Kaur v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] FedCFamC2G 1931

1. CBA submits that Ms Kaur was a national system employee as defined in s 13 of the FW Act and CBA a national system employer as defined in s 14 of the FW Act. Accordingly, CBA submits that Ms Kaur was covered by Part 3-1 of the FW Act at the time of her termination and therefore entitled to make a general protections claim under Part 3-1 of the FW Act. Accordingly, CBA submits that pursuant to s 723, Ms Kaur is precluded from making an unlawful termination application.
2. In support of this proposition CBA relies on Pitrau v Barrick Mining Services Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 186 (Pitrau) where at [43] FM Lucev (as he then was) said:

Section 723 of the FW Act imposes a personal prohibition on a person making an unlawful termination application in relation to conduct if the person is entitled to make a general protections court application.

1. CBA also relies upon the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2009 (Cth) in relation to s 723, which provides as follows:

This clause prevents a person from making an unlawful termination application under Division 2 of Part 6-4 if they are able to make an application under the general protection provisions in Part 3-1 in relation to the same termination of employment. This is because the general protections and unlawful termination provisions cover the same grounds of when a termination is for a prohibited reason. The unlawful termination provisions are only intended to be an extension of these protections to person who are not covered by the general protections in relation to the termination. The additional coverage in unlawful termination arises because these provisions rely on the external affairs power, as they give effect, or further effect, to the ILO Convention (No. 158) concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer (Geneva, 22 June 1982).

1. Ms Kaur made no relevant submissions as to s 723 of the FW Act, its operation or its effect.
2. I accept that Ms Kaur was a national system employee and that CBA was a national system employer and accordingly, Ms Kaur was entitled to make a general protections application to the FWC under s 365 of the FW Act. It is also beyond doubt that the phrase "must not make" as used in s 723 is to be interpreted as creating a negative absolute obligation or requirement: Pitrau at [23], [35]; Hill v Compass Ten Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 761 at [30] - [31].
3. In Maher v Mulgowie Fresh Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 439; (2010) 197 IR 64 at [14] - [15] Justice Collier said the following in relation to the interaction between Part 3-1 and Part 6-4 of the Act:

In my view there is no doubt that Mr Maher should have relied on Pt 3-1 of the Act in respect of his claim against Mulgowie. Part 3-1 of the Act sets out a range of workplace protections in respect of national systems employers and employees contemplated by the Act, and is a key part of the Act in respect of the prevention of discrimination and other unfair treatment of such employees (cf para 1333 and para 1334 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth)). In contrast, it is clear from s 769 that the provisions of Pt 6-4 of the Act, which include s 772 and s 773, give effect, or further effect, to certain international agreements relating to discrimination and termination of employment. The distinction between the application of Pt 3-1 and Pt 6-4 is explained by para 1342 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) as follows:

Part 3-1 does not rely on the external affairs power in the Constitution in the same way as the existing unlawful termination protections (which apply to all employees in Australia). To maintain existing protections, Division 2 of Part 6-4 provides for unlawful termination protections for employees who do not have a remedy under this Part. This ensures that every employee in Australia has a remedy for unlawful termination.

Accordingly, an individual employee must look to s 723 of the Act to identify the relevant Part of the Act which provides that employee with protection. National systems employees, such as Mr Maher, are required to commence proceedings under Pt 3-1.

Section 723 is clear and unambiguous on its terms. Mr Maher, being a national systems employee entitled to the benefit of the general protection provisions in Pt 3-1, was required to commence his application pursuant to that Part. He was not permitted to commence an action pursuant to s 772.

1. Accordingly, as submitted by CBA, pursuant to s 723 of the FW Act, Ms Kaur is precluded from making an unlawful termination application and as such the Application is bound to fail.
2. It therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.
3. I address the question of whether the Application is statutorily barred below.

1. Although Ms Kaur did not submit that the Application was intended to be anything other than an unlawful termination application pursuant to s 772 of the FW Act, in the Statement of Claim she relies upon certain provisions of Part 3-1 of the FW Act. Accordingly, for completeness, I address whether Ms Kaur is able to now make a general protections claim involving dismissal pursuant to Part 3-1 of the FW Act and whether the Court would have jurisdiction to determine such an application if the Application was considered to be a general protection application involving dismissal under Part 3-1.
2. Section 725 of the FW Act is included in Division 3 of Part 6-1 of the FW Act headed "Preventing Multiple Actions" and provides:

A person who has been dismissed must not make an application or complaint of a kind referred to in any one of sections 726 to 732 in relation to the dismissal if any other of those sections applies.

