CHILD SUPPORT - application for extension of time - estimated adjusted taxable income - reasonable explanation for the delay - Family Court proceedings - no substantive merit - extension of time refused

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

1. Ms Lennon and [Mr A] are the parents of one child for whom a child support case commenced on 8 May 2023. [Mr A] is the parent assessed to pay child support.
2. On 30 June 2025 [Mr A] made an election to Services Australia - Child Support (Child Support) to use his estimated adjusted taxable income in the child support assessment for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026. [Mr A] provided evidence that his previous work contract ended on 30 June 2025, and advised Child Support that he expected that his total adjusted taxable income for the 2025/26 financial year was expected to be $1,048, which is made up wholly of an expected rental property loss. That election was accepted by Child Support on or about 30 June 2025. Ms Lennon objected to that decision. On 30 August 2025 a Child Support objections officer disallowed Ms Lennon's objection.
3. Ms Lennon had a right to apply to the Administrative Review Tribunal for review of Child Support's objection decision. Pursuant to section 18 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (the ART Act), to apply for review within time she needed to do so within 28 days of being notified of Child Support's decision, i.e. she needed to apply for review by 29 September 2025. Ms Lennon made her application to the ART on 20 November 2025. She also applied for an extension of time in which to apply for review, as allowed by section 19 of the ART Act. The Tribunal considered Ms Lennon's request for extension of time on the papers.
4. The principles to be applied when deciding an extension of time application were summarised in Phillips v Australian Girls' Choir and Another [2001] FMCA 109:
   1. There is no onus of proof upon an applicant for extension of time though an application has to be made. Special circumstances need not be shown, but the court will not grant the application unless positively satisfied it is proper to do so. The "prescribed period" of 28 days is not to be ignored ...
   2. It is a prima facie rule that the proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period will not be entertained ... It is not a pre-condition for success in an application for extension of time that an acceptable explanation for delay must be given. It is to be expected that such an explanation will normally be given as a relevant matter to be considered, even though there is no rule that such an explanation is an essential pre-condition ...
   3. ...It is relevant to consider whether the applicant has rested on his rights and whether the respondent was entitled to regard the claim as being finalised. ...
   4. Any prejudice to the respondent ... is a material factor [which goes] against the grant of an extension.
   5. The mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. ...
   6. The merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. ...
   7. Considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons otherwise in a like position are relevant to the manner of exercise of the court's discretion ...
5. In her written request for extension of time Ms Lennon said that there were a number of factors that prevented her from making her application to the Tribunal within 28 days of the date she was notified in writing of the objection decision. There were Family Court proceedings on foot. A final hearing had been held on [dates in] August 2025 and a signed agreement was submitted, however there were extensive post-hearing negotiations and the matter was not finalised until [in] October 2025. [Later in] October 2025 [Mr A] filed a further application in the Family court, with an initial hearing listed for 30 October 2025. Ms Lennon was unrepresented in those proceedings and so had to devote a significant amount of time to preparing and filing court documents without legal assistance. In addition, Ms Lennon had to attend court in order to extend a family violence intervention order [in] September 2025. In addition, Ms Lennon says she was continuing to discuss various child support issues with a Child Support staff member, and was encouraged to keep providing information to Child Support, which created some uncertainty regarding the appropriate next steps to take.
6. Ms Lennon provided a copy of a family violence intervention order made on [a day in] August 2024, and a family violence interim intervention order made [in] August 2025 which is expressed to be an interim extension of the final intervention order made [in] August 2024.
7. I am satisfied that during the period from the date of the objection decision and through September and October 2025 Ms Lennon was engaged with a number of court matters that would have taken up considerable time and energy. I accept that those matters present a reasonable explanation as to the delay in Ms Lennon making her application to the Tribunal, which I note was a delay of approximately 7 weeks.
8. In relation to the merits of Ms Lennon's application, Ms Lennon stated that [Mr A's] claims of reduced income are inconsistent with his actual circumstances. She states that he received over $130,000 in departure payments and stock options and spent tens of thousands of dollars in a short period. According to information provided by Child Support, in her objection to the decision Ms Lennon said:
   • [Mr A] has consistently earned income over $250,000 in prior financial years, as shown in his tax returns.
   • He received a final payment of $24,375.98 from his previous employer, [Employer 1], on 12 December 2024, which I believe was not disclosed to the CSA.
   • His last known (and potentially ongoing) employment was a casual fixed-term role with [Employer 2], working four days per week and earning a gross weekly income of $4,304.93, as evidenced by his employment contract.
   • He continues to have substantial financial capacity and has chosen to voluntarily reduce his reported income to avoid his financial responsibilities as a parent while simultaneously increasing his discretionary spending.
   • Despite claiming a loss of income, he has consistently maintained monthly car finance repayments of $1,231.66 to [Business 1]. Yet, he reduced his child support contributions almost immediately. Notably, he also made a [specified] payment of $14,995 on 14 February 2025.
9. Ms Lennon also outlined significant expenditure that she says was undertaken by [Mr A] between December 2024 and March 2025.
10. I note that the issues raised by Ms Lennon all relate to income she says was received by [Mr A] prior to 1 July 2025. Ms Lennon has not raised any grounds that relate to the question of whether [Mr A's] adjusted taxable income in the period 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 is likely to be higher than his estimated income. Pursuant to section 63AA of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act), the only basis on which an election to estimate an income can be refused is if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person's actual adjusted income will be higher than the estimated amount. Issues such as previous incomes, earning capacity and other financial resources available to the parent that would not form part of their adjusted taxable income are not relevant to the decision as to whether or not to accept the estimate election.
11. I also note that, according to the documents provided by Child Support, Ms Lennon made an application to Child Support under Part 6A of the Act for a departure from the usual formula assessment in her child support case in approximately July 2025. An application under Part 6A will allow a more wholistic assessment of not only [Mr A's] income but also his property, financial resources and earning capacity, and therefore is the preferable administrative option to address the concerns raised by Ms Lennon.
12. Although I have accepted that Ms Lennon has provided a reasonable explanation as to the delay in making her application to the Tribunal in this matter, I am satisfied that there is no substantive merit to her application. On that basis it would be futile to allow the application to proceed. I therefore find that the appropriate decision is to refuse Ms Lennon's request for an extension of time to lodge her application.