2. The parties have leave to apply in respect to the quantum of any back payments of weekly payments of compensation.

3. Within 14 days the parties are to file a joint memorandum for proposed agreed orders in respect to the costs of the referral.

4. If the parties are unable to agree proposed orders for the purposes of (3) then within 21 days the parties are to file and serve submissions in respect to costs.

Workers compensation - Entitlement to compensation - Whether employer entitled to permanently terminate weekly payments - Whether payments should be reduced in any event

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020;

Evidence Act 2001

Graeme Peter Ilsley v Wattle Australia Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 427;

KC v Devonfield Enterprises Inc [2025] TASCAT 65;

White v Vero Insurance and Police Citizens & Youth Club [2007] TASSC 88;

SE v Crown Equipment Pty Ltd [2025] TASCAT 195;

Holmyard v The Marine Board of Hobart [1987] TASSC 22;

State of Tasmania v Parsons [2002] TASSC 59;

Bradshaw v Tasmanian Networks Pty Ltd [2019] TASSC 41;

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355;

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8;

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11;

Portelli v Tabriska Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] NSWCA 17;

Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93;

Martin v Medical Complaints Tribunal [2006] TASSC 73;

SD v McKay Investments Pty Ltd [2025] TASCAT 50

The decision has been anonymised for the purpose of publication.

1. The worker has filed a referral pursuant to s 42 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the Act) in connection with a claim arising from a low back injury sustained by him on 4 May 2023. The worker seeks a determination of his entitlement to weekly payments and payment of relevant expenses.
2. The worker has at no time since his injury been cleared for his usual duties. He undertook a graded return to work on restricted duties, eventually returning to his full usual hours for a period.
3. The worker then made another claim for a separate psychological injury, and ceased work. That claim was disputed. During and following that dispute the worker continued to provide partial incapacity certificates in respect to his physical injury, but has not attended work and has not been paid workers compensation since determination of the disputed psychological claim.
4. The employer's position is that it lawfully terminated the worker's weekly payments of workers compensation pursuant to s 86(1)(a) or (b) by reason of his return to work and earnings.
5. The worker contends that the only issue on the referral is whether there was a lawful termination pursuant to s 86(1)(b).
6. The employer contends that the issues arising from the s 42 referral include: whether the worker has an incapacity for work, whether the incapacity is total or partial, the cause of the incapacity, the rate of compensation which the worker is entitled to and the periods during which payment of workers compensation should be made.
7. For the reasons set out in KC v Devonfield Enterprises Inc [2025] TASCAT 65 I am satisfied that the issues raised by both parties are matters arising on the referral.