1. Section 729 deals with unfair dismissal applications (as made by Ms Kaur) and provides:

Unfair dismissal applications

(1) This section applies if:

(a) an unfair dismissal application has been made by the person in relation to the dismissal; and

(i) been withdrawn by the person who made the application; or

(ii) failed for want of jurisdiction; or

(iii) failed because the FWC was satisfied that the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy.

(2) An unfair dismissal application is an application under subsection 394(1) for a remedy for unfair dismissal.

1. I have earlier addressed the mandatory nature of the phrase "must not make" and I refer to and repeat those comments here.
2. As to the phrase "in relation to" as used in s 725, that phrase has been the subject of judicial consideration in a number of different contexts. In Woodside Energy Ltd (ABN 63 005 482 986) v Commissioner for Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia [2006] FCA 1303 at [57] French J said:

The words 'in relation to' and similar terms like 'in respect of' or 'in connection with' or just 'in' have been considered in many cases and many contexts. They denote a necessary connection between two subject matters which may be activities, events, persons or things. The nature of the closeness or remoteness of connection depends on the context... The words 'in relation to' have been described as a 'prepositional phrase' which is 'indefinite' and which, 'subject to any contrary indication derived from its context or drafting history... requires no more than a relationship whether direct or indirect between two subject matter'- O'Grady v North Queensland Company Limited [1990] HCA 16; (1990) 169 CLR 356 at 376 (McHugh J)...

1. There can be little doubt that the Application has a direct relationship to the dismissal and is therefore "in relation to the dismissal" for the purpose of s 725 of the FW Act.
2. In Piefke v Workpac Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 1166 (Piefke), Lucev J considered the above provisions and at [14] - [15] said as follows:

The requirements of s 725 of the FW Act can be summarised as follows:

(a) a former employee of an employer making an application or complaint must have been dismissed;

(b) that dismissed former employee must have made an application or complaint of a kind referred to in ss 726-732 of the FW Act that has not been withdrawn or failed for want of jurisdiction; and

(c) the dismissed person "must not make" another application or complaint of a kind referred to in ss 726-732 of the Fair Work Act "in relation to the dismissal" unless the initial application has been withdrawn or failed for want of jurisdiction.

(a) the findings of the Federal Court in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 2146; (2019) 292 IR 183 at [22] per Collier J, where it was held that s 725 of the FW Act "specifically prevents a person who has been dismissed from bringing a second application 'in relation to' their dismissal"; and

(b) the relevant statutory purpose prescribed by the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum:

This Part deals with cases where there may be more than one remedy available for the same conduct or circumstances. It ensures that people have access to an appropriate remedy but also ensures that they are not entitled to more than one remedy in such cases: at [406].

...

This Subdivision is intended to prevent a person 'double dipping' when they have multiple potential remedies relating to a dismissal from employment by seeking to limit a person to a single remedy...: at [408].

1. I respectfully adopt those comments.
2. Accordingly, having filed the FWC Application and that application not having been withdrawn or failed for want of jurisdiction, pursuant to s 725 and 729 of the FW Act, Ms Kaur is prohibited from making a general protections application in the FWC in respect of the termination of her employment.
3. Further, s 370 of the FW Act provides:

Taking a dismissal to court

A person who is entitled to apply under section 365 for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute unless:

(a) both of the following apply:

(i) the FWC has issued a certificate under paragraph 368(3)(a) in relation to the dispute;

(ii) the general protections court application is made within 14 days after the day the certificate is issued, or within such period as the court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days; or

(b) the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction.

1. Rule 30.04 of the 2021 Rules provided as follows:

An application for an order in relation to an allegation that an employee was dismissed in contravention of a general protection mentioned in Part 3 - 1 of the Fair Work Act must:

(a) be in accordance with the approved form; and

(b) be accompanied by:

(i) a claim in accordance with the approved form; and

(ii) unless the application includes an application for an interim injunction, a certificate issued by the Fair Work Commission under the Fair Work Act that provides that the Fair Work Commission is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful.

1. Rule 31.05 of the Rules, as now in force, although not expressed in exactly the same terms, is to the same effect as previous r 30.04 of the 2021 Rules.
2. It is not disputed that Ms Kaur has not been issued with a certificate under s 370(a)(i).
3. In Gao v Tin (Staffing Services) Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 453 (Gao) Steward J considered the requirement for a certificate under s 370(a)(i). Steward J held that the terms of s 370(a)(i) are clear. His Honour held that where a certificate has not been issued under s 370(a)(i) of the FW Act there is a jurisdictional bar to the Court determining whether an applicant has been dismissed in contravention of Part 3-1 of the FW Act. In the words of his Honour "it follows that pursuant to s 370(a)(i) of the FW Act, an essential condition of the Court's jurisdiction has not been satisfied.": Gao at [21].
4. His Honour further held at [21] that the absence of the certificate cannot be overcome by an applicant's fervent conviction that they have been treated poorly by the employer. Further, at [22] his Honour observed that the Court has no discretion to waive the requirement of the certificate under s 370(a)(i).
5. Accordingly, I find that Ms Kaur is prohibited from now making a general protections claim involving dismissal and further, that the Court does not, in any event, have jurisdiction to determine such an application.

