KREIDIE -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 13 (28 January 2026)

1. As stated, the cash and methylamphetamine found in the third trailer had been packaged and placed there by Radford. He was ultimately charged on indictment 1920 of 2021 with one count of supplying methylamphetamine to another (count 1) and one count of money laundering (count 2).
2. Radford was also charged with unrelated offences in connection with events that occurred on 3 February 2021, with which the appellant had no involvement. On that day, Radford met Joshua Kenneth Edwards in a truck bay in Fairbridge, WA. Edwards had driven a truck from South Australia. Radford arrived in a rental van. Edwards unloaded a number of boxes from his truck and passed them to Radford, who loaded them into the rental van.
3. Later that day, police conducted a search of the rental van, which was parked in Radford's driveway. Police located 11 cardboard boxes containing quantities of methylamphetamine which totalled 119.05 kg, with an overall average purity of 81%.
4. A search of Radford's house located three separate amounts of cash which had been unlawfully obtained ($1,300, $10,000 and $24,750). This money was part of the $40,000 that Radford had been paid to commit the offences the subject of indictment 1920 of 2021.
5. Radford was charged with one count of possession of a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply, and three counts of possession of property suspected of being unlawfully obtained. These offences were charged in indictment 517 of 2021.
6. Radford pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity to the offences charged in both indictments. On 17 November 2021, he was sentenced on both indictments to a total effective sentence of 17 years' imprisonment. Radford received a 25% discount, under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), for his pleas of guilty. His role was essentially to transport drugs and cash at the instructions of others. The details of the offences and the sentences imposed upon Radford in respect of all of his offending are set out in the table below.

Possession of methylamphetamine (119 kg) with intent to sell or supply

(Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a))

Possession of money ($1,300) suspected to have been unlawfully obtained

Possession of money ($24,750) suspected to have been unlawfully obtained

Possession of money ($10,000) suspected to have been unlawfully obtained

(Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(c))

Dealt with money (approximately $3.5 million) that was the proceeds of an offence

1. Count 2 on indictment 1920 of 2021 corresponds with the money laundering offence committed by the appellant, the subject of the present appeal (the common offence).
2. The State appealed against the sentences that were imposed on Radford at first instance. The State contended that the individual sentences for count 1 on indictment 517 of 2021 and count 1 on indictment 1920 of 2021 were manifestly inadequate. The State also contended that the overall total effective sentence of 17 years' imprisonment infringed the first limb of the totality principle. No challenge was made to the sentence imposed on Radford for the common offence.
3. The State appeal against Radford was allowed.[2] This court increased the individual sentence for count 1 on indictment 517 of 2021 to 17 years' imprisonment, and imposed a new total effective sentence of 18 years' imprisonment. On the resentencing, this court did not interfere with the individual sentence of 8 years imposed on Radford for the common offence.

1. By the time he was sentenced, the appellant was 41 years of age. He was born in Lebanon and came to Australia with his family when he was 5 years old. All of his family, including his extended family, reside in Sydney.
2. The appellant completed year 12 and, later, an apprenticeship in refrigeration and air conditioning mechanics. After working in this trade for four or five years, he entered the transport industry, which is where he has worked ever since.
3. The appellant is married and has six children with his wife. He has twins, who suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, global developmental delay and autism spectrum disorder, and are currently supported through the National Disability Insurance Scheme. One of his children (who it is convenient to refer to as 'A') has been diagnosed with an eating disorder and depression. This child is prone to self‑harm, suicidal ideation and has twice attempted suicide. The appellant's incarceration has had a serious adverse impact upon this child.
4. The appellant has himself suffered longstanding symptoms of depression, anxiety and low self‑esteem. The complex medical conditions suffered by his children have intensified his depression, which results in constant feelings of sadness, pessimism and guilt. According to consultant psychologist, Tim Watson‑Munro, the appellant suffers from a severe and recurring (bordering on extreme) depressive disorder.[3]
5. In September 2006, the appellant was involved in an accident, which resulted in three of his toes being amputated and the onset of gangrene. He has also been diagnosed with diabetes.
6. The appellant has no prior criminal history. He does not use prohibited drugs and does not drink alcohol. He poses a low risk of reoffending and his prospects of rehabilitation are good. The learned sentencing judge was also provided with a number of character references. These references speak highly of the appellant and refer to the shame that he has experienced because of his offending. His Honour was further provided with material that referred to the stress the appellant's incarceration has caused to members of his immediate family.

1. The sentencing remarks are lengthy and detailed.
2. In the course of his recitation of the facts, the learned sentencing judge made these findings:

(a) The appellant agreed with Youi's request to transport the cash back to NSW because he believed that, if he did not do so, his brother might be hurt.[4] The appellant acted largely out of concern for his brother.

(b) Nevertheless, the appellant willingly agreed to involve himself in the transport of the cash, which he knew to be the proceeds of drug dealing carried out by 'organised crime'.[5]

(c) While the appellant did not know the exact amount of cash he was to transport from WA to NSW, he knew that it was a substantial sum, being 'at least six figures'.[6]

1. His Honour made these findings as to the appellant's role in the offending:[7]

When I look at your role and the part that you played I am also satisfied as to the following:

(1) That you were the driver or courier for the money. I accept the State's submission that, to that extent, your level of involvement is not unusual when one looks at comparative cases, and I'll look at that and return to that issue in a little while.

(2) The second fact is that you are not someone who willingly or enthusiastically allied yourself with this criminal enterprise, but you did so out of a degree of reluctance and as a consequence of your concerns as to what might befall your brother if you didn't.

(3) The third fact is that whilst you were promised some degree of financial reimbursement, and so it cannot be suggested your involvement was entirely altruistic, I do accept that you were not someone participating in the commission of this offence or engaging with organised crime for the purposes of making money or for financial gain.

(4) The fourth fact is that you were not involved in making decisions, but rather, you were responsible for following instructions.

(5) And the fifth is that you were not the one that was responsible for loading the money into the truck. That was Radford, but ultimately, for reasons I'll come back to, I'm not entirely sure that provides much of a point of distinction between his and your criminality. Ultimately, you were still aware of the presence of the money and what it signified, and you agreed to transport it.

1. The sentencing judge referred to the extensive written materials which had been provided to him in respect of the sentencing of the appellant and made the following observations:

(1) The appellant was, until this offending, 'a good, hardworking man who is dedicated to [his] family'.[8]

(2) The appellant was brought up 'in a very positive family upbringing and a family who care for [him] very much'.[9]

(3) With the exception of the offending, the appellant is 'hardworking and of good character', who has 'made positive contributions to the Australian community'.[10]

(4) The offending was out of character.

1. The learned sentencing judge described the appellant's offending as being 'simply poor judgment' and not a reflection of any underlying criminogenic factors such as drug abuse, gambling problems, financial issues or trauma.
2. His Honour said:[11]

Ultimately it was just a bad decision that you made when you were put under pressure that you would now suffer the consequences of and so there are no risk factors here that I can see and so I am satisfied that the likelihood of you doing something like this again in the future is slim indeed.

1. His Honour found that the need for the appellant to be personally deterred was reduced, and his Honour was satisfied that when the appellant was released from prison he would be able to 'return to being a positive contributor to society'.[12]
2. The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant was 'genuinely remorseful' for what he had done and wished 'to atone for it'.[13]
3. The sentencing judge found, in effect, that the appellant's positive antecedents made him 'a perfect target for the commission of this type of offending'.[14] His Honour elaborated:

It is through using good people who are then prepared to do wrong things that assists in giving illicit money the necessary appearance of legitimacy or to conceal it's transportation, because somebody who is a positive member of the community is less likely to attract attention than members of Hell's Angels crossing the border and taking large parcels of money back across the state.

And so whilst I will of course give you credit for the positives and the good character that you have demonstrated, in my view that credit must be diminished because it really forms a critical part of this type of offending. And because these are good people who are being convinced to do bad things, naturally there is usually a reason for why they do it, some kind of incentive is offered to induce good people into doing these bad things, into corrupting them into doing what it is that they ultimately do.

1. The sentencing judge addressed at some length the submission made on behalf of the appellant that his incarceration would cause exceptional hardship to the appellant's wife and children, particularly in respect of the appellant's daughter. His Honour found that the appellant's imprisonment would cause exceptional hardship to the appellant's child A (referred to at [33] above), and found that it was a mitigat[16]g factor.16
2. At one point in the sentencing remarks, the sentencing judge encapsulated the mitigating factors as:[17]

One, your plea of guilty, for which I'll award a 10 per cent discount, as I've indicated. Two, in addition to your acceptance of responsibility, I find that there is evidence of genuine remorse.

Three, your good character in the absence of a criminal history. And I do find that this offending was out of character for you. Four, the need for personal deterrence in your case is greatly reduced. Five, hardship in service so far brought about by the conditions at Hakea as well as the COVID lockdowns means that the service of parts of your term have already been harder than what would ordinarily be imposed.

Six, the hardship to [A], which I will take into account. And seven, whilst not strictly mitigating, I do accept that your motivation in this offending was not exclusively for financial reward, but was out of feeling of obligation to your brother.

1. The sentencing judge said that against the mitigating factors he weighed a number of aggravating factors; being, first, that the appellant had actual knowledge and willingness to assist an organisation that was involved in organised crime. Secondly, that he knew the cash he was transporting was drug‑derived money. Thirdly, that the quantity of money that was transported was $3.6 million. Although, his Honour accepted that the appellant did not know the precise amount of money involved in the commission of the offence, he knew it was a substantial sum. Fourthly, that the appellant was engaged in the transportation of the money across 'a national border'.[18] Fifthly, that the appellant, being aware of the nature of the operation that he had involved himself in, took steps to conceal the commission of his crime and to avoid its detection.
2. The sentencing judge found that the appellant was 'an essential cog' in smuggling the cash into NSW.
3. His Honour referred to Radford's sentencing and made reference to this court's decision in The State of Western Australia v Radford, noting that Radford had been sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment for his involvement in the common offence. His Honour said that this case was the most useful comparative case in the sentencing of the appellant. In the context of the common offence, his Honour observed that the roles of Radford and the appellant were not materially different. However, his Honour noted that Radford was financially motivated to commit the offence and this was a material factual difference between him, on the one hand, and the appellant, on the other.[19]
4. His Honour also noted that Radford's antecedents 'weren't entirely dissimilar' to the appellant's.[20] His Honour further noted that Radford received a 25% reduction under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act for his plea of guilty. However, the mitigating factors favourable to the appellant, of exceptional hardship in respect of the appellant's daughter and the time spent in COVID‑19 lockdowns and home detention, did not apply to Radford.
5. The sentencing judge found that the appellant's involvement in the common offence and his level of responsibility were 'largely similar to Radford's'.[21]
6. In the course of the sentencing remarks, his Honour referred to a number of cases decided by this court which emphasised the importance of general deterrence in the sentencing of offenders convicted of money laundering.[22]

1. The general principles applicable to this appeal are well established. We adopt the statement of general principles enunciated by this court in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia.[23] There is no need to repeat them.
2. It is convenient to deal with the grounds of appeal in numerical order.

Ground 1 - alleged error in the assessment of the overall objective seriousness of the appellant's offending

The sentencing judge erred in assessing the objective seriousness of the appellant's offending by:

(a) conflating the need for general deterrence with the objective seriousness of the offence committed by the appellant;

(b) finding [the appellant's] conduct was 'not materially different' to that of the co‑offender Radford;

(c) finding that the appellant 'was a willing participant in the drug enterprise' and 'was clearly someone who allied himself with the syndicate for the purposes of financial reward';

(d) finding that the most appropriate 'yardstick' comparative case was The State of Western Australia v Radford [2022] WASCA 142.

1. It may immediately be noted that nowhere in the sentencing remarks does the learned sentencing judge commit the alleged error in particular (a). Further, in respect of particular (c), that finding made by the learned sentencing judge did not concern the appellant. Rather, the finding was in respect of Radford.[24]
2. The ground seeks to impugn the learned sentencing judge's assessment of 'the overall objective seriousness of the appellant's offending'. Nowhere in the sentencing remarks does his Honour make an express assessment of 'the overall objective seriousness' of the appellant's offending. Essentially, the appellant's written and oral submissions highlight passages in the sentencing remarks which, it is said, in combination, show that the sentencing judge misapprehended the objective seriousness of the appellant's offending conduct. In effect, the appellant submits that the objective seriousness of the offending did not warrant the sentence that was imposed.
3. These arguments are more aptly considered in the context of ground 2, which alleges that the sentence of 6 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. As this court has said in Lyons v The State of Western Australia,[25] and Cheng‑Pin v The State of Western Australia,[26] a sentencing judge's characterisation of the seriousness of an offender's offending involves an evaluative judgment, not a finding of fact. As such, a challenge to the characterisation of the offending is better viewed as a particular of a ground of appeal alleging manifest excess. Indeed, as will be seen at [62] below, the learned sentencing judge's allegedly erroneous assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending is a particular of the allegation that the sentence is manifestly excessive.
4. For these reasons, ground 1 is misconceived and has no reasonable prospect of success. However, the question of the objective seriousness of the appellant's offending, and the appellant's arguments in respect of this question, will be considered in the context of ground 2.

Ground 2 - was the sentence manifestly excessive?

(a) The sentence awarded to the appellant was significantly out of step with sentences imposed on other offenders for offences of a similar and more serious nature;

(b) The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the appellant's offending and/or placed too much weight on the objective seriousness of the appellant's offending;

(c) The sentencing judge failed to give appropriate weight to the appellant's subjective features including the exceptional circumstance of the effect of imprisonment on his daughter ...;

(d) The sentence was so unjust and unreasonable that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred.

1. In essence, the appellant contends that when the objective seriousness of the offending is properly understood, and having regard to the mitigating factors and the relevant comparable cases, it is apparent that the sentence of 6 years' imprisonment was unreasonable and plainly unjust and, thus, manifestly excessive.
2. As to the objective circumstances of the offending, counsel for the appellant sought to, in effect, differentiate the appellant's case from other cases by reiterating the finding that the appellant made a one‑off bad decision, under pressure, in order to protect his brother, Youi, from harm. Counsel for the appellant said his 'largest point' was the appellant's reluctance to be involved in the offending, and his lack of willingness to help the Hells Angels. Although the appellant was to receive payment for transporting the cash from Perth to Sydney, this was not his primary motive.
3. Counsel for the appellant pointed to the mitigating factors as found by the sentencing judge (encapsulated at [48] above), and added to these the appellant's physical and mental health issues; the fact that imprisonment in WA would be more onerous as he would be required to serve his sentence away from his family; that personal deterrence was not a matter of any significance in the sentencing process; and that a period of about 10 months had been spent on bail in home detention.
4. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the sentence imposed on the appellant was inconsistent with the sentences imposed in other cases involving money or property laundering, including The State of Western Australia v Hoxha;[27] BSA v The State of Western Australia;[28] Knowler v The State of Western Australia;[29] Radford; Watson v The State of Western Australia;[30] The State of Western Australia v Zhuang;[31] H v The State of Western Australia;[32] Phan v The State of Western Australia;[33] Tan v The State of Western Australia;[34] and Wong v The State of Western Australia.[35] The appellant placed particular emphasis on the outcome in Watson.[36]
5. The written submissions went so far as to delphically suggest that it was open to the learned sentencing judge to impose 'some alternative to full time imprisonment'.[37]

1. In essence, the respondent submitted that the sentence of 6 years' imprisonment was an appropriate sentence, having regard to the objective seriousness of the offence, and notwithstanding the mitigating factors identified by the learned sentencing judge.

1. The maximum penalty for an offence contrary to s 563A is 20 years' imprisonment.
2. As this court recently observed in Da Silva v The State of Western Australia,[38] the conduct sought to be criminalised in s 563A is wide in its scope. Plainly, it includes the transportation of cash which is the proceeds of crime from one place to another.
3. The object of the offence is to prevent criminal activity by stopping offenders from obtaining their ill‑gotten gains. This is particularly important in thwarting organised crime. It has been said that money laundering is 'vital to the functioning of organised criminal syndicates', and that the money launderer is an 'important cog in the wheel of organised crime'.[39] Thus, those who, like the appellant, agree to assist in the laundering of crime‑derived property are liable to serious penalties, even if they had no involvement in the criminal activity from which the property is derived. Because of the importance that is typically given to general deterrence in cases of money laundering, the personal circumstances of the offender, while not irrelevant, are ordinarily given limited weight.
4. The appellant gave considerable emphasis to the comparable cases. In truth, the comparable cases were of limited assistance. There is no tariff for money laundering offences, or at least no tariff has yet emerged.[40] Money laundering offences may be committed in widely varying circumstances, by offenders whose personal circumstances also vary widely. It is often difficult to meaningfully compare one case with another. Further, there are a limited number of cases decided by this court dealing with sentences imposed for money laundering offences.[41]
5. We have read the cases cited by the parties. All of them were cited in Black v The State of Western Australia.[42] We incorporate into these reasons the analysis of the comparable cases undertaken by the court in Black.
6. The outcomes of the comparable cases do not support the contention that the sentence imposed on the appellant was manifestly excessive. Insofar as any real comparison can be made, the outcome in the present case is broadly consistent.
7. In deference to the submissions put on behalf of the appellant, we will make brief reference to the cases of Watson and Radford.
8. In Watson, the offender was convicted on his early pleas of guilty of one count of supplying a trafficable quantity of a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine, to another, and one count of money laundering contrary to s 563A(1)(b) of the Code. The offender dropped a backpack containing almost 4 kg of methylamphetamine in some bushland. Later, the offender was found in possession of almost $6 million in cash, which was the proceeds of the sale and distribution of prohibited drugs. The offender was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for the drug offence, and 3 years' imprisonment (reduced from 5 years' imprisonment in application of the totality principle) for the money laundering offence. The offender appealed to this court on grounds which included an allegation that the sentence for the money laundering offence was manifestly excessive. Leave to appeal was refused on all grounds of appeal. This court said that the sentence imposed for the money laundering offence was commensurate with the seriousness of the offending.[43]
9. Of course, the outcome in a single case does not determine the range of sentences customarily imposed. Also, the court's finding that the sentence of 3 years' imprisonment was commensurate with the seriousness of the offender's offending was made in the context that it was reduced from 5 years for totality. Moreover, the offender in Watson received a discount of 20%, pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act, as compared with the discount of 10% given to the appellant. Finally, the observation made by the court, that the sentence imposed was commensurate with the seriousness of the offending, does not fix the limits of an appropriate sentencing range, especially when leave to appeal was refused.[44]
10. As for Radford, we have already described the facts and circumstances of his offending. We do not accept the appellant's submission that the learned sentencing judge erred in finding that the roles played by Radford and the appellant in the common offence were materially different. The appellant was also critical of the learned sentencing judge's observation that Radford was the most useful comparative case in the sentencing of the appellant. Again, we do not accept that his Honour's observation was erroneous. Radford and the appellant were involved in the common offence. It was entirely appropriate for his Honour to have regard to the sentence imposed on Radford, for parity reasons, at least. It is also a relevant comparable case in arriving at an appropriate sentence for the appellant. For present purposes, the outcome in Radford does not assist the appellant, given that the appellant received a substantially lower sentence for the common offence.
11. We now turn to the objective seriousness of the offence committed by the appellant.
12. The appellant knew that:

(1) He was transporting a large quantity of cash from WA to NSW.

(2) He was participating in a sophisticated operation, conducted for the benefit of the Hells Angels, an organised crime group.

(3) His assistance involved the transportation of cash derived from prohibited drug dealing.

(4) While the appellant may not have known exactly how much cash he was transporting, he did not ask and was clearly reckless as to the amount of cash, a point counsel for the appellant conceded in his submissions to this court.[45] The appellant knew that the quantity of cash was at least 'six figures'.

1. The appellant's decision to become involved in the offence was undoubtedly unwise, out of character, and primarily motivated by a desire to protect Youi from potential harm. However, none of this can significantly detract from the fact that the appellant knew exactly what he was doing, and that, in helping his brother, he was also helping an organised criminal entity. The appellant must have known that to transport the cash from WA to NSW was risky and wrong.
2. The appellant's involvement in the offence cannot be said to have been fleeting. The appellant agreed, on 21 January 2021, to transport the cash on his return journey from WA. He agreed to the arrangements described at [14] above. When he arrived in WA, he undertook the activities set out between [15] and [19] above. The appellant remained in Perth for four days before undertaking the return journey with the cash. We observe that he was given a Ciphr‑encrypted mobile telephone, and that he resealed the trailer into which the cash had been placed by Radford, using bogus security tags.
3. While the appellant's motivation to commit the offence was not primarily financial, it cannot be ignored that the appellant stood to gain $15,000 for his efforts.
4. There is nothing altruistic about the appellant's offending conduct. He was playing a significant role in the distribution of prohibited drugs by transporting cash derived from their sale. Given the damage caused to the community by drug offending, the offending in the present case is not victimless. He could, and should, have refused to be involved. This may have put Youi in a difficult position. However, any problems Youi had with the Hells Angels were for Youi, and not the appellant, to solve.
5. The strongest submissions made by the appellant concern his personal circumstances. The appellant is a person of prior good character, who has led a productive life, and presents as a low risk of reoffending. He is remorseful for what he has done. His wife and children, who all reside in NSW, face significant difficulties because of his incarceration in WA. The hardship his absence will cause his daughter, in particular, was considered by the sentencing judge to be mitigating.
6. The appellant has depression, and his separation from his family will make imprisonment in WA more onerous for him. We also acknowledge the appellant's physical health problems, and that, prior to being sentenced, he spent some time in home detention.
7. We also recognise the appellant's late plea of guilty, for which he received, as already mentioned, a reduction of 10% pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act.
8. Notwithstanding the appellant's favourable personal circumstances, for the reasons already given, they can only be given limited weight. The hardship caused to the appellant's daughter, sad as it undoubtedly is, similarly, can only be given limited weight because of the objective seriousness of the appellant's offending.
9. General deterrence remains an important sentencing consideration. The message must be clear and consistent. Money laundering offences are serious, and those who involve themselves in offending contrary to s 563A of the Code will, generally, receive strong penalties.
10. Having regard to all of the relevant facts and circumstances, we have concluded that, although the sentence imposed upon the appellant was substantial, it was not unreasonable or plainly unjust. Implied error has not been demonstrated. The sentence of 6 years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive. While we would grant leave to appeal on ground 2, the ground has not been made out.

1. Neither of the grounds of appeal have been made out. The appeal must be dismissed. The appellant filed an application to adduce additional evidence, dated 22 July 2025, in the event that this court resentenced the appellant. As the appeal must be dismissed, so, too, must this application. The orders we would make are as follows:
   1. The appellant's application to adduce additional evidence, dated 22 July 2025, is dismissed.
   2. Leave to appeal on ground 1 is refused.
   3. Leave to appeal on ground 2 is granted.
   4. The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[2] See The State of Western Australia v Radford [2022] WASCA 142.

[3] Report of consultant psychologist Mr Tim Watson‑Munro, dated 31 October 2024, 7.

[23] Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21].

[25] Lyons v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 81; (2022) 100 MVR 420 [67].

[26] Cheng‑Pin v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 104 [60].

[27] The State of Western Australia v Hoxha [2025] WASCA 101.

[28] BSA v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 31.

[29] Knowler v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 27.

[30] Watson v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 80.

[31] The State of Western Australia v Zhuang [2021] WASCA 56.

[32] H v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 211.

[33] Phan v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 163.

[34] Tan v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 112.

[35] Wong v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 8.

[38] Da Silva v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 151 [57].

[39] Tan v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 112 [49], citing Majeed v The Queen [2013] VSCA 40 [37] and Truong v The Queen [2016] VSCA 228 [36].

[41] Black v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 192 [38].

[44] See GUE v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 121 [59], citing Pedrochi v Brown [2021] WASC 81 [43].