those events as his diving buddy and would be at a foreseeable risk of the injury of which the Plaintiff suffered."

[32]

The decision of the trial judge on liability

The trial judge found for the plaintiff under the ACL for breach of the statutory guarantee that services be rendered with due care and skill. The effect of her Honour's finding that the plaintiff was a "consumer" was to base the defendant's liability on the ACL rather than the tort of negligence. It followed from this finding that the waiver signed by the plaintiff was rendered inoperative (s 64 of the ACL) and ss 5M (no duty of care for recreational activity where risk warning) and 5N (waiver of contractual duty of care for recreational activities) of the Civil Liability Act did not apply. Although there may be differences in the expression of the standard of proof or the requirement of causation between the Civil Liability Act and an action against the supplier of services pursuant to s 267 of the ACL, it was not suggested that the differences were material in the present case. No issue arose as to whether the provisions of the Civil Liability Act or the ACL were more favourable to the plaintiff: cf. Alameddine v Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 219; (2015) 324 ALR 355 at [72] (Macfarlan JA, Simpson JA agreeing).
It was common ground that s 5L of the Civil Liability Act (no liability for harm suffered from obvious risks of dangerous recreational activities) could, as a matter of law, apply in the present case to exclude the defendant's liability for breach of the statutory guarantee created by s 60 of the ACL: s 275 of the ACL.
The trial judge's essential findings were as follows: "[185] Taking all of the above into account, I am satisfied that Mr Shorter not only neglected both the plaintiff and Mr Moore, but never connected or set up the extra oxygen he claimed was on board. I am satisfied that this oxygen was not there. I am also satisfied that Mr Shorter knew that Mr Moore had been injured because he hit his head, and that the conversation Mr Moore deposed to did occur. When Mr Moore was injured, Mr Shorter compounded his wrongdoing by not offering the necessary emergency equipment, thereby putting the burden of this onto the plaintiff, who was himself physically affected by the rapid ascent, the shock of these events, the physical exertion of getting Mr Moore out of the water and the distraction of having to look after Mr Moore for a considerable time instead of considering whether he himself was unwell. . . . [242] Whether or not a person is a consumer is a factual issue. On the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that the plaintiff, his girlfriend and other experienced divers who had made a booking through his shop were engaged in a recreational activity and the plaintiff was just one of the group, although the most experienced. If that is the case, then ss 60-61 of the ACL apply. . . . [245] I am satisfied, from the plaintiff's evidence and the GoPro footage, that he was not provided with any first aid treatment at all. The GoPro footage shows that he used the pony bottle of his own volition. He can be heard on the GoPro telling Mr Shorter he is doing this; it sounded as though he was wanting Mr Shorter's permission, or at least to explain why he was using Mr Moore's pony bottle. [246] The plaintiff was coughing and exhausted from pulling Mr Moore over the railing. It should have been evident to Mr Shorter that he needed to check the plaintiff's condition, but I am satisfied he never did so. There was insufficient medical oxygen on board but even if there was medical oxygen on board, the plaintiff could hardly go and find them and then help himself, especially as he was looking after Mr Moore at the time. Conclusions as to breach of warranty [247] I find that the defendant warranted to the plaintiff that its boat's diving services would be rendered with due care and skill and that all necessary emergency equipment was available. In breach of this warranty, those services were not rendered with due care, because the defendant's servants or agents failed to take care in relation to both the plaintiff and Mr Moore's safety, in circumstances where the plaintiff was himself injured having to rescue Mr Moore, bring him to the boat and consider his safety issues ahead of his own. [248] The defendant compounded those breaches by failing to have, let alone offer, 100% oxygen sufficient for two divers and specifically to the plaintiff (T 483), although the likelihood that the plaintiff, as well as Mr Moore, could be affected was acknowledged by Mr Shorter to be a possibility (T 471). [249] I am satisfied that the plaintiff's evidence that the D cylinder was not there is correct, and is supported by the GoPro film of the cabin, where it is not to be seen, and that the volume and delivery of the oxygen available was, for the reasons explained by Mr Coxon, insufficient."