Taking a dispute to court

A person who is entitled to apply under section 773 for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make an unlawful termination court application in relation to the dispute unless:

(a) both of the following apply:

(i) the FWC has issued a certificate under paragraph 776(3)(a) in relation to the dispute;

(ii) the unlawful termination court application is made within 14 days after the day the certificate is issued, or within such period as the court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days; or

(b) the unlawful termination court application includes an application for an interim injunction.

1. As is the case in s 725, the use of the phrase "must not make" in s 778 of the FW Act, imposes a personal prohibition on a person making an unlawful termination application to this Court, where the person does not have a Certificate.
2. Rule 30.05 of the Rules provided as follows:

Application in relation to alleged unlawful termination of employment

An application for an order in relation to an alleged unlawful termination of an employee's employment must:

(a) be in accordance with the approved form;

(b) be accompanied by:

(i) a claim in accordance with the approved form; and

(ii) unless the application includes an application for an interim injunction, a certificate issued by the Fair Work Commission under the Fair Work Act that provides that the Fair Work Commission is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful.

1. Rule 31.04 of the Rules, although not expressed in exactly the same terms, is to the same effect as previous r 30.05 of the 2021 Rules.
2. CBA submits that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Ms Kaur has not satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for bringing an action in this Court. Specifically, the necessary prerequisite that the FWC has issued a Certificate in relation to the Application.
3. Ms Kaur made no relevant submissions as to s 778 of the FW Act, its operation or effect.
4. For the reasons that follow, I accept the submissions of CBA as to s 778.
5. Firstly, for the reasons set out above, Ms Kaur was not entitled to make an application to the FWC under s 773 of the FW Act and, indeed, there is no evidence before the Court that Ms Kaur has at any time made an application to the FWC under s 773 of the FW Act. Further, the "complaint" relied upon by Ms Kaur in her email to the FWC stated to have been sent on 6 January 2025 is not an application under s 773 of the FW Act and, additionally, Ms Kaur concedes in her material that no action arose from this email communication.
6. Secondly, and most significantly, even if Ms Kaur was entitled to make an unlawful termination application to the FWC (which she was not), it is undisputed that Ms Kaur has not been issued with a Certificate under s 776(3)(a). The terms of s 778(a)(i) are clear and unambiguous and are expressed in mandatory language. The language of s 778(a)(i) is in near identical terms to that of s 370(a)(i). Accordingly, although Gao considered s 370(a)(i) of the FW Act in relation to a certificate issued under s 368(3)(a) of the FW Act, I consider the analysis of Steward J to be equally applicable in relation to s 778(a)(i) and a certificate issued under 776(3)(a) of the FW Act. There is therefore a jurisdictional bar to the Court determining whether Ms Kaur has been unlawfully terminated under Part 6-4 of the FW Act, as pursuant to s 778(a)(i) of the FW Act an essential condition of the Court's jurisdiction has not been satisfied.
7. Further, in Piefke, Lucev J considered s 778 of the FW Act and the requirement that a certificate be issued under s 776(3)(a) by the FWC and also concluded that an absence of a certificate under s 776(3)(a) resulted in the Court not having jurisdiction to hear an unlawful termination application, saying at [25] - [26]:

Although Pitrau concerned a case in which the applicant did not have the required certificate under s 369 of the FW Act when bringing a general protections court application, s 369 of the FW Act is drafted in near-identical terms to s 776 of the FW Act and on a plain reading of s 776 of the FW Act shares the same intended meaning as s 369 of the FW Act. In relation to the Section 776 Certificate:

(a) the issuance of a Section 776 Certificate is mandatory under s 776 of the FW Act if the FWC is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful;

(b) only the FWC has the power to issue a Section 776 Certificate;

(c) the issuance of a Section 776 Certificate marks the end of the conciliation or mediation functions of the FWC; and

(d) is the prerequisite for the exercise of judicial power by this Court: Pitrau at [52] per Lucev FM; C v Commonwealth of Australia [2015] FCAFC 113; (2015) 234 FCR 81; (2015) 327 ALR 195; (2015) 252 IR 471; (2015) 149 ALD 57 at [66] per Tracey, Buchanan and Katzmann JJ.

