1. The hearing of the application was conducted in Perth from 7 to 9 October 2025.
2. At the hearing, the applicant was represented by Mr I R Freeman of counsel, instructed by Mr A Geronimos of Lavan Legal. The respondent was represented by Ms L Martin of counsel, instructed by Ms A Lean of Mills Oakley.
3. The evidence before the Tribunal was extensive. The parties provided a Joint Hearing Bundle which contained numerous reports, assessments, and communications. I refer to this evidence where material to my decision. However, of particular relevance within the bundle, were the Functional Capacity Assessment authored by Ms Meg Jenkins and the Behaviour Support Plan (July 2025) authored by Ms Melynnda Jelley . The respondent relied on the evidence of Ms Trudi Warner who prepared a report dated 9 December 2024.
4. In addition to the bundle, the Tribunal was provided with the applicant's plan dated 30 September 2025 ; the NDIS Pricing Arrangements for Specialist Disability Accommodation 2025-26; the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Specialist Disability Accommodation) Rules 2020; the SDA Guidelines ; a 'plan breakdown' for the applicant; and an email chain between R Griffiths and P Klepe dated 7 April 2025. The Tribunal was also provided with advice from the Technical Advice and Practice Improvement Branch dated 13 August 2025.
5. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from Ms Jacqueline Kirby (the applicant's mother and plan nominee), Ms Jelley (the applicant's behaviour support practitioner), and Ms Jenkins (the applicant's occupational therapist).
6. Following the hearing, the parties filed written closing submissions in relation to the supports that remain in dispute. As those submissions made clear, it is common ground that the applicant has profound disabilities, including Autism Spectrum Disorder, Intellectual Disability, and severe anxiety. It is also agreed that he requires 2:1 support, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and that this level of support is reasonable and necessary.

1. As this is a merits review, the Tribunal's role is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision by applying the same law as the original decision maker. The legislative framework governing this decision is the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (the Act) and the legislative instruments made under it, principally the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 (the Supports Rules).

1. The Act is to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with its statutory purpose,[1] insofar as that purpose is discernible from the statutory text and context.[2]
2. The objects of the Act include giving effect to Australia's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.[3] The Act is intended to support the independence, and social and economic participation, of people with disability, and to enable them to exercise choice and control in the pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery of their supports.
3. The objects of the Act, and how those objects are to be pursued, are contained in s 4 of the Act. The general principles guiding actions under the Act are set out in s 4. These principles provide that people with disability have the same right as other members of Australian society to realise their potential for physical, social, emotional, and intellectual development.[4] The principles require that people with disability are central to the scheme and are to be supported to exercise choice and control over their lives.[5] The role of families, carers, and other significant persons is to be acknowledged and respected.[6] A further guiding principle is the need to ensure the financial sustainability of the National Disability Insurance Scheme.[7]

1. Section 31 of the Act specifies principles that must guide the preparation of a participant's plan. A participant's plan should, so far as reasonably practicable, be individualised and be directed by the participant.[8]
2. Section 32 of the Act provides that the CEO is required to facilitate the preparation of a participant's plan. Section 33 of the Act provides that the plan must include the participant's statement of goals and aspirations, and a SoPS prepared with the participant and approved by the CEO.

1. The central provision for the funding of supports is s 33, which provides that the NDIS will fund supports that are 'reasonable and necessary'.
2. The phrase 'reasonable and necessary supports' is not defined in the Act, but its meaning can be determined with the assistance of the provisions at ss 33 and 34 of the Act.
3. In McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] FCA 308, Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) made the following observations:[9]

Section 13 expressly indicates that a 'support' might be a service, or it might be an activity. In my opinion, although s 14 (which deals with funding by the Agency of others to assist the participant rather than the Agency assisting the participant directly) is expressed purposively, its subject matter is also 'support' - whether by way of services of activities or any other matter that assists a person with disability in a way that is consistent with the general principles set out in s 4. The word 'support' must be given a broad construction in this context, and there is no need for the purposes of this proceeding to seek to give it any comprehensive meaning. Rather, the point to be made is that it is a practical description of the means by which a person with disability is assisted. It is not intended, in my opinion, to encompass funding, especially because what s 14 contemplates is that the Agency will 'fund' a support. The Agency cannot 'fund' funding. > > ... > > Whether a support is 'reasonable' requires a different assessment to whether a support is 'necessary'. Again, it is not necessary in the context of this proceeding to be definitive about the nature and extent of the meaning of the phrase, or its components. It is enough to observe that using the concept of necessity would appear to tie one aspect of the CEO's assessment to an evaluation of the kinds of factors set out in ss 34(1)(a), (b) and (d). The word 'reasonable' would appear to be directed at factors such as those set out in s 34(1)(c) and (f). That is not to say the meaning of each word is exhausted by the factors set out in s 34(1): rather, it is to illustrate the different work that each concept does as an adjective in the phrase 'reasonable and necessary supports'.

4. Additionally, in National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF [2020] FCAFC 79; (2020) 276 FCR 415,[10] the Full Court of the Federal Court made the following observations about the meaning of 'reasonable and necessary supports':

[T]here is no doubt that the contextual use of the phrase in this Act links it to public funding to be provided to a participant. In that context, the phrase connotes supports which meet a threshold which justifies - by reference to the context, objects and guiding principles of the Act and the facts of the case - the expenditure of public funds for that support, for a particular participant. As we have already explained, the phrase also needs to be understood taking into account what has qualified a person as a participant, and the links between a person's impairment and their full participation in the community, in the same variety of ways as persons without a disability might choose to participate.

