//
[2026] QSC 37
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2026-03-13
Bowskill CJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
COURTS AND JUDGES - CONTEMPT - PUNISHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT - where the respondent pleads guilty to six charges of causing or permitting conduct to be undertaken in contravention of orders made by the Supreme Court of Queensland, pursuant to the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), in support of anti-enforcement orders made by a New Zealand court, restraining the taking of steps to enforce a default judgment obtained in a United States Court which is alleged to have been obtained by fraud - where the respondent pleads guilty to a seventh charge of contempt, for failing to comply with an order made requiring him forthwith to deliver up his passports to the Registrar of the Supreme Court - punishment to be imposed
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 77(1)(a)
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 9
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 665, r 930(1)
Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98, considered
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Halkalia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 522, considered
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Matthews [1999] FCA 803; (1999) 32 ACSR 404, considered
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 1259; (2004) 52 ACSR 115, considered
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Wealth & Risk Management Pty Ltd (No 3) [2025] FCA 722, considered
Buckby v Wharton [2012] QSC 416, considered
Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, considered
City Hall Albury Wodonga Pty Ltd v Chicago Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 31, considered
Commissioner of Fair Trading v TLC Consulting Services Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 374, considered
Coveney v Western Australia [2026] WASCA 20, considered
Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] QCA 215, considered
Duhs v Pettet (No 3) [2010] QSC 55, considered
Emmanuel College v Rowe [2014] QSC 238, considered
Evenco Pty Ltd v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Joiners etc [1999] QSC 77, considered
Glenn v Watson [2018] EWHC 2016 (Ch), considered
Infa-Secure Pty Ltd v Crocker (No 2) [2016] FCA 202; (2016) 338 ALR 586, considered
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90, considered
Kea Investments Ltd v Watson [2020] EWHC 2796 (Ch), related
Kea Investments Ltd v Watson [2020] EWHC 472 (Ch), related
Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215, related
Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley [2023] QSC 79, related
Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd [2023] NZHC 3260, related
Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 2407, related
Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2023] NZHC 466, related
Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2022] NZHC 2881, related
Lade & Co Pty Ltd v Black [2006] QCA 294; [2006] 2 Qd R 531, considered
NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd v Dunne (No 2) [2025] QSC 143, considered
O'Connor v Witness G [2013] QSC 281, considered
R v Edwards [2025] QCA 123, considered
R v Guthrie [2002] QCA 509; (2002) 135 A Crim R 292, considered
R v McInerney (1986) 42 SASR 111, considered
R v Pope; Ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [1996] QCA 318, considered
R v RAL [2012] QCA 34, considered
R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77, considered
Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Dowling (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 1106, considered
Sun v He (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 1298, considered
Tax Practitioners Board v Dabalos (formerly Van Stroe) (No 3) [2025] FCA 223, considered
Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc [2011] FCAFC 17; (2011) 276 ALR 596, considered
Waverley Council v Tovir Investments Pty Ltd & Rappaport (No 3) [2013] NSWLEC 35, considered
Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2025] HCADisp 33, related
Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] NZCA 609, related
Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] QCA 201, related
Witham v Holloway (1985) 183 CLR 525, considered
G J Gibson KC, P K O'Higgins KC and B W Wacker, for the applicant
D B O'Sullivan KC, W D Hall and N J Pratt, for the respondent
[1] The respondent, Mr Kenneth David Wikeley, is to be punished for seven charges of contempt. He has pleaded guilty to each of the charges, all of which involve wilfully breaching orders of this Court.
[2] The factual background is complicated - involving courts in the UK, the United States, New Zealand and Australia. An understanding of it is relevant to the determination of the appropriate punishment for Mr Wikeley's contempt.
[3] The applicant (Kea) is a British Virgin Islands (BVI) company, whose shareholder is Sir Owen Glenn. He is also a director of Kea. Mr Wikeley is or was at the relevant times the sole director and shareholder of Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd (WFTL). WFTL is a New Zealand company which was incorporated in July 2021. The following month, in August 2021, WFTL became the trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust, which was settled by Mr Wikeley in 2005 and of which Mr Wikeley was previously the trustee.
[4] Kea contends that it is the victim of a major and ongoing fraudulent conspiracy, and that Mr Wikeley is at the heart of the fraud.[1]
[5] The story begins in about 2011, when a Mr Watson, who is an associate of Mr Wikeley,[2] sought to persuade Sir Owen Glenn to make investments with him in relation to a joint venture called Project Spartan. In July 2018, the High Court of England and Wales found that Kea and Sir Owen Glenn had been fraudulently induced to participate in the joint venture at a cost of £129 million.[3] Mr Watson was found to be the architect of the fraud. Kea's director at the relevant time, Mr Dickson, was found to have breached his fiduciary duties to the company.
[6] Kea was held entitled to set aside the joint venture agreement and recover the monies it had paid, including from Mr Watson. Mr Watson was subsequently held in contempt of court for breaching court orders - in particular, an order which required him to disclose details of a bank account, in the context of attempts by Kea to enforce the judgment in its favour. In 2020, Mr Watson was sentenced to four months in custody (reduced from six months, to take account of personal circumstances, including Covid).[4]
[7] In August 2021, WFTL - which had just become the trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust - commenced a court proceeding in the Fayette Circuit Court in Kentucky, USA, claiming damages for alleged breach of a purported agreement between Mr Wikeley, as trustee for the Wikeley Family Trust, and Kea (represented by Mr Dickson), described as a Coal Funding and JV Investment Agreement (the Coal Agreement).[5]
[8] WFTL was represented in these proceedings by a Kentucky lawyer called Mr Andre Regard. Mr Wikeley instructed Mr Regard.[6]
[9] The proceedings were served on Kea's registered agent in BVI but, due to an oversight on the part of the agent, were not passed on to Kea.[7] That "oversight" has had significant consequences for Kea.
[10] On 31 January 2022, the Fayette Circuit Court entered default judgment in favour of WFTL against Kea for the sum of USD$123,750,000 plus interest and costs.[8]
[11] WFTL then purported to issue a statutory demand against Kea in the BVI, based on the default judgment. Kea became aware of the default judgment when Kea and its English solicitors received correspondence from WFTL's BVI-based lawyer, attaching the statutory demand, which now claimed USD$136,240,994.[9]
[12] Kea says the Coal Agreement is a fabrication constructed by Mr Wikeley and Mr Watson to defraud Kea.
[13] In the next few months, from July to October 2022, Kea tried, in vain, to set aside the default judgment in Kentucky. On 21 July 2022, Kea filed a motion in the Fayette Circuit Court, seeking to set aside the default judgement on the basis the claim was fraudulent. This motion was denied by Judge Bunnell of that Court on 18 October 2022,[10] on the ground that Kea had been "properly served".[11] The judge refused to consider the merits of Kea's fraud argument. WFTL had already started to take steps to try to enforce the default judgment, by serving subpoenas on 11 banks in Kentucky, New York and New Jersey seeking documents regarding financial transactions undertaken by Kea since 1 January 2012.[12]
[14] Kea made a further attempt to set aside the default judgment, by applying to the same judge, Judge Bunnell, to set aside the 18 October 2022 order. That was also denied. In November 2022, Kea commenced an appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.[13]
[15] Out of concern for whether the Kentucky Court of Appeals might take the same approach as the first instance judge, Kea also sought other avenues to protect its position against enforcement of the default judgment.
[16] Because WFTL is a New Zealand company, Kea brought proceedings in the High Court of New Zealand, seeking injunctive relief to restrain WFTL, Mr Wikeley and Mr Watson "from taking steps to perpetuate what Kea says is a massive worldwide fraud against it".[14] The allegation in the New Zealand High Court was summarised by Gault J, who heard the initial urgent application on 4 November 2022, as follows:
"[23] Kea says it has reason to suspect that Mr Watson is attempting to use the Kentucky proceeding to frustrate Kea's enforcement of its English judgment against him by winding up Kea and also by diverting its legal team and resources, to vex Kea and Sir Owen Glenn in their long-running dispute - including by forcing disclosure of their confidential financial information and causing them to waste legal fees which are unlikely to be recovered, and to extract value from Kea. Kea says that Mr Wikeley also appears to be attempting to use the Coal Agreement and the Kentucky default judgment to extort Kea and its agents or associates.
[24] Kea says the immediate vehicle for this fraud is WFTL, which has obtained the default judgment. As mentioned, WFTL is a New Zealand company incorporated a month before commencing the Kentucky proceeding."
[17] On 4 November 2022, Gault J made interim orders against WFTL, Mr Wikeley and Mr Watson, on an ex parte basis, which included an interim injunction restraining those defendants from taking any steps to enforce or otherwise act on the Coal Agreement and the default judgment.[15] The orders included:
(a) an order that WFTL and Mr Wikeley not take any steps (or cause or permit any other person) to appoint an additional or replacement trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust (para (a));
(b) orders prohibiting WFTL from taking any steps to enforce or otherwise act on the Coal Agreement or the Default Judgment (para (b));
(c) an order that Mr Wikeley and Mr Watson "shall not take any steps to procure, encourage, assist or otherwise cause WFTL or the Wikeley Family Trust to take steps in violation" of the orders (para (g)); and
(d) an order that "without limiting order (g), none of the defendants shall sell, assign, gift, grant any security interest in or over, or otherwise in any way whatsoever transfer or encumber any interest any of them may have, directly or indirectly, in any rights any of them may have under or in connection with the Coal Agreement and/or the Default Judgment".[16]
[18] Those orders came to the attention of Mr Wikeley within a few days of being made. He filed an application on 10 November 2022 in the New Zealand High Court seeking to stay or dismiss the New Zealand proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds_,_ and to set aside the interim orders. Those applications were heard by Gault J on 12 December 2022. Pending judgment, the parties consented to the extension of the interim orders.[17]
[19] For reasons given on 10 March 2023,[18] Gault J dismissed WFTL's and Mr Wikeley's applications, finding that New Zealand is an appropriate forum for the dispute and, being satisfied that "Kea has a good arguable case (and serious question to be tried) that the defendants are conspiring to defraud it", continued the interim orders until further order of the court. Justice Gault said:
"For the reasons set out in my earlier judgment, further steps by the defendants seeking to enforce the default judgment would be unconscionable, meeting the oppressive and vexatious requirement for interim anti-suit relief."[19]
[20] WFTL and Mr Wikeley were represented by lawyers at the time of the 12 December 2022 hearing before Gault J. On 17 March 2023, Mr Wikeley's New Zealand lawyers advised the New Zealand court that WFTL and Mr Wikeley intended to seek leave to appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2023 and the interim orders and to change their legal representation.[20]
[21] Between 22 March 2023 and 2 April 2023, Mr Wikeley exchanged messages with his Kentucky lawyer, Mr Regard, and a Mr Coleman, via WhatsApp. The content of these messages came to the attention of Kea's Kentucky lawyer in October 2023.[21] The messages reveal a deliberate plan on the part of Mr Wikeley, with the assistance of his Kentucky lawyer, to subvert the New Zealand orders, by removing WFTL (a New Zealand company) as the trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust and replacing it with a newly incorporated USA company, and substituting that, or another new USA company, as the plaintiff in the Kentucky proceedings - so that he could proceed to enforce the default judgment. In these messages, after Mr Coleman refers to assigning the judgment debt to a new USA company so that "such company can then continue with enforcement", Mr Wikeley said, on 23 March 2023:[22]
"Go contempt of court. Shift the Judgement and NZ goes to Hell.
"Guys. We doing assignments of Judgements and assignments of Contract
Plus WFT board resolutions from WFTL giving all assets to be distributed to WIKELEY Inc
Should WFTL as [sic] change the jurisdiction of the WFT to KY USA ?
Then when we inform USA courts and Kea we can clearly say WFT has NO assets and NO New Zealand Jurisdiction?
*Next step after this should be WFTL resigns and new Trustee appointed OR just leave it ?
Lets move guys i done my part we need final Docs please"
[23] A few days later, on 2 April 2023, Mr Wikeley said:
"Whatever happens above surely WFTL needs to be removed as the Trustee completely urgently this week? Then its got nothing just a shell?
I can make the NEW trustee of WFT my son Oliver Wikeley using his Company in Vanuatu ?
KEA 100% will show KY judge that WFTL and KW are under Court injunction in NZ, and we are not allowed to transfer the Judgement/ Contract to Wikeley Inc.
* What do you tell the KY judge answer to this challenge ?
You have some LEGAL precedents to quote that NZ Court cannot legally stop WFTL doing what it has done . Yes its against a Court Order ,but nothing they can do about it legally ? Michael [Coleman] you say its Legal 100% just naughty. I assume KY judge might need understand this? I assume its like having a court injunction against a GOLD BAR . If WFTL allows gold bar to leave NZ to Wikeley Inc the reality is its gone ? ..."[24]
[25] Mr Wikeley objected to the inclusion of the WhatsApp messages in the "agreed statement of facts" for the purposes of this proceeding on the basis of relevance. I ruled against that objection. The messages are relevant because they reveal Mr Wikeley's willingness to act deliberately and in a calculated manner to take steps to subvert the orders of the New Zealand court in his own self-interest; and his total disregard for the authority of the New Zealand court.[25]
[26] What was discussed in the WhatsApp messages came to pass. On 28 March 2023, Wikeley Inc was incorporated in Kentucky, with Mr Wikeley as sole incorporator and director.[26] From 28 March until at least 21 April 2023, Mr Wikeley was the President, the sole director, the directing mind and will, and in control, of Wikeley Inc.[27]
[27] On 30 March 2023, Mr Wikeley as director of both WFTL and Wikeley Inc, executed two documents in Brisbane (where he was living at the time):
(a) a deed of assignment of contract, by which he purported to assign the Coal Agreement to Wikeley Inc; and
(b) an assignment of judgment, by which he purported to assign the default judgment to Wikeley Inc.[28]
[28] On about 4 April 2023, Mr Wikeley instructed Mr Regard on behalf of Wikeley Inc and WFTL to seek to substitute Wikeley Inc for WFTL as plaintiff in the Kentucky proceedings, on the basis of the purported assignments.[29]
[29] Mr Regard acted on those instructions, by filing the motion for substitution in the Fayette Circuit Court on 4 April 2023, as well as motions for discovery and an anti-suit injunction (to restrain Kea from continuing to prosecute the New Zealand proceeding). The motion for substitution was set down for hearing on 14 April 2023 in Kentucky (which was at the relevant time 14 hours behind Brisbane time[30]).[31]
[30] On becoming aware of that, on 6 April 2023 Kea filed an ex parte application in the New Zealand High Court, seeking further interim orders. In subsequent reasons,[32] Gault J recorded that, upon the hearing of this application:
"I found that it appeared likely that Mr Wikeley and WFTL had acted in breach of this Court's earlier interim orders by assigning or purporting to assign the Coal Agreement and the very substantial default judgment. In the unusual circumstances, I considered it was just and equitable that WFTL be put into interim liquidation."
[31] On 6 April 2023, Gault J made ex parte orders adding Wikeley Inc as a defendant to the New Zealand proceedings and restraining WFTL and Mr Wikeley from taking any steps or causing or permitting another person (including Wikeley Inc) to bring or pursue any litigation in relation to the assignments, the motion for substitution and the other motions (for discovery and injunctions). Justice Gault also made an order appointing interim liquidators to WFTL and recorded that on and from the appointment of the interim liquidators, Mr Wikeley ceased to have any powers, functions or duties as a director of WFTL.[33]
[32] Those orders were served on Mr Wikeley in various ways on 6 April 2023, by email to Mr Wikeley's New Zealand solicitor, to his Kentucky attorney, Mr Regard's law firm, and to Wikeley Inc's registered agent. The orders were also served on 13 Aril 2023 by email to Mr Regard, and to Mr Wikeley at email addresses he used and had access to.[34]
[33] In the meantime, on 5 April 2023, Mr Wikeley signed articles of association to incorporate another company called USA Asset Holdings Inc. That company was incorporated on 11 April 2023. Mr Regard also acted as the attorney for this company. On and from 11 April until at least 21 April 2023, Mr Wikeley was the sole director, directing mind and will, and in control, of USA Asset Holdings Inc.[35]
[34] The following day, on 12 April 2023, Mr Wikeley executed:
(a) a deed of appointment of new trustee and removal of trustee, by which he purported to appoint USA Asset Holdings as new trustee of WFT and removed WFTL as trustee; and
(b) a document purporting to be a resolution changing the governing law of the WFT to that of Kentucky.[36]
[35] The following summary of Mr Wikeley's conduct, by the New Zealand Court of Appeal,[37] is apt and I adopt it:
"Suffice to say that having failed on his jurisdictional challenge, Mr Wikeley embarked upon a scheme to insulate WFTL from any New Zealand judgment by assigning the benefit of the Kentucky Default Judgment to a new United States entity, Wikeley Inc, and replacing the trustee of WFT with USA Asset Holdings Inc, all in breach of Gault J's interim orders."
[36] Kea commenced the proceeding in this Court on 11 April 2023, by filing an ex parte application for injunctive and other relief under ss 25 and 26 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). This was because Mr Wikeley was living in Queensland at this time. As recorded in the reasons of Cooper J given on 12 April 2023:[38]
"[6] Very recently, within the past few days, Kea has become aware that Mr Wikeley has taken steps to contravene the orders made by the New Zealand court and is attempting to avoid the effect of those orders. Most relevantly, the conduct by which Mr Wikeley is said to have sought that effect is by purporting to assign the Kentucky judgment from WFTL to a new Kentucky company called Wikeley Inc, incorporated for the apparent purpose of frustrating the orders made in the New Zealand proceeding.
[7] On 6 April 2023, Kea obtained ex parte orders from the New Zealand court further restraining Mr Wikeley and WFTL and placing WFTL under the control of a provisional liquidator.
[8] In this application, in order to properly secure Mr Wikeley's compliance with the orders made in the New Zealand proceeding, Kea seeks the assistance of this court to grant interim relief against Mr Wikeley under s 25 of the Act. It is submitted, and I accept, that Mr Wikeley's presence in Queensland makes him amenable to the jurisdiction of this court and to its processes for enforcement, including committal for contempt if he breaches its orders.
[9] There is some urgency to the resolution of this application. That is why these reasons were delivered ex tempore, notwithstanding the seriousness of the restraints imposed.
[10] That urgency arises in circumstances where a hearing has been scheduled for 14 April 2023 to substitute the purported assignee of the Kentucky judgment as plaintiff in the Kentucky proceeding. Kea also seeks an interim order restraining Mr Wikeley from departing Australia and to deliver up his passport, and further, or alternatively, an order under s 100 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) (Civil Proceedings Act) and r 935 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) for the court to issue a warrant for his arrest."[39]
[37] Justice Cooper was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to grant the relief sought, in terms equivalent to the orders made in the New Zealand proceeding, saying at [58]:
"That is because Mr Wikeley has shown a disregard for the orders made in the New Zealand proceeding and the restraints set out in those orders. Those actions demonstrate that securing his compliance with orders will be difficult without personal consequences for him for contravening court orders, including committal for contempt. Mr Wikeley appears to have considered himself free to disregard the restraints imposed by the orders made in the New Zealand proceeding, in circumstances where, because of his residence in Queensland, he is beyond the scope of enforcement of the orders made in New Zealand."
[38] Justice Cooper was satisfied there was a need to ensure Mr Wikeley stayed in Queensland "so that Kea will be able to enforce the restraints against him personally" (at [68], see also [73]-[74]).
[39] The orders made by Cooper J on 12 April 2023, pursuant to s 25 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, in support of the New Zealand proceeding, were as follows:
"7. Pursuant to section 25 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) in support of a proceeding in the High Court of New Zealand (Auckland Registry) No. CIV 2022-404-2086, until 4pm on the return date:
(a) the Respondent shall not take any steps, and shall not cause or permit any other person, to appoint an additional or replacement trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust;
(b) the Respondent be restrained from taking any steps, or causing or permitting any other person including Wikeley Family Trustee Limited (WFTL), a New Zealand company, and/or Wikeley Inc (Wikeley Inc), a corporation formed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, to take any steps, to bring or pursue any litigation, or to enforce or otherwise act on:
(i) the purported Coal Funding and JV Investment Agreement dated 23 October 2012 between the Applicant and the WFTL (Coal Agreement);
(ii) the Order for Default Judgment (Default Judgment) dated on or about 31 January 2022 in proceedings Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd v Kea Investments Ltd (Commonwealth of Kentucky, Fayette Circuit Court, 9th Division (Kentucky Court), Civil Action No. 21-CI-02508 (Kentucky Proceedings);
(iii) the statutory demand purportedly made by WFTL, by its solicitors Mourant Ozannes, to the Applicant, dated 28 June 2022, for the sum of USD136,240,994 pursuant to s 155 of the Insolvency Act 2003 (BVI) (Statutory Demand);
(iv) The purported Deed of Assignment of Contract between WFTL and Wikeley Inc dated 30 March 2023 (Assignment of Coal Agreement) under which WFTL purported to:
(A) Advance all assets belonging to WFTL as trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust to Wikeley Inc; and
(B) Assign to Wikeley Inc the "full benefit of" the Coal Agreement;
(v) The purported Assignment of Judgment (Assignment of Judgment) between WFTL and Wikeley Inc dated 30 March 2023 under which WFTL purported to assign to Wikeley Inc the benefit of the Default Judgment;
(vi) The Motion for Substitution and Notice of Hearing on April 14 2023 (Motion for Substitution) under which application has been made to the Kentucky Court for orders that Wikeley Inc be substituted for WFTL as the plaintiff in the Kentucky Proceedings, purportedly in reliance on the Assignment of Coal Agreement and the Assignment of Judgment;
(vii) The Motion to Compel Discovery (Motion to Compel Discovery) and the Motion for Injunction (Motion for Injunction) annexed to the Motion for Substitution;
(viii) Any notices of the Assignment of Coal Agreement and Assignment of Judgment to the Applicant or any other person anywhere in the world;
(c) The Respondent shall cause Wikeley Inc to withdraw, adjourn or seek a continuance of the Motion for Substitution, the Motion to Compel Discovery and the Motion for Injunction;
(d) Without limiting orders (a) and (b), the Respondent shall be restrained from taking any steps, or causing or permitting any other person including WFTL and Wikeley Inc to take any steps:
(i) to enforce compliance with any subpoena issued by WFTL or Wikeley Inc that relies on the Coal Agreement or the Default Judgment (WFTL or Wikeley Inc subpoena) which would result in documents being provided under that subpoena pending further order of the Court;
(ii) to obtain documents from any other person whether under any WFTL or Wikeley Inc subpoena or otherwise in reliance on the Coal Agreement or Default Judgment;
(iii) to read any document which WFTL or Wikeley Inc has received or may in the future receive under any WFTL or Wikeley Inc subpoena;
(iv) to directly or indirectly (or by any agent including a lawyer or attorney) provide any document it receives under any WFTL or Wikeley Inc subpoena or any information contained in any such document to any other person and specifically not to Eric John Watson or Rizwan Hussain or any company, person or other entity with which either of them is associated;
8. Pursuant to section 25 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) in support of a proceeding in the High Court of New Zealand (Auckland Registry) No. CIV2022-404-2086, alternatively, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) until 4pm on the return date, the Respondent be restrained from leaving Australia; and
(b) the Respondent forthwith deliver up all of his passports into the custody of the Registrar of this Court, or an enforcement officer of this Court, or an appropriately qualified person (within the meaning in rule 936 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)) authorised in writing by the enforcement officer, or of the solicitors for the Applicant.
(c) until 4pm on the return date, the Respondent be restrained from applying for any additional or replacement passport whatsoever."
[40] The orders of 12 April 2023 were remade on 13 April 2023, with the addition of an order 8(d), which required the Australian Federal Police to place Mr Wikeley on the AFP Watch List, and adding the penal notice required by rule 665 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR).
[41] The 13 April 2023 orders were served on Mr Wikeley, and on Mr Regard, by a number of emails and also by hand delivery to Mr Wikeley's address in Queensland on 13 April 2023. Mr Regard was sent two emails (one at 6.42 am and one at 12.51 pm Kentucky time on 13 April) and Mr Wikeley was sent three emails (one at 3.58 pm, one at 7.17 pm and one at 8.27 pm Kentucky time on 13 April).[40]
[42] Notwithstanding the 13 April 2023 orders, which both Mr Wikeley and Mr Regard had received before the morning of 14 April 2023 in Kentucky, Mr Regard appeared in the Kentucky Court before Judge Bunnell for Wikeley Inc on the hearing of the motion for substitution on 14 April 2023. Mr Regard had also, the night before, filed a "reply brief" in relation to that motion - about two hours after Mr Wikeley received the first email serving the orders (at 3.58 pm).[41] This forms the basis of charge 1 and charge 5 of contempt - in that:
(a) (for charge 1) Mr Wikeley caused or permitted Wikeley Inc to file a reply brief in respect of the motion for substitution and caused or permitted Wikeley Inc to pursue the hearing of the motion for substitution before Judge Bunnell, in breach of orders 7(b)(i), (ii), (iv), (v) and [or] (vi) of the 13 April orders;[42] and
(b) (for charge 5) Mr Wikeley caused or permitted Wikeley Inc to pursue the motion for substitution before Judge Bunnell and failed to cause Wikeley Inc to withdraw, adjourn or seek a continuance of the motion for substitution, in breach of order 7(c) of the 13 April orders.[43]
[43] Judge Bunnell adjourned the hearing of the motion for substitution until 21 April 2023.[44]
[44] On 20 April 2023, Kea filed the contempt application in this proceeding - seeking that Mr Wikeley be found to have committed a contempt of court by failing to comply with the requirements of the 13 April 2023 orders.
[45] The return date for the 13 April 2023 orders was 21 April 2023.
[46] On 21 April 2023, Mr Wikeley was not present in Court but was represented by a solicitor, Mr Andrews. As recorded in a later judgment of Cooper J:[45]
"[9] On the return of the 13 April orders on 21 April 2023 (21 April hearing), Mr Wikeley was represented by a solicitor. At that hearing, the court:
(a) refused an application by Mr Wikeley for an adjournment of the inter partes hearing;
(b) made orders continuing the 13 April orders until 28 days after the final determination of the New Zealand proceeding or earlier order (21 April orders);
(c) issued a warrant for Mr Wikeley's arrest, given his apparent non-compliance with parts of the 13 April orders, including the requirement that he surrender his passports.
[10] On 26 April 2023, Mr Wikeley delivered his passports into the custody of the court. On that day, Mr Wikeley appeared before the court by counsel, instructed by new solicitors (26 April hearing). In response to an application by Kea to execute the arrest warrant, Mr Wikeley offered conditions in lieu of making orders for his immediate arrest. The court made orders, consistent with the conditions offered by Mr Wikeley, that he provide security for his appearance at the hearing of the contempt application and that he reside at a specified address and be subject to a curfew (26 April orders)."
[47] The 21 April orders were served on Mr Wikeley at 2.31 pm on 24 April 2023.[46]
[48] On the morning of 21 April 2023 (Kentucky time; which was 10.30 pm on 21 April Queensland time) Mr Regard, acting for Wikeley Inc, appeared again before Judge Bunnell on the return date for the motion for substitution and submitted for it to be granted.[47]
[49] This forms the basis of charge 2 of contempt, in that Mr Wikeley caused or permitted the conduct to occur, in breach of orders 7(b)(i), (ii), (iv), (v) and [or] (vi) of the 13 April orders.[48] It also forms the basis of charge 6 of contempt, on the basis that causing or permitting this to occur was also in breach of order 7(c) of the 13 April orders.
[50] On the same day, Mr Regard, acting for Wikeley Inc, filed a (parallel[49]) motion for substitution in the Kentucky Court of Appeals.[50] This conduct, which was caused or permitted by Mr Wikeley, was also in breach of the 13 April orders (in particular, orders 7(b)(i), (ii), (iv) and [or] (v)) and is the subject of charge 3 of contempt.[51]
[51] To put charge 4 into context, it is necessary to go back a few days in the chronology. On 18 April 2023, the interim liquidators of WFTL filed interlocutory motions for injunctive relief in the United States Federal District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky (the US Federal District Court) seeking a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief against Wikeley Inc and USA Asset Holdings[52] to prevent the transfer of WFTL's assets and give effect to the orders of the New Zealand High Court.[53]
[52] On 20 April 2023, Mr Regard acting for Wikeley Inc and USA Asset Holdings filed a preliminary response in the US Federal District Court to the motions.[54] The judge who heard the motion refused to grant the temporary restraining order, but scheduled a later hearing in respect of the injunctive relief sought.[55] Mr Regard, acting for Wikeley Inc, filed a copy of this order in the Fayette Circuit Court the next day[56] (the practical effect of which was to flag to the Fayette Circuit Court that the proceedings in that Court had not been restrained and could continue).
[53] This forms the basis of charge 4 of contempt - namely, that Mr Wikeley caused or permitted the conduct of Mr Regard, which was in breach of orders 7(b)(i), (ii), (iv) and [or] (v) of the 13 April orders.[57]
[54] The final charge of contempt is of a different character. As already noted, by order 8(b) made on 13 April 2023, Mr Wikeley was required "forthwith" to deliver up all of his passports (to either the Registrar of this Court, an enforcement officer or other appropriately qualified person under r 936 UCPR or Kea's solicitors). The 13 April order was served on Mr Wikeley on the day it was made. He failed to comply with it. The order for delivery up of his passports was made again, as order 4(b), on 21 April 2023, following a hearing at which Mr Wikeley was represented by a solicitor. As noted above, Cooper J also issued a warrant for Mr Wikeley's arrest on 21 April 2023, given his apparent non-compliance with the order previously made.
[55] By 24 April 2023, Mr Wikeley still had not complied with the orders of 13 April and 21 April. As recorded in the Agreed Statement of Facts:
"74. At 9.31am on 24 April 2023, the solicitor acting for Mr Wikeley, Mr Dowd, sent Mr Deighton, the solicitor acting for Kea, an email stating that Mr Dowd had possession of the passports and undertook to hold them pending further order of the Court. In that email, Mr Dowd proposed the terms of an email to the Associate to the Honourable Justice Cooper which stated that Mr Dowd was in a position to surrender Mr Wikeley's passports to the Registrar.
[56] There followed an exchange of emails about when the matter would be listed - and it was eventually agreed to be listed at 4.30pm on 26 April 2023. Mr Wikeley finally delivered his passports into the custody of the Registrar of the Court at 10 am on 26 April 2023.[58] His failure to do so earlier is the subject of charge 7 of contempt, breach of order 8(b) of the 13 April orders and order 4(b) of the 21 April orders.
[57] At the hearing on 26 April 2023, Cooper J made orders including that, until determination of Kea's application for Mr Wikeley to be punished for contempt, Mr Wikeley be required to reside at a particular address and be present at that address between 11 pm and 6 am. This curfew regime was offered by Mr Wikeley as an alternative to the execution of the warrant for his arrest.[59]
[58] That curfew was, subsequently, on 4 October 2023, set aside as no longer necessary.[60] But Mr Wikeley has remained subject to the "no-departure order" first made on 13 April 2023, and without his passport(s), up until now.
[59] There have been various other steps taken since 26 April 2023 by Mr Wikeley trying to challenge the orders made by Cooper J which underpin this contempt proceeding: an application by Mr Wikeley seeking to set aside the 13 April and 21 April 2023 orders, and stay the contempt application (which was heard in August 2023 and dismissed by Cooper J on 4 October 2023[61]); an appeal against Cooper J's 4 October 2023 decision (which was dismissed on 29 October 2024[62]); and an application for special leave to appeal that decision (which was refused by the High Court on 6 March 2025[63]).
[60] From May to December 2025, various steps were taken in relation to the contempt application, including in relation to service and amendment of it. The order listing the application for hearing was made on 1 December 2025.
[61] By the end of 2025, the proceedings in New Zealand had been finalised, including following appeals to the Supreme Court (the ultimate appellate court in New Zealand). In short, the New Zealand High Court has determined, on a final basis, that the Coal Agreement was "fake" and "fraudulent", the default judgment was obtained by fraud, and Mr Wikeley, WFTL and others conspired to defraud and cause loss to Kea using the default judgment (among other findings).[64] Those findings were upheld by the New Zealand Court of Appeal,[65] and Mr Wikeley's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed.[66] The New Zealand High Court also granted a permanent injunction, in terms of the April 2023 orders made by Gault J, which has also been upheld by the Supreme Court.[67] The relevant High Court judgments have been registered in the Federal Court of Australia.[68]
[62] On the basis of the evidence as at July 2025, the proceeding in the Kentucky Court of Appeals is stayed and no further substantive action has been taken in relation to the Fayette Circuit Court proceedings either.[69]
[63] Kea initiated bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Wikeley in August 2025, to enforce the judgment for damages ultimately made in its favour by the New Zealand court. That resulted in further litigation, as Mr Wikeley applied to set aside the bankruptcy notice (including, at one stage, by purporting to claim that Kea is indebted to WFT for about $123 million, by reference to the default judgment). Mr Wikeley ultimately filed a debtor's petition making himself bankrupt on 5 February 2026.[70]
[64] Mr Wikeley formally entered pleas of guilty to the charges of contempt on 12 December 2025. By his amended plea, recorded in a document filed on 24 February 2026, Mr Wikeley pleads guilty to having caused or permitted the conduct the subject of each of charges 1 to 6 (in breach of court orders) and, as to charge 7, pleads guilty to failing to comply with the orders made on 13 April and 21 April 2023 to forthwith deliver up his passports.
[65] In the case of each of charges 1 to 6, Mr Wikeley pleads guilty to having "caused or permitted the particularised conduct" by permitting the conduct to occur. As will be seen below, Mr Wikeley minimises his contempt in a number of ways, including by drawing a distinction between actively doing something (in breach of a court order) and failing to do something. In the context of this case, Mr Wikeley, with knowledge of this Court's orders, failed to intervene to stop a train of events, which he had already caused to commence, from continuing. In that way, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he caused and permitted the particularised conduct.[71]
[66] By his pleas of guilty, Mr Wikeley admits liability for each of the charges of contempt.
[67] On the basis of his pleas of guilty, I find that Mr Wikeley has committed the contempts the subject of each of charges 1 to 7, and he is convicted of those charges.
[68] There is a vast difference between the punishment that Kea contends ought to be imposed, and what Mr Wikeley submits is appropriate.
[69] Mr Wikeley submits that his contempt should be regarded as falling at the lower end of the scale, and that no further punishment should be imposed on him, because he has "already been sufficiently punished" by virtue of having his liberty curtailed since he was required to surrender his passports in April 2023, and having regard to the delay in prosecution of these proceedings, the fact that the orders have expired, his good character, pleas of guilty, age and ill health.
[70] Kea submits Mr Wikeley's contempt is extremely serious, and the only appropriate punishment is imprisonment.
[71] To accede to Mr Wikeley's submissions would be an affront to the authority of this Court. For the following reasons, I find that the only appropriate punishment is imprisonment.
[72] This Court has an inherent power to punish for contempt and may impose a wide range of orders by way of punishment. By operation of rule 930(1) of the UCPR, where an individual has been found guilty of contempt, the Court may punish the individual by making an order that may be made under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992. This rule is permissive and facilitative[72] - it broadens the range of penalties available for contempt, rather than constrains it.[73] And although the forms of punishment of an individual extend to the forms of punishment available under the Penalties and Sentences Act, the general provisions of that Act do not otherwise apply to contempt orders (including, for example, the provisions in relation to parole, or recording of convictions).[74]
[73] The underling rationale for the exercise of a court's contempt power is the need to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice.[75] Contempt proceedings are essential to facilitate courts being able to function properly, by making orders that will be obeyed.[76] If they are not "the very basis and structure of the administration of justice crumbles".[77]
[74] There is no longer in Queensland a relevant distinction drawn between "civil" and "criminal" contempt, for the purposes of determining the appropriate penalty.[78] However, where the contempt is disobedience of a court order, the question whether the disobedience was wilful, as opposed to "casual, accidental or unintentional", remains relevant in the exercise of the judicial discretion as to the punishment to be imposed.[79]
[75] The point is well made in the following passage from the decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, in R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77 at [70]:
"Sentencing for a contempt of court constituted by a breach of the court's orders may serve two distinct purposes. These purposes may be described as coercive and punitive. A sentence for contempt may provide a coercive means by which court orders can be enforced and future compliance with the order secured for the benefit of a party to the proceedings can be ensured. However, a sentence for contempt may also punish wilful disobedience of a court's order so as to vindicate judicial authority and maintain the integrity of the court's process in the public interest. These different purposes mark the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. Although the significance of that distinction has been reduced almost to the point of obliteration in Australia, the dual purpose of sentencing for contempt of court remains and imposition of a single sentence may serve both purposes.[80]"[81]
[76] In this case, the predominant purpose is punitive. The time for providing an incentive for belated compliance has passed and been overtaken in any event by the decisions of the New Zealand courts (in which final relief has now been granted) and of the United States courts (which have, at least as I understand it, stayed further proceedings in relation to the default judgment).
[77] The purpose for which I am sentencing Mr Wikeley for his contempt of this Court is to vindicate the authority of the Court, by punishing him; to denounce his conduct in the strongest terms; to deter him and, significantly, to deter other like-minded people: "retribution is called for because it is essential to the proper working of the court system that court orders are obeyed."[82]
[78] Previous authorities have identified the following as relevant considerations in determining the appropriate sentence:[83]
(2) the contemnor's culpability (or blameworthiness);
(3) whether the contemnor was aware of the consequences to himself of what he did;
(4) the actual or potential consequences of the contempt on the proceedings in which the contempt was committed;
(5) whether the contempt was committed in the context of a proceeding alleging crime or conduct seriously prejudicial to the public interest;[84]
(7) whether the contemnor has received, or sought to receive, a benefit or gain from the contempt;
(8) whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor;
(9) the character and antecedents of the contemnor;
(11) what punishment is required to deter the contemnor and others of like mind from similar disobedience to the orders of the court;
(12) what punishment is required to express the court's denunciation of the contempt.
[79] As the Full Federal Court observed in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90, after referring to a list incorporating most of those things:
"103 The burden of the additional authority in this Court is to add weight to the factors listed ... , rather than requiring any change by way of addition, subtraction or variation. The focus remains on the core themes of the objective seriousness of the conduct and, in particular, its effect on the administration of justice, subjective factors such as the contemnor's culpability, antecedents and attitude, including in particular any apology or other palpable sign of contrition, the capacity to pay a fine, and imprisonment being a last resort. Deterrence remains a dominant theme, both specific and general. Even denunciation and punishment can be seen as bolstering deterrence. That is especially so when the conduct entails contemplation and the opportunity to reflect and desist.
[80] I have proceeded on the basis that for the purposes of determining the appropriate penalty, I must be satisfied of any disputed matters beyond reasonable doubt.[85]
[81] Mr Wikeley's conduct was intentional and deliberate. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that his conduct post-13 April 2023 the subject of charges 1 to 6, with knowledge of the orders made by this Court on 13 April and then on 21 April 2023, was part of his ongoing strategy to subvert the authority of any court to interfere with his plan to press forward with the enforcement of the default judgment. That he did so with knowledge of the allegations against him of serious fraud, which were sufficient to persuade not only the New Zealand court, but also this Court, that there was a serious question to be tried such as to justify the imposition of an extraordinary anti-enforcement restraint further demonstrates the seriousness of his contemptuous conduct.
[82] It is not to the point to say that his actions (such as applying to substitute a party, or replacing the trustee) were, of themselves, lawful in Kentucky; nor that the default judgment remains in place in Kentucky (the various proceedings in the US still being stayed). That misses the point entirely[86] and underscores a later consideration - that Mr Wikeley's response to this proceeding demonstrates a complete lack of insight on his part. His actions were not lawful in so far as the authority of this Court was concerned.
[83] Nor is it to the point to say that Mr Wikeley's contempt merely involved "a failure to take action". It was Mr Wikeley who instructed his lawyer, Mr Regard. The fact that Mr Wikeley had put in train the course of action in Kentucky - in breach of the New Zealand orders - prior to the orders made by this Court on 12 and 13 April 2023, does not diminish the seriousness of Mr Wikeley's conduct in continuing that course of action, in further breach of another court's orders - namely, the Supreme Court of Queensland. In this age of instant communication, it was well within Mr Wikeley's power and ability, if he had any respect for the authority of this Court, to immediately inform Mr Regard to take no further steps in relation to the Kentucky proceeding. I am left in no doubt at all that Mr Wikeley consciously and deliberately did no such thing. On the contrary, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the sentiments Mr Wikeley expressed in the WhatsApp messages, in so far as the New Zealand court's orders are concerned, continued to reflect his views of the orders made by this Court on 12, 13 and 21 April 2023.
[84] As Nugee J said, in Kea Investments Ltd v Watson [2020] EWHC 2796 at [30]:
"The authorities establish that deliberate breaches of court orders are always serious because they have a tendency to undermine the administration of justice. ... the entire system of the administration of justice depends upon persons who are ordered to do things by courts actually doing them."
[85] It follows from what I have just said that I find Mr Wikeley is squarely to blame for the conduct comprising his contempt and deserving of punishment to vindicate the authority of this Court, denounce his conduct, deter him and other like-minded persons.
[86] I am satisfied that Mr Wikeley was well aware that his conduct constituted contempt of court. I draw the inference, as the only rational inference, that the attitude displayed in the WhatsApp messages to his respect for the authority of the New Zealand court, continued to be his attitude to the authority of orders of this Court.
The potential consequences of the contempt were grave
[87] For Mr Wikeley it was submitted that there were no consequences of the contempt, which was another factor relied upon to place this at the lower end of the scale of seriousness.
[88] The potential consequences were in fact grave, and reflect the consequences which would have flowed from a refusal to grant the injunction - as explained by the Court of Appeal in Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] QCA 201:
"[29] During the oral hearing of this appeal, senior counsel for the respondent described some submissions made on behalf of the appellant as having an air of unreality about them. I think the description applies very well to this submission. The 'practical consequences likely to flow' from a refusal to make the injunction sought by the respondent would be enormous, and likely irretrievable if there is in fact a fraud, as Kea alleges. In circumstances where the respondent showed a strong prima facie case that it was a victim of a fraudulent conspiracy, this was a very strong matter weighing against the appellant below.
[30] Lastly, there was an oral submission made by the appellant on this appeal that the judge had misunderstood or misapplied the first of the main enquiries referred to in O'Neill. It was said that the 'status quo' in this case was that the appellant was entitled to enforce a judgment entered in Kentucky. I reject this submission. In circumstances where Kea asserts that judgment to have been obtained as part of a fraudulent conspiracy against it, the status quo, relevantly, is that the Kentucky judgment remains unexecuted. To allow execution would be to cause major and perhaps irreparable financial harm to the respondent."[87]
[89] Likewise, the potential consequence, if Mr Wikeley had accomplished what he set out to do - in breach of this Court's orders - was major financial harm to Kea. The fact that he was thwarted in those efforts, by the continued legal proceedings in Queensland, New Zealand and in the United States, does not diminish the seriousness of his actions.
[90] Kea also submits it has suffered detriment, in the form of substantial legal costs in the United States, New Zealand and in Queensland, as a consequence of Mr Wikeley's conduct. It is difficult to draw any conclusion as to what proportion of this could be said to be due to Mr Wikeley's contempt of this Court, and so I do not place significant weight on this consideration. In any event, as I have already said, the primary purpose of punishing Mr Wikeley is vindicating the authority of the Court, in the public interest.
The nature of the proceeding in which the contempt was committed
[91] This next factor also underscores the seriousness of Mr Wikeley's conduct. His contempt was not committed in the context of a simple civil dispute between private parties. His contempt was committed in the context of proceedings concerning serious allegations of fraudulent conspiracy, arising in part from abuse of court processes. That is conduct seriously prejudicial to the public interest. It is also relevant that Mr Wikeley's contempt involved deliberate breach of orders made in the context of a scheme of international judicial cooperation under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010.
[92] To be clear, I do not proceed to sentence Mr Wikeley on the basis that I am sentencing him for his involvement in a fraudulent conspiracy.[88] I proceed to sentence Mr Wikeley on the basis that, at the time he acted in contempt of this Court, he was well aware of the serious allegations of fraudulent conspiracy made against him, and which formed the basis of the extraordinary restraints granted by, first, the New Zealand High Court and then by this Court, in support of those restraints.
[93] I am satisfied to the requisite standard that the motive for Mr Wikeley's contempt was to advance his deliberate strategy to subvert the attempts to restrain his enforcement of the default judgment obtained in Kentucky, under the black cloud of serious allegations of fraudulent conspiracy.
[94] It may be accepted that Mr Wikeley has, in the end, gained little from his contempt - unless causing inconvenience and substantial financial cost to Kea was his goal. But the fact that his attempts were, in the end, thwarted, does not diminish the seriousness of his conduct.
No expression of genuine contrition or remorse
[95] There has been no expression of contrition or remorse by Mr Wikeley.
[96] He has pleaded guilty to the charges, and I take his pleas into account in determining the appropriate punishment.
[97] I accept that by pleading guilty Mr Wikeley has, in the end, indicated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice. The pleas of guilty have had utility, in shortening the duration of the trial, which was ultimately limited to a hearing in relation to penalty only. Although the evidence, and substantial liability submissions, had already been filed well before the pleas of guilty were entered. And I accept Kea's submission that this was an overwhelmingly strong case.
[98] Mr Wikeley has, to some extent, taken responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty - although the minimisation of his culpability, in submissions put on his behalf, tends to temper the extent to which that can be said to be so. He has not demonstrated any insight. Although remorse may sometimes be revealed by a plea of guilty,[89] in this case I am unable to reach that conclusion. There has been no apology tendered by Mr Wikeley for his actions.
[99] Mr Wikeley is 70 years of age. He has some long-standing health conditions. I reject the submission, though, that he is an "ailing and elderly" man. His conduct and abilities belie such a characterisation of him.
[100] The evidence is that Mr Wikeley has longstanding coronary artery disease, which required medical intervention about 17 years ago and which is managed with medication and regular follow ups.[90] As at 19 April 2023 (so around the time the contempts were committed), it was said that Mr Wikeley had "4 admissions to hospital over the last 12 months for chest pain". He appears to have had one more after that.[91] He also has a 30 year history of diabetes mellitus which is also managed with medication and regular reviews. He has had prostate surgery (at some time between April 2023 and March 2024) and has some urinary issues. It is relevant to the weight to be given to this evidence that Mr Wikeley was suffering from the first two of these conditions, for which he seeks sympathetic treatment in the context of this penalty hearing, well before and at the time he acted in contempt of this Court.[92]
[101] I accept that imprisonment is likely to be difficult and uncomfortable for Mr Wikeley. Imprisonment is and is intended to be punishment. However, I am satisfied that it is the only form of effective punishment for Mr Wikeley's contempt. I do not accept, because the evidence does not support, that imprisonment would affect Mr Wikeley's health deleteriously, nor that his health conditions could not be adequately managed in custody.[93] Although I accept that Mr Wikeley's age and state of health are relevant considerations more generally.[94]
[102] I do not accept the submission that Mr Wikeley is a person of good character. The circumstances outlined above, culminating in the finding made in the New Zealand courts that the default judgment was obtained (by Mr Wikeley) by fraud[95] deprive that submission of credibility.
[103] In support of the submission, counsel for Mr Wikeley relied upon letters of support provided by Mr Wikeley's sister, with whom he has been living in Queensland, his son, and the man who was the foster father to Mr Wikeley's son for many years. This does not persuade me to a different view. People are not of one dimension. A fraudster may yet have people who think well of them in other contexts.
[104] Having said that, I accept as a matter of principle that while good character may operate to reduce the sentence, bad character does not increase it.[96]
[105] I am told Mr Wikeley has no criminal history. Whilst Kea submitted there was no evidence before the court to support this, I am prepared to act on the submission. It has been held in any event that whilst a prior conviction for contempt can be taken into account, other criminal history is not generally relevant in sentencing for contempt, unless the offence is sufficiently similar to the contempt for which the person is being sentenced.[97]
[106] Another submission made by Mr Wikeley is that to impose a sentence of imprisonment would improperly impose a financial burden on the State, in the context of an application brought in the private interests of the applicant. I place no weight on this submission. It once again misses the point. The overarching consideration in this case is the public interest in vindicating the authority of the Court.
[107] Mr Wikeley submits that Kea has unreasonably delayed the prosecution of this contempt proceeding. I do not accept that there has been any unreasonable delay. The initial application that Mr Wikeley be punished for contempt was filed almost immediately - on 20 March 2023. That there has been a delay of some three years since then is largely due to the subsequent court proceedings - initiated by Mr Wikeley. Mr Wikeley accepts that, until 6 March 2025, Kea was under no obligation to prosecute the contempt application, because Mr Wikeley was challenging the underlying basis for the application. The time that has passed since the High Court refused special leave in March 2025 is not unreasonable, having regard to the complexity of this case.
[108] The fact that Mr Wikeley has been subject of restriction since March 2023 - in terms of his inability to travel overseas - falls at his own feet. Likewise, the fact that Mr Wikeley was subject of a curfew for about six months in 2023. Mr Wikeley's own conduct placed him in a position where a judge of this Court was persuaded that he was "a person who is prepared to ignore the authority of court orders when he is not amenable to the court's powers of enforcement", who would, if permitted to do so, leave Australia and not return as required to appear on the hearing of the contempt proceeding, and who would, if able to leave Australia, act in contravention of the injunctions which had been granted and "put himself beyond the powers of enforcement of this court".[98] I do not accept that this curtailment should be considered adequate punishment for his contempt. That it has continued for so long is in large part due to Mr Wikeley's own actions, as already noted.
[109] I have considered what punishment is required to deter Mr Wikeley and others of like mind from similar disobedience to the orders of the Court. I have also considered what punishment is required to express the Court's denunciation of the contempt.
[110] Suffice to say, I reject the submission that Mr Wikeley has been "punished enough" because he has been unable to leave the jurisdiction.
[111] I accept that in sentencing for contempt, imprisonment is a sentence of last resort, and a sentence of immediate imprisonment should be imposed only where other sentencing options are inappropriate.[99]
[112] But the penalty imposed must be effective - for if it is not effective, "serious and lasting damage to the fabric of the law may result".[100]
[113] In my view, a fine is inappropriate in this case, because Mr Wikeley is bankrupt. In any event, having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that a monetary penalty would be either a real punishment or a real deterrent for Mr Wikeley.[101]
[114] I do not consider that community service is an appropriate sentencing option either, having regard to the serious nature of the contempts in this case.[102]
[115] I am satisfied that the only appropriate, and effective, punishment in this case is an order for immediate imprisonment.
[116] I have had regard to a number of decisions in determining what the appropriate sentence should be, including those referred to by both parties in their respective schedules of punishment decisions. Whilst it is relevant and necessary to have done so, as has previously been observed, the punishment imposed in other cases is of limited assistance because each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances.[103] A consistent theme, however, is that in cases of serious contempts, involving deliberate conduct, a sentence of actual imprisonment is regarded as appropriate.[104]
[117] It is important to keep squarely in mind the particular charges for which punishment is to be imposed:
(a) Charges 1 and 5 involve contravening (parts of) order 7(b) [which imposed a restraint on taking any steps to enforce, inter alia, the default judgment] and order 7(c) [which required steps to be taken to withdraw or adjourn the motion for substitution] made on 13 April 2023, by causing or permitting the Kentucky lawyer, Mr Regard to "file a reply brief" in relation to the motion for substitution and then to pursue the motion for substitution in the Kentucky Court by appearing before Judge Bunnell on 14 April 2023.
(b) Charges 2 and 6 involve contravening (parts of) order 7(b) and order 7(c) made on 13 April 2023, by causing or permitting Mr Regard to appear again before Judge Bunnell on the return date of the motion for substitution, 21 April 2023, and pressing for it to be granted.
(c) Charge 3 involves contravening (parts of) order 7(b) made on 13 April 2023, by causing or permitting Mr Regard, on 21 April 2023, to also file a motion for substitution in the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
(d) Charge 4 involves contravening (parts of) order 7(b) made on 13 April 2023, by causing or permitting Mr Regard to file a copy of the US Federal District Court order (refusing to grant a temporary restraining order) in the Fayette Circuit Court (in effect, conveying to the Circuit Court that there was no impediment to the proceedings in that court continuing).
(e) Charge 7 involves failing to comply with the order made on 13 April 2023 and then remade on 21 April 2023, to "forthwith" deliver up his passports to the Registrar. It appears Mr Wikeley had given his passports to his solicitor on 24 April 2023. Mr Wikeley did not deliver them up to the Registrar until 26 April 2023, in the face of a warrant being issued for his arrest.
[118] The conduct comprising the contempts therefore took place over a relatively short period of time - from 13 April to 21 April 2023, in so far as the conduct in breach of orders 7(b) and 7(c) is concerned, and from 13 April to 26 April 2023 in so far as the breach of order 8 made on 13 April and order 4 made on 21 April (in relation to the passports) is concerned. Whilst that may be a factor mitigating the seriousness, the fact that charges 1 to 6, in particular, involved deliberate conduct, as part of an ongoing strategy to subvert the force and effect of court orders imposing restraints in the context of allegations of serious fraudulent conduct, is an aggravating feature. The failure to deliver up the passports "forthwith" reflects a defiant attitude to the orders of the Court. The effect of this contempt, however, was effectively purged once the passports were delivered up.
[119] The cases in which imprisonment has been imposed as punishment for contempt reveal a wide range of terms: I refer to some, by way of example (there are, of course, many more) but none are directly, or closely, comparable.
[120] In ACCC v Halkalia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 522, the Court imposed three months' imprisonment for six charges of contempt arising from contravention of court orders prohibiting the contemnor from carrying on a business involving inviting persons to invest (with five months' imprisonment imposed on a further two charges, regarded as more egregious because they involved solicitation of business by telling those approached that profits would be donated to charity). That sentence was suspended after serving two weeks, for a period of two years - on the condition the contemnor refrain from any further contravention of the Court's orders (which were in effect for 15 years). The contemnor was a 74 year old man, with some health conditions, who pleaded guilty late, and otherwise showed no remorse or contrition.
[121] A similar penalty was imposed on the contemnor in Infa-Secure Pty Ltd v Crocker (No 2) [2016] FCA 202; (2016) 338 ALR 586 for contempt comprising multiple breaches of an undertaking given to the Court, by sending emails to various retailers making serious allegations of theft and fraud. The contemnor was sentenced to 13 weeks' imprisonment, to be (in effect) suspended for three years after serving two weeks, provided she complied with the undertakings in the future.
[122] In City Hall Albury Wodonga Pty Ltd v Chicago Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 31 the contempt comprised breach of undertakings given to the Court not to remove money and breach of the duty of disclosure by creating false documents which were disclosed as if they were genuine, so as to pervert the course of justice. The contemnors admitted many of the charges of contempt and apologised to the court and the other party. The payments made in breach of the undertaking were made to creditors. Other charges were denied but found to be proved. A fine was found to be inappropriate punishment (even apart from the fact that both contemnors were bankrupt). One of the contemnors was sentenced to four months' imprisonment; the other was sentenced to two months' imprisonment.
[123] In Commissioner of Fair Trading v TLC Consulting Services Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 374 a sentence of six months' imprisonment was imposed for contempt comprising breach of undertakings given to the Court not to trade. The conduct took place over a prolonged period and involved deliberately circumventing the Court's orders made for the protection of the public, in circumstances where financial detriment was suffered by a number of unsuspecting individuals (at [62]). There was no plea, and obfuscation in relation to the contempt proceedings. The contemnor was ordered to actually serve four months; with the remaining two months to be suspended, on the condition the contemnor comply with the orders of the Court. In this decision, Philippides J referred to a number of other comparable decisions (at [49]-[55]), in one of which (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Levi (No 3) [2008] FCA 1586) a sentence of 10 months was imposed. Her Honour observed, however, that this was a more serious case for two reasons - firstly because the contempt involved conduct similar to action which had previously resulted in the contemnor being convicted and sentenced to imprisonment;[105] and because the contravention conduct continued after the contempt proceedings were commenced (at [63]).
[124] In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 1259; (2004) 52 ACSR 115 an overall sentence of 18 months' imprisonment was imposed, as well as substantial fines. ASIC had commenced proceedings against the defendants for numerous contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 involving dishonesty. At an early stage of the proceeding, asset preservation orders were made, as well as orders requiring the defendants to surrender their passports and not leave the state or the country. The defendants contravened those orders, by "serious, flagrant and calculated" conduct. The defendants were apprehended at the airport attempting to board a plane to Singapore. The defendants pleaded guilty to multiple charges of contempt involving breach of court orders - including transferring substantial amounts of money out of the country, failing to deliver up their passports, and attempting to leave the country. Other than the plea, there was no expression of remorse or contrition.
[125] An overall sentence of 12 months' imprisonment was (following an appeal) imposed on the contemnor in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90. The contempt comprised conduct in breach of consent orders requiring the contemnor to take certain steps in relation to the dissemination of adverse information about the other party. In breach of the consent orders, the contemnor embarked on a "vendetta" (at [163]) involving dissemination of information via social media, on websites and on vans driving around over a substantial period of time. The conduct was deliberate and characterised as "trying to find a weakness or loophole in the orders and seeking to exploit that, rather than to avoid breaching the orders." There was no plea. The need for deterrence of the contemnor and others of like mind was said to be substantial (at [168]-[171] and [175(8)]).
[126] In Emmanuel College v Rowe [2014] QSC 238, a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment was imposed on the contemnor (a parent whose child attended Emmanuel College) for contempt comprising breach of an injunction and undertakings restraining him from publishing (negative) comments about Emmanuel College. Only the fear of imprisonment caused him to remove posts from the internet. The contemnor was a practising solicitor. He admitted his contravention of the orders in some respects, but not entirely. The breach of court orders and undertakings was found to be wilful and deliberate. The sentence was wholly suspended for three years, on the condition that the respondent comply with the orders and undertakings during that period. Securing compliance with the orders was a key factor in this case.
[127] In Tax Practitioners Board v Dabalos (formerly Van Stroe) (No 3) [2025] FCA 223, the contemnor was sentenced to, effectively, 12 months' imprisonment for contempt, involving conduct in breach of an injunction permanently restraining her from providing tax agent services. She was found to have provided such services on 365 identified occasions. The contemnor was required to serve six months, with the balance suspended on the condition she comply with the order in the future. The contempt was in the face not only of a permanent injunction following proceedings against the contemnor for providing tax agent services in breach of the relevant legislation but also in the face of having been fined $230,000 for that conduct. Breach of the permanent injunction commenced only a few months after it was ordered. The contemnor did plead guilty, albeit somewhat late, and apologised to the Court. She had two children, aged two and 16, who would suffer from her imprisonment.
[128] In a number of these cases, the sentence of imprisonment was suspended after a period of time. Suspension of part of a term of imprisonment might be appropriate where the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the punishment is to encourage belated compliance with a court order. That is not relevant here. Suspending some part of the sentence would serve no purpose in this case, and so it would be artificial to impose a higher penalty, and then order that it be suspended after a shorter period of time. Instead, the approach I have taken is to determine what I consider to be the appropriate period of actual imprisonment that is warranted by way of punishment for Mr Wikeley's contempts, having regard to the predominant purposes of denunciation and deterrence - to vindicate the authority of the Court in the public interest.
[129] Taking into account the particular circumstances of this case, and Mr Wikeley's personal circumstances, I find the appropriate overall term of imprisonment is three months' imprisonment.
[130] The cases of Michalik (18 months) and Kazal (12 months) are both objectively more serious. Dabalos is also in my view objectively more serious (12 months, required to serve six months). The period of 10 months, imposed in Levi, reflects aggravating factors which are not present here - continuing the contempt for some time after contempt proceedings were commenced and prior convictions for contempt. As to the latter, although I have taken into account, as part of the context, Mr Wikeley's conduct in breach of the New Zealand orders (and his attitude to them, reflected in the WhatsApp messages), I have not proceeded on the basis he has a prior conviction for contempt. At the other end of the scale, I would regard a punishment of only two weeks' actual imprisonment (as in Halkalia and Infa-Secure) as wholly inadequate having regard to the serious nature of the contempts committed by Mr Wikeley, in their context.
[131] As already noted, none of the authorities is directly comparable to the circumstances of this case. In the end, I am guided, in the exercise of my discretion, by the purposes for which punishment is to be imposed, the seriousness of the contempt in all the circumstances outlined above, the fact that Mr Wikeley has pleaded guilty (which warrants some reduction in the penalty which would otherwise be imposed), and his age and personal circumstances.
[132] The principle of totality and the requirement that a separate penalty be imposed for each charge apply in relation to punishment for contempt.[106] There is no reason to distinguish between charges 1 to 6, and so I will impose the term of three months' imprisonment on each of these charges, to be served concurrently. In respect of charge 7, I impose no further punishment, taking into account the penalty imposed for charges 1 to 6, and the fact that the contempt was purged on 26 April 2023 by delivering up the passports.
[133] The costs of a proceeding for punishment for contempt are within the Court's discretion (r 932 UCPR).
[134] Kea submits that Mr Wikeley should pay its costs of this application on the indemnity basis. Mr Wikeley submits there should be no order as to costs, taking into account the fact that he has pleaded guilty, saving the court significant time.
[135] Mr Wikeley's submission is rejected. As the cases explain, it is common in cases of this kind for an order to be made that the contemnor pay the applicant's costs, and for those costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis.[107] The primary reason for that is because the applicant is performing both a private and a public service in prosecuting charges of contempt.[108]
[136] Nevertheless, the question of the appropriate order to be made in relation to costs remains a matter for the Court's discretion.
[137] The circumstances of this case provide powerful discretionary reasons supporting an order that Mr Wikeley pay Kea's costs on the indemnity basis.
[138] As already noted, Mr Wikeley is a bankrupt. Section 77(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) requires a bankrupt, forthwith after becoming bankrupt, to give to their trustee any passport held by them. It is appropriate to make an order that the Registrar of this Court release Mr Wikeley's passports directly to Mr Wikeley's trustee(s) in bankruptcy.
(1) For each of the contempts the subject of charges 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, I order that Mr Wikeley be imprisoned for a term of three months from today.
(2) Each of the terms of imprisonment are to be served concurrently.
(3) For the contempt the subject of charge 7, Mr Wikeley is convicted but not further punished.
[140] Having regard to s 9(1)(c) and s 9(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), for the purposes of this sentence, I order that Mr Wikeley be committed into custody in a corrective services facility to be determined by the chief executive under that Act for three months from today.
[141] I direct that the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland cause Mr Wikeley's passports, which are held in the custody of the Court, to be delivered to Mr Wikeley's trustee in bankruptcy within 14 days. To facilitate this direction, I also direct that the solicitor for Mr Wikeley provide to the Registrar, within three business days, the name, address and telephone contact details of Mr Wikeley's trustee in bankruptcy.
[142] I order that Mr Wikeley pay Kea's costs of this application on the indemnity basis.
[1] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley [2023] QSC 79 at [2]; Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215 at [15].
[2] See Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd [2023] NZHC 3260 at [21] and [84(b)].
[3] Glenn v Watson [2018] EWHC 2016 (Ch); a summary of which appears in Kea Investments Ltd v Watson [2020] EWHC 472 (Ch) at [2]- [4].
[4] Kea Investments Ltd v Watson [2020] EWHC 2796 (Ch).
[5] Agreed Statement of Facts at [4] and [5]. A description of the Coal Agreement appears in Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215 at [18]- [23]. See also Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] QCA 201 at [2]- [10].
[7] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2022] NZHC 2881 at [9]; Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215 at [26].
[10] Agreed Statement of Facts at [15].
[11] Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] NZCA 609 at [37] and [162].
[12] Agreed Statement of Facts at [13] and [14].
[13] Agreed Statement of Facts at [18] and [20].
[14] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2022] NZHC 2881 at [1].
[15] Agreed Statement of Facts at [18]; Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2022] NZHC 2881.
[16] Agreed Statement of Facts at [18] and [19]; and the actual orders as they appear in Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2022] NZHC 2881 at [82].
[17] Agreed Statement of Facts at [22]-[23].
[18] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2023] NZHC 466.
[19] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd, Wikeley and Watson [2023] NZHC 466 at [92].
[20] Agreed Statement of Facts at [24].
[21] Affidavit of Hagerman, filed 3 July 2025, at [40].
[22] Affidavit of Hagerman, at p 400 of the exhibits.
[25] The messages are proved, through the evidence of Mr Hagerman. Counsel for Mr Wikeley accepted these facts are proved by the evidence - the objection was as to relevance only (transcript of the hearing p 1-8).
[26] Agreed Statement of Facts at [27].
[27] Agreed Statement of Facts at [28].
[28] Agreed Statement of Facts at [29].
[29] Agreed Statement of Facts at [30].
[30] Transcript of the hearing at p 1-9.
[31] Agreed Statement of Facts at [31]-[33].
[32] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 2407.
[33] Agreed Statement of Facts at [36] and [37].
[34] Agreed Statement of Facts at [38]-[40].
[35] Agreed Statement of Facts at [33] and [34].
[36] Agreed Statement of Facts at [43].
[37] Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] NZCA 609 at [43], see also at [68].
[38] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley [2023] QSC 79.
[40] Agreed Statement of Facts at [45].
[41] Agreed Statement of Facts at [47] and [48].
[42] Agreed Statement of Facts at [47]-[49].
[43] Agreed Statement of Facts at [66]-[68].
[44] Affidavit of Hagerman, filed 3 July 2025, at [19].
[45] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215.
[46] Agreed Statement of Facts at [54].
[47] Agreed Statement of Facts at [55].
[48] Agreed Statement of Facts at [55]-[56].
[49] See the affidavit of Hagerman, filed 3 July 2025, at [23]; see also [21] and [22] (in light of the parallel motion filed in the Kentucky Court of Appeals, Judge Bunnell decided to "pass" the Fayette Circuit Court motion for substitution (that is, defer a ruling on it) until the Kentucky Court of Appeals had ruled on the parallel motion for substitution).
[50] Agreed Statement of Facts at [58].
[51] Agreed Statement of Facts at [58-[59].
[52] Agreed Statement of Facts at [61].
[53] Affidavit of Hagerman, filed 3 July 2025, at [29] and pp 259-264 of the exhibits.
[54] Agreed Statement of Facts at [62].
[55] Agreed Statement of Facts at [63].
[56] Agreed Statement of Facts at [63].
[57] Agreed Statement of Fact at [62]-[64].
[58] Agreed Statement of Facts at [83].
[59] Agreed Statement of Facts at [93].
[60] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215 at [283]- [284].
[61] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215.
[62] Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] QCA 201.
[63] Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2025] HCADisp 33.
[64] Agreed Statement of Facts at [86], referring to Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 3260 (Gault J).
[65] Agreed Statement of Facts at [89], referring to Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] NZCA 609.
[66] Agreed Statement of Facts at [90], referring to Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2025] NZSC 76.
[67] Agreed Statement of Facts at [89(b)], [91] and [92], referring to Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley [2025] NZSC 156.
[68] Agreed Statement of Facts at [88].
[69] Affidavit of Hagerman, filed 3 July 2025, at [3], [22], [26]-[28]
[70] Agreed Statement of Facts at [106]-[111].
[71] See Waverley Council v Tovir Investments Pty Ltd & Rappaport (No 3) [2013] NSWLEC 35 at [13]- [14] as to the meaning of "causing" and "permitting".
[72] Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] QCA 215 at [72].
[73] O'Connor v Witness G [2013] QSC 281 at p 8.
[74] Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] QCA 215 at [74]- [76]. See also R v Edwards [2025] QCA 123 at [126]- [129].
[75] Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 107.
[76] Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 at [97].
[77] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 1259; (2004) 52 ACSR 115 at [47].
[78] See Witham v Holloway (1985) 183 CLR 525 at 534 (where the distinction was described as "illusory"); see also Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 108; and Lade & Co Pty Ltd v Black [2006] QCA 294; [2006] 2 Qd R 531 at [65] per Keane JA, Jones J agreeing.
[79] Lade & Co Pty Ltd v Black [2006] QCA 294; [2006] 2 Qd R 531 at [65] and [71].
[80] See Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530-534; Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-109, 113.
[82] R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77 at [77], referring to In the Marriage of Tate (No 3) [2003] FamCA 112; (2003) 30 Fam LR 427 at [57]. See also Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 107.
[83] See Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 at [101], referring to Matthews v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] NSWCA 155 at [129]; see also Buckby v Wharton [2012] QSC 416 at [80] per Mullins J (as her Honour then was), referring to Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 1259; (2004) 52 ACSR 115 at [29].
[84] See Buckby v Wharton [2012] QSC 416 at [80], referring to Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116 (a case of contempt arising from a witness' refusal to answer questions put to him in the course of an investigation under the Securities Industry (South Australia) Code).
[85] Duhs v Pettet (No 3) [2010] QSC 55 at [8].
[86] And also, in so far as [10] of Mr Wikeley's reply submissions is concerned, ignores the Court of Appeal's decision in Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] QCA 201 at [36] and at [37]-[46].
[88] Cf the reply submissions on behalf of Mr Wikeley at [3], referring to R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383 and also [9].
[89] Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 at 343 [11]-[14].
[90] Affidavit of Mathews filed on 22 December 2025, at pp 1, 17-18 and 19 of the exhibits (letters from Dr Vahidy dated 19 April 2023, 26 March 2024 and 5 December 2025).
[91] The letters from Dr Vahidy of 26 March 2025 and 5 December 2025 both refer to "5 admissions".
[92] R v Guthrie [2002] QCA 509; (2002) 135 A Crim R 292 at [45]. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Halkalia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 522 at [162].
[93] R v RAL [2012] QCA 34 at [13] and [14], referring to R v Pope; Ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [1996] QCA 318 at p 8.
[94] Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc [2011] FCAFC 17; (2011) 276 ALR 596 at [123]- [127].
[95] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee [2023] NZHC 3260 at [105], [114], [120], [136] [156]; a finding which was upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2024] NZCA 609 at [211(d)]) and from which special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.
[96] R v McInerney (1986) 42 SASR 111 at 113 per King CJ; see also Coveney v Western Australia [2026] WASCA 20 at [69]- [72].
[97] See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Wealth & Risk Management Pty Ltd (No 3) [2025] FCA 722 at [92], referring to Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [25], Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Levi (No 3) [2008] FCA 1586; [2008] ATPR 42-257 at [101]- [110] and Ferguson v Dallow (No 5) [2021] FCA 698 at [20].
[98] Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215 at [276]- [278].
[99] R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77 at [114]; see also Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc [2011] FCAFC 17; (2011) 276 ALR 596 at [54] and [174].
[100] Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 115; R v Edwards [2025] QCA 123 at [131].
[101] See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Matthews [1999] FCA 803; (1999) 32 ACSR 404 at [32] and Sun v He (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 1298 at [109].
[102] Cf NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd v Dunne (No 2) [2025] QSC 143, in which such an order was made. This decision is not comparable to Mr Wikeley's case.
[103] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 1259; (2004) 52 ACSR 115 at [49].
[104] Infa-Secure Pty Ltd v Crocker (No 2) [2016] FCA 202; (2016) 338 ALR 586 at [42].
[105] Another case in which this was an aggravating factor is Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Dowling (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 1106.
[106] R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77 at [116].
[107] A useful summary of the cases appears in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 at [192]- [195]. See also Evenco Pty Ltd v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Joiners etc [1999] QSC 77 at [5].
[108] Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 110.
Kea Investments Ltd
Wikeley [2026] QSC 37
(1986) 161 CLR 98
(2002) 209 CLR 339
(2016) 338 ALR 586
(2017) 256 FCR 90
(1986) 42 SASR 111
(2022) 58 WAR 77
(2011) 276 ALR 596
(1985) 183 CLR 525
(1995) 183 CLR 525
(2003) 30 Fam LR 427
(1982) 31 SASR 116
(1981) 147 CLR 383
(2006) 149 FCR 494
(v) to obtain an order which compels the Applicant to answer any interrogatories or to provide any disclosure pending further order of the Court;
(e) Without limiting the above orders, the Respondent shall not cause Wikeley Inc or WFTL to sell, assign, gift, grant any security interest in or over, or otherwise in any way whatsoever transfer or encumber any interest he or Wikeley Inc may have, directly or indirectly, in any rights either of them may have under or in connection with the Coal Agreement and/or the Default Judgment;
(f) For the avoidance of doubt the following would not constitute a breach of the interim orders of this Court:
(i) WFTL filing required briefs in Kentucky in response to the appeal lodged by the Applicant in the Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals against the denial of its motion to set aside the Default Judgment and the denial of its motion to alter, amend or vacate.