1. The issue for determination is whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the Tribunal to exercise the discretion in s 19 of the ART Act to extend the time for the Applicant to make an application for review of the decision.

1. Under s 56 of the NVR Act, ASQA may cancel a VET qualification or VET statement of attainment issued to a person by a former registered training organisation (RTO) if ASQA is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:

(a) the organisation did not provide, or arrange for another person to provide, all or part of the assessment necessary for the person to achieve the learning outcomes or competencies required for:

(ii) the units of competency or modules specified in the statement; or

(d) it is appropriate, in all the circumstances, because of action the Regulator has taken, or is taking, in relation to:

(i) the organisation, in respect of the VET course, or part of the VET course to which the qualification relates; or

1. Section 57 of the NVR Act requires ASQA to notify a person of the proposed cancellation and invite the person to give a written response to the notice within the period specified in the notice which must be at least 24 hours.
2. Section 58 of the NVR Act allows ASQA to proceed with cancelling the VET qualification or VET statement of attainment after considering any response received within the period specified in the notice.
3. Section 58(4) of the NVR Act requires ASQA to take reasonable steps to give the person concerned written notice of the decision to cancel the qualification or statement and of the requirement to return the qualification or statement.

1. Section 18 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act) contains the general rule that an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision must be made within the period prescribed by the rules. The Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 prescribes that period as 28 days. Section 19(2) of that Act provides an exception to the general rule allowing the Tribunal to extend the period if the Tribunal 'considers that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so'.
2. Section 19(2) is in similar terms to s 29(7) of the now repealed Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (repealed) (AAT Act). I consider that the presumption from re-enactment being that words in an Act which have been the subject of judicial construction are presumed to bear the same construction when used in a subsequent Act applies here.[8] The Explanatory Memorandum supports this construction stating that s 19(2) is equivalent to s 29(7).[9]

1. The relevant considerations under s 29(7) of the AAT Act have been the subject of detailed consideration by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Considerations which may be relevant in this case to assist the Tribunal in determining whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances to extend time include:

(a) the length and explanation for delay > > (b) whether the Applicant has rested on their rights > > (c) prejudice to the Respondent or other person affected by the decision > > (d) consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a similar position > > (e) strength of the Applicant's case and the significance of the issue to be determined, and > > (f) the availability of alternative remedies for the Applicant.

2. The Tribunal and the Court have also said that not one factor takes primacy over the other; that no matter is a condition precedent to the exercise of my discretion[10] and that all that are relevant to the particular case have to be weighed together in reaching a decision.[11] Further, that the Applicant bears the onus of showing that the justice of the case requires the exercise of the discretion.[12]

1. There is no dispute as to the facts that the Applicant's application was lodged outside of the 28-day period prescribed by s 18 of the ART Act and rule 5 of the ART Rules.
2. The reason provided in the Applicant's extension of time application is that:

'I am requesting an extension to lodge my appeal because I was not aware of the decision to cancel my qualification earlier, my email address has changed and I did not receive the original notice on time. > > I would like the opportunity to appeal this decision, as I had completed all my theory modules and practical requirements with IIET. I have also been working as a support worker for over a year now and have developed strong skills and genuine passion for this work. I truly love my job and take pride in supporting people in need, and I would be very grateful to have the chance to have this decision reviewed.'

3. The Respondent submits that the Applicant has provided no evidence of any change to his email address. On the contrary, the material before the Tribunal indicates that the email address held by the Respondent is both current and correct, and that the Applicant did not change his email address at any time between receiving ASQA's notices and lodging the application for review with the Tribunal.[13]
4. The evidence adduced by the Respondent shows that:

(a) The notice of intent dated 26 November 2024 was sent via email to the email address at 3:39 pm. The notice was first opened at 3:47 pm on the same day. No bounce back error was received.[14] > > (b) The notice of decision dated 6 December 2024 was sent via email to the email address at 10:14 am. The notice was first opened at 10:24 am on the same day. No bounce back error was received.[15] > > (c) An SMS message was sent to the Applicant on 29 November 2024 advising the Applicant of the need to respond to an important email about his qualifications and to check Junk mail.[16] > > (d) The Applicant used the same email address to correspond with the Tribunal regarding the review of the reviewable decision. The same mobile phone as used by the Applicant on 29 November 2024 was also listed in the application to the Tribunal.

5. At the hearing, I asked the Applicant for his perspective on what I considered to be evidence of substantial probative value. His response was he only found out that the RTO had been shut down completely when he attempted to contact them because he wanted to undertake further study. He was then advised by a colleague to check on the training.gov website whether the RTO was still operating. After discovering IIET's registration had been cancelled, he then contacted ASQA. He also said he had three email addresses and confirmed that the email address ASQA had for him was still in use.
6. It has been said previously by the Tribunal and Courts that an acceptable explanation for the delay is not a precondition to the exercise of the discretion to allow an extension.[17] It has also been said although it is expected that such an explanation will normally be given, as a relevant matter to be considered, there is no rule that such an explanation is needed.[18]
7. I also note previous Tribunal decisions which have said the brevity of the extension sought does not automatically justify granting it, just as a lengthy delay does not automatically justify refusing it.[19]
8. The Court has also said that while there is often sympathy for a litigant who does not understand the principles of time limits, where there is failure to apply for review within the stipulated timeframe, ignorance of those time requirements (without more), is generally not regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay.[20]
9. In the present case, I find that the Applicant was in fact aware of the time limits. While there may be some extenuating circumstances, I do not consider his explanation for failing to lodge his application within time to be compelling, particularly given the significant length of the delay.
10. I also find that the explanation for the delay is not supported by the evidence. The Applicant's email address did not change, and the evidence demonstrates that the emails containing the notice of intent, and the notice of decision were opened on the same day they were received.
11. In the absence of evidence substantiating the Applicant's explanation for the delay, I find the explanation to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I consider that this factor weighs in favour of the Respondent.

1. The Respondent submits it did not receive any response or correspondence from the Applicant within the period specified in the notice of intent or at all until they received notice of this application before the Tribunal.[21]
2. The Respondent also submits the Applicant rested on his rights in not ensuring an application was made to the ART for review of ASQA's decision by 4 January 2025.[22]
3. The Respondent further submits that the Applicant allowed it to believe that the matter was finally concluded for a period of 284 days.[23]
4. At the hearing, the Applicant stated that he first contacted ASQA on 26 August 2025 and subsequently emailed the Tribunal on 28 August 2025 requesting a review of ASQA's decision. He then lodged his extension‑of‑time application on 14 October 2025. The Tribunal's records do not explain the delay between the Applicant's initial contact with the Tribunal and the later filing of the extension‑of‑time application.
5. Even if the Respondent was on notice, prior to the filing of the extension‑of‑time application, that the Applicant intended to challenge its decision, there remained a significant period during which the Applicant took no steps. As evidence does not support the Applicant's explanation for this delay, this factor also weighs in the Respondent's favour.

Prejudice to the Respondent or other person affected by the decision

6. I accept the Respondent's submission that it is in the interest of ASQA and the general public that prescribed time limits are adhered to so as to ensure a final, predictable and orderly conclusion to matters.[24] I also accept the Respondent's submission that there is an important public interest in ensuring that ASQA's regulatory functions and decision making processes are not unnecessarily impeded by a lack of finality when that is solely due to the Applicant's failure to manage his affairs in a timely manner.[25]
7. However, I have some difficulty with the Respondent's contention that this is especially important in circumstances where the qualification warrants to third parties that the Applicant holds the necessary skills and competencies to work with highly vulnerable individuals.[26] Particularly as the Respondent then goes onto contend 'In a sector where the risk of harm is salient, and qualifications are not prerequisites to gain support worker roles, it is important that the finality of ASQA's decision is maintained for the safety and peace of mind of the aged care industry and its clients'.