5. The criteria for determining whether a support is reasonable and necessary are set out in s 34(1) of the Act. As a consequence of the commencement of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS back on Track No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth) on 3 October 2024, to be considered reasonable and necessary, a support must meet all of the following criteria:

(aa) the support is necessary to address needs of the participant arising from an impairment in relation to which the participant meets the disability requirements (see section 24) or the early intervention requirements (see section 25);

(a) the support will assist the participant to pursue the goals, objectives and aspirations included in the participant's statement of goals and aspirations;

(b) the support will assist the participant to undertake activities, so as to facilitate the participant's social and economic participation;

(c) the support represents value for money in that the costs of the support are reasonable, relative to both the benefits achieved and the cost of alternative support;

(d) the support will be, or is likely to be, effective and beneficial for the participant, having regard to current good practice;

(e) the funding or provision of the support takes account of what it is reasonable to expect families, carers, informal networks and the community to provide;

(f) the support is an NDIS support for the participant.

1. The Act is supplemented by Rules made under the Act.[11] The Supports Rules provide additional guidance on the criteria for what is a reasonable and necessary support.
2. Rule 3.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when determining whether a support represents value for money under paragraph 34(1)(c) of the Act. These factors include:

(a) whether there is evidence that the support will substantially improve the life stage outcomes for, and be of long-term benefit to, the participant; > > (b) whether the funding of the support is likely to reduce the cost of funding of other supports for the participant in the long term; > > (c) whether the support amounts to or involves income replacement; > > (d) the cost of the support compared to the cost of supports of the same kind that are provided in the area where the participant resides; and > > (e) whether the support will increase the participant's independence and reduce the participant's reliance on other supports.

3. Rule 5.1 and 5.2 are relevant to whether a support is an NDIS Support. Rule 5.1(c) provides that a support will not be funded if it is a duplication of other supports funded under the NDIS.

1. As the supports sought by the applicant include specialist disability accommodation, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Specialist Disability Accommodation) Rules 2020 (Cth) (SDA Rules) are relevant. I deal further with these rules below.

1. I am required to consider, but am not bound by, relevant policy.[12] However, I recognise that absent good reason for not doing so, the Tribunal should apply relevant government policy.[13] However, that does not mean that policy can be relied on to construe the legislation and delegate legislation it is made under. To adopt such an approach would be to engage in 'bottom up' interpretation.[14]

1. I start my consideration of the supports in dispute by first setting out what was observed by the Full Court in WRMF at [152]:

the statutory task of determining the contents of a participant's plan, and what are the reasonable and necessary supports, is a fact‑intensive exercise. More so than in many legislative schemes that confer an administrative benefit, the circumstances of each participant will vary greatly. The exercise is highly individualised. There will be an area of 'decisional freedom' (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li at [28] (French CJ)) for the decision‑maker, about what supports fall within this description, given the circumstances of a particular individual. Provided no substantive legal error attends the choices made, it is possible for reasonable minds exercising the power under s 33(2) to differ. So too on merits review.

2. Before turning to the particular supports in dispute, it is useful to make some preliminary observations.
3. The applicant's most recent plan was approved on 25 September 2025 following the reviewable decision being remitted to the respondent pursuant to s 85 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth). This plan provides for supports funded to a maximum amount of $1,846,084.51 over a twelve-month period, although it must be noted that figure includes $1 as a 'placeholder' amount to represent the applicant's SDA eligibility.[15]

1. Hamish's goals are recorded in his most recent plan. In summary, Hamish's expressed goals are to develop his ability to regulate his anxiety and reduce associated behaviours; explore future housing options so that he can be supported to move out of the family home in the future; develop skills to manage his daily activities in a variety of settings; and have his personal care and safety needs met in his home and community.

1. This is the most significant area of dispute, with the parties fundamentally disagreeing on the proper construction of the relevant legislative and policy framework.
2. Notwithstanding the disagreement about the relevant legislative and policy framework, the parties now agree that:

(a) the applicant is eligible for SDA;[16] > > (b) the design category should be 'robust';[17] and > > (c) that the location should be the 'WA - Wheat Belt' region.[18]

3. There was no issue raised as to whether any SDA was to be provided as an in-kind support.[19]
4. The issue in dispute concerns the permissible building type and, bound up within that consideration, the appropriateness of inclusion of two On-Site Overnight Assistance (OOA) rooms.
5. The applicant seeks funding for a house in the robust category for one resident, with two OOA rooms in the WA - Wheatbelt Region.
6. The respondent contends that a 'villa/duplex/townhouse' in the robust category for one resident (and with one bedroom) is permissible.
7. The respondent expressly submits that, irrespective of the applicant's personal circumstances and impairments, by operation of the SDA Rules and SDA Price Guide, it cannot provide a support which consists of a house (irrespective of whether it has one or more OOA rooms) to a single occupant.
8. To properly frame the context of the submissions, it is helpful to first outline the respondent's submissions.

1. The respondent submits that the SDA Price Guide is expressly 'adopted'[20] by the SDA Rules (via the definition in s 5 and the note to s 15(2)) and that its limits are binding not only on it, but on the Tribunal.[21]
2. The respondent submits that the current 'SDA Price Guide' is the 'NDIS Pricing Arrangements for Specialist Disability Accommodation 2025-2026'. I will proceed on the assumption that submission is correct, even though the SDA Rules expressly define the SDA Price Guide as 'the publication known as the National Disability Insurance Scheme Price Guide for Specialist Disability Accommodation, published by the CEO, as in force from time to time.'
3. Whether anything turns on the difference between a document entitled, relevantly, 'NDIS Pricing Arrangements' as compared to the defined 'Price Guide' is not necessary to determine for present purposes.
4. However and in any event, on the above basis, the respondent submits:

(a) the SDA Price Guide does not provide funding for a sole occupancy house. It limits sole occupancy to apartments or villas/duplexes/townhouses. Houses are only funded for two or three SDA residents; > > (b) the applicant's request for a three-bedroom house is properly construed as a 'house, 1 resident, robust' with two OOA rooms; > > (c) the request for two OOA rooms is contested. The respondent states the applicant is funded for 2:1 active overnight support. There is no evidence of improved capacity to justify a move to inactive support, and the respondent does not understand why two rooms would be required given both carers should not be sleeping simultaneously; > > (d) a direction to fund a 1-resident house would 'lack statutory force and be invalid' as it is contrary to the limits adopted by the SDA Rules; and > > (e) therefore, the only building types the respondent can offer the applicant as a support are an 'apartment' or a 'villa/duplex/townhouse'. The respondent submits the latter is 'more appropriate'.