Although it is not particularly clear, one can infer from the trial judge's findings and the judgment entered that her Honour accepted all three cases put on behalf of the plaintiff: the Oxygen Supply Case, the Moore Head Injury Case and also the Lifting Case, at least in terms of a finding of negligence or failure to render "services" with due care and skill. The breach was not clearly found and the "services" were not identified. Moreover, any finding of causation must be implied because it does not appear expressly. Whatever inadequacies in the reasons, neither party asked this Court to order a re-trial.
The trial judge was satisfied that the plaintiff was a "good samaritan" within the meaning of Part 8 of the Civil Liability Act, which protects good samaritans from liability in negligence. Her Honour relevantly found as follows: "[258] . . . The plaintiff saved Mr Moore's life, but endangered his own, in circumstances where the breach of warranty and breach of duty of care by the defendant has been made out on the evidence. I am satisfied that the impact of the 'good Samaritan' provisions in ss 57 and 58 is that the defences under other sections of the legislation do not apply."
Her Honour found that there was no contributory negligence as follows: "[284] Mr Hart submits that the only area of conduct for which the plaintiff can be criticised is that the plaintiff disregarded his own symptoms in the knowledge of available oxygen. This would be, in my view, a matter for mitigation rather than contributory negligence. However, I am satisfied that the plaintiff did not negligently disregard his own symptoms but, by reason of the dramatic events and his role in the rescue, did not appreciate that he had suffered any injury himself. That is clear from the form that he completed two days later for PADI. [285] Accordingly there will be no adjustment for contributory negligence. [286] As I am satisfied that there was no contributory negligence, it is not necessary for me to consider whether the 'good Samaritan' provision (s 56 Civil Liability Act) deprives a defendant of a contributory negligence claim."
The trial judge rejected the allegation that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate his loss in the following terms: "[289] The plaintiff was preoccupied with caring for Mr Moore. His evidence is that, while this was occurring, he did not realise he himself was ill. That is a complete answer in relation to all these particulars except for "later at hospital". [290] Even at the hospital, the plaintiff had yet to suffer the headache that was the beginning of physical signs. He simply did not know that he was ill. Given the trauma of the events and his preoccupation with Mr Moore, I accept the plaintiff did not realise he himself should have had medical attention. [291] The plea of mitigation is not made out."
The trial judge also rejected the defendant's argument that any liability was excluded by s 5L of the Civil Liability Act in the following terms: "[262] If diving is a dangerous recreational activity, the defendant may rely upon s 5L, which falls outside the relevant provisions of the ACL. [263] No factors of the kind identified in Fallas v Mourlas (2006) 65 NSWLR 418 are made out here. This was a simple half-hour dive in relatively calm water and to a relatively shallow level of around 30 metres where, as long as the necessary precautions were taken, it should not have been necessary for the divers to be in any danger. On the evidence in this case, this particular activity was not dangerous. … [266] … The risk was not inherent in the activity but as a result of Mr Shorter's wrong advice to Mr Moore and failure to give appropriate first aid to the plaintiff, whether Mr Shorter had access to first aid or not."