1. The worker made a claim in respect to his injury on 15 May 2023. The claim was accepted.
2. The worker was certified as totally incapacitated for work until 14 September 2023. He was then certified as partially incapacitated, and returned to work eventually progressing to full pre-injury hours of 38 hours per week, or 76 hours per fortnight, but with restrictions.
3. Fortnightly pay slips show that the worker worked reduced hours in the pay periods up to 3 March 2024. He then took a period of long service leave until 12 May 2024. For the period 13 May 2024 to 23 June 2024 he worked full normal hours, although the last fortnight in that period included a public holiday. In the next pay period from 24 June 2024 to 7 July 2024 the worker worked 68 hours of ordinary time and took 8 hours of sick leave. In the following pay period from 8 July to 21 July 2024 he worked full normal hours. In the next pay period 22 July to 4 August 2024 he worked 64 hours of ordinary time and took 12 hours of personal leave which was noted as "time for mental health current work compensation in place, work related".
4. In cross-examination the worker accepted that he would have been able to continue the restricted duties during the various periods of leave, but for being on leave.
5. On 30 July 2024 there was an incident in the workplace, in which the worker used offensive language. A complaint was made and as a result the worker was called to a meeting on 31 July 2024. On 1 August 2024 the worker obtained a workers compensation medical certificate for total incapacity due to an alleged discrete psychological injury. On 13 August 2024 he submitted a new workers compensation claim for the psychological injury. The employer took the view that the claim for the psychological injury arose from the administrative process in response to the complaint. The worker contended that the cause was broader than that. The employer disputed liability for that injury by a notice to the worker dated 1 November 2024 and a referral to the Tribunal pursuant to s 81A of the Act on the same date. On 15 November 2024 the Tribunal made orders by consent pursuant to s 81A that the employer not pay compensation in respect to the psychological injury.
6. The worker ceased work on 1 August 2024 under the separate initial medical certificate in connection with his claim for the disputed psychological injury. He did not assert an ongoing right to compensation for the psychological condition after the orders made on 15 November 2024.
7. The worker has not returned to work since 1 August 2024, when he provided the initial certificate in respect to his psychological injury. Notwithstanding that for a period the worker had medical certificates for the psychological condition, he continued to be covered by separate certificates for his physical injury throughout that period, and subsequently. The has experienced fluctuating levels of capacity, but they constitute a single period of incapacity: White v Vero Insurance and Police Citizens & Youth Club [2007] TASSC 88 at [18].
8. The worker has not received weekly payments of workers compensation for any reason since the orders made by the Tribunal on 15 November 2024.
9. On 22 October 2024, after making the claim for the psychological injury but before the orders were made by the Tribunal, the worker was informed by his case manager that his entitlement to weekly payments of workers compensation for the physical injury had ended because he had returned to work.
10. Until November 2024 the worker's workers compensation medical certificates were generally provided by his general practitioner, Dr Farideh Bagheri. Thereafter he received certificates from Dr Carlin White, a registrar in occupational and environmental medicine. The worker's medical records include a letter from his surgeon, Dr Arvind Dubey, to Dr Bagheri dated 17 September 2024 requesting referral of the worker to "an occupational physician for his future employment prospects and restrictions".
11. Dr Bagheri's penultimate certificate covered the period from 22 August 2024 to 22 October 2024. It described the worker's symptoms as low back pain, and certified the worker as fit for full time work, but on suitable duties. The certificate identified reduced capacity in respect to pull/push with a lifting limit of 12kg, and the certificate provides that rest breaks were required.
12. Dr Bagheri's last certificate covered the period from 22 October 2024 (incorrectly noted in the certificate as 2014) until 20 December 2024. He describes the worker's symptoms as low back pain and limitation on physical activities, and certified the worker's capacity as having reduced to 4 hours per day 5 days per week, with restrictions in respect to pull/push, sit, bend/squat/twist, a lifting limit of 12kg and rest breaks required every 2 hours. In the certificate Dr Bagheri notes that he had referred the worker to Dr White. Subsequent certificates were provided by Dr White.
13. The worker's next certificate was by Dr White. Dr White examined the worker on 14 November 2024. Although the worker's last certificate from Dr Bagheri would run until 20 December 2024, on 20 November 2024 Dr White provided him with a certificate for the period from 20 November 2024 to 13 December 2024. In the certificate Dr White stated a diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome secondary to lumbar disc protrusion and described the worker's symptoms as low back pain, radicular symptoms, reduced range of movement, low mood, and irritability. Dr White noted that the worker had undergone surgery for a disc issue on 15 June 2024. He certified the worker as fit for suitable duties. He did not certify as to a reduction in hours, but stated that the worker is "not fit for work in current environment". Dr White extended the physical restrictions of the worker. The certificate identified reduced capacity in respect to lifting weight, pull/push, bend/squat/twist and climb and provided a 5kg lifting limit with no lifting above head height, no two person lifts, no climbing, avoidance of repetitive lifting, twisting or bending, regular rest breaks, in an office setting, and no sitting for longer than 45 minutes.
14. In the certificate Dr White noted that the worker would not regain sufficient function to return to his previous role, that redeployment is the appropriate goal, and noted that the current work environment "is propagating pain symptoms". That opinion is repeated in subsequent certificates. From 21 February 2024 Dr White added to his certificates an opinion that it is not safe or appropriate for the worker "to return to that environment", which I infer is a reference to the circumstances of the worker's usual work with the employer in the context of the history of the worker's compensation claims.
15. Dr White's subsequent certificates continued in essentially the same terms, although from a certificate provided on 21 February 2025 he added to the list of restrictions that the worker is not fit to undertake CPR training or CPR.
16. The only evidence from medical practitioners directly addressing capacity is the medical certificates. Neither party called any medical witness. None of the documentary material indicates that the worker is, or at any relevant time has been, fit for his pre-injury duties.
17. The employer called evidence from Mr DJ Stubbs, who is the human resource manager with the employer. Mr Stubb's evidence was that he could not think of a reason why the worker would not have continued to work if not for the incident on 30 July 2024. That is, of course, not evidence of the worker's capacity for work.
