austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/795
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-06-27
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) Diploma of Business and Management from 23 April 2013 to 24 August 2014[6], and
(b) Advanced Diploma of Business and Management from 23 April 2014 to 22 June 2014.
(a) the Applicant had spent nearly six years in Australia on student visas, mostly completing VET courses despite initially arriving on a higher education visa[13],
(b) the Applicant's Confirmation of Enrolment (COE) for the proposed Advanced Diploma of Hospitality had been cancelled on 29 March 2018 due to non-commencement of studies[14],
(c) the Applicant's GTE statement lacked detail and was considered to be unconvincing by the Delegate[15],
(d) the Applicant had not provided a sufficient explanation or documentation to show the value of the proposed course to his future employment or business prospects in Pakistan[16], and
(e) the Delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant would return to Pakistan after completing his studies, especially in light of his lengthy stay in Australia, his brothers' circumstances, and limited family ties to Pakistan.[17]
(a) enrolled in a registered course of study; and
(b) a genuine temporary entrant, consistent with the requirements of cl.500.212 of the Regulations and Direction Number 69 - Assessing The Genuine Temporary Entrant Criterion for Student Visa and Student Guardian Visa Applications (Direction 69).
(a) completed Request for Student Visa Information Form[21],
(b) COE in Certificate III in Commercial Cookery (form 23 September 2019 till 20 February 2021)[22],
(c) COE in Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery (from 1 March 2021 till 3 July 2021)[23],
(d) COE in Diploma of Hospitality Management (from 12 July 2021 till 16 October 2021)[24], and
(e) COE in Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management (from 25 October 2021 till 9 April 2022).[25]
If you wish to have your hearing adjourned on medical grounds, you must provide us with a medical certificate certifying that you are unable to attend and give oral evidence. The certificate must also indicate when the medical practitioner considers you will be able to attend a hearing and give oral evidence. If you have a representative acting on your behalf, medical certificates should be submitted no later than two business days before the scheduled hearing day, where available: Migration and Refugee Matters Practice Direction, at paragraph 7.4.
Additionally, it is the Tribunal's general practice to conduct a hearing by telephone if an applicant is unable to attend in person. If you are unable to participate in a hearing by telephone on medical grounds, you must provide a medical certificate that clearly states this.
Requesting your hearing be adjourned on medical grounds without providing appropriate medical evidence may result in the Tribunal refusing your request.[27]
I just want to inform you and request to adjourn the hearing for next week or later this month since my client has got sick after he returned back to Australia.[28]
Shoaib Khan has a medical condition and will be unfit for work/study from 20/09/2019 to 21/09/2019 inclusive.[30]
Dear Mr Khan,
I am writing in relation to an application for review by the Migration and Refugee Division of the AAT.
As discussed on the telephone this afternoon, the adjournment request has been denied. The reason the adjournment request is denied is that the medical certificate provides that Mr Khan will be unfit to attend work or study, it does not provide that MR Khan is unable to attend to the hearing of his application at the Tribunal, which by all accounts, does not constitute work or study.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal not prepared to adjourn the hearing on the basis of the material provided.[32]
Shoaib Khan has a medical condition and will be unfit for work/study from 20/09/2019 to 21/09/2019 inclusive. The patient has gastroenteritis with diarrhoea and vomiting and general weakness. This report has been given with patient consent and handed to the patient.[40]
a) the Non-Appearance Decision, which is 1 page long and spans 6 paragraphs, and > > b) the No Reinstatement Decision, which is 2 pages long and spans 12 paragraphs.
Non-appearance dismissal decision
In exercising its discretion to make the non-appearance dismissal decision, the Tribunal found that:
17.1. The applicant was invited under s 360 of the Act to appear before the Tribunal on 20 September 2019, and the hearing invitation stated that if the applicant did not attend the hearing the Tribunal may dismiss the application for review without any further consideration of the application or information before it.
17.2. The Tribunal sent SMS reminders about the hearing 5 business days and one business day before the hearing.
17.3. The Tribunal had regard to the applicant's adjournment request and the first medical certificate, but did not grant the adjournment because the first medical certificate provided that the applicant was not fit for work or study, and attending the Tribunal to give evidence at a hearing is neither study, nor work.
17.4. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was properly invited to the hearing in accordance with s 379A(5), and that the hearing invitation had not been returned to sender.
17.5. The applicant did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the scheduled time and place.
17.6. No satisfactory reason for the non-appearance had been given.
In these circumstances, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the application without further consideration of the application or the information before it.
Confirmation decision
19. In confirming the non-appearance dismissal decision, the Tribunal found that:
19.1. The applicant applied for reinstatement of his application within 14 days after receiving the notice of the non-appearance dismissal decision.
19.2. The Tribunal had regard to the reinstatement request, including the second medical certificate and the representative's submission.
19.3. In the medical practitioner's opinion, the applicant was unfit to work or study on 20 and 21 September 2019 due to a medical condition.
19.4. Based on the contents of the medical certificate, the applicant was not unfit to attend before the Tribunal to give evidence, because attending the Tribunal to give evidence is neither work, nor study.
19.5. The representative's submission and the second medical certificate did not contain any new matters which would cause the Tribunal to form the view that the applicant was unfit to attend the hearing due to a medical condition.
- For these reasons, the Tribunal refused the application for reinstatement and confirmed the non-appearance dismissal decision.[43]
(a) First Respondent to 'Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs', and
(b) Second Respondent to 'Administrative Review Tribunal'.
(a) Applicant to file any amended application, written submissions, and further evidence by 4 April 2025, and
(b) Respondent to file any written submissions and further evidence in response by 18 April 2025.
(a) Applicant to file any amended application, written submissions, and further evidence by 18 April 2025, and
(b) Respondent to file any written submissions and further evidence in response by 2 May 2025.
(a) the Applicant filed submissions on 18 April 2025, and
(b) the Minister filed submissions on 2 May 2025.
(a) the application for judicial review filed on 21 October 2019,
(b) Minister's response filed on 15 November 2019,
(c) a Court Book numbering 171 pages filed 29 January 2020 (marked as Exhibit R1),
(d) Applicant's outline of written submissions filed on 18 April 2025,
(e) Minister's outline of written submissions filed on 2 May 2025,
(f) an affidavit of Adam James Slevison from Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) filed 2 May 2025, which annexed several attachments relating to correspondence with the Tribunal which was omitted from the Court Book (marked as Exhibit R2), and
(g) Applicant's further written submissions filed on 23 May 2025.
(a) the Applicant appeared before the Court represented by Ms Thara Sujithkumar, solicitor, FCL Lawyers.
(b) the Minister was represented by Mr Adam James Slevison, solicitor, Australian Government Solicitor.
(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 ("Craig") at 198;
(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material: Craig at 198;
(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at 198;
(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [207]- [208];
(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; and
(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44].
THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
(a) why they believe the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error, and
(b) each of the remaining grounds of review (Grounds 1 and 2).
*** I lodged my student visa application with the Department of Home Affairs (DOHA) on 2nd December 2017 which was refused on 24th April 2018. I applied for an appeal at Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) on 30th April 2018. On 25th July 2019 AAT requested more documents with a form to submit. I submitted all documents on 06th August 2019. I was invited for a hearing on 4th September 2019 to attend hearing on 20th September 2019 at 01.30 pm. I got sick on 19th September 2019 due to my recent trip to Pakistan. I went to my GP and obtained a medical certificate and provided to AAT on 20th September 2019 prior to the hearing, requesting for an adjournment. However, on 20th September 2019 Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) refused to adjourn and affirmed the decision under review. I believe that the AAT has not considered the health conditions I have had been suffering during that time. They didn't consider my inability to attend the hearing. AAT gave reasons that the medical certificate mentioned "unable to study or work'' and doesn't specify "not able to attend the hearing". I believe that AAT has made error in the application of the law.**
(a) decided to reject the Applicant's request for an adjournment,
(b) proceeded with the hearing,
(c) dismissed the Applicant's application for non-appearance, and
(d) affirmed the decision of the Delegate rejecting the Student Visa.
39. What all the cases referred to above demonstrate is that:
(a) it is unsatisfactory and insufficient for an applicant for an adjournment of proceedings to rely upon a medical certificate which asserts unfitness by reason of an unspecified medical condition with unspecified medical consequences beyond mere unfitness; and
(b) there needs to be meaningful detail and content provided by the medical practitioner to explain why the medical condition and its consequences mean that the person seeking the adjournment cannot attend the proceedings personally or participate in the proceedings electronically or telephonically.
(a) other reasonable decision-makers could have arrived at on the same evidence, and
(b) had an evident and intelligible basis because of the bare nature of the First Medical Certificate.
*** AAT gave me an option under the legislation with 14 days to reinstate the review application. I applied to reinstate the review application on 2 October 2019 however AAT didn't consider my application and didn't give me opportunity as a matter of procedural fairness, erring the law.**
"the letter from the migration agent and the updated medical certificate do not contain any new matters."[67]
The applicant was denied procedural fairness when the Tribunal dismissed his matter in his absence, despite receiving a timely adjournment request supported by a valid medical certificate. The certificate clearly outlined that the applicant was suffering from gastroenteritis, with associated symptoms such as vomiting, diarrhoea, and general weakness, and was medically unfit for study or work on the day of the hearing. These symptoms were of such nature that they would have significantly impaired his ability to attend or meaningfully participate in the hearing.
No reasonable accommodation was made by the Tribunal. The applicant was not offered an alternative mode of appearance, such as a telephone or online hearing, nor was the matter rescheduled to allow his participation. Instead, the hearing was dismissed for non-appearance, without any further inquiry or follow-up, despite medical evidence explaining his inability to attend. This failure to provide a reasonable opportunity to participate in the hearing process constitutes a clear breach of procedural fairness. The Tribunal failed to give appropriate weight and consideration to the medical evidence submitted in support of the applicant's adjournment request and subsequent reinstatement application. The medical certificates clearly identified a diagnosed condition gastroenteritis and confirmed his inability to attend work or study on the relevant dates.
Rather than assessing the medical evidence in its proper context, the Tribunal dismissed it on the narrow basis that it did not explicitly mention an inability to attend a hearing. This overly literal approach ignored the practical implications of the illness and the real world effect such symptoms would have on a person's capacity to appear and participate meaningfully in a legal process. A failure to genuinely engage with probative evidence amounts to an error of law and procedure
Natural Justice
Natural justice requires that a person affected by a decision must be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard before that decision is made. In this case, the applicant's inability to attend the hearing was properly explained and documented through medical evidence. Nevertheless, the Tribunal proceeded to determine the matter in his absence and made a contrary decision without allowing the applicant to present his case.
This failure to consider the applicant's legitimate request for adjournment and to proceed in his absence disregarded his right to be heard and to respond to matters affecting his interests. Such conduct undermines the basic tenets of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing. The dismissal of the hearing and the making of a decision without the applicant's participation resulted in an unfair outcome and justifies setting aside the decision.
CONCLUSION
In light of the matters set out above, it is respectfully submitted that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the applicant's application, and its refusal to reinstate the matter, was procedurally unfair, legally unreasonable, and failed to give proper consideration to relevant and probative evidence. The applicant acted in good faith, complied with all procedural requirements, and provided timely medical documentation confirming his genuine inability to attend the hearing. The resulting dismissal has caused disproportionate and unjust consequences. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the dismissal decision should be set aside, the application be reinstated, and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with law and the principles of procedural fairness.
43. Section s 362B(1C) provides as follows:
(1C) On application for reinstatement in accordance with subsection (1B), the Tribunal must:
(a) if it considers it appropriate to do so - reinstate the application, and give such directions as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, by written statement under section 362C; or
(b) confirm the decision to dismiss the application, by written statement under section 368.
- The Full Court considered this provision in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 184; (2018) 266 FCR 459 (Singh 2018), where Colvin J (with whom Kenny and Bromberg JJ) stated:
[29] When s 362B(1C) says that on an application for reinstatement the Tribunal must, if it considers it appropriate to do so reinstate the application, it imposes a statutory responsibility on the Tribunal to form an opinion or make an assessment as to whether reinstatement is "appropriate" having regard to all of the circumstances advanced to support reinstatement. In such a context, the word "appropriate" connotes two aspects: fitness and propriety. That is, in order to be "appropriate", something must be both suited to the particular circumstances as well as sensible, right and proper. In Mitchell v The Queen [1996] HCA 45; (1996) 184 CLR 333 at 346, it was said by Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ that:
The phrase "considers ... appropriate" indicates the striking of a balance between relevant considerations so as to provide the outcome which is fit and proper.
[30] Relevantly for present purposes, the use of the word "appropriate" requires the Tribunal to make an assessment of all of the matters that are advanced to support reinstatement. If more is raised on an application to reinstate than the single issue as to whether the applicant was notified of the scheduled hearing, then the Tribunal could not properly form a view as to whether reinstatement was appropriate by confining consideration to the facts concerning notification.
- In Kumar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 479 (Kumar), O'Bryan J found at [48] that in considering whether to reinstate an application, the question of whether the Applicant has a reasonable excuse for their absence at the hearing of their substantive application is a mandatory consideration for the Tribunal. It is the only mandatory consideration when a Tribunal is determining if it is appropriate to reinstate an application.
- The Tribunal's decision makes clear that it considered both the second medical certificate and the representative's submission and found that they did "not contain any new matters which would cause the Tribunal to form the view that the applicant was unfit to attend the hearing on 20 September 2019 due to a medical condition": paragraphs [5] and [9] of the Tribunal's decision. That finding was open to the Tribunal and was made in a procedurally fair manner, where:
46.1. The Tribunal had advised the applicant in the hearing invitation that an adjournment request must be supported by a medical certificate certifying that he was unable to attend to give oral evidence, and indicate when the medical practitioner considered he would be able to do so. Further, paragraph [3] of the non-appearance dismissal decision conveyed that the adjournment request was refused on the basis that the first medical certificate stated that the applicant was not fit to attend work or study, but that attending the Tribunal to give evidence at a hearing was neither work nor study.
46.2. Neither the first nor the second medical certificate certified that the applicant was unfit to attend the Tribunal hearing for medical reasons, despite the Tribunal having clearly conveyed that this was what was necessary for the Tribunal to accept that the applicant had a reasonable reason for not attending the Tribunal hearing. The assertion in the representative's submission that the medical practitioner had refused to state the applicant's exact conditions and inabilities because it is not the practice of any practitioner to specify any specific inabilities other than 'work or study' (except for bed rest or weight specific limitations) was unsupported by any evidence. In these circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to form the view that the evidence provided in support of the reinstatement request was not 'suited to the particular circumstances', in the sense described by Colvin J in Singh 2018 at [29], and that the applicant had not provided 'a reasonable excuse for [his] absence at the hearing', in the sense described by O'Bryan J in Kumar at [48].
46.3. Further, the assertion in the applicant's written submissions that the Tribunal erred by not contacting the applicant or his representative to clarify the meaning of the representative's submission cannot succeed. It is well established that the Tribunal is not obliged to investigate or conduct an inquiry to discover whether a visa applicant's case might be better put or supported by other evidence. It is also not the case that the Tribunal failed to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which was easily ascertainable.
- While it would have been open to the Tribunal to reinstate the application, the test for legal unreasonableness is necessarily stringent, and it is not to be assessed through the lens of procedural fairness to an applicant. The Minister submits that the Tribunal's decision not to reinstate the application plainly fell within a range of possible acceptable outcomes in the circumstances of this case.
- In that respect, the Minister submits that the Tribunal's decision was reasonably open to it based on the evidence before it. Neither medical certificate sought to address the critical question of whether, and if so why, the applicant's medical condition prevented him from participating effectively in the hearing such that he had demonstrated a reasonable excuse for not appearing. The confirmation decision therefore did not lack an 'evident and intelligible justification', and is not affected by jurisdictional error on the basis of legal unreasonableness, nor can it be impugned by way of a failure to have regard to a mandatory relevant consideration. The applicant's disagreement with that finding cannot, without more, establish jurisdictional error.
...The relevant principles may be summarised as follows:
(a) The requirement of reasonableness flows from or is connected with an implied legislative intention that a discretionary power that is statutorily conferred must be exercised reasonably: Li at [29], [63], [88]; Singh at [43].
(b) Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising Court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process. Or it can be a conclusion reached without necessarily identifying another jurisdictional error: Li at [27]-[28], [72]; Singh at [44]. In the latter case unreasonableness may be taken to be unreasonableness from which an undisclosed error may be inferred: Li at [27], [68]; Singh at [44].
(c) Unreasonableness can be inferred where the decision appears to be arbitrary, capricious, without common sense or "plainly unjust": Li at [28], [110]; Singh at [44].
(d) In those circumstances, where reasons are given, the supervising Court is concerned with seeing if there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification within the decision-making process: Li at [105]; Singh at [44]-[45]. The intelligible justification must lie within the reasons given by the decision-maker: Singh at [47].
(e) Regard can also be given to the outcome of the decision: whether the "decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of fact and law": Li at [105] (Gageler J quoting Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220-221; Singh at [44]-[45].
(f) The legal standard of reasonableness and the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case: Li at [67]; Singh at [48]. In the case of discretionary powers vested in the Tribunal, the location of these powers in the statutory scheme, as aids to the performance of a review function, is important: Singh at [49].
...
(j) Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a Court's view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker: Li at [30], [66]; Singh at [47]. The test of legal unreasonableness is stringent: Li at [113].
The Tribunal's reasons given for refusing the adjournment are not comprehensive. It should not be criticised for the brevity of them. However, the[y] are also devoid of expression in relation to a matter that ought to have been central to the decision.... The absence of some expression about that critical factor supports the suggestion that this matter, a very relevant matter, was not considered by the Tribunal in reaching its conclusion to proceed...
I certify that the preceding eighty-six (86) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.
[43] First Respondent's Outline of Submissions filed 2 May 2025.
[46] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
[47] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17].
[48] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
[49] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152 (LPDT) at [3].
[50] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323 at [82].
[52] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 at [82].
[54] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [38].
[55] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (at [33]).
[59] [2024] FedCFamC2G 921 at [26] to [38].
[61] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611; (2010) 84 ALJR 369; (2010) 266 ALR 367; (2010) ALD 24 ("SZMDS") at [130], [131] and [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ.
[69] Minister's submissions 2 May 2025, para [42].
Khan
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 795
Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163
Kumar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 479
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611
Mitchell v The Queen [1996] HCA 45; (1996) 184 CLR 333
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 184; (2018) 266 FCR 459
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
(1995) 184 CLR 163
(2014) 231 FCR 437
(2013) 249 CLR 332
(2010) 240 CLR 611
(1996) 185 CLR 259
(1999) 197 CLR 611
(1996) 184 CLR 333
(2005) 228 CLR 294
(2018) 266 FCR 459
(2003) 211 CLR 476
(2022) 289 FCR 21
(2024) 418 ALR 152
(2001) 2006 CLR 323
(2001) 206 CLR 323
(2021) 273 CLR 506
(2022) 276 CLR 80
(2010) 84 ALJR 369
(2010) 266 ALR 367