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[2026] NSWSC 689
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-06-16
Sirtes J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Kuhsun v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2026] NSWSC 689
Hearing dates: 12 June 2026
Date of orders: 16 June 2026
Decision date: 16 June 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Sirtes J
Decision: (1) These proceedings are stayed until the earlier of:
(a) the Plaintiff filing a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor; or
(b) 4 pm on 16 September 2026.
(2) If the Plaintiff does not file a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor by 4 pm on 16 September 2026, the proceedings are dismissed.
(3) Subject to Order 4, the costs of the Defendant’s motion are reserved.
(4) If the proceedings are dismissed in accordance with Order 2, the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – parties – where plaintiff cannot conduct proceedings without a solicitor – where plaintiff has not taken steps to retain a solicitor – whether proceedings should be stayed pending appointment
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 56, 57, 59, 67
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 13
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 7.36, 12.7
Cases Cited: Kuhsun v Azzi [2024] NSWSC 670
Kuhsun v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 484
Kuhsun v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 1384
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Sun Kuhsun (aka Hadi Rassekhi Kazerooni) (Plaintiff)
State of New South Wales (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
R Coffey (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Makinson d’Apice (Defendant)
Plaintiff (self-represented)
File Number(s): 2023/00042105
The Plaintiff, Mr Sun Kuhsun (also known as Hadi Rassekhi Kazerooni), commenced these proceedings by Summons filed on 8 February 2023. He proceeded against four officers of the New South Wales Police Force, as well as the State of New South Wales. Mr Kuhsun is self-represented. He speaks some English but requires the assistance of an interpreter in Farsi, who I confirm was in Court during this application.
The Summons sought the following relief:
“STATEMENT OF CHARGES - INDICTMENT
COMMON ASSAULT - crim.law. An assault is any unlawful attempt or offer with force or violence to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness; for example, by striking at him or even holding up the fist at him in a threatening or insulting manner, or with other circumstances as denote at the time. an intention, coupled with a present ability, of actual violence against his person, as by pointing a weapon at him when he is within reach of it. When the injury is actually inflicted, it amounts to battery.
PARTICULARS OF THE OFFENCES
1. Pursuant to s. 13 of the Crimes Act 1914, Sun Kuhsun (aka Hadi Rassekhi Kazerooni) institutes these proceedings of the indictment for Assault against the First, Second, Third and Fourth Defendants who are Officers in the NSW Police Force. The times, places and details of the offence are in the Affidavit accompanying this Summons.
2. Pursuant to s. 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958 and s. 8 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983, Sun Kuhsun (aka Hadi Rassekhi Kazerooni) holds the Fifth Defendant accountable.
RELIEF CLIAMED
1. THAT a Jury adjudge the First, Second, Third and Fourth Defendants did assault Sun Kuhsun (aka Hadi Rassekhi Kazerooni) and impose punishment as they deem appropriate and necessary.
2. THAT a Jury adjudge the Fifth Defendant to be vicariously liable and pay to Sun Kuhsun (aka Hadi Rassekhi Kazerooni) aggravated and exemplary damages of $AUD 1,000,000.00 (one million Australian dollars) or as they deem to be fit..”
The crux of Mr Kuhsun’s complaint is that he was physically assaulted by police and Sheriff’s officers on two occasions in 2018.
The matter was brought on for trial in May 2025 but is now at a standstill. The trial was stopped and the matter stayed because it became apparent that Mr Kuhsun could not conduct the proceedings without a lawyer. Despite the passage of some 13 months, he has not obtained legal representation.
Now for determination is the State’s application, by Notice of Motion filed on 9 March 2026, to dismiss or stay the proceedings.
This matter has an unfortunate history.
On 4 April 2023, shortly after Mr Kuhsun commenced these proceedings, Rothman J ordered that he be referred to the Registrar to obtain pro bono assistance, pursuant to r 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR). His Honour also recommended that, to the extent practicable, the Registrar make enquiries to obtain a Farsi interpreter without cost to Mr Kuhsun. Nothing came of this.
The State’s solicitors wrote to Mr Kuhsun on 14 June 2023 to advise him of the defects in the Summons. Shortly stated, the letter indicated that:
the Summons sought to indict officers pursuant to s 13 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), but there is no offence of common assault in Commonwealth law;
the Summons was not the correct way in which to commence a criminal prosecution;
the Summons claimed damages of $1 million, but the UCPR requires such claims to be commenced by Statement of Claim; and
juries do not impose sentences, such that prayer 1 of the Summons was inappropriate.