5. The respondent also puts an alternative submission which is necessarily dependant on its primary submission being accepted. The respondent argues that if a villa/duplex/townhouse is the only available option, the Tribunal must consider the risks under rule 5.1(a) of the Supports Rules (support must not cause harm) and s 16(h) of the SDA Rules (mitigation of risks).
6. In this respect, the respondent refers to evidence from the applicant's mother and practitioners that the applicant poses a 'fatal threat' to neighbours, has previously 'hospitalised' teachers, and would be at risk himself in a villa (e.g. escaping).
7. The respondent submits that if a 1-resident house is excluded by the SDA Price Guide and a villa/duplex/townhouse is inappropriate due to the significant risks it poses then it is 'open to the Tribunal... to remove the SDA funding from the applicant's plan because there is no appropriate SDA building type for the Applicant'.[22]

1. The applicant's primary submission is that the respondent has adopted a 'reversed construction' of the NDIS framework by starting with the SDA Price Guide instead of the Act and the SDA Rules. The applicant argues the correct approach begins with the Act.
2. On this basis and adopting that approach, the applicant submits:

(a) the proposed SDA meets all six criteria for a 'reasonable and necessary' support under s 34(1) of the Act. > > (b) the proposed SDA (a house for a sole resident) is the most appropriate building type under s 16 of the SDA Rules. The applicant provides submissions addressing the relevant considerations in s 16, ultimately submitting that a house mitigates risks to himself and others, which other building types would not. > > (c) the two OOA rooms are justified. The applicant has a sleep disorder. The rooms are intended for carers to rest if the applicant manages to sleep, anticipating a future improvement in his sleep patterns. This would eventually reduce costs by allowing carers to move from 'active' to lower 'inactive' overnight rates. This, he argues, represents long term value for money. > > (d) the SDA Price Guide is an administrative policy document, not legislation. The applicant argues it is an 'internal yardstick' that cannot be used to impose limitations that are inconsistent with the Act or SDA Rules. > > (e) the fact that a 1-resident house is not listed as a specific line item in the SDA Price Guide's tables does not mean it is an 'active exclusion with legislative force'.[23] The applicant submits that to deny the support on this basis would be an unjust and 'perverse outcome'.[24]

1. The proper approach to whether SDA should be included in a plan has been the subject of some consideration by the Tribunal. In Allen and CEO, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 1359, Senior Member French broke the approach down into three stages involving twelve separate steps. I gratefully adopt, to the extent necessary for the resolution of the present review application, the approach articulated by Senior Member French in that case.
2. It is not necessary to set out the approach in detail largely because of the quite proper and commendable way that the parties conducted their cases which confined the issues which stood in the way of the applicant being able to receive SDA.
3. However, Senior Member French identified (correctly with respect) the three separate stages as involving:[25]

(a) as to the first stage, determine whether the applicant is eligible to receive support for SDA; > > (b) as to the second stage, determine if the requested support is reasonable and necessary having regard to the criteria in s 34(1) of the Act; and > > (c) as to the third stage, determine the building type, design category and area in which the SDA is to be located.

4. Properly understood, there was no real dispute between the parties that the first and second stage of that analysis was satisfied in respect of the applicant. The divergence of the parties was in relation to the outcome of the third stage which involved a close consideration of the SDA Rules and the SDA Price Guide made under those rules. There is no real dispute that a 'house' is a reasonable and necessary support and that each of the criteria contained in s 34(1) of the Act are met.

1. The SDA Rules establish the framework for determining when a participant is eligible for SDA and the specific nature of that accommodation. Where, as here, the parties agree that a participant meets the eligibility criteria in s 11, the inquiry shifts to Division 3 of Part 2 of the SDA Rules.[26] This Division, comprising ss 15 to 18, governs the determination of the design, type and location of the SDA.
2. The central provision is s 15. Section 15 requires the CEO (or this Tribunal on review) to determine three key matters for an eligible participant: the appropriate SDA building type, the appropriate SDA design category, and the area in which the accommodation is to be located. These determinations define the character of the support to be included in the participant's plan.
3. Section 15(2) provides a specific power that allows the CEO (or this Tribunal on review), upon written notification from a participant, to determine that the participant is eligible to receive support in a dwelling that does not meet the primary determinations made under s 15(1). This may apply where the participant wishes to remain in their current dwelling, or requires transitional accommodation while seeking a more suitable, long-term option.

1. Section 16 prescribes the matters to which the CEO (or this Tribunal on review) must have regard when determining the appropriate SDA building type for an eligible participant. The provision mandates a comprehensive, person-centric assessment. The decision-maker must consider a range of factors, including:

(a) the participant's preference, where it can be established and aligns with their statement of goals and aspirations; > > (b) the participant's support needs, and whether the support model requires immediately available or constant person-to-person support; > > (c) whether the building type represents value for money, assessing the reasonableness of the costs relative to the benefits achieved and the cost of alternatives; > > (d) the extent to which the building type would facilitate social and economic participation, including engagement in the life of the household and community; > > (e) the facilitation of informal supports and the impact on the cost of other supports; and > > (f) the impact of the building type on the participant's capacity, skill development, and the effectiveness of other supports.

1. Section 17 deals with the determination of the SDA design category. This decision must be made having regard to the specific needs of the eligible participant.
2. The design categories themselves are set out in Schedule 2 and range from 'improved liveability' to 'high physical support'. Section 17(2) expressly prohibits the CEO (or this Tribunal on review) from determining the SDA design category of 'basic'.
3. The evident purpose of such a prohibition is to ensure that a SDA determination is only made for a home which has specialist design features beyond that of a standard home.

1. Finally, s 18 sets out the matters for consideration when determining the area in which the SDA is to be located. Like the process for determining building type, this requires a multi-factorial assessment. Regard must be had to matters including:

(a) the participant's preference, particularly where it is important for their support needs or connections; > > (b) the extent to which the location would assist the participant to pursue their goals; > > (c) the facilitation of past, established or planned cultural and community connections; > > (d) the likelihood that the location will facilitate social and economic participation; and > > (e) whether the location represents value for money, having regard to its impact on informal supports and access to other required services.

2. The area determined must be defined by reference to the Australian Statistical Geography Standard, as either a Statistical Area Level 4, a part of such an area, or a combination of such areas.
3. In summary, once a participant is found to be eligible for SDA, ss 15 to 18 provide a structured and principled pathway for determining the specific features of that accommodation. The decision-maker must undertake a distinct analysis for each of the three components (building type, design category, and location) having regard to the comprehensive and specific list of matters set out in the Rules. This ensures the resulting determination is tailored to the individual needs and circumstances of the participant.

Does the SDA Price Guide exclude the ability to provide the applicant with a house?

1. There is no dispute that the applicant is eligible for SDA. As already noted:

(a) the applicant seeks funding for SDA in the form of a 'house', 1 resident, 2 OOA rooms, Robust' design category, to be in or around Albany, Western Australia; and > > (b) the respondent submits that a 'house' in the configuration sought is not available as a support and, that subject to the submissions about risk issues identified, the appropriate SDA is a 'Villa/Duplex/Townhouse, 1 resident, Robust' design category.

2. The respondent's preliminary submission, that a 'house' in the configuration sought by the applicant is not an available option, logically falls to be addressed first. This is a threshold legal question. The respondent argues that the SDA Rules, through their adoption of the 'SDA Price Guide', do not permit SDA funding for a 'house' occupied by a single participant.
3. I accept the applicant's submission that the respondent erroneously seeks elevate the SDA Price Guide to a position of paramountcy over the Act and the SDA Rules. I accept that the correct approach begins with the Act which then looks to the relevant rules. To do otherwise is to adopt a bottom up approach which would be erroneous.[27]
4. The correct approach begins with the Act and the Rules. Somewhat curiously, at least for the respondent's argument, the SDA Rules make only limited reference to the SDA Price Guide. Those references are:

(a) in s 5 relating to its own definition and in the definition of 'minimum design requirements'; > > (b) in s 9 of the SDA Rules, which relate to the simplified outline of Part 2 of the SDA Rules; > > (c) in 'Note 2' to s 15(2) of the SDA Rules. However, I note the applicant does not seek a determination under s 15(2) of the SDA Rules.

5. Notwithstanding, the respondent appears to place considerable emphasis on this Note, which states: 'The SDA Price Guide sets out the maximum amount of support that is available'.
6. In my view, this wording supports the conclusions I have reached in any event. The respondent's submission requires a conclusion that the SDA Price Guide is exhaustive and covers the field for all available SDA types. I reject this. I accept the applicant's submission that the fact a 1-resident 'House' is absent from the SDA Price Guide's tables does not mean it is an 'active exclusion with legislative force'.
7. Rather, I am satisfied that the Price Guide's stated purpose is to set a maximum price, not to define the entirety of the supports that can be funded. On a proper construction of the SDA Rules, the absence of a 'maximum amount' being 'set out' in the Price Guide for a 1-resident 'House' results in a conclusion that there is no pre-determined maximum price, not a conclusion that such a support cannot be funded at all. To accept the respondent's construction would lead to the perverse outcome that the respondent, by simply omitting a building type from its own policy document, could unilaterally extinguish a participant's right to a support that is otherwise found to be reasonable and necessary under the Act.
8. Therefore, I find that the S` DA Price Guide does not operate to preclude the funding of a 'House' for a sole resident.

1. Having found that a 'House' is a legally permissible building type, I must now consider whether it is the appropriate building type for the applicant under s 16 of the SDA Rules.
2. That analysis requires consideration of the SDA Rules. The SDA Rules require me to consider whether the proposed SDA (a house with two OOA rooms for a sole resident) is the most appropriate building type under s 16 of the SDA Rules. That assessment is to be conducted by reference to the matters in s 16(a)-(m). The applicant provides submissions addressing all 13 matters under s 16, asserting that a house mitigates risks to himself and others, which other building types would not.
3. My consideration is informed by the matters in s 16(a)-(m) of the SDA Rules. The respondent does not contend that, on an analysis of these factors, a 'villa/townhouse' is more appropriate than a 'house'. [28] In any event, I consider that a number of those factors weigh heavily, indeed dispositively, in favour of the applicant's position. Among other things, the SDA Rules require consideration of the participant's preferences;[29] where the participant currently lives and has lived;[30] and the extent to which a location would facilitate established connections.[31] The evidence establishes that the applicant has lived his entire life in and around the Albany region. The evidence clearly demonstrates that his family, his formal support providers, and his entire community are based in the Albany region. I am satisfied that his preference, understandably, is to remain in that location and it is, understandably, the preference of his parents.
4. The evidence regarding risk is also compelling. The applicant's behaviour support plan details that changes to his routine are a primary trigger for behavioural escalations and extreme anxiety, posing a significant risk of harm to himself and others. This is supported by oral evidence that the applicant poses a 'fatal threat' to neighbours and has previously 'hospitalised' teachers.
5. A 'villa/duplex/townhouse', by its nature, involves shared walls or close proximity to other residents. This would create an unacceptable and unmanageable risk to neighbours, to the applicant's support workers, and to the applicant himself, who would be at risk of absconding. A standalone 'House' is the only building type that adequately mitigates these significant risks, thereby satisfying s 16(h) of the SDA Rules.
6. Furthermore, the applicant's family and entire support network are based in the Albany region. His parents are his primary informal support. Considering the matters referred to in s 16 of the SDA Rules, I am satisfied that the correct and preferable decision is that the applicant's plan should include funding for SDA for a 'House, Robust' design category.

1. I am also satisfied that the request for two On-Site Overnight Assistance (OOA) rooms is reasonable and necessary and satisfies the criteria in s 34(1) of the Act.
2. The respondent disputes this, submitting that because the applicant is funded for 2:1 active overnight support, there is no justification for rooms to facilitate inactive support.
3. This submission takes an unduly narrow view. SDA is a long-term, foundational support. The decision must consider the applicant's needs over the life of the dwelling, not just his funding at this precise moment.
4. I accept the support represents value for money as required by s 34(1)(c). The applicant has a sleep disorder, but the evidence supports an aspiration that his sleep patterns may improve. The inclusion of the OOA rooms is a pre-emptive and prudent investment. It creates the physical infrastructure to allow his support to transition from 'active' to 'inactive' overnight rates in the future, which would result in a significant reduction in long-term support costs. The cost of including the rooms now is far less than the cost of retrofitting them later.
5. I further accept that the support is effective and beneficial (as required by s 34(1)(d)) and assists the applicant in pursuing his goals (as required by s 34(1)(a)). I find it is beneficial in ensuring the accommodation is a long-term, stable home that can adapt to his future needs. This minimises the risk of disruptive modifications or a future move (or moves if his needs change over time), which the evidence establishes would be traumatic for the applicant.
6. I am further satisfied that the provision of SDA in the form of a house is permitted having regard to Rule 5.1 and 5.2 of the Supports Rules. Whilst there will always be some inherent risks in relation to the applicant's outbursts, he has been living in a house and the separation from neighbours has meant that he has not harmed neighbours and I am satisfied that the provision of a house, instead of a villa/duplex/townhouse would mitigate against the risk that the applicant might otherwise pose to others if he were to be housed in closer proximity to others.
7. Weighing all the relevant factors, I am satisfied that the conclusion is clear. The need to sustain the applicant's indispensable family supports, the need to maintain the continuity of his care, and the grave and evidence-based risks associated with relocation far outweigh the respondent's concern regarding the present lack of available housing stock.
8. I therefore find that the inclusion of two OOA rooms is justified as a reasonable and necessary component of the SDA support, I am satisfied that the correct and preferable decision is that the applicant's plan should include funding for SDA for a 'House, Robust' design category, for a single resident with provision for support workers, located in the Albany area.

1. I turn now to the issue of transport funding. The applicant seeks $251,878.64, representing 2,920 hours, for the cost of support workers travelling to and from his rural property in Scotsdale. This property is in a Modified Monash Model 5 area.
2. The applicant submits that the respondent's offer of $95,598.00 (1,170.5 hours) is based on a 2022 agreement. That figure is no longer sufficient because the applicant's circumstances have changed: he no longer attends school, and his parents cannot provide the informal support they once did due to carer burnout. This necessitates a significant increase in formal care, and consequently, provider travel.
3. The applicant contends that the respondent's offer of partial funding amounts to an acceptance that the support itself is reasonable and necessary. Relying on McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] FCA 308, the applicant argues that once a support is found to be reasonable and necessary, the respondent must fund the whole amount required, not just a part of it. The applicant concedes this funding could be removed once suitable SDA is secured.
4. The respondent submits that the $251,878.64 sought for support worker travel from Albany to Scotsdale does not represent value for money under s 34(1)(c) of Act. This is because the applicant has been approved for SDA funding in the Albany area, which, once secured, would place him in the same location as his support workers and 'eliminate the need for transport funding'.
5. However, the respondent accepts that there is currently no suitable SDA available for the applicant. In view of this, the respondent 'offers' to reinstate the previous funding amount of $95,598.04 for a 'time-limited period' of 12 months to cover 1,170.5 hours of travel costs.[32]