18. Mr Stubbs described the worker's role as a team leader in disability support services. He said that the role is to provide direct supervision to staff who work with people with disabilities across accommodation, community based and home support services, and to have a hands on role. He said that the worker's role was in assisting, mentoring and supervising staff, not completing work for them. The role includes supporting participants with gardening and maintaining the exterior appearance of residences. Mr Stubbs said that after his injury the worker "got a lot of autonomy in his work and was able to dictate the duties he performed". Mr Stubbs' description of the work undertaken by the worker emphasised the supervisory nature of his duties over the physical.
19. Mr Stubbs said that the worker commenced a graduated return to work in around August 2023. The worker did not make any complaints to him in respect to low back pain and to the best of his knowledge the worker made no complaints to the worker's supervisor.
20. Mr Stubbs said that the worker had been working until the incident on 30 July 2024, which involved an allegation by a colleague of swearing by the worker. He said that the worker knew that the employer would be obliged to look into the circumstances of that incident and that the worker was afraid of losing his job. The inference raised by Mr Stubbs was that the worker has not returned to work because he is concerned that an investigation and disciplinary process may result in the termination of his employment. The worker confirmed in cross-examination that he understood the seriousness of his conduct and the risk that he might lose his job as a result. It was not clear why the employer has not pursued the disciplinary process.
21. Mr Stubbs contended that the worker and his doctors had raised barriers to his return to work. He gave as an example Dr White's certification that the worker could not undertake CPR training. Mr Stubbs said that on 20 February 2025 an email was sent to the worker advising that a return to work could be accommodated in accordance with a return to work plan prepared for the period 13 February 2025 to 21 February 2025 and that a reinduction session had been scheduled for 24 February 2025. Mr Stubbs said that the worker did not respond to the email and that he was not sure why the worker was refusing to return to work. The worker did not respond to the email or attend the reinduction. The worker says that he did not receive the email, saying that his Bigpond email account, to which the email had been addressed, had ceased. Mr Stubbs did not produce the email to the worker, but produced another email of 20 February 2025 addressed to several people involved in the worker's claim, that set out the contents of the email to the worker on the same date. The email noted that outstanding and expired training would be addressed at the reinduction session, including CPR, and that the worker would be booked into the next CPR course. The worker saw Dr White on the following day, 21 February 2025, and was given a medical certificate on that day in which the restriction "pt not fit to undertake CPR training or CPR" was introduced for the first time. The return to work plan did not mention CPR. The inference is that the worker was being untruthful when he denied receiving the email, and that he must have advised Dr White of the proposed CPR training as a result of receiving the email, although I cannot discount the possibility that Dr White became aware of the proposed CPR training in some other communication relating to the worker's rehabilitation. That the worker may have been untruthful in respect to that evidence does not mean that his evidence should be rejected in respect to other matters, but I have approached the assessment of the weight of his evidence with care: SD v McKay Investments Pty Ltd [2025] TASCAT 50 [22].
22. The worker gave evidence that his duties involved a combination of hands-on gardening, crew management and supporting people with disabilities. He would also do hands-one physical work with clients, such as using industrial timber machines, heavy lifting, hedge trimming and other landscaping work. He said that since approximately 2018 his work was predominantly garden work and training with clients that required a lot of heavy lifting, climbing of ladders and using various heavy garden equipment such as brush cutters, lawn mowers and chainsaws. In the leadup to the injury on 4 May 2023 he said that he was engaged in several weeks of physically demanding work. It was the usual sort of garden work that he would do but it was particularly strenuous, with a lot of hedge trimming and cutting trees that required him to work frequently at heights of 2m to 2.5m on ladders and that he was the only staff member on site who could do work at height. He was also doing a lot of replanting work which required digging of holes and removing of root systems using long handled shovels and crowbars.
23. The worker said that following the injury he did not return to work for several months. On 15 June 2023 he underwent surgery. Following that he gradually returned to work via a graded return to duties. He said that despite returning to work he continued to experience low back pain which he would score as an average of approximately 5 out of 10, increasing to 8 to 9 out of 10 when engaged in physical activity. He said that he never had a day when he was not in discomfort or on pain relief, but that he persevered at work. He said that prior to making the psychological injury claim the workplace did not have any coherent plan for managing his return to work. The worker's evidence as to the continuation of his back pain was not contradicted. Mr Stubb's evidence that the worker had not complained to him or the worker's supervisor is at best neutral evidence in respect to the worker's ongoing back pain, and the worker was presenting medical certificates stating that he had low back pain and reduced capacity.
24. The worker said that he experienced chronic low back pain triggered by physical exertion, prolonged standing and bending and that Dr White had advised him not to return to his preinjury duties. He said that he was willing to go back to work with the employer but that he was following medical advice from Dr White.
25. The employer's evidence included a copy of a questionnaire completed by Dr White on 14 May 2025 in response to an email from a rehabilitation consultant retained by the employer's insurer. The email stated that the worker had participated in a vocational assessment. In response to a question as to whether the worker could undertake work as a disability services officer or a motor vehicle or caravan salesperson, with the relevant duties detailed, Dr White considered that it was possible that the worker could engage in that type of work subject to the restrictions in his certificates. He noted that the hours of work would depend on the nature of the duties, especially the duration of driving, and recommended commencing at 12 hours per week. Dr White considered that a third vocational option of nursery person/gardener was not appropriate for the worker due to his physical limitations.
26. The worker said that on 22 October 2024 he had a telephone conversation with his case manager during which he was told that his weekly payments of compensation had ended because he had returned to meaningful work. He advised the case manager that he was not able to undertake heavy work. The worker said that on 1 November 2024 he received an email from his case manager stating that he no longer had any entitlement to weekly payments and that his entitlement had ceased on 26 May 2024. The email refers to the incident giving rise to the psychological injury claim and goes on to say:

It is very important that you understand again that on your back claim there is no entitlement to ongoing weekly compensation payments and that you are only entitled to medical accounts only [sic] on this claim, your medicals for your back claim will cease 52 weeks after the date your weeklies ceased and this means that from 26th May 2025 there is no ongoing entitlement to medical treatment for your back.

27. There was no evidence as to when the employer made the decision to terminate the worker's payments pursuant to s 86(1), or if any express decision was in fact made, but the clear inference is that by 22 October 2024 the employer considered that the worker's entitlement to weekly payments had ceased on 26 May 2024 notwithstanding his ongoing certification of partial incapacity.
28. By that date the worker had for the previous five pay periods been in receipt of payments equal to his workers compensation weekly rate. During the first four of those periods he was in receipt of long service leave and it was only the immediately preceding pay period from 13 to 26 May 2024 in which the worker both worked full hours and received a payment equal to his workers compensation weekly rate.

1. I can deal with the worker's contentions in respect to s 86(1)(b) fairly briefly. The employer contends that either of s 86(1)(a) and (b) might apply to justify the termination of weekly payments.
2. Section 86(1) provides a power to an employer to terminate or reduce weekly payments without an order from the Tribunal:

86. Cases in which employer may terminate or reduce payments > > (1) Except in pursuance of a determination made by the Tribunal under section 88 (2) , an employer may, subject to this section, terminate or reduce a weekly payment made to a worker only where - > > (a) the payment is in respect of total incapacity and the worker has returned to work; > > (b) the worker is in receipt of the weekly payment in respect of partial incapacity and is receiving weekly earnings in excess of the amount upon which the amount of such weekly payment was determined; > > (c) a medical practitioner who has examined the worker has certified that, in his opinion, the worker has wholly recovered or substantially recovered, from the effects of the injury in respect of which the payment is being made or that the worker's incapacity is no longer due, wholly or substantially, to that injury; or > > (d) . . . . . . . . > > (e) a worker's entitlement to weekly payments has expired as provided by section 69B(2E) .