On 11 August 2023, Wright J made several case management orders. His Honour ordered that the proceedings be taken to have been duly commenced by Summons, that Mr Kuhsun’s affidavit sworn on 16 January 2023 stand as pleadings, and that the matter proceed on pleadings. His Honour also struck out the following words from the Summons: “statement of charges – indictment”, “crim.law”, “pursuant to s. 13 of the Crimes Act 1914”, “of the indictment”, and “against”. The parties were referred to court-annexed mediation, but this was evidently unsuccessful.
On 5 October 2023, Mr Kuhsun filed a Notice of Motion seeking that his claim be tried by a judge sitting with a jury. That application was dismissed by McNaughton J on 4 June 2024: Kuhsun v Azzi [2024] NSWSC 670.
The police officers named in the Summons were removed as defendants by order dated 3 November 2023. Mr Kuhsun was ordered to file an Amended Summons to reflect this. He did not.
The trial commenced on 12 May 2025 before Harrison CJ at CL. It did not go well.
In Kuhsun v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 484 (Kuhsun (No 1)), the Chief Judge recorded the following observations at [5]–[10], which bear setting out in full:
“[5] Three things became crystal clear shortly after the hearing before me commenced. First, Mr Kuhsun was of the view that he was entitled to a lawyer to represent him and that the responsibility for arranging that lay with the Court. Secondly, whether or not he was able to secure legal representation, he also insisted that he required an interpreter in the Persian language and that it was the responsibility of the court to provide that as well. Thirdly, consistently with his summons, Mr Kuhsun persisted with his demand that his case should be heard by a jury, notwithstanding the fact that the issue had been long ago decided by McNaughton J in what might be considered to be unexceptionable terms…
[6] It can hardly be controversial in my opinion that Mr Kuhsun needed a lawyer to represent him. He was born and grew up in Iran and English is not his first language. That aside, he has no qualifications in law or any cognate discipline here or overseas that might have equipped him for the rigours of contested litigation. Many of his protestations at various junctures during the hearing revealed a total absence of the most fundamental understanding of almost all aspects of the proceedings. By way of example, Mr Kuhsun kept complaining that the defendants had not apologised for assaulting him. He was clearly incapable of accepting or understanding that his allegations have been denied and that he bore the onus of proving that they were true. He also continued to complain that the CCTV footage of the incidents at the police station and at the Local Court were not provided to him, despite the explanation by counsel for the defendants that such recordings were only retained for 6 months and no longer exist. As the transcript will reveal, Mr Kuhsun constantly returned to these, and other, themes despite my attempts to explain that it was useless to do so. In short, Mr Kuhsun did not exhibit any understanding or appreciation of the concept of adversarial proceedings but instead appeared to insist that there was but one side to his story and that I should proceed to decide the case on that basis.
[7] Mr Kuhsun had at one stage been referred for pro bono legal assistance. It came to nothing. However, Rothman J’s orders were made, favourably to Mr Kuhsun, in the widest terms. As far as the evidence or other material before me suggests, no solicitor or barrister was prepared to act for Mr Kuhsun at any stage of the proceedings and certainly not for the hearing before me. Mr Kuhsun’s understanding of the referral ordered by Rothman J has clearly become an unshakeable belief that the court has been commanded to find him a lawyer. Despite my best efforts, I was patently unable to disabuse him of that belief. The only reasonable aspect of Mr Kuhsun’s concerns about his unrepresented status was his implicit recognition that he actually needed a lawyer.
[8] Mr Kuhsun also reiterated his concern that he could not continue without an interpreter. This issue was ultimately resolved satisfactorily when the defendants agreed to pay for one. That occurred at about 11.30AM on the second day of the hearing. The interpreter’s services were welcome and proved to be valuable. However, while I will assume confidently that the translated versions of what I was saying to Mr Kuhsun were no longer clouded by Mr Kuhsun’s limited understanding of English, that fact did not to my observation increase Mr Kuhsun’s comprehension of what I was saying to him. So much is apparent from the number of times it became necessary to explain a concept to Mr Kuhsun, clearly without success, even with the patient assistance of a professional interpreter in his native tongue. Mr Kuhsun insisted that he was “not stupid”, a proposition that I am prepared, if not bound, to accept. However, it remains the fact that, for whatever reason, he was not able, or refused, to understand what I was attempting to explain, at least as far as that can be determined from the answers that he gave me.
[9] One example of that difficulty was Mr Kuhsun’s constant return to his demand for a jury trial. I explained that that issue has been finally determined, unfavourably to him, but he reprised his protestations more than once.