The Court therefore concludes that:

(a) the Unlawful Termination Application:

(i) does not fulfil the requirements of s 778 of the FW Act; and

(ii) fails to satisfy the requirements of r 45.07 of the FCC Rules; and

(b) the Court consequently does not have jurisdiction to hear the Unlawful Termination Application.

1. In oral submissions, as I understand it, Ms Kaur submitted that sometimes for unknown reasons the Certificate is not provided. I infer from this that she contends the Court ought entertain the Application in the absence of the Certificate. I reject that submission. Ms Kaur has not, and could not have, made an unlawful termination application under s 773 to the FWC and accordingly no Certificate could ever have been issued. For the reasons articulated above, the issuing of a Certificate is an essential condition to the Court's jurisdiction.
2. In Part H of the Application, Ms Kaur has ticked the box for an "injunction". In her materials Ms Kaur says (without amendment):

I request court to protect me within CBA and in finance industry from bullying and intimidation behaviour. Impact and behaviours of Dewey Sloan, Christian Shaw, Russell Hayman, Paul Belluomo and Giles Dudley has scared me badly. Tamira Grandi from Workplace Grievances Team and Chris Breen from Human Resources also manipulated information and documents around this case to cover management rather than assisting me.

1. This does not satisfy the requirements of s 778(b) or r 31.04(3)(b) and eliminate the need for the Certificate. Firstly, it is not an application for an interim injunction. Secondly, it is, at best, vague as to what injunctive relief is sought. Thirdly, nothing in the management of the matters to date is consistent with a claim for interim injunctive relief, nor has Ms Kaur agitated a claim for interim injunctive relief since the proceedings were commenced in March 2025, some eight months ago.
2. Accordingly, in light of all of the above, the prerequisites for the Court's jurisdiction under s 778 have not been met and the Court therefore has no jurisdiction.
3. Accordingly, as submitted by CBA, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the Application and it is bound to fail.
4. It therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. As set out above, the parties entered into the Deed on 4 June 2024.
2. The Deed is in evidence before the Court. Ms Kaur executed the Deed on 30 May 2024 and CBA's representative executed the Deed on 4 June 2024.

1. The recitals to the Deed provide that Ms Kaur's employment was terminated on 8 April 2024, that she had commenced proceedings against CBA in the FWC alleging she had been unfairly dismissed (U2024/4157) and that the parties had agreed to settle the proceeding.
2. The terms of the Deed include a payment to be made to Ms Kaur of an amount equivalent to six weeks' pay and for her termination to be regarded as a resignation. The Deed, at clause 3.1, includes a release by Ms Kaur in favour of "the Group" from all "Claims" in the following terms:

3.1 The Employee:

(a) on and from the date of this Deed, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, unconditionally releases the Group from all Claims the Employee has now, or may have had in the future if the Parties had not executed this Deed;

(b) agrees not to make, take or institute any Claims against the Group; and

(c) indemnifies, and keeps indemnified, the Group against any loss or damage incurred in relation to any Claims the Employee institutes in breach of this Deed.

1. "Group" and "Claim" is defined in the Deed at clause 11, respectively, as follows:

Group means the Employer and all of its Related Bodies Corporate including each of their current and former directors, officers, employees and agents (jointly or severally).

Claim means any present and future demand, action, legal or other proceeding, application, arbitration, appeal, cause of action, complaint, cost, debt due, determination, inquiry, judgment, suit, verdict and any other claim whether under statute or otherwise, whether known or unknown, arising directly or indirectly from or in connection with the Employment Agreement, the Employment, the Termination the Proceedings and any other matters recited in the Background, but does not include any claims arising under applicable workers' compensation.

(a) must file a notice of discontinuance (NoD) within five days of signing the Deed (clause 2.1(a));

(b) acknowledges that the payments and benefits under the Deed are in full satisfaction of any Claims (as defined) that Ms Kaur has or may have against CBA or the Group (clause 4); and

(c) warrants that she has read the terms of the Deed, has had an opportunity to seek legal advice about the terms and effect of the Deed and the Group has not made any promise, representation or inducement or been a party to any conduct material to Ms Kaur entering into the Deed, other than as set out in the Deed (clause 7).

1. Clause 8 of the Deed provides that the Group may plead the Deed as a bar to proceedings brought by Ms Kaur in relation to any Claims that are the subject of the release given by Ms Kaur in the Deed.
2. On the evidence before the Court a NoD was filed on 21 May 2024 and there is nothing before the Court to suggest that CBA has not made the payment required under the Deed.
3. The definition of Claim contained in the Deed is broad and comprehensive. The release unambiguously prohibits claims arising directly or indirectly from or in connection with Ms Kaur's employment with CBA and its termination, both at the time of the Deed and in the future. Given the claims Ms Kaur presses in Part G of the Form 3, I am satisfied that such claims are, prima facie, barred by the Deed.

1. Ms Kaur's evidence is that she executed the Deed under duress and not "under free will". She says that she was emotionally distressed as a result of the deaths of her parents and other family members, in particular the death of her father on 7 March 2024, approximately two months before the conciliation conference, was crying during the conciliation conference and was "not in a position to understand what was going on."
2. In her affidavit dated 8 July 2025, Ms Kaur's evidence is that Mr Vague, the solicitor who acted for CBA in the Unfair Dismissal Application telephone conciliation, threatened her during the conciliation conference saying (without amendment) "If I don't sign this Deed paper there will be black mark against me" and "without that I will not be able to secure any future jobs in future". However, under cross-examination Ms Kaur's evidence, whilst nonetheless maintaining that her affidavit was correct, was that she asked Mr Vague if there was "a black mark against her" and that Mr Vague told her there was no restriction on her seeking employment with CBA again if she signed the Deed.
3. She contends that she was coerced and threatened into entering into the Deed and that "otherwise I wouldn't have signed this document." She says she "acted under duress to avoid any serious harm to my career." She also says that Mr Vague, her representative in the conciliation conference, Mr Dircks, and the conciliator laughed during the conference. Ms Kaur seems to suggest that this laughter was because of the deaths of her parents.
4. She also complains about the conduct of Mr Dircks and says, amongst other things, he would not let her speak during the conciliation conference and simply wanted to resolve the claim to obtain his fee.
5. Finally, at the hearing Ms Kaur said she did not read the Deed and was unaware of its contents.

1. Mr Vague's evidence is that on 14 May 2024 he attended a telephone conciliation conference on behalf of CBA in relation to Ms Kaur's Unfair Dismissal Application. His evidence is that Ms Kaur was represented at the conciliation conference by Mr Dircks of Just Relations. It is undisputed that Ms Kaur was so represented however, as set out above, she complains about aspects of Mr Dircks' representation. Mr Vague's evidence is that he did not engage in settlement discussions with Ms Kaur or have any direct interaction with Ms Kaur during the conciliation conference. She was represented by Mr Dircks and settlement offers were exchanged via the conciliator. His evidence is that it was agreed at the conciliation conference that he would send Mr Dircks a draft deed while final details of the settlement were resolved.
2. Mr Vague denies threatening Ms Kaur or that he told her there would be a "black mark" against her if she did not sign the Deed. In his affidavit Mr Vague's evidence is that in a previous conciliation conference involving an earlier general protections not involving dismissal claim made by Ms Kaur during her employment with CBA, Ms Kaur asked if there was a "black mark" against her and he made enquiries and was told there was not but that there would be a note on her file that she was dismissed for misconduct. His evidence is that he may have relayed this to Ms Kaur at the Unfair Dismissal Application conciliation conference. His evidence under cross-examination was that he did not recall laughing in the conciliation and that he does not think "that would have happened at all."
3. The evidence before the Court is that on 21 May 2024 Mr Dircks emailed the FWC conciliator to confirm that a NoD would be filed in relation to the Unfair Dismissal Application. Mr Vague's evidence is that on 31 May 2024 Mr Dircks sent him the Deed signed by Ms Kaur, informing him that Ms Kaur had made changes to the Deed without Mr Dircks' knowledge. Annexed to Mr Vague's affidavit is an email from Mr Dircks attaching the Deed and informing Mr Vague of these matters.
4. Although Ms Kaur says that Mr Dircks engaged in "unprofessional behaviour" and that "he should have taken this case to hearing" she does not however assert that he acted without or contrary to her instructions to agree to the settlement. Further, I note that the conciliation conference occurred on 14 May 2024 and Ms Kaur did not sign the Deed until 30 May 2024.

1. Ms Kaur claims that she signed the Deed under duress. I reject that contention for the reasons that follow.
2. To establish duress at common law:

(a) the pressure must cause the conduct; and

(b) the pressure must be illegitimate.

1. Firstly, Ms Kaur's own evidence is that at the conciliation conference she was emotionally distressed as a result of the deaths of her parents and other family members, most particularly, the death of her father on 7 March 2024. I am unable to see how on any view this could constitute pressure by Mr Vague such as to cause Ms Kaur to sign the Deed. Further, for the reasons below, I do not consider that Ms Kaur's distress over her father's death, which I accept, was such as to result in her not understanