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[2026] NSWSC 846
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-07-17
Cavanagh J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Kinsella v Commonwealth of Australia [2026] NSWSC 846
Hearing dates: 2 July 2026
Decision date: 17 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Cavanagh J
Decision: Pursuant to s 173 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), order that this proceeding be discontinued.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — representative proceedings — application of plaintiff for approval of Court to discontinue proceedings — where defendants consent to discontinuance — whether the proposed discontinuance would be fair and reasonable and in the interests of group members
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss, 166, 173
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s 6A
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 12.3
Cases Cited: AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2; (2026) 100 ALJR 170
Findlay v DSHE Holdings Ltd [2021] NSWSC 249
Fisher v BT Funds Management Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 1340
Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 1) [2010] FCA 124
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: David Kinsella (Plaintiff)
Commonwealth of Australia (First Defendant)
State of New South Wales (Second Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
M Painter SC and J R Walker (Plaintiff)
R J Pietriche (First Defendant)
N Newton (Second Defendant)
Solicitors:
Arnold Thomas & Becker (Plaintiff)
Australian Government Solicitor (First Defendant)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2024/472956
HIS HONOUR: Pursuant to an amended notice of motion filed on 4 March 2026, the plaintiff seeks approval to discontinue the proceedings pursuant to s 173 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (“the CPA”).
Both defendants, being the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of New South Wales, consent to the discontinuance and do not seek any costs orders against the plaintiff consequent upon the discontinuance.
In support of the application, the plaintiff relies on affidavits of his solicitor, Kim Price, dated 8 October 2026, 7 November 2026, 10 February 2026 and 26 June 2026, respectively.
In addition, I am in receipt of two confidential advices, provided by counsel for the plaintiff, Ms Painter SC and Mr Walker. The supplementary confidential opinion was provided after an enquiry I made about this matter following the High Court’s decision in AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2; (2026) 100 ALJR 170.
By statement of claim filed on 19 December 2024, the plaintiff pursues proceedings pursuant to Pt 10 of the CPA on his own behalf and on behalf of group members, who were residents at the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong (“Fairbridge”) between 1937 and 1974, being persons who were subject to serious physical and/or sexual abuse within the meaning of s 6A of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) whilst resident at the school, and suffered injury as a consequence of that serious physical abuse and/or sexual abuse.
These proceedings follow or have been commenced subsequent to another class action pursued on behalf of the residents of Fairbridge (being the Giles class action: Giles v Commonwealth of Australia 2009/32977).
In those proceedings, no claims were made for economic loss. Those proceedings were settled and on 21 August 2015, Garling J approved the settlement of that class action.
The settlement was effected by way of a deed. Suffice to say that subsequent to the current legal representatives for the plaintiff obtaining that deed, it became apparent that it may be necessary to have the deed set aside so as to permit any further proceedings to be pursued.
The plaintiff filed a motion on 20 October 2025, seeking orders that the proceedings no longer continue as a class action, pursuant to s 166 of the CPA. Although that motion was originally listed on 8 December 2025, it was stood over to allow the plaintiff to adduce further evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the motion to seek approval to discontinue the proceedings under s 173 of the CPA.
The hearing of the motion came before me on 2 July 2026.
Although a plaintiff may ordinarily discontinue or settle proceedings at any time and without leave of the Court, representative proceedings are different. Representative proceedings such as these may only be settled or discontinued with leave of the Court: s 173 of the CPA. Even though all parties might consent to the discontinuance, it is still necessary for the Court to grant leave.
The reason for that requirement is that the Court’s function in respect of representative proceedings is essentially protective: see Findlay v DSHE Holdings Ltd [2021] NSWSC 249 at [12] (Stevenson J). Although the proceedings may be pursued through a lead plaintiff, decisions made by the lead plaintiff and other group members might necessarily impact upon the rights of all group members. The Court must have regard to the interests of all group members and be aware of the possibility of conflicts of interest or conflicts between the lead plaintiff and group members or between other group members.
The Court must be satisfied that the proposed discontinuance would be fair and reasonable and in the interests of group members as a whole and not only the interests of the lead plaintiff: see Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 1) [2010] FCA 124 at [9]-[10]. See also Fisher v BT Funds Management Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 1340 at [24].
It is also important to note that a discontinuance is different from a conventional settlement. A discontinuance of proceedings generally does not prevent a plaintiff from recommencing proceedings (unlike, for example, a dismissal of proceedings): see r 12.3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
In proceedings other than representative proceedings, a party may discontinue proceedings without approval of the Court and without any estoppel arising as no findings are made about the issues in the proceedings. That is an important aspect of the Court’s function in representative proceedings in approving a discontinuance rather than a settlement.
Firstly, I am satisfied that the solicitors for the plaintiff have taken all appropriate steps to notify group members of the decision to discontinue the proceedings. In accordance with orders previously made by Coleman J, those solicitors have either:
Emailed group members who had provided an email address; or
Sent an SMS to group members who had provided a phone number; or
Sent a notice by ordinary mail in circumstances in which a group member provided their residential or post office address.
Notice has been given to approximately 101 group members. No objections have been received as to the proposed discontinuance.
A notice has also been published on the plaintiff's solicitors’ firm website and the website of this Court. Further, as set out by Mr Price, the approximately 101 group members fall into three categories, being:
75 who participated in the 2015 settlement distribution following the earlier class action;
6 who also participated in the 2015 settlement distribution and have since also accepted an offer under the National Redress Scheme, thereby extinguishing any further entitlement to common law damages from the defendants; and
Approximately 20 who did not participate in the 2015 settlement distribution.
The solicitors for the plaintiff have conferred with approximately 68 of the potential group members who previously participated in the 2015 settlement distribution. I am satisfied that these group members have been advised of certain issues arising in the proceedings. I am satisfied that none have objected to the proposed discontinuance.
I have also reviewed the confidential opinions provided by counsel. In circumstances in which the effect of the application is to permit the plaintiff to discontinue the proceedings, rather than bring to an end the potential right of any group member to bring their own individual proceedings, it is not appropriate that I comment on those confidential opinions. It is only necessary to say that whatever the intentions might have been at the commencement of these proceedings, it became apparent that to pursue further damages, it may be necessary for individual group members to apply to set aside the deed of settlement entered into at the time of the original class action.
It is also apparent that some other issues have arisen in the proceedings, which may or may not impact upon the rights of any individual plaintiff, but again, the prospects any individual plaintiff might have in obtaining damages from the defendants can only be assessed on a case by case basis.
The effect of the discontinuance is not to bring to an end the rights of any individual plaintiff (if any particular individual has any rights) to pursue their own action against the defendants but merely reflects that which has become apparent, being that this matter can no longer proceed as a representative proceeding.
No adverse order for costs is sought by the defendants and no such order will be made.
In all these circumstances, I am satisfied that approval should be given to the plaintiff to discontinue the proceedings in the terms sought. Having regard to the matters raised in the confidential opinions, I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of group members that these proceedings be discontinued, thereby allowing any individual claimant to pursue his or her own action.
In reality, group members will be returned to the position that they would have been in if these proceedings had not been commenced. The Court has made no findings, there are no adverse costs orders and nothing has occurred in these proceedings which would necessarily impact upon any action which any individual may now wish to pursue.
I make the orders sought in the amended notice of motion filed 4 March 2026, being:
Pursuant to s 173 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), order that this proceeding be discontinued.
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Kinsella
Commonwealth of Australia