[36]

The finding that the defendant ought to have known that the plaintiff needed oxygen

The appellant submitted that the finding that the defendant ought to have known that the plaintiff needed oxygen was incorrect having regard to the following evidence. First, the plaintiff accepted in cross-examination that Mr Shorter asked him on more than one occasion whether he was all right and on each occasion he confirmed that he was. Secondly, he accepted that apart from telling Mr Moore that he felt that he might need to be monitored, he did not tell anyone on the boat that he was unwell. The plaintiff admitted that he did not perceive any symptoms while he was on the boat although he did recall that he coughed, as is recorded on the GoPro. As far as the evidence revealed, the plaintiff was by far the most experienced diver on the boat, had experienced decompression illness previously and was familiar with its causes, effects and treatment, both in terms of first-aid (oxygen therapy) and the cure (recompression in a hyperbaric chamber).
Mr Cavanagh submitted that given that the plaintiff did not complain to anyone on the boat, confirmed that he was all right to Mr Shorter, did not perceive that he had any symptoms that would require oxygen therapy and did not request any oxygen therapy, the finding that Mr Shorter ought to have known that the plaintiff needed oxygen and was required to supply it to him was incorrect. Moreover, not only did the plaintiff not complain on the boat, but when he accompanied Mr Moore to the clinic and thereafter to the hospital, he did not ask for treatment or recompression for himself.
Mr Hart relied on the plaintiff's evidence that his request for oxygen was "implied" by the circumstance that he was coughing. Further, he relied on the fact that Mr Shorter saw the plaintiff sucking on Mr Moore's nitrox bottle. Mr Hart submitted that the only available inference was that Mr Shorter was aware that the plaintiff had a condition which required some form of oxygen. He contended that the defendant ought not to have accepted the plaintiff's assurance that he was all right but, rather, Mr Shorter should have demanded the plaintiff's dive computer, ascertained that the ascent had been too fast and required him to have pure oxygen therapy.
I am satisfied that the trial judge's finding that the defendant ought to have been aware that the plaintiff needed oxygen was erroneous, having regard to the evidence referred to above. The plaintiff was an experienced diver; he was an adult; he was running a dive business; and as far as the evidence revealed, no one on the boat had greater expertise in diving and decompression illness than he did. To require the defendant to countermand the plaintiff's own assessment in circumstances where (as the plaintiff admitted in the incident report form) the dive did not require a decompression stop and no symptoms were apparent would, in my view, be to elevate the standard of care required to a higher level than reasonable care. If anyone had a responsibility to review the plaintiff's dive computer, it was the plaintiff himself. He was aware that he had come up quickly and took precautions himself by breathing nitrox when on board.