[10] All of this led me to a consideration of how the hearing could possibly continue in the circumstances. Mr Kuhsun was unrepresented and was in considerable danger of being unable to present his case in any convincing or persuasive way. The prospect that he would ever understand the need for him to cross-examine the police witnesses, whose statements of evidence he said he had never read, was something frighteningly redolent of a Joseph Heller novel with Kafkaesque connotations. If the hearing had continued, there is no doubt that it would have descended into a farcical parody of what it should have been. On one view, a patently unreasonable and unacceptable insistence by me that Mr Kuhsun continue to run his case in the face of these difficulties might have supported a later complaint that he was denied procedural fairness and that the outcome of such flawed proceedings would be manifestly unjust. By the same token, my decision to bring the proceedings to a halt could be viewed in the same way. My decision to pause the proceedings was largely informed by my concern that any complaint about the approach I have taken should not also be burdened with the potential need for Mr Kuhsun to establish that an unfavourable judgment should be set aside. In other words, by reason of the approach I have taken, Mr Kuhsun’s case, whatever its strengths or weaknesses, about which I express no opinion, remains on foot.”
His Honour formed the view that “the proceedings cannot continue as presently constituted and that Mr Kuhsun cannot expect, and the Court cannot provide, a just outcome if they do”: Kuhsun (No 1) at [16]. On this basis, the Chief Judge stayed the proceedings until further order, with liberty to restore, and reserved on the question of costs.
Nothing more happened until November 2025. The matter was then relisted before Harrison CJ at CL at Mr Kuhsun’s request. His Honour delivered a short judgment following that hearing: Kuhsun v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 1384. I set it out in full as follows:
“[1] This matter was listed before me on 24 November 2025 at Mr Kuhsun’s request. It appears that he was concerned that the matter had not progressed since I delivered my judgment on 16 May 2025 … It will have been apparent to anyone reading my decision that it was my view that Mr Kuhsun was incapable of representing himself in these proceedings and that he was also probably in need of a tutor.
[2] Mr Kuhsun is not legally trained, does not speak English as his first language and does not understand that these are adversary proceedings. Mr Kuhsun, in my view somewhat remarkably, conceded yesterday morning that he had not even read my earlier judgment or had what I had written translated for him so that he could understand what I had decided. He simply wants me to conclude the matter in his favour now without more.
[3] The proceedings had reached a procedural roadblock on the last occasion. It remains in place.
[4] In an attempt to clear it, Mr Regener, who appears for the State, offered to attempt to locate a lawyer who may be prepared to act for Mr Kuhsun in this case on a no win, no fee basis. My attempt to explain Mr Regener’s offer did not at first appear to find favour with Mr Kuhsun, although it is more likely that he simply did not understand what was being suggested. I got the impression that Mr Kuhsun ultimately accepted that an attempt was being made to find a lawyer for him to assist with the conduct of his case.
[5] As my earlier judgment will, I trust, have made plain, Mr Kuhsun’s case is going nowhere unless he is at least represented by a lawyer. I emphasise again that he has, through no fault of his own, absolutely no understanding of adversary litigation in general or what he must establish to prove his case in particular.
[6] Having regard to Mr Regener’s suggestion, which I hasten to observe was a non-binding offer, I will stand these proceedings over for further directions before the Registrar on 3 February 2026. I note that in the meantime, Mr Regener will write to Mr Kuhsun with the name or names of any lawyer who he has been able to locate who might be prepared to assist Mr Kuhsun with this case on a no fee basis.”
The State’s motion was heard by me on 12 June 2026. Mr Kuhsun appeared in person and was assisted by an interpreter. Mr Coffey of Counsel appeared for the State.
Mr Coffey moved on the State’s motion and read two affidavits sworn by its solicitor, Ms Blake, in support. He pressed the following prayers for relief:
“4. An order pursuant to r 12.7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 that the proceedings be dismissed.
5. An order that the Plaintiff may not commence new proceedings concerning the same claim unless and until they are represented by an Australian Legal Practitioner.
- An order pursuant to r 42.20 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s costs.
In the alternative:
- An order pursuant to s 67 Civil Procedure Act 2005 that the proceedings be permanently stayed.
- An order pursuant to r 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s costs.”
Mr Coffey reformulated the State’s position in two respects, both of which were favourable to Mr Kuhsun and reflected the State’s awareness of its role as a model litigant in the context of the claim brought against it.