3. In the recent decision of SE v Crown Equipment Pty Ltd [2025] TASCAT 195 I determined that the right to terminate or reduce payments under s 86(1)(b) relates to the specific periods of earnings and does not permit an employer to terminate weekly payments permanently regardless of subsequent fluctuations of capacity occurring within a single period of incapacity. The right to weekly payments will continue beyond the particular circumstances giving rise to the termination or reduction for the relevant period.
4. The employer has invoked s 86(1)(a) and (b), but the circumstances of this case would fall within s 86(1)(b) as the worker was in receipt of make-up pay for partial incapacity at the relevant time. However, the analysis of s 86(1)(b) in SE v Crown Equipment Pty Ltd, other than the particular grammar of the paragraph, would also apply to a termination or reduction under s 86(1)(a). Where a worker returns to work, but subsequently suffers reduced capacity within the same overall period of incapacity for the same injury, the worker will be entitled to receive weekly payments for the subsequent incapacity.
5. I will not duplicate the reasoning in SE v Crown Equipment Pty Ltd in these reasons for determination, but given the recency of the decision it has not yet been published on AustLII or BarNet Jade and I have therefore attached a copy as an annexure. I adopt and rely on the analysis in paragraphs [10]-[35] of that decision.
6. Ignoring any other considerations, the worker would be entitled to a resumption of weekly payments from his certification of reduced capacity from 22 October 2024.

1. However, the employer has raised other considerations that go to the right of the worker to receive weekly payments and the quantum of the payments. For the reasons explained in KC v Devonfield Enterprises Inc, I am satisfied that the matter referred to the Tribunal pursuant to the worker's s 42 referral is broad enough to raise related issues of capacity and rate.
2. Section 49(2)(b) of the Act provides that in proceedings before the Tribunal "the onus of proving that a worker is no longer entitled to the payment of compensation lies on the employer".
3. The employer contends that the worker does not have incapacity for work or that any capacity does not have an economic consequence. In the alternative the employer contends that the worker has only partial incapacity which does not amount to a physical disability. Further in the alternative, the employer contends that the cause of any incapacity is the disputed psychological injury. The employer also contends that the worker's weekly payments ought be reduced by $1,186.70 to reflect his retained earning capacity. The employer also contends that any periods of incapacity cannot be identified because there is no evidence of cessation of the incapacity stemming from the psychological injury.
4. The last issue can be disposed of fairly simply. The employer contends that on the balance of probabilities the worker's incapacity is not because of the physical injury but because of the psychological injury. The employer did not submit any medical evidence as to any persisting incapacity arising from the psychological injury.
5. The psychological condition was a supervening condition. A worker's right to compensation for incapacity arising from a work injury is neither reduced nor increased by incapacity caused by a supervening injury: Holmyard v The Marine Board of Hobart [1987] TASSC 22 at [17]. Even if the psychological condition has incapacitating effects, and I make no finding that it does, those effects may be ignored in considering incapacity arising from the physical injury.
6. More broadly, the employer is critical of the conclusions expressed in the medical certificates of Dr Bagheri and Dr White, but did not provide any medical evidence to contradict those conclusions. The employer criticised the worker's credibility and pointed to inconsistencies in his evidence.
7. The employer correctly observed that the question of whether incapacity results from an injury is a question of fact: Graeme Peter Ilsley v Wattle Australia Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 427. The purpose of a medical certificate is to certify as to incapacity not as to causation: State of Tasmania v Parsons [2002] TASSC 59 at [78], and see also the first instance decision in Bradshaw v Tasmanian Networks Pty Ltd [2019] TASSC 41 at [35]. Although the employer contends that the worker's incapacity results from the psychological injury, it was not asserted that the injury in respect of which the certificates for physical incapacity were provided was not the compensable physical injury sustained by the worker on 5 May 2023. Given my conclusions in respect to s 86(1)(a) and (b), and the application of s 49(2)(b), the onus rests with the employer to establish that the worker is not entitled to payments. Normally a contention that the worker is not entitled to weekly payments would be pursued by an employer by way of a certificate pursuant to s 86(1)(c) or a referral to the Tribunal pursuant to s 88. The employer has attacked the evidence of the worker and the medical certificates, but has produced no evidence itself that directly contradicts the existence of reduced capacity evidenced by the medical certificates. Dr White's certificates identify a more nuanced assessment of capacity than simply an ability to undertake certain work for unrestricted hours.
8. The employer objected to the admission of medical certificates by Dr Bagheri and Dr White insofar as they contained expressions of opinion. The test for admissibility is relevance, subject to procedural fairness: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355 [90]. Adopting the formulation in s 56 of the Evidence Act 2001, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. The medical certificates meet that test. I am not bound by the rules of evidence, although they may be applied and may be used as a guide to fairness: see s 79 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, Martin v Medical Complaints Tribunal [2006] TASSC 73 at [14] and Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93 at [93]- [97], [115]-[116] and [121]. If the rules of evidence were applied the certificates would be likely be admissible and exceptions to the hearsay rule under s 48 and s 69 of the Evidence Act. Subject to any issues of farness I am satisfied that the certificates are proof of their contents.
9. As to fairness, the employer points to the fact that Dr Bagheri and Dr White were not called as witnesses by the worker. The employer contends that I should draw a Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8 inference that their evidence would not have assisted the worker's case. It should be noted that if Dr Bagheri and Dr White were called as witnesses in respect to the worker's capacity, they would provide evidence as experts and be subject to the Tribunal's Expert Witness Code of Conduct, which would require them to assist the Tribunal and not to act as partisan advocates for the worker. The employer had notice that the doctors would not be called, as the evidence of experts must be proofed and exchanged. The failure to call the doctors reflected the worker's case, which focussed on the operation of s 86(1). It was the employer's case that raised capacity and the employer has the onus. In that context, it would have been open for the employer to call Dr Bagheri and Dr White. Putting that to one side, the rule in Jones v Dunkel is that the failure to call a witness that the worker might be expected to call would permit an inference to be drawn that the evidence would not have helped the worker's case, or make more readily acceptable the drawing of an inference otherwise available and relevantly unfavourable to the worker, but does not alone entitle a positive inference unfavourable to the worker to be drawn: Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Limited [2011] HCA 11 at [63]- [64] and Portelli v Tabriska Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] NSWCA 17 at [55]. The rule in Jones v Dunkel is a rule of evidence and the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. In this circumstance the certificates speak for themselves. Failure to call the certifying doctors does not lead me to draw an inference that the certified incapacity is not correct or does not result from the work injury.
10. The worker has an ongoing entitlement to weekly payments in circumstances where he produces certificates to evidence incapacity and is not earning equal to or more than his weekly rate of workers compensation: s 69(1) and s 86(1). The evidence that the worker does not have an ongoing incapacity reflecting his medical certification is at best imprecise and circumstantial. The employer has produced no direct or expert evidence that the worker is not so incapacitated, or that he is in receipt of earnings. The employer has not sought a review of the worker's weekly payments pursuant to s 88 or sought to terminate them pursuant to s 86(1)(c). The employer complains that the worker and his doctors have raised barriers to his return to work. Insofar as those barriers might exist and be unreasonable the employer has not pursued any dispute under the procedures available in respect to injury management in s143P and s 143Q. The employer contends that the worker is in fact not returning to work because he is concerned that his employment may be terminated for misconduct. There is no restriction on the employer pursuing the disciplinary process without a return to work, and as the alleged misconduct is unrelated to the occurrence of the worker's injury it would not affect the worker's ongoing entitlement to compensation in any event.
11. The issues identified by the employer might with sufficient evidence be capable of establishing that the worker's weekly payment should be reduced, perhaps to nil, but the evidence does not persuade me to make such a finding in the face of the medical certificates and the worker's evidence.

1. The matters referred to the Tribunal by the worker are the "determination of his entitlement to weekly payments and to expenses payable pursuant to Division 2 of Part VI of the Act" and payment of costs of and incidental to the referral.
2. The employer was not entitled to permanently terminate the worker's weekly payments. Payments should be reinstated from the date that they were terminated. There will be periods in which the worker's entitlement will be affected by his earnings. I will leave it to the parties to determine the quantum of any backpay owing to the worker, but will provide leave to apply in the event that the sum cannot be agreed.
3. I expect that employer ceased paying the worker's medical and other expenses, payable under Div 2 of Pt VI of the Act, on 26 May 2025, being the anniversary of the termination of weekly payments, pursuant to s 75(2). The reinstatement of the obligation to make such payments will flow from the order that I will make in respect to weekly payments without need for an additional order.
4. I will provide the parties with the opportunity to reach agreement on orders for costs or to make submissions if agreement cannot be reached.
5. Accordingly I make the following orders and directions:
   1. The employer is to reinstate weekly payments of workers compensation to the worker from 26 May 2024 to be paid in accordance with the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988.
   2. The parties have leave to apply in respect to the quantum of any back payments of weekly payments of compensation.
   3. Within 14 days the parties are to file a joint memorandum for proposed agreed orders in respect to the costs of the referral.
   4. If the parties are unable to agree proposed orders for the purposes of (3) then within 21 days the parties are to file and serve submissions in respect to costs.