Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 457

(a) Certificate 3 in Commercial Cookery (end date 26 May 2019);

(b) Certificate 4 in Commercial Cookery (end date 22 December 2019); and

(c) Diploma of Hospitality Management (end date 7 June 2020).

1. On 2 July 2018, a delegate refused to grant the appellant a visa on the basis the delegate was not satisfied the appellant met the genuine temporary entrant criterion: cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
2. On 18 July 2018, the appellant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision. The Tribunal requested further information from the appellant on 8 January 2021 and provided the appellant with Ministerial Direction 69, which was the relevant Ministerial Direction at the time.
3. The appellant provided further information to the Tribunal on 17 January 2021 and again on 11 February 2021. The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 18 February 2021. Prior to the Tribunal hearing, the appellant enrolled in Certificates 3 and 4 in Commercial Cookery and a Diploma in Hospital Management with the last of the courses finishing on 10 April 2023.
4. Following the hearing on 18 February 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision by delivering an oral decision with written reasons being delivered on 6 April 2021. It is from that decision that the appellant applied for judicial review to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2).
5. On 13 September 2024, the FCFCoA dismissed the application: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 855 [J].

1. The appellant relied on a single ground of review before the primary judge which was that the Tribunal did not consider the compelling and compassionate grounds of her case.
2. The appellant had appeared before the Tribunal at the hearing on 18 February 2021 by telephone. It was the period in which the COVID-19 pandemic occurred.
3. The primary judge analysed the Tribunal's reasons carefully. Since the appellant was unrepresented, the primary judge endeavoured to interpret the appellant's single ground of review as broadly as possible: J [45], referring to MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [59]- [77] and the cases cited therein (Mortimer J, as her Honour then was).
4. The primary judge observed that the Tribunal found that there was a discrepancy in the appellant's evidence as to her intentions about opening a restaurant in India and noted that the Tribunal considered the appellant was vague in providing information about her future career plans: J [26].
5. The primary judge noted that the issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant met the mandatory criteria for the grant of a visa set out in cl 500.212 of the Regulations and that the Tribunal had to consider the matters in Ministerial Direction 69, which included the appellant's circumstances: J [47].
6. The primary judge identified the appellant's personal circumstances, noting that the death of her father in 2015 and the illness of her husband (who was in Australia) in 2016 were the reasons advanced by the appellant as to why she had not enrolled in any study between July 2018 and January 2021.
7. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had dealt with these matters in its reasons and had regard to the appellant's circumstances: J [49].
8. In particular, the primary judge found that the Tribunal engaged with the appellant on her claim that the death of her father in 2015 and her husband's illness in 2016 had impacted upon her ability to study, but the Tribunal had rejected the appellant's evidence as providing an explanation for why she had not enrolled in any study for a two and a half year period between 2018 and 2021: J [50].
9. The primary judge noted that although the Tribunal's reasons could have been more fulsome, the reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence as an explanation for her not studying were clear, rational and open on the evidence.
10. Having reached that conclusion, the primary judge dismissed the appellant's application.

1. The appellant was self-represented on the appeal.
2. The appellant appeals on two grounds which may be summarised as follows:

(1) The primary judge overlooked the fact of the appellant's life circumstances in deciding the case.

(2) The Tribunal considered the appellant's husband's history which led them to believe that she was not a genuine temporary entrant and that her primary objective in Australia is to prolong her stay.

1. The first ground is, in effect, a repetition of the ground of review before the primary judge.
2. Nothing has been put before the Court which demonstrates that the primary judge erred in his consideration of the Tribunal's reasons and erred by not finding jurisdictional error.
3. Ground one fails.

1. Ground two challenges the Tribunal's finding that the appellant was not a genuine applicant for entry and stay on a student visa: cl 500-212.
2. That finding was based, to a large degree, on the material before the Tribunal which the primary judge considered before finding that the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's evidence as to why she had not studied for two and half years was clear, rational and open on the evidence.
3. Whilst the appellant did not raise the issue of procedural fairness, the primary judge accepted the Minister's submission that the Tribunal had complied with its procedural fairness obligations by identifying a number of steps taken by the Tribunal, including requesting the provision of further information: J [52]-[53].
4. Since the appellant was not represented, the primary judge considered the Tribunal's decision as a whole and determined that there was no discernible jurisdictional error such that the application for judicial review was dismissed.
5. The primary judge was correct to do so and the appellant has not demonstrated any error on the part of the primary judge such that ground two also fails.

1. It is for these reasons that the appeal is dismissed.
2. The Minister seeks costs in a lump sum of $5,000. That amount is less than the scale costs and is reasonable in all the circumstances and there will be an order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Sullivan.