First, the State indicated that, if the Court were minded to grant relief, a stay should be ordered in preference to dismissal. This is because if the Court dismissed the proceedings, any reinstituted proceedings would be barred by the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).
Secondly, the State made it clear (as it did in its written submissions) that it sought a stay of the proceedings unless and until Mr Kuhsun was represented by an Australian Legal Practitioner. This condition would allow Mr Kuhsun to prosecute his claim if he is able to secure legal representation.
Mr Kuhsun read two affidavits sworn by him and made oral submissions, mostly through his interpreter. I enquired of Mr Kuhsun whether he understood the nature of the State’s application. It was not apparent to me that he did. His submissions focused on the injustice which he says gave rise to his commencing the proceedings and his lack of understanding as to why the hearing had been “blocked” after he filed his evidence. I explained to Mr Kuhsun the conclusions reached by Harrison CJ at CL in his judgments (which the State had arranged to be translated into Farsi for him). Mr Kuhsun did not appear to accept or understand this explanation.
There was no sworn evidence as to what steps Mr Kuhsun had taken to secure legal representation. He made vague statements from the Bar table that the solicitors he had approached (whom he did not name) declined to act because he was suing the police, and because, in their view, the Court would inevitably find for the police. I was left with the impression that Mr Kuhsun’s efforts to find a lawyer were not particularly rigorous.
Finally, Mr Kuhsun made rather opaque references to the police or the State poisoning his food before he came to court in order to undermine his conduct of the proceedings. The State sheds some light on this in its written submissions, which extract parts of a report of Dr Adam Martin, psychiatrist, who assessed Mr Kuhsun in relation to these proceedings. At paragraph 9 of his report, Dr Martin recorded:
“Later in the interview, [Mr Kuhsun] made various statements consistent with psychotic phenomena such as delusions, for instance stating that meat he had bought had been poisoned and affected his brain…”
Having considered the above matters, I reach the following conclusions.
First, a fair trial cannot occur unless Mr Kuhsun is represented by a lawyer. The learned Chief Judge delivered comprehensive reasons as to why that is so. His Honour formed that view after having had the advantage of observing Mr Kuhsun’s conduct during the aborted trial. I did not enjoy that advantage. I am in no position to doubt his Honour’s conclusions.
Secondly, from my own, albeit comparatively brief, observation of Mr Kuhsun, I have reached the same conclusion as Harrison CJ at CL. Mr Kuhsun demonstrated a lack of understanding as to the State’s application. He did not understand why these proceedings had been stayed (or, as he stated, “blocked”) or why he required a lawyer. I referred him to the Chief Judge’s remarks and explained the position to him. This did not seem to assist.
Thirdly, there is no evidence that Mr Kuhsun has sought to obtain legal representation. Based on his statements from the Bar table, I infer that he has not taken any meaningful steps to do so. If he had, the hearing of this motion would have been the forum to adduce such evidence.
The difficulty with ordering a conditional stay, as the State proposes, is that these proceedings cannot remain in limbo pending Mr Kuhsun’s election or ability to retain solicitors. The Court is bound to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the proceedings, including by promoting the efficient disposal of the business of the Court with minimal delay: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ss 56(1), 57(1)(b) and 59. Moreover, as the State submits, if a trial were to recommence, it would be required to call evidence from six police officers, two Sheriff’s officers, and two medical experts. The availability and quality of evidence diminish with the passage of time. It would be unsatisfactory to allow Mr Kuhsun to revivify his claim at a time of his choosing where it would compromise the prospect of a fair trial eventually taking place. I do not propose to stay the proceedings indefinitely.
I will order a stay for a period of up to three months. This will allow Mr Kuhsun sufficient time to retain a solicitor to represent him. The proceedings will be dismissed automatically if, by 4 pm on 16 September 2026, no Notice of Appointment of Solicitor has been filed on his behalf. It should be made clear to Mr Kuhsun that this is his last opportunity to prosecute his claim if he still wishes to do so. I should also make it clear that it is not the role of the Court to find Mr Kuhsun legal representation. It is his and his alone.
I will reserve costs pending the stay. If the proceedings are dismissed, there is no reason why costs should not follow the event.
Finally, I record with gratitude the State’s undertaking to have this judgment translated into Farsi at its expense and thereafter provided to Mr Kuhsun.
The Court makes the following orders:
These proceedings are stayed until the earlier of:
(a) the Plaintiff filing a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor; or (b) 4 pm on 16 September 2026.
**********
Kuhsun
State of New South Wales (No 3)