1. I understand this contention to be that given the qualification has been cancelled for almost one year, consistent with the approach taken by McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor, that in order to protect people from experiencing harm arising from poor quality or unsafe care there is a public interest in the finality of the Respondent's decisions, and in ensuring that any disputes be settled as quickly as possible.[27]

1. It is also the case leaving such decisions open to review so far outside the statutory timeframe risks undermining public confidence in decision-making.
2. The Respondent submits that, if an extension of time were granted, it would be required to participate in the proceedings. However, it concedes that this would not, in itself, amount to significant prejudice.[28]
3. I note that the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the granting of an extension of time.[29] Given the important public interest considerations outlined above, I consider this factor weighs in the Respondent's favour.

Consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a similar position

4. The Respondent submits that a decision to allow the extension of time application would further mean that there is no benefit for those applicants applying within time.[30] This is because applicants that are within time have a choice to pursue alternative means to reobtain their qualification (such as enrolling with another registered VET provider to undertake training or engage in a Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) process) or pursue an appeal through the Tribunal.
5. The Respondent submits that it would be unfair to permit out‑of‑time applicants to pursue both avenues when there are no unusual or exceptional circumstances warranting the use of the Tribunal's limited resources, particularly where an alternative mechanism exists for obtaining the qualification that has been cancelled.[31]
6. Also pertinent to this consideration is whether the Applicant's application has any real prospect of being successful on review to which I will now turn.

Strength of the Applicant's case and the significance of the issue to be determined

1. In Brown Hill J said that there is no doubt that if the Applicant's case is strong the more likely the discretion would be exercised in favour even where the explanation for the delay may not be strong.[32] Conversely, it was also said that it would be a futility to permit an extension of time for a case which is frivolous or bound to fail as a matter of law with the case having no arguable merits.[33]
2. The Tribunal has previously decided that while the Tribunal should not undertake a merits review of the reviewable decision at this stage, it is nonetheless necessary to decide whether the Applicant's case has any arguable merits[34] or some reasonable prospects of success.
3. The issue to be determined in the substantive application is whether the Applicant's VET qualification issued to him by IIET should be cancelled pursuant to s 56 of the NVR Act. The Respondent submits that in considering this issue, in recent Tribunal decisions it has been accepted that the relevant considerations are:[35]

(a) Is the Tribunal satisfied on reasonable grounds that IIET did not provide, or arrange for another person to provide, all or part of the assessment necessary for the Applicant to achieve the learning outcomes or competencies required for the CHC33015 Certificate III in Individual Support issued to the applicant by IIET? > > (b) Is the Tribunal satisfied on reasonable grounds that it is appropriate to cancel the Applicant's IIET qualification, in all the circumstances, because of action the Regulator has taken, or is taking, in relation to IIET in respect of the courses to which the qualification relates? > > (c) Should the Tribunal cancel the Applicant's IIET qualification or, notwithstanding its satisfaction that it is appropriate to cancel that qualification, should it not do so in the exercise of its discretion?[36]

4. The Applicant submits that the decision is unfair and should be reviewed for several reasons:[37]

(a) He successfully completed all the theory modules of the Certificate III in Individual Support and provided payslips and evidence of employment in the field, which were accepted by my RTO at the time as meeting the practical requirements. > > (b) The RTO closure was beyond his control and he acted in good faith, completed all requirements, and relied on the RTO's authority to issue the qualification. > > (c) He had a legitimate expectation that the certificate issued was valid and to cancel it, despite compliance with all requirements, causes significant unfairness and directly impacts his ability to continue in his chosen profession. > > (d) He has been working as a support worker and contributing meaningfully. Removing his qualification not only undermines his career but also reduces the workforce capacity in an area where support workers are in high demand.

1. Tribunal decisions have concluded that, in similar circumstances, allowing the qualification to stand would undermine the purpose of the NVR Act and fail to give effect to its Objects.[38] They further recognise that permitting a person who is not properly qualified to retain and use certificates or qualifications that were inappropriately awarded may pose a substantial risk to those who rely on that person being suitably qualified.[39]

1. The Respondent submits that the Applicant's submissions indicate that 'payslips and evidence of employment ... were accepted ... as meeting the practical requirements'. The implication being that the Applicant satisfied 'practical requirements' solely on the basis of a slim portfolio of documents that he conveyed to IIET whereas the 'practical requirements' for a Certificate III in Individual Support require demonstration of practical competencies across fifteen individual units of competency, as well as completion of a 120-hour work placement.[40]
2. The Applicant will be required to produce probative evidence for the Tribunal to be satisfied that he has received the necessary training and assessment required to achieve the qualification.
3. The Respondent submits that Tribunal decisions have concluded that evidence of a person's skills and experience does not resolve the key question of whether all or part of the assessment necessary for the Applicant to achieve the required learning outcomes or competencies was actually provided by the training provider at the relevant time.[41]
4. Based on the oral evidence given at the hearing, it appears highly likely that the Tribunal will not have the evidence required to be satisfied that the Applicant received the training and assessment necessary to obtain and hold a VET qualification. The Applicant himself acknowledged that the ease with which the qualification was obtained seemed too good to be true.

1. As noted above, an alternative means is available to the Applicant to regain what has been lost. At the hearing, the Respondent encouraged the Applicant to explore whether an assessment‑only pathway through the RPL process would offer a quicker and less burdensome means of obtaining relief.

1. Taking into account all of the matters that contributed to the delay, together with the principles set out in the authorities cited, I am not satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to extend the time for lodging the application. The delay is substantial, and the explanation provided for it is not satisfactory. Although the Respondent has accepted that it will not suffer significant prejudice in preparing its case, allowing lengthy extensions of time has the potential to burden the system and cause delays for applicants who have complied with statutory timeframes, thereby creating broader prejudice to the community. In light of the absence of evidence supporting the Applicant's explanation for the delay, the Applicant has not discharged the onus of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the exercise of my discretion. Further, the merits of the Applicant's case do not appear strong. I therefore conclude that the alternative avenue of relief available to the Applicant is the more appropriate option.
2. The Tribunal will not extend the time for lodging the application.

Representative for the Applicant: Self-represented

Solicitor for the Respondent**: Kristen Elliot-Newell ASQA**

[1] Respondent's submissions of extension of time application at [3].

[8] See RPPL Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCA 1126 at [70] where Cheeseman J found in that case the presumption 'applies with force' in relation to s 172(1) of the ART Act and s 44(1) of the AAT Act.

[9] Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024 at [307].

[10] Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 444; Dix v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1993] VicRp 21; [1993] 1 VR 297.

[11] Zizza v Federal Commission of Taxation [1999] FCA 0037 at [42]- [44].

[12] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor 1996 [HCA] 25.

[13] Respondent's submissions opposing extension of time at [31].

[17] Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441; 119 ALR 85; Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2011] AATA 280; (2011) 121 ALD 184.

[19] Re Dolan and Comcare (1993) 29 ALD 887.

[20] SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319 at [38].

[21] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [8].

[22] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [35].

[23] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [36].

[24] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [37].

[25] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [38].

[26] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [38].

[27] [1996] HCA 25 at [9].

[28] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [32].

[29] Hutchinson and Comcare [2018] AATA 4600 at [14] applying Lucic v Nolan [1982] FCA 217; (1982) 45 ALR 411.

[30] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [40].

[31] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [41].

[32] [1999] FCA 563 at [58].

[34] Re Spencer and Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1194; (2007) 100 ALD 389 at [48]; Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2011] AATA 280; (2011) 121 ALD 184 at [24].

[35] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [44].

[36] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [44].

[37] Applicant's email to the Tribunal dated 28 August 2025.

[38] Neupane and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2024] ARTA 959_._

[39] Rozario and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2024] ARTA 421.

[40] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [48]-[49].

[41] Respondent's submission on applicant's request for extensions of time at [51]-[52].