[38]

The finding that there was insufficient oxygen on board

It was common ground that the regulations required two sources of oxygen. It was the defendant's case at trial that the Tomaree had on board both a "C" cylinder and a "D" cylinder. The plaintiff's case was that the "D" cylinder was not on the boat. The plaintiff's evidence was that he did not see the "D" cylinder. The defendant's evidence came from a number of sources. It relied on the evidence of Mr Shorter that the "D" cylinder was on the boat on 15 January 2012. It also relied on the evidence of Ms Challen (who was not on the boat for that trip, but who had seen it on the boat not long before) that it was on the boat. The defendant also tendered documentary evidence of the acquisition of both cylinders and that the cylinders had been serviced in November 2011. It does not follow from the evidence that neither the plaintiff nor Ms Hetherington saw the "D" cylinder on the vessel that day that it was not there. This evidence was not sufficient, in light of the documentary evidence, to discharge the plaintiff's onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the "D" cylinder was not on the vessel on 15 January 2012. I reject Mr Hart's submission that the defendant bore the onus of proving that the "D" cylinder was on the boat.
It was common ground that, if both the "C" and the "D" cylinders were on board, there was sufficient oxygen available. The plaintiff accepted that the "C" cylinder was on board. He failed to prove that the "D" cylinder was not on the boat. Accordingly, the trial judge's finding that there was insufficient oxygen on board was erroneous.
Mr Coxon's evidence did not assist the plaintiff to prove that the oxygen was insufficient since his opinion was based on two unproved assumptions: first, that there was no "D" cylinder on the boat; and secondly, that the plaintiff had asked for oxygen therapy. Although the defendant did not directly challenge Mr Coxon, it challenged the assumptions on which his opinion was based, thereby rendering the opinion of no forensic value: Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 649 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ).
Further, Mr Cavanagh submitted that the plaintiff could not prove his case on liability irrespective of whether the "D" cylinder was on the boat on 15 January 2012. He relied on the evidence that the "C" cylinder was capable of accommodating two divers simultaneously, one on the continuous supply valve and the other on the demand supply valve. He submitted that the plaintiff had failed to prove that there was insufficient oxygen in the "C" cylinder for both Mr Moore and the plaintiff. To that extent, he argued that the presence or absence of the "D" cylinder on the boat was irrelevant.
Mr Cavanagh contended that the statement by the plaintiff to Mr Shorter that he was going to take the cylinder with him so that Mr Moore could have the benefit of the oxygen when he travelled to the clinic amounted to an admission that the "C" cylinder still had oxygen in it when the boat was already on the way back to the marina. Mr Cavanagh also relied on the plaintiff's admission in the incident report form he filled in on 17 January 2012 that the plaintiff was "Kept on O2 till arrival at hospital (Nelson Bay)". As no other source of pure oxygen was identified by the plaintiff, the source of O2 must have been the "C" cylinder, notwithstanding the plaintiff's rather implausible suggestion in cross-examination that the "O2" in the incident report form which he had filled in by hand was a "typo". Mr Cavanagh also relied on the circumstance that there was no support in Mr Moore's statement for the proposition that the oxygen had run out. Her Honour did not deal with the alternative way in which the defence case was put. In light of the plaintiff's request of Mr Shorter that he borrow the "C" cylinder and his admission that oxygen was supplied to Mr Moore until he arrived at Nelson Bay hospital I do not regard the plaintiff as having discharged the onus of proving that the "C" cylinder did not have sufficient oxygen which could have been supplied to the plaintiff had he asked for it.

[40]

The rejection of the evidence of Mr Shorter and Ms Challen

The trial judge's rejection of the evidence of both Mr Shorter and Ms Challen is largely irrelevant to the appellant's challenge to the finding that there was insufficient oxygen on board as the "D" cylinder was not on board. As Mr Cavanagh put it, in his oral submissions: "In reality, it wouldn't have mattered whether the appellant had actually turned up [to the trial] in this case. The plaintiff did not prove what he needed to prove."
As referred to above, the plaintiff's evidence, that he did not see the "D" cylinder on board that day, was insufficient to discharge his onus to the requisite standard in any event. However, Mr Cavanagh relied on the trial judge's rejection of the evidence of Mr Shorter and Ms Challen as providing some indication of the way in which the trial was conducted, and of the ways in which he contended her Honour had misused the advantage she enjoyed as trial judge of hearing and seeing the witnesses.
Her Honour found: "[161] Ms Challen's explanation for these missing records was unconvincing, as was her inconsistent claim that there was no need to contact PADl but that she had made a phone call nevertheless, only to be told the same thing. This was a potentially serious injury; the plaintiff [sic, Mr Moore] was taken to hospital by helicopter and the potential for him to have suffered injury of a serious kind was significant. [162] Mr Shorter, like Ms Challen, claimed to have a good recollection of events in circumstances difficult to accept, given the failure to make a note of the events, make a report to PADl or even to keep essential information relating to the events of the day in question. . . . [174] Mr Shorter's demeanour at this stage of his evidence [after he had been accused of lying] changed. He appeared disdainful of questioning and then became angry, as the following excerpt from the transcript shows: 'Q. Do you think it is a joke? A. No, I don't.['] . . . [175] Mr Shorter then did not answer several questions, and complained that he found Mr Hart "confronting" (T 467). . . . [185] Taking all of the above into account, I am satisfied that Mr Shorter not only neglected both the plaintiff and Mr Moore, but never connected or set up the extra oxygen he claimed was on board. I am satisfied that this oxygen was not there. I am also satisfied that Mr Shorter knew that Mr Moore had been injured because he hit his head, and that the conversation Mr Moore deposed to did occur. When Mr Moore was injured, Mr Shorter compounded his wrongdoing by not offering the necessary emergency equipment, thereby putting the burden of this onto the plaintiff, who was himself physically affected by the rapid ascent, the shock of these events, the physical exertion of getting Mr Moore out of the water and the distraction of having to look after Mr Moore for a considerable time instead of considering whether he himself was unwell. [186] Mr Hart submits that if I find Mr Shorter not to be a witness of credit, then that is the end of the case. While I would not want the findings of fact solely to rest on his credit, the fact remains that his evidence is inconsistent with the accounts given by the plaintiff in his report to PADI, Mr Moore's statement and the GoPro footage, in circumstances where his own lack of contemporaneous records is noteworthy. In particular, I do not accept Mr Shorter's failure to complete the dive log as acceptable; that issue alone is a significant problem for his credit. [187] Taking all of the above into account, I would not accept Mr Shorter's evidence unless it was corroborated and I do not regard Ms Challen as reliable."
The matters referred to in [187] included her Honour's observation (at [174]) that Mr Shorter's demeanour changed at a particular point in the cross-examination. That point was when it was put to him that he was lying when he denied that Mr Moore had told him that he wanted to abort the dive because he had hit his head. Her Honour's adverse credit findings against Mr Shorter and Ms Challen appear to have been largely based on the circumstance that neither had made a written record of what had happened on the day and neither had filled in an incident report form (such as the one that was completed by the plaintiff which is set out above). Her Honour did not make a finding about whether she accepted their evidence about the equipment.
Mr Shorter and Ms Challen accepted that they had not filled out an incident report form. Mr Shorter explained that he was not obliged to because he was not the diver concerned. Ms Challen was not given the opportunity to explain why she did not fill in an incident report form, but it can reasonably be inferred that her response would have been similar. Her situation was different from Mr Shorter's since she was not even on the boat at the relevant time. She was on shore, in the dive shop.
Although Mr Shorter's evidence that the "D" cylinder was on the boat was corroborated by Ms Challen and by the invoices tendered regarding their acquisition and maintenance, her Honour did not accept it. As referred to above, Mr Shorter's evidence in chief was that the "D" cylinder was kept on the bench seat next to the first aid kit and that there was a regulator for it which was also on the bench seat. He was cross-examined at length by Mr Hart, as can be seen from the passages from the transcript extracted above.
The principal challenges made by Mr Hart at trial to the credibility of Mr Shorter were, first, that he had spoken with Ms Challen about the case; secondly, that he had not filled in an incident report form in respect of 15 January 2012 or made any other written record of what happened; thirdly, that he could not remember whether Mr Moore was wearing a dry suit or a wet suit on 15 January 2012; fourthly, that his evidence that he had not read the statement of Mr Moore before giving evidence was "incredible"; fifthly, that he was lying when he denied that Mr Moore had told him that he wanted to abort the dive because he had hit his head; and, sixthly, that he ought to have realised that the plaintiff needed oxygen therapy because he saw him sucking on Mr Moore's nitrox bottle when Mr Moore was breathing from the "C" cylinder.
No transcript is adequate to convey the tone of the voices of the persons whose exchanges are transcribed for the court record: Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen [2016] NSWCA 88; (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [198]. Nonetheless, in the present case, the content of Mr Hart's questions, his comments to Mr Shorter and Ms Challen (many of them gratuitous and supercilious) and his inappropriate rebukes to them, make their responses, in so far as they can be discerned from the transcript, understandable.
The statement of Mr Moore did not provide a basis for Mr Hart to put to Mr Shorter that Mr Moore had told him that he wanted to abort the dive because he had hit his head. There was no basis in the evidence for the proposition that Mr Moore told Mr Shorter, or anyone else on the day, that he had hit his head. Mr Hart was entitled, if it was relevant, to put to Mr Shorter that Mr Moore had told him that he wanted to abort the dive (since Mr Moore's statement provided a sufficient foundation for this matter), but he was not entitled to put to him that Mr Moore had told him that he had hit his head. A barrister is obliged to take care to ensure that allegations or suggestions made in court against any person are reasonably justified by the material then available to the barrister: Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (NSW), r 61(a). The only relevant material available to Mr Hart was the statement of Mr Moore. It did not support the proposition. By the time Mr Shorter was cross-examined, the plaintiff had given evidence and Mr Moore's statement had been tendered. Her Honour was privy to Mr Moore's statement as it was tendered and was therefore in a position to make the assessment that there was no basis to suggest that Mr Shorter was lying. Far from providing a basis to reject the evidence of Mr Shorter, the allegation that he was lying when he denied that Mr Moore told him that he had hit his head was plainly unwarranted and apparently in breach of counsel's professional obligations. As appears from the transcript Mr Shorter took umbrage at the suggestion that he was lying, which resulted in a change to his demeanour which reflected his understandable outrage at a baseless accusation.

[41]

The obligations of a trial judge

A trial judge has an obligation to ensure that litigation is conducted in a civil way and that practitioners adhere to their professional responsibilities. It is always a matter of judgment as to whether it is necessary to intervene in cross-examination to protect a witness from unfair questioning. However, I regard the present case as one where judicial intervention was required. Mr Reynolds, on behalf of the defendant objected to the proposition being put that Mr Shorter was lying. Her Honour's error in failing to uphold Mr Reynolds' objection had consequences for the trial. It is hardly surprising that a witness such as Mr Shorter would become uncommunicative after having been accused of lying when there was no basis for the allegation to be put.
Her Honour's failure to control Mr Hart's cross-examination of witnesses generally had ramifications for the trial beyond the baseless allegation of lying, which her Honour allowed to be put, referred to above. Procedural fairness requires more than merely giving each party an opportunity to be heard. It also requires that each witness be permitted to answer questions without being abused in the process. This is not to say that cross-examination cannot be robust, but it must be fair. The latitude commonly afforded to cross-examiners does not amount to a licence to offend, ridicule or vilify. Fairness requires that no proposition, particularly one which is damaging to the witness, be put without a basis. It also requires that questions be asked one at a time and that cross-examination not be peppered with gratuitous and, as in the present case, insulting, commentary to the witness. It requires that the witness be permitted to finish his or her answer and not be cut off or needlessly interrupted. Where a trial judge fails to intervene to stop such egregious conduct, an impression can be created that the judge is endorsing, or even collaborating, in such conduct. It is possible that encouragement, whether tacit or explicit, to such conduct could give rise to an apprehension of bias which is inimical to the proper administration of justice. The advantage that a trial judge enjoys of seeing and hearing the witnesses ought not be misused.
Mr Cavanagh postulated in his submissions that the trial judge: "seemed to have a view this was some sort of heroic action of the plaintiff in rescuing Mr Moore, he was a good Samaritan and that in some way rendered him more believable than anyone else in the case."
I am persuaded by Mr Cavanagh's submissions that the trial judge in the present case misused her advantage and, in doing so, deprived both Ms Challen and Mr Shorter of a fair opportunity of giving their evidence. Whether her Honour did so for the reason postulated by Mr Cavanagh need not be determined. It is sufficient to say that tribunals of fact, whether judges or juries, are to decide cases on the evidence and act impartially and dispassionately. They must not let sympathy or emotion affect their judgment.
Because of the way the appellant conducted the appeal it is unnecessary for this Court either to form an assessment of Ms Challen's and Mr Shorter's credit from the objective facts and documents and the objective probabilities, even if it were possible to do so; or to order a retrial. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that the trial judge's assessment of Mr Challen's and Mr Shorter's credit was tainted by the errors outlined above and was, accordingly, unsound. It ought not be assumed that credit findings made at trial cannot be impugned because of the so-called Abalos advantage (after Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 at 178-179; [1990] HCA 47): see Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479, 482-483; [1993] HCA 78; State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] HCA 3; (1999) 73 ALJR 306; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [26].

[42]

The implied finding of causation on the Oxygen Supply Case

Mr Cavanagh submitted that, even if breach with respect to the Oxygen Supply Case were established, there would be insufficient evidence to establish causation to the requisite standard. What the plaintiff was required to prove with respect to the Oxygen Supply Case was that, on the balance of probabilities, he would not have suffered decompression illness if oxygen had been supplied to him on the boat. In Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 the High Court said at [45] and [104] that in order to prove causation, in a case of breach of duty of care by failing to take a particular step (in the present case, by failing to provide oxygen therapy to the plaintiff on the boat), the plaintiff must prove that the taking of such step would, more probably than not, have prevented or minimised the illness which was in fact suffered (in the present case, decompression illness). A defendant who negligently exposes a plaintiff to risk of injury or damage, will not be liable unless the plaintiff can persuade the trier of fact that it was probable the risk ensued: s 5D of the Civil Liability Act; see also Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd v Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307 at 318.
The only evidence on the question of causation came from Associate Professor Mitchell, who was the only witness who gave evidence about the effect of oxygen therapy on decompression illness. Accordingly, it was necessary for the plaintiff to rely on his evidence to prove causation. The trial judge found his evidence to be of limited value and did not accept it in so far as there was any difference of opinion between him and Associate Professor Bennett or Mr Coxon. Associate Professor Mitchell's evidence was that, although pure oxygen therapy was a recommended first-aid treatment for decompression, the only cure for decompression was recompression. He referred to the 2007 study in his report set out above in support of his opinion that oxygen therapy would not have made any difference in the present case. He said of the 2007 study: "The authors compared outcomes for divers receiving or not receiving first aid oxygen before recompression for decompression sickness and found no difference in final outcome between the two groups, though the divers receiving first aid oxygen required fewer recompression treatments to achieve maximum recovery (Longphre et al 2007)."
By the time the plaintiff eventually sought medical treatment for decompression illness from his general practitioner, Dr Cooke, on 4 May 2012, it was too late for recompression. Thus, the only evidence of causation, that of Associate Professor Mitchell, taken at its highest, was insufficient to prove factual causation within the meaning of s 5D(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (for negligence) or causation under the ACL for breach of the statutory guarantee. The plaintiff did not prove that the failure to provide oxygen therapy on the boat was a necessary condition of the decompression illness. Proof on the balance of probabilities was required. This was not a case such as Adelaide Stevedoring Company Limited v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538; [1940] HCA 45 where causation could be inferred from the sequence of events. The plaintiff admitted to Dr Bennett that had dived 15-20 times after the incident on 15 January 2012. He was examined by two medical practitioners in March 2012 who certified that he was fit to be a diving instructor for the following year. The plaintiff did not report symptoms which he associated with the dive on 15 January 2012 or attributed to decompression illness until 4 May 2012.
For these reasons, even if, contrary to my view that breach was not established, the plaintiff's Oxygen Supply Case was not made out as the plaintiff failed to prove causation.
I note for completeness that the evidence adduced by the defendant appears to have been sufficient to disprove causation in any event. As set out above, Associate Professor Mitchell said: "Ironically, by breathing 50% oxygen through a demand valve Mr Barrett was probably inspiring a higher fraction of oxygen than Mr Moore who was receiving oxygen therapy via a Hudson mask."
Associate Professor Mitchell's opinion was consistent with the plaintiff's own admissions in cross-examination (set out above) that the oxygen delivery from the "C" cylinder through the Hudson mask would be at a concentration of between 40-60% of oxygen and that using a regulator to breathe through the pony bottle with its concentration of 50% oxygen and 50% nitrogen would be "about the same". The effect of this evidence was that the plaintiff could not prove that the result would have been different if he had been given the "C" cylinder with the Hudson mask than it was as a result of his breathing from Mr Moore's pony bottle using a regulator. This evidence would appear to answer Mr Hart's submission that the plaintiff, by not requesting pure oxygen from Mr Shorter, was sacrificing himself for Mr Moore.

[48]

The plaintiff's notice of contention

On the second day of the hearing of the appeal Mr Hart sought leave to file a notice of contention in the following terms: "The Trial Judge was entitled to find in favour of the Respondent on the issue of breach of duty, in the absence of specific knowledge that the Respondent suffered the injuries alleged, on the basis that the Appellant, by its servants were bound to make enquiry independently of the Appellant, such enquiry being mandated by the scope and standard of care, as informed by the accepted regulatory and/or voluntary codes by which the Appellant operated the diving vessel. The Appellant, in failing to make records and enquiry as mandated by the scope and standards, cannot assert that the Respondent must fail on the issue of breach of duty."
The Court did not, before it reserved its decision, determine whether leave to rely on the notice of contention ought be granted. As is apparent from its terms the first ground of the notice of contention relates to the alleged failure to make an inquiry; and the second relates to the failure to make records.
In respect of the first ground, Mr Hart was unable to articulate why it was unreasonable for the defendant to accept the plaintiff's assessment of his own condition and the assurances given by the plaintiff to Mr Shorter that he was all right.
Mr Hart relied on the transcript (Briggs v State of New South Wales [2017] HCA Trans 109) of an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against the decision of this Court in State of New South Wales v Briggs [2016] NSWCA 344. In State of New South Wales v Briggs this Court allowed an appeal against a judgment in favour of the respondent police officer against the State of New South Wales for damages in negligence for injury alleged to have been suffered in the course of his duties. A relevant matter in State of New South Wales v Briggs was whether it was unreasonable for the State to accept the police officer's non-disclosure of difficulties which he suffered as a result of his exposure to traumatic events in his service as a police officer or whether reasonable care required a more substantial inquiry. It is undesirable and inappropriate to attempt to predict the result of an appeal from the transcript of a special leave application. In any event, questions of duty and breach in the law of torts depend on circumstances. I discern no relevant comparison between the present case and State of New South Wales v Briggs where the appellant was, in effect, the respondent's employer who owed him a non-delegable duty to take reasonable care to provide him with a safe system of work. In the present case, the evidence established that the plaintiff's experience and expertise relating to diving and decompression illness was substantial. The evidence did not establish that anyone else on the boat had expertise on these topics which was superior to the plaintiff's.
Moreover, even if the proposition in the respondent's notice of contention, that the defendant was obliged to make an enquiry of the plaintiff as to his physical and mental state, were made out, the evidence established that such an enquiry was in fact made by Mr Shorter.
The second ground in the notice of contention was bound to fail. There was no conceivable connection between the failure to make a record and the injury suffered. Further, there was no explanation as to how the making of a record was part of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. Mr Hart was invited on several occasions to identify the "accepted regulatory and/or voluntary codes" relied upon but was unable to do so.
In these circumstances, I would refuse leave to the respondent to file and rely on the notice of contention as I consider both grounds to be hopeless. Neither of the matters alleged in the notice of contention provides any basis to support the trial judge's finding that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff.

[52]

The findings of the trial judge

The trial judge's findings on damages were relevantly as follows: "[373] The plaintiff has suffered a loss of opportunity of the Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 92 ALR 545 variety, in that he has been obliged to close down his business and reorganise his life. In those circumstances, the average weekly earnings, as opposed to the actual earnings the company was able to give him of $440 a week (which Mr Hart noted in submissions should have been $1,000 per week), is not an accurate guide. [374] Taking all of the above into account, I propose to use the average weekly earnings of $1,000 gross and $812 net per week. Given the long drawn out process of the plaintiff identifying precisely what was wrong with him (which I note included a trip to Queensland for extensive further investigations), I am satisfied that the figure of 70% for past economic loss as estimate[d] by the plaintiff is reasonable. Accordingly, I would award the plaintiff past economic loss in the sum of $142,760 sought by the plaintiff. This would include past superannuation of 11%, which totals $15,705."
The trial judge entered judgment for the plaintiff on 16 December 2016 in the sum of $638,144. In assessing damages for loss of earning capacity, the trial judge accepted the plaintiff's submissions as to how such loss ought be assessed. The trial judge found that the plaintiff would never be able to work as a diving instructor again, presumably on the basis that he will continue to suffer the long term effects of decompression illness for the rest of his life. Her Honour accepted Mr Hart's submission that the plaintiff ought be compensated for loss of earning capacity by calculating past loss on the basis of the plaintiff's claim of 70% of Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) of $812 net from the day of the accident, 15 January 2012 to the date of judgment and thereafter "for the rest of his working life" on the basis of a figure of $1,112, which was the AWE at the time of trial. There was an allowance of 30% for vicissitudes in accordance with the plaintiff's submission at trial.
Following the ordering of judgment for the plaintiff on 25 November 2016, the trial judge invited the parties to prepare short minutes for the damages figure in accordance with her Honour's reasons. As referred to above, her Honour quantified the judgment sum on 16 December 2016. The amount for past economic loss (not including past superannuation and the Fox v Wood component: Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438; [1981] HCA 41) was $142,760 and the amount for future economic loss (not including superannuation) was $389,200.

[58]

Consideration of damages

Her Honour found that the plaintiff was a consumer and that the defendant had breached the statutory guarantee in s 60 of the ACL that the "services" would be rendered with due care and skill. Although her Honour did not specify what the services were, I am prepared to assume for present purposes that, if the Oxygen Supply Case had been made out, the "services" would have been the provision of oxygen therapy. In these circumstances, the plaintiff would have been entitled to have his damages assessed by reference to s 267 of the ACL. Section 267(4) of the ACL relevantly provides that the consumer may, by action against the supplier, recover damages for any loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of the failure to comply with the guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.
Although there may be differences between damages under s 267 of the ACL, damages at common law and damages under the Civil Liability Act, what is common to any such assessment of damages is that the plaintiff prove what his position would have been but for the defendant's conduct: see Gates v The City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1 at 14-15 (Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ); [1986] HCA 3. The plaintiff's unchallenged evidence was that, but for the events of 15 January 2012, he would have continued to run his business. In these circumstances, his damages ought to have been assessed by reference to the amount he could be expected to have earned from that business from the date of the accident and into the future, with allowance for any actual earnings in that period. There was no justification for her Honour to assess the plaintiff's damages on the basis of AWE when there was no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff would have sought employment rather than run his own business.
In the absence of evidence by the plaintiff to explain how the different, and inconsistent, figures in the documents he tendered in his case could be reconciled or explained, I consider that, had the defendant been liable to the plaintiff, damages ought to have been assessed on the basis of $440 net per week, with a deduction for the amounts shown to have been earned after the accident. It is not necessary, having regard to my view that the appeal against liability ought be allowed and the judgment set aside, for such damages to be calculated by this Court.

Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd v Barrett

At a glance

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Judgment (60 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (7)

Cases Cited (31)

Cited By (14)