The applicant was born in a Kenyan refugee camp and has both Ethiopian and Somalian ancestry. For the purposes of this review, and in accordance with the respondent's submission, I have proceeded on the basis that the applicant is an Ethiopian national. At the time of the hearing before me, he was 24 years of age and had lived in Australia for some 12 to 13 years; i.e., he arrived in Australia aged about 11. He presently resides in the community on a bridging visa pending his removal from Australia.
In his evidence to me, the applicant described his early life as a boy in the camp as very hard and unstable. He did not feel safe there. I accept that overall he has had very difficult experiences that have left contributed toa condition of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.[11]
The applicant's parents are living in Australia although they are now separated. The applicant currently sleeps at his father's address but spends the day at his mother's. The applicant has a large number of siblings.
One of the male siblings, to whom I shall refer as 'A', aged 17, requires special assistance given a severe disability which has left him non-verbal.[12] The applicant assists in the giving of care to this sibling. I accept the evidence that the applicant is close to A.[13] The applicant records that his care extends to the following tasks: feeding A, administering medication to him (which can be difficult), accompanying him on outings to the park and the basketball court.[14] Oral evidence was given that the applicant assists A to dress and changes his diapers: A must wear diapers as he is incapable of attending to his own toileting and has impaired bowel control. Evidence was also given that A damages household items, such as the television set, when he does not get what he wants. I accept this evidence.
The applicant is the father of a young child, whose first initial is 'A', and to whom I shall refer as 'the child' to avoid confusion with the applicant's brother, A . The child, who is cared for by the mother, the applicant's former partner, sleeps over at the applicant's mother's home on Fridays and the weekends generally speaking; and the child also joins the applicant at the park from time to time. It would appear the applicant and the mother of the young child are separated at the present time.
The applicant has some but limited employment experience and limited education.
I turn now to the applicant's criminal offending. The applicant's criminal record before his visa was cancelled was before me.[16] Certain offending was accepted by the respondent to be offending to which I may not have any regard by law, and I have, accordingly, ignored it.[17]
On 17 May 2019, the applicant was convicted of contravening a direction or requirement. He was 18 years of age at the time of the offending. No conviction was recorded by the Beenleigh Magistrates Court but he was fined $350. Later that year he appeared before the same court and was found guilty of possessing tainted property. Again the offence occurred when he was just 18 years of age. No conviction was recorded but a fine of $450 was imposed. In respect of these two offences, I note that no conviction was recorded and fines only were imposed. Although I am required to take these offences into account, they are minor,; they are some years old now; and they could hardly be 'tipping points' in my consideration of the applicant's application for review in this Tribunal. Accordingly I may leave them to one side.
On 29 July 2020, the applicant was convicted of a number of offences in the Brisbane District Court on his plea of guilty. I had the court's sentencing remarks before me and I accept and rely upon them.[18] The events in question relate to the applicant's participation in a series of violent offences in company when he was 18 years of age. The events in question are recorded by the Court as having occurred over a period of four days.[19]
The Court notes that on the first occasion, the applicant was a bystander to the offending although the offending was aided by his presence.[20] In the second incident, the applicant brandished a knife and held it against a victim's stomach. In the third incident, the applicant punched the victim, stabbed him twice in the right upper arm and then punched him again in the head with a closed fist. As the Court found, there was a 'rapid escalation' in behaviour.[21]
It would appear that the applicant was sentenced in relation to seven counts in total. I note that the offending has been helpfully set out in the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal delivered on 6 October 2023.[22] For present purposes, it is sufficient to summarise the offending as follows. The applicant and his co-offenders committed a variety of offences involving theft and assault as part of a gang. The offending was deliberate. All the offending is serious. There were three common assaults, and an assault occasioning bodily harm whilst in company and a further charge of stealing property. These were all dealt with by conviction only with a probationary period of two years. It would appear that the assaults involved pushing a male in his chest and punching a female to the left side of her face with a closed fist.
The charge that received a sentence of three years imprisonment (to be suspended for four years after serving 10 months) involved armed robbery. In this case the applicant and his co-accused (two males and the applicant's girlfriend)[23] approached a man. The man was bailed up and the applicant held a knife to his bare stomach. He then moved the knife to the victim's throat whilst the victim was forced to hand over his backpack and disclose the PIN to his phone. One can well imagine that that must have been a very confronting and frightening experience. I note that on this occasion it was the applicant who wielded the knife.
There was another count involving armed robbery in company with wounding. The applicant was in company with his co-accused. The applicant grabbed the victim's head with his right arm, pressed an object against the victim's chest and warned him not to move or he would be stabbed. While so restrained, the victim had his pockets searched and the co-accused removed bankcards and a mobile phone. As the victim was searching for his keys, the applicant punched him in the head and told him not to move. The co-accused stole the keys. When the victim gave chase to the co-accused and demanded the return of his property, the applicant ran up to him and stabbed him twice in his right upper arm and punched him in the head with a closed fist. The victim sustained lacerations to his left eye and nose and lacerations to his left upper arm. Other wounds required stitches. Again, this is very serious offending.
In relation to this offending, the applicant received a sentence of four years' imprisonment (to be suspended for four years after a period of 10 months was served).
There were a number of other offences dealt with by the Court on that occasion. These involved two charges of stealing, and the unlawful use of a motor vehicle. A conviction was recorded and a probationary period of two years was ordered upon release from custody. I note that the Court observed that there was a further count of driving without a licence and this attracted a concurrent sentence of one month's jail. There was also a separate charge of failing to appear in accordance with an undertaking and in respect of that charge a conviction was recorded but the applicant was not further punished.
The Court's sentencing remarks are important. I have already referred to the fact that the Court decided there was a rapid escalation in the applicant's behaviour in which he moved from being a mere bystander to an active and violent participant. The Court noted that the applicant was 'starting to look like a danger to the public'.[24] The Court was prepared, however, to accept that going into custody had 'pulled [the applicant] up and given [him] time to think'.[25]
The Court accepted that the applicant 'had got in with a bad crowd'. The Court referred to one female co-accused[26] as the 'ringleader' but then importantly noted that the applicant had tried 'to catch up with her', and that had 'got [him] in the (sic) big trouble'.
The Court referred to the offences being serious and made the following point:
[2]
Your age is a huge factor in this, because you were 18, and the Courts recognise and the Parliament recognises that young people have not much foresight. They take risks. But it also recognises good prospects for rehabilitation. I hope you can rehabilitate from here. You are very lucky to have a supportive family and somewhere to go. Alot of people do not. I take into account that the events happened over a short period of four days. You did not give an interview to the police but you did plead guilty, so I recognise that. You have spent eight months in custody. [27]
[3]
As a result of the Court's sentencing, the applicant was to serve a further two months in jail after the date of sentence and then be released on parole (viz, on 1 October 2020).
The applicant was duly imprisoned for a further two months. His visa was cancelled during this time (viz, in August 2020), and mandatorily so under the Act, as I have pointed out.
The applicant was taken immediately into immigration detention on his release from jail on 1 October 2020. He was detained in immigration detention until 12 February 2024, namely for a period of over three years. When this time is added to the ten months spent in jail, the aggregate period during which the applicant was deprived of his liberty exceeds four years. I understand the applicant was released from immigration detention into the community on a bridging visa on 12 February 2024. When that expired, he was granted a bridging visa (pending removal) ('BVR') on 14 March 2025, which he continues to hold.
In addition, the applicant was found in possession of drugs in detention in 2023 whilst in immigration detention and was also found guilty of driving with an excess reading of blood alcohol once he had been released into the community. He blew 0.1 (twice the lower limit) in circumstances where he held a learner's permit and should not have been drinking at all.
[4]
I now turn to the Direction and make the following prefatory remarks. The following four paragraphs are standard directions I include in all my decisions in this area.
The Direction is framed against the stated objective of the Act, which is to regulate, in the national interest, the presence of non-citizens in Australia: see paragraph 5.1(1). The decision-maker is directed by paragraph 5.1(2) and (3) to consider the specific circumstances of the case. The explicit purpose of the Direction is to guide decision-makers in performing their functions under the Act: see paragraph 5.1(4).
Principles appear under paragraph 5.2 of the Direction. These principles provide the framework within which decision-makers should approach their task. They are stated in paragraphs numbered (1) to (8). I set out some of the salient features of these principles.
First, remaining in Australia is a privilege conferred on non-citizens in the expectation that they are law-abiding, will respect important institutions, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community. Secondly, the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. Accordingly, non-citizens who engage in criminal or other serious misconduct should expect to forfeit the privilege of remaining in Australia, and the Australian community expects that the Australian Government should cancel visas or refuse non-citizens a right of entry where they have engaged in conduct that raises serious character concerns. This expectation arises whether or not the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community. Fourthly, Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have been participating in and contributing to Australia for a short period of time only. A higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious misconduct may, however, be afforded to those who have lived in Australia for most of their life or from a very young age. Fifthly, the nature of the non-citizen's conduct and the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may prove an insufficient counterweight. In particular, I note that the inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may prove insufficient justification (to warrant not cancelling the visa, not refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation), and this is so even if the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing harm to the Australian community.
Informed by these principles, I am required under Part 2 of the Direction to take into account the considerations identified in sections 8 and 9. I add here that paragraph 7(1) directs me to give appropriate weight to information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources. Paragraph 7(2) also directs me to give greater weight 'generally' to the protection of the Australian community over other primary considerations; it also provides that primary considerations should 'generally' be given greater weight over other considerations.
[5]
I now turn to apply the Direction. I refer first to the protection of the Australian community. Paragraph 8.1(1) of the Direction provides that when considering the protection of the Australian community decision-makers should keep in mind that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. To that end, the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm. Decision-makers should have particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are law-abiding, will respect important institutions and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community. I bear this principle in mind. It has particular application in circumstances of gang violence directed towards innocent members of the public.
Paragraph 8.1(2) of the Direction provides that decision-makers should also give consideration to the nature and seriousness of the noncitizen's conduct to date and the risk to the Australian community should he or she commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.
I turn to consider the nature and seriousness of the applicant's conduct. Paragraph 8.1.1(1) provides that I am to have regard to a number of matters set out in subparagraphs (a) to (i) when evaluating the nature and seriousness of the applicant's criminal offending. Under subparagraph (a), violent offending is always to be regarded very seriously, and I follow that guidance. I regard theft as, the receipt of tainted property, and the unlawful use of motor vehicles seriously. These crimes strike at society's orderliness. Misuse of drugs as a consumer is also highly anti-social as it promotes a dangerous trade in an illicit substance.
I must have regard to the sentences imposed by the Courts as required by subparagraph (c). The longest sentences (one of four years and one of three) were significant, especially given the applicant's youth. That is a matter that marks out the seriousness of the applicant's offending overall. There has been a frequency in the applicant's offending (subparagraph (e)) and there has also been a trend of increasing seriousness as the Court itself found.
I take into account the cumulative effect of repeated offending upon the community (as required by subparagraph (f)). I also take into account the fact that the applicant reoffended, although not in a violent way (by driving with an excessive blood alcohol), after he was released into the community and whilst his matter was not yet finally determined before the Tribunal.
By paragraph 8.1.2, I must consider the risks to the Australian community should the applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct. Subparagraph (1) provides that in considering the need to protect the Australian community from harm, decision-makers should have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Decision-makers should bear in mind that some conduct and the harm that would be caused if it were to be repeated is so serious that any risk of repetition may be unacceptable. I bear that guidance steadily in mind, and it has a special significance in the context of violent gang offending fuelled by drug- or alcohol abuse and motivated by robbery.
In assessing the risk that the applicant may pose to the Australian community, I am to have regard to two matters 'cumulatively'; namely the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct and the likelihood of his or her so doing taking into account information and evidence on the risk of reoffending and evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision.
If the applicant were to reoffend, the consequences for individuals in the community could be very serious indeed. The violence here involved the use of a knife. I bear in mind that violence in circumstances where a group robbery is underway can quickly escalate and entail unforeseen consequences. The applicant was no doubt in a heightened state during these episodes. He was certainly affected by a background of drug and alcohol abuse. He carried a knife and opted to use it. Situations like this have a real potential to escalate beyond the perpetrators' original plan: frequently the weapon passes from being an instrument with which to make a threat to one inflicting serious bodily harm. So I bear in mind that the nature of harm to individuals or the Australian community could be very severe indeed.
I must have regard to the likelihood of the applicant reoffending. I received evidence from Dr Kwok, an expert psychologist. I regard her report as generally reliable.[28] I accept her conclusion that the applicant's risk of reoffending is moderate (as at the time she prepared her latest report in November 2025), with a risk of increase if the applicant does not undertake alcohol and drug-counselling, but with a diminishing risk if counselling is undertaken.[29]
I regard the applicant's risk of reoffending as moderate. There are a number of matters that I have also borne in mind in this connection. First, as the Court made clear, the offending was committed when the applicant was immature. The Court concluded, as I have earlier noted, that it believed the applicant's incarceration had 'pulled [him] up' and 'given [him] time to think'. That offending is some years old now, and so there is a reasonable basis for believing that the applicant has matured somewhat in the interim. He may not find offending in this way attractive, or at least as attractive as he once did. It would be surprising if that were otherwise since the offending cost the applicant over four years in the deprivation of liberty as I have pointed out, and doubtless much stress.
There is, however, the very serious question of his drug and alcohol counselling, which needs to be undertaken as part of a reform program and which has not been. Dr Kowok refers to the importance of this. I do not accept that he has engaged seriously enough with any of the options on offer, and has demonstrated some indifference to them rather than engage with them pro-actively.
I accept that the applicant was found with drugs in detention, a matter that counts against him. There are no doubt stresses in detention, and the applicant was confined for a long time; but it still counts substantially against him. He has not given up all drinking as he should. He drove a car when he had been drinking, but he ought not to have been driving at all given his alcohol intake and his 'L'-plate status. I accept his evidence that he did not anticipate driving that night, but he felt he had to when all his friends, on an evening out, were too inebriated to drive. That evidence implies he was not under adequate supervision in the vehicle when he ought to have been as an 'L'-plate driver, and of course he blew 0.1 when breathalysed by police, twice the limit for a licensed driver.[30]
His response in that situation evidences a serious lack of judgment and ongoing immaturity because he was only a learner driver himself. That he chose to behave in that way when his visa status was still under review is a serious matter. It demonstrates an ongoing lack of judgment. Nevertheless, I do weigh that the offending in question was not of the same violent type as that which had led to the applicant receiving lengthy jail sentences. He has not returned to that more serious form of offending in the community, and that is something I do need to weigh in his favour.
All in all, I have concluded that despite the lapse in driving when he ought not to have been driving and the use of drugs while in detention, the prospect of jail and of visa cancellation (and the possibility of removal from Australia at some future time if all he has is a BVR) remain very important issues for him, and so there is a deterrent effect in that.
All in all, I have decided that Dr Kwok's estimation of risk as medium is a reasonable one in the circumstances.
There is no family violence under paragraph 8.2 that I need to consider.
I am to have regard to the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia under paragraph 8.3 of the Direction. This consideration is not relevant if the applicant remains indefinitely in Australia on a BVR. It only becomes relevant if he leaves Australia. On this latter assumption, the applicant's absence from Australia will affect, in particular, immediate family members. I refer in particular to his mother, and I think the delegate was right to give this some weight.[31]
The applicant has also assumed a very important caring responsibility in respect of A, a severely disabled sibling, who is presently 17 years of age. The impact upon A of a departure from Australia by the applicant will be considerable as A has an important relationship with the applicant. It is also the case that the caring duties presently taken care of by the applicant will have to be transferred, and to the extent that they are borne by other family members, those family members will be impacted.[32]
Overall, there is a close family unit here to which the applicant makes a serious contribution.
I must have regard to the best interests of minor children by paragraph 8.4. I do not include the interests of 'A' here because he is 17 and, even if the applicant were to leave Australia, he would most likely be 18 years of age or older when that occurred.
The applicant does have a minor child of his own as I have noted. Again, the interests of the child are only affected if the applicant departs Australia. I believe that the interests of the minor child would be advanced by the applicant remaining in Australia. The applicant does have a relationship with the child, and although he is estranged from the mother at the present time, he continues to play a role in the child's life. The child is young and there has been sufficient contact, in my opinion, to describe the relationship as a meaningful one. I do bear in mind that the mother is already fulfilling a parental role in relation to that child, and there is a wider family circle that assists in caring for the child. Moreover, I do weigh that any return to drugs or alcohol abuse by the applicant would most probably affect the child adversely, and I must bear that in mind as a counterbalance.
I turn now to the expectations of the Australian community dealt with in paragraph 8.5. By subparagraph (1), I must bear in mind that the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia and that where they have engaged in serious conduct in breach of this expectation, the Australian community 'as a norm' - albeit not as an inflexible rule - expects the Government not to allow such non-citizens to remain in Australia.
By subparagraph (2), it is provided that the non-revocation of the mandatory cancellation of a visa may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person not to continue to hold a visa. In the circumstances of this case, I believe the consideration in this subparagraph arises because the applicant has participated in group violence in very serious circumstances. I note that the expectations as given in paragraph 8.5 apply regardless of whether the applicant poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community: see subparagraph (3). I also note that I am not by subparagraph (4) to embark on an independent assessment of the community's expectations in a particular case but to regard them as specified in paragraph 8.5.
This consideration counts substantially against the applicant. In particular, in my opinion, subparagraph (1) of paragraph 8.5 is better met by a decision to affirm the decision under review because the BVR does envisage a removal from Australia at some point, which is in keeping with the intent behind the subparagraph.
I must have regard to other considerations under section 9. A non-exhaustive list of three such considerations as given. I note expressly that they are non-exhaustive. If I affirm the decision under review, the consequence of my decision will be that the applicant will remain on a BVR, which is a temporary visa only pending his removal from Australia.
There are, logically, three outcomes that might ensue in due course as a consequence of affirming the decision under review and given the applicant's status as the holder of a BVR. First, the applicant might be returned to Ethiopia. As I understood the respondent's submissions, it was not conceded that the respondent necessarily owed the applicant non-refoulement obligations that would prevent his removal to Ethiopia. If that is the case, the applicant's removal to Ethiopia remains a possibility (if he is, in fact, found not to be owed non-refoulement obligations and the decision under review is affirmed).[33] In that circumstance, the very serious impediments would meet the applicant on his removal to Ethiopia. These would be in my opinion very severe. The applicant was raised in a refugee camp in Kenya and came to Australia as a young child. He does have on the evidence before me, a network in Ethiopia. The applicant has submitted substantial evidence in relation to Ethiopia and the extremely difficult circumstances prevailing in that country, which I accept.[34] It is well known that Ethiopia has had a very troubled past and is a very poor country.
A second outcome might be that the applicant is found to be owed non-refoulement obligations, which would prevent his removal to Ethiopia, but he ends up never being placed overseas in a third country because none will take him. (I think I can discount as remote the possibility of the respondent granting the applicant a protection visa since the delegate has refused in this matter to reinstate the applicant's refugee visa because of character concerns, and the respondent is entitled to refuse a protection visa to a visa-applicant on character grounds.)[35] As far as this outcome is concerned, I must still weigh in the applicant's favour the ongoing stress the applicant and his mother would endure on an ongoing basis of being unsure whether he will be suddenly removed from Australia. That would impose a quite considerable stress upon him and his family. But he would continue to remain in Australia and live in the community. His BVR status, amongst other factors, does affect employment opportunities in the applicant's view,[36] and I accept this is plausible.
The third outcome that might arise if I affirmed might be his removal at some point to a third country. At the present time, that third country is not known. There is, as is well known, an arrangement with the Government of Nauru, under which non-citizens who cannot be returned to their own country because of non-refoulement obligations may be removed from Australia to Nauru. I do not know whether that would be the country to which the applicant would be sent or whether it would be some other country. I think it is appropriate here, however, to note that, whatever the country, there would be a severe impact on the applicant in finding himself severed from family. He would have to build his life in that third country, and the initial dislocation at least would be severe for him.
It is appropriate in my opinion to view these three outcomes as mutually exclusive possibilities that could arise from a decision by me to affirm the decision under review.
[6]
I turn now to weighing the considerations. It is important to weigh first, in my opinion, the very serious violence in which the applicant has most recently engaged as well as his other anti-social offending. That is very much the focus of the Direction in various aspects. I believe I ought to keep this consideration at the forefront of my deliberations in this matter. The applicant has been found guilty of very serious crimes involving group violence. He has inflicted substantial injury on innocent community members. He continues to pose a risk to the Australian community at a moderate level, and this could increase if he does not engage in drug and alcohol counselling. The community-expectations consideration operates powerfully here.
The Direction is required, however, to be applied in the particular context arising from the facts of each case. Paragraph 5.1(3) directs me to consider the specific circumstances of a case when assessing whether there is 'another reason' to revoke the cancellation decision.
I have already adverted to three different outcomes that might arise from a decision by me to affirm the decision under review. It is appropriate in my view to weigh the relevant considerations required to be addressed by the Direction in the context of each of the three outcomes that I have mentioned above. These three outcomes are mutually exclusive, as I have said, and so it is important not to weigh the considerations together or cumulatively.
I have found it useful to ask myself what my decision would be if I assumed, in turn, that each one of the three outcomes eventuated. I cannot, of course, know in advance which would be more likely to eventuate if I affirmed the decision under review. It is a useful way, however, to approach my task in this case because in approaching my task in this way, I ascertain whether my conclusion would differ depending upon the outcome the applicant would face should I affirm the decision under review.
As far as the first outcome is concerned (namely, eventual removal to Ethiopia), I note that this outcome would squarely meet the guidance in the Direction that the applicant, as a serious offender, should be removed permanently from the Australian community and cease to threaten it in the future. That is undoubtedly the case and is a powerful consideration; but as far as the weighing exercise is concerned, I should also have regard to the impact upon the applicant of navigating the disordered circumstances of Ethiopia without family connection. This weighs very heavily in his favour. Unlike other Ethiopians, he has no network in Ethiopia or familiarity with the country. He would face special challenges and burdens not faced by local Ethiopians in navigating the profound difficulties of that country.[37]
I would also weigh the serious contribution he makes to his family with the caring responsibilities he has undertaken in relation to his sibling, A, and the effect upon his mother of deportation. All in all, if this were the outcome I had to weigh if I affirmed the decision under review, I would set aside the decision under review given the particular circumstances of this case.
As far as the second outcome is concerned, I should weigh that the applicant would continue to live in the Australian community indefinitely with some restrictions[38] but subject to a risk that he would be deported to a third country at some point in the future (whenever that arrangement could be made by the Government). The risk would always be there in the applicant's mind; but the removal would never eventuate as a matter of fact eventuate under this outcome. I do accept that this ongoing prospect would impose on the applicant a significant burden personally, and, I would also say, upon his mother, who would have to accept that he might be removed at short notice at any time. I do regard that as a serious burden. Remaining in Australia with such an unsettled status on an indefinite basis is a serious limitation to impose upon a young person, where he would find it more difficult to settle in the community and pursue a meaningful life.
Nevertheless, the applicant would not face in this outcome any impediments on removal, as he would face in Ethiopia or in a third country to which he was removed. On the other hand, he would continue to pose a risk to the Australian community because he would not be removed from it. I do not accept here what I took to be the respondent's submission, namely, that the risk of recidivism is better met by the deterrent effect of the BVR. It seems to me that the prospect of a significant jail sentence for the commission of a further violent offence, operates as a significant deterrent; and if it did not operate as an effective deterrent in the case of this applicant, the further deterrent of being prosecuted for a breach of a condition of his BVR would not offer additional deterrence (or at least additional deterrence that is appreciably greater).
So, in this outcome, I accept that if I affirm the decision under review, I would give effect to the Direction partially so far as it concerns the Direction's normative guidance that remaining in Australia is a privilege and that the cancellation of a visa may be appropriate given the character concerns arising from the non-citizen's behaviour; but I would not give any appreciable practical effect to the Direction's concerns about ongoing risk because the applicant, under this outcome, would remain in Australia and continue to pose a risk here. Here, having regard to the very unusual circumstances of this case, I would also conclude that an appropriate balancing favours revocation of the cancellation decision.
As far as the third outcome is concerned, I must weigh the applicant's removal to a third country (i.e., not Ethiopia). Here, I cannot assume that the third country would necessarily be Nauru. I would have to weigh here the fact that if I affirmed the decision under review, the removal of the applicant would give effect to the Direction fully; and by this, I mean that the defensive aspect of the Direction which concerns removal of threats from Australia would be met (as I pointed out in relation to the first outcome). But here I would have also to weigh the applicant's own interests in remaining in Australia as well as the interests in particular of his sibling, A, and of his mother. Again, these are considerable circumstances and despite the Direction being given full effect to, so to speak, through the applicant's eventual removal from Australia, I would still need to weigh in the circumstances of this case the very serious impact that such a decision would work upon the family and upon the applicant himself. Here again, I would conclude that the preferable decision favours revocation of the cancellation decision.
In respect of each outcome, therefore, the preferable decision, in my opinion, is to find that the weighing process leads, on balance, to a decision that favours revocation of the visa cancellation. Given that this is my conclusion in each of the three mutually exclusive outcomes, I do not need to address what my decision should be if I had reached a different conclusion in relation to one or two of the hypotheses. It seems to me that if that had been the case, I might then have had to evaluate as best I could which is the more likely outcome of a decision by me to affirm the decision under review; but I am spared that difficult question since each outcome leads to the same result in my assessment.
[7]
All in all, therefore, I have decided that the preferable decision in this case is to find that there is 'another reason' for the cancellation decision to be revoked under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act. I shall, therefore, set aside the decision under review and substitute a decision that the cancellation of the applicant's visa be revoked.
[8]
I certify that the preceding seventy-six (76) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Manetta.
[9]
[1] The delegate's decision was before me in the Hearing Book ('HB') at 25ff.
[3] The applicant has 'a substantial criminal record', as defined, and could not pass the test for this reason: see s 501(6)(a) and (7)(b) of the Act. The delegate's view appears at HB, 26-27, [4] - [9].
[12]
[4] I.e., a reason other than the applicant passing the character test.
[13]
[7] See Khalil v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[2025] HCA 33.
[14]
[8] Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Cth), Direction no. 110 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (7 June 2024).
[15]
[9] What follows in this paragraph is a series of observations I regularly include in my decisions.
[16]
[10] See, for example, Khalil v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Supra fn 7), [16] and [18]-[19].
[17]
[11] See Dr Kwok's Report: Joint Tender Bundle ('JTB') 19ff, [62]ff.
[18]
[15] Oral evidence given by the applicant's sister.
[19]
[17] All the offending appearing in the record that was dealt with by the Beenleigh Children's Court.
[20]
[23] Who, I understand, is the mother of the applicant's child, to whom I have referred above.
[21]
[29] JTB, 22 [85]; 25 [106] (third bullet point; and 27 (second bullet point on this page).
[22]
[30] L-plate drivers may not drink alcohol at all.
[23]
[32] I acknowledge that A receives some NDIS services and attends a special school for part of the day.
[24]
[33] If I affirm the decision under review, the next stage would be the formal assessment of the applicant's protection visa application, where his non-refoulement obligations would be assessed.
[25]
[34] See, for example, 'Humanitarian Response Plan Ethiopia' July 2022 where it is noted that in 2022, more than 20 million people stood in need of humanitarian including 5.5 internally displaced people: HB 2022ff. The adverse human rights situation is referred to in "Ethiopia 2022 Human Rights Report: HB, 2226ff.
[37] See Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v LJTZ[2021] FCA 92.
[28]
[38] I accept the respondent's concession that the conditions of the BVR are restrictive of liberty and may affect the applicant's ability to participate in society: see JTB, 645 [90].
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Khalil
Respondent/Defendant:
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
Cases Cited (3)
LRMM and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2026] ARTA 418 (24 March 2026)
Khalil v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[2025] HCA 33
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v LJTZ[2021] FCA 92