1. The applicant seeks significant funding for provider travel to cover the costs of support workers travelling from Albany to his current rural residence, and for activity-based transport from that residence. The respondent submits that this funding does not represent value for money, as required by s 34(1)(c) of the Act, because a cheaper alternative would be for the applicant to move closer to those supports.
2. This argument fails for the reasons I have just given. The proposed alternative of relocating the applicant is not, on a holistic assessment, a viable or appropriate one. The question of value for money must therefore be assessed in the entirety of the applicant's actual and present circumstances. The concept of 'value for money' under s 34(1)(c) is not a simple exercise in finding the lowest possible cost for a single support in isolation. It requires a broader assessment of the costs of a support relative to the benefits achieved and the cost of alternative supports.
3. In this case, the applicant lives in a rural location and requires 24-hour, 2:1 support from workers who are based in the nearest regional centre, Albany. Without funding for those workers to travel to his home, he cannot receive the support. The benefit achieved by funding the transport is therefore fundamental and is critical to ensuring the entire package of core supports viable. It enables the applicant to be supported safely in his home, preventing the harm that the expert evidence indicates would otherwise occur. I find that it is the essential precondition to the provision of 2:1 support as provided for in his plan being effective.
4. The cost of the alternative must also be considered. I do not accept the submission that the relevant alternative is to consider requiring the applicant to move to the Perth - South West area and, indeed, the respondent concedes that SDA should be included as a support in the Perth - Wheat Belt region which encompasses Albany and its surrounds. Moreover, the immediate alternative to not funding transport is that the applicant's support plan collapses and either his parents are required to care for Hamish or he is left without any support whatsoever. In other words, Hamish would be left without the 2:1 support that all parties agree is necessary to keep him and others safe. This would create an unreasonable risk to Hamish and to others, including his parents. The respondent's previously suggested alternative, relocation, carries its own severe costs, as detailed above. A significant behavioural decline, risk of injury, and the potential need for more restrictive, and ultimately more expensive, interventions are the likely consequences. When viewed in this proper context, the cost of funding transport to maintain the applicant in a stable and safe environment represents a sound and necessary investment.
5. Further, I accept the applicant's submission[33] that the respondent's offer to fund $95,598.00 in respect of travel for support workers involves a concession on the part of the respondent that such a support is reasonable and necessary and satisfied s 34 of the Act. I further accept the applicant's submissions that the respondent's offer to partially fund the travel required for a period of 12 months is an 'incomplete funding' and that a support cannot be partially funded as the respondent proposes.[34]
6. Accordingly, until such time as the applicant moves into the new SDA dwelling in Albany, the funding sought for provider travel and for activity-based transport is a reasonable and necessary support. I am satisfied that it represents value for money because it is the only means of ensuring the applicant's safety and giving effect to the other essential supports in his plan. It will assist him to pursue his goals and facilitate his social participation to the extent possible. The funding for Transport, as sought by the applicant, should be included in his plan.

1. The next issue concerns funding for positive behaviour support. The dispute has narrowed to 40 hours of Behaviour Management and Training (BMT). The parties agree on 120 hours of specialist behaviour intervention. The respondent has approved 50 hours of BMT, but the applicant seeks 90 hours.
2. The applicant submits the extra 40 hours are justified by the reports of Ms Jelley (Behaviour Support Practitioner, BSP) and Ms Jenkins (Occupational Therapist, OT).
3. He rejects the respondent's contention that this funding creates a 'duplication of supports'. He argues that a BSP (registered under the Act) and an OT (a regulated health professional) have different, though complementary, roles and focuses. The fact that both may deliver their services via training support workers does not make the services a duplication.
4. The respondent submits the additional 40 hours are 'excessive'. It argues Ms Jelley's evidence failed to provide 'adequate justification' for the extra hours. The respondent submits that there is insufficient evidence to justify the additional hours. It contends that the behaviour support practitioner's report, while recommending 90 hours, does not adequately explain why this specific amount is necessary, nor what outcomes would be achieved beyond those realisable with the 50 hours already approved. On this basis, the respondent argues the additional support is not value for money under s 34(1)(c) or effective and beneficial under s 34(1)(d) of the Act.
5. The respondent maintains the request constitutes a duplication of supports, contrary to rule 5.1(c) of the Supports Rules. It points to Ms Jenkins' evidence that her OT work 'wholly consisted of training for the Applicant's support team'. As both practitioners are training the support team, the respondent submits the extra hours are not value for money.

1. The flaw, in my view, with this submission is that it takes too narrow a view of the evidence and the nature of the support required. The recommendation for 90 hours of behaviour management and training is the considered professional opinion of the applicant's behaviour support practitioner, Ms Jelley, which was essentially unshaken in cross examination. Her behaviour support plan must be read as a whole and in the full context of the applicant's life. When this is done, as I will endeavour to explain, the basis for her recommendation becomes clear.
2. The evidence establishes and I find that the applicant is embarking on and navigating a period of profound transition. In this respect I observe that the applicant has recently finished high school, removing the structure that previously occupied a significant part of his life. His parents, after years of providing intensive informal support, are understandably and necessarily stepping back to manage their own business and wellbeing, leading to a change in the applicant's daily patterns of support. He is also maturing into a young adult. The Behaviour Support Plan makes it plain that these kinds of changes to routine and environment are significant triggers for the behavioural escalations that place the applicant and those around him at risk.[35]
3. The purpose of behaviour management and training is to equip the applicant's support team with the specific skills and strategies needed to implement the Behaviour Support Plan effectively. It involves direct training, modelling, and oversight to ensure the team can proactively de-escalate situations and respond safely and consistently when incidents occur. In a period of heightened flux and instability, it is both logical and necessary that the intensity of this training and support for his carers would need to increase. The additional 40 hours is directed at ensuring his support team is prepared for the increased challenges that these life transitions will inevitably present.
4. I am satisfied that the support is plainly effective and beneficial. A key achievement of the applicant's current support arrangements, as evidenced in the material, is that he is able to live in the community without the imposition of restrictive practices. The provision of such a support, among other things, supports a primary object of the Act. I accept that maintaining this outcome requires constant vigilance and proactive, expert-led support. The training for his support team is, and will be, a critical component of this success. I accept that to reduce this support at the very time the applicant's circumstances are becoming more challenging would create an unacceptable risk of behavioural decline and increase the likelihood that restrictive practices might be considered necessary in the future.
5. This also disposes of the respondent's value for money argument. The 'benefit achieved' by this support is the maintenance of the applicant's safety and stability, the safety of his support workers, and his ability to live without resort to restrictive practices. The alternative is to leave the applicant and his support team potentially ill-equipped to manage his heightened needs, risking serious incidents which may require crisis intervention, hospitalisation, or involvement of the justice system. Such outcomes are immeasurably more costly, both financially and in human terms. In my view, the proactive funding to prevent such a situation represents a clear and prudent example of value for money.
6. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the 90 hours of behaviour management and training, as recommended by the applicant's behaviour support practitioner, constitutes a reasonable and necessary support and, accordingly, the additional 40 hours ought to be included in his plan.

1. The applicant notes the 'recent inclusion of 3 hours per week' for these services, which was included in his plan subsequent to a consent order remitting the applicant's plan to the respondent for reconsideration.
2. The respondent states the applicant seeks 5 hours per week. It accepts that the applicant cannot undertake these tasks and has funded 3 hours per week in the current plan. The respondent contends there is a 'lack of... evidence' to support the additional 2 hours sought. It submits these extra hours would be a duplication of tasks that can be performed by the applicant's 2:1 support worker, contrary to rule 5.1(c).

1. The respondent's submission misunderstands the fundamental purpose for which the 2:1 support worker ratio is funded. The evidence before me readily establishes that the applicant requires two support workers to be with him at all times because of the significant, constant, and unpredictable risk of physical aggression and harm to himself and others. The evidence is overwhelming and consistent on this point. The core function of this 2:1 support is the continuous and vigilant supervision required to maintain safety. Both workers must remain attentive and available to respond to the applicant's needs and to ensure each other's safety.
2. It is not realistic, nor is it safe, to expect one of those two workers to disengage from this primary and critical duty of supervision to perform distinct household tasks such as mowing lawns, tending to a garden, or completing the multiple loads of laundry the applicant requires each day. To do so would be to leave the remaining worker alone with the applicant, thereby negating the very purpose of the 2:1 ratio.
3. The support provided by the 2:1 workers is therefore properly characterised as 'Assistance with Self-Care Activities and Safety Supervision'. The support sought by the applicant is for 'Assistance with Household Tasks'. These are not the same support. Given the particular and severe nature of the applicant's disability, funding for both is required. It is not a duplication.
4. The evidence also establishes that the support is necessary. The applicant presently lives on a rural property where yard maintenance is essential for safety, particularly in relation to fire and snake risk. Further, his disability-related needs result in him requiring between six and eight loads of laundry to be completed each day, a burden far in excess of ordinary day-to-day living costs. He is unable to complete these tasks himself.
5. I am satisfied that funding for five hours per week of assistance with household tasks is reasonable and necessary. This funding is to be used flexibly to complete essential domestic activities that the 2:1 support workers cannot safely perform, including gardening, cleaning, and the significant daily laundry tasks required. The additional support will be included in the plan.

1. I now move to the dispute in relation to the applicant's laundry supports.
2. The applicant seeks $2,000 for laundry liquids and cleaning products. It is submitted that due to his significant incontinence, he produces a large amount of laundry that is 'more than normal living expenses'.
3. The applicant argues these products are not excluded items under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) (NDIS Supports) Transitional Rules 2024 (Cth) (Transitional Rules). He characterises them as 'Disability Related Health Supports' under Schedule 1 of those rules, related to continence management.
4. In the alternative, if the Products are found to be in Schedule 2 (excluded items), the applicant submits the NDIA has discretion under s 10(6) of the Act to fund them. He argues this discretion should be exercised as the products represent better value for money ($2,000) than the NDIS support they would replace (a linen service, costed at $70,000).
5. The respondent submits the applicant's request is either for $2,000 in consumables or $70,000 for a linen service. It argues the laundry liquids and sanitisers are 'day-to-day living costs' and are expressly 'excluded as NDIS supports' under Schedule 2 of the Transitional Rules.
6. To the extent the applicant seeks the $70,000 linen service, the respondent argues this would duplicate the funding already provided for 2:1 support workers, who are able to do the laundry.
7. The respondent also rejects any suggestion that this support is needed due to inadequate funding for continence products, noting the applicant's plan already contains over $8,300 for such products.

1. The applicant seeks $2,000 for laundry liquids and cleaning products. The respondent submits these are 'day-to-day living costs' and are excluded from funding under Schedule 2 of the Transitional Rules, which adopts the language of rule 5.1(d) of the Supports Rules.
2. However, the respondent's submission is based on a misconstruction of the rule 5.1(d) and, indeed, it would appear the same misconstruction that has been rejected by the Full Court of Federal Court. The proper construction of the phrase 'relates to day-to-day living costs (for example, rent, groceries and utility fees) that are not attributable to a participant's disability support needs' was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in National Disability Insurance Agency v Warwick [2025] FCAFC 100.
3. Rule 5.1(d) needs to be read with rule 5.2.[36] The exclusion in rule 5.1(d) only applies if both parts of its test are met: the cost must be a 'day-to-day living cost' and it must be an 'additional' cost which is 'not attributable' to disability support needs. In the applicant's case, the support fails both parts of this test.[37]
4. First, the support is not a 'day-to-day living cost' as properly construed. The Full Court in Warwick held that the term 'day-to-day' imports an element of 'regularity or routine' and does not apply to 'one-off, remarkable... or extraordinary costs'. While the purchase of laundry liquid is, for an ordinary household, a routine expense, the evidence before me establishes that the applicant's circumstances are extraordinary. Due to his significant incontinence, the applicant requires multiple loads of laundry each day. The cost of products required to service this level of need is far removed from the ordinary, routine expenditure contemplated by the examples in the rule (rent, groceries, utilities). It is an extraordinary cost arising directly from the applicant's impairment.
5. Second, even if the support were considered a 'day-to-day living cost', the exclusion in rule 5.1(d) is not engaged because of the inclusion of the words 'not attributable to a participant's disability support needs' in rule 5.1(d). As Warwick confirms, this requires a 'direct causal connection' between the cost and the disability need.[38] This is a 'specific and fact-intensive inquiry'. Here, the evidence establishes that direct causal link. The need for this extraordinary quantity of laundry products is not a standard living expense; it is a cost caused solely and directly[39] by the applicant's significant, disability-related incontinence. The cost is therefore clearly 'attributable to' his disability support needs and as such comes within the exclusionary words in rule 5.1(d).
6. For both reasons, the exclusion in rule 5.1(d) does not apply. I am otherwise satisfied that the support is a reasonable and necessary support that meets each of the criteria in s 34(1) of the Act. Neither party contended otherwise. Accordingly, the $2,000 for laundry liquids and cleaning products will be included in the applicant's plan.

1. Neither party made submissions on the duration of the plan.
2. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that a plan duration of two years (24 months) is appropriate in the circumstances. This decision provides for the funding of SDA, which the evidence indicates will require new construction. It is reasonable to conclude this process will take a significant period, likely 12 months or more.
3. A two-year plan will provide the applicant with necessary stability during this period of construction and subsequent transition. It also provides a logical and practical point in time for a review. At that review, the applicant's successful transition into his new accommodation and the corresponding removal of the significant provider travel funding can be properly managed.

1. For the reasons set out above, the applicant has been successful in establishing that the supports sought in relation to SDA, Transport Funding, Positive Behaviour Support, and Gardening and Laundry Services are reasonable and necessary supports that should be funded. The respondent's position in respect of the notation for communication devices is upheld.
2. The decision under review will be set aside and substituted with a decision giving effect to these findings.

1. The decision of the delegate of the CEO of the NDIA made on 19 May 2024 and as amended by the plan dated 30 September 2025 is set aside.
2. In substitution for the decision set aside, the matter is remitted to the CEO of the NDIA with a direction that the applicant's Statement of Plan Supports be approved in accordance with the findings in these reasons, namely that the applicant's plan is to include funding for:

(a) specialist disability accommodation for a 'House, Robust' design category, for one resident with two on-site overnight assistance rooms, located in or around the Albany, Western Australia area; > > (b) provider Travel - labour costs in the amount of $251,878.64 and activity-based transport in the amount of $54,614.98; > > (c) positive behaviour support, to include 90 hours of behaviour management and training; > > (d) assistance with household tasks for five hours per week; and > > (e) consumables - laundry liquid in the amount of $2,000;

3. For the purposes of s 33(2)(c) of the Act, the plan is to be reassessed 2 years from the date of this decision or 3 months after the applicant transitions into SDA, whichever is earlier.

1. I certify that the preceding one-hundred and thirty-nine (139) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member F Robertson

..........................[SGD].........................

7-9 October 2025 (final submissions 3 November 2025)

[1] Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35 [4].

[2] Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35 [4]; YBFZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 40; (2024) 99 ALJR 1 at 12 [16]; [2024] HCA 40; 419 ALR 457 at 468.

[3] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 3(1).

[4] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 4(1).

[5] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 4(8).

[6] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 4(12A).

[7] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 4(17). See also National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s (3)(b).

[8] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 31.

[9] McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] FCA 308, [88], [91].

[10] National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF [2020] FCAFC 79; (2020) 276 FCR 415 [151].

[11] See, for example, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 34(2).

[12] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (no. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.

[13] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (no. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.

[14] Commissioner of Taxation v Macoun (2014) 227 FCR 265; [2014] FCAFC 162 [40].

[15] That said, the plan also includes: 'We've added a $1.00 placeholder amount for your SDA eligibility. You're eligible for SDA as follows: the design category is Robust, building type is Villa/Duplex/Townhouse, 1 Resident, location is WA -Perth - South West. The maximum we'll pay for your SDA supports is $76,490.00.'

[20] See e.g., Respondent's written closing submissions, [23].

[21] Respondent's written closing submissions, [23].

[22] Respondent's written closing submissions, [53].

[23] Applicant's written closing submissions, [49].

[24] Applicant's written closing submissions, [57].

[25] Allen and CEO, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 1359 at [29].

[26] In this regard, I agree with the analysis of Senior Member P French in Allen and CEO, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 1359 at [29].

[27] Commissioner of Taxation v Macoun (2014) 227 FCR 265; [2014] FCAFC 162 [40].

[28] The respondent only submits that under s 16(b), (c), and (e) that a villa/duplex/townhouse is more appropriate than an apartment. Otherwise, the respondent's submissions in relation to s 16(h) relate to a villa/duplex/townhouse is inappropriate, having regard to the safety of others.

[29] National Disability Insurance Scheme (Specialist Disability Accommodation) Rules 2020 (Cth), s 18(a).

[30] National Disability Insurance Scheme (Specialist Disability Accommodation) Rules 2020 (Cth), s 18(d).

[31] National Disability Insurance Scheme (Specialist Disability Accommodation) Rules 2020 (Cth), s 18(e).

[32] Respondent's written closing submissions, [13].

[33] Applicant's written closing submissions, [10].

[34] Applicant's written closing submissions, [10].

[36] National Disability Insurance Agency v Warwick (2025) 311 FCR 18; [2025] FCAFC 100 at [12].

[37] National Disability Insurance Agency v Warwick (2025) 311 FCR 18; [2025] FCAFC 100 at [44]- [63].

[38] National Disability Insurance Agency v Warwick (2025) 311 FCR 18; [2025] FCAFC 100 at [57].

[39] National Disability Insurance Agency v Warwick (2025) 311 FCR 18; [2025] FCAFC 100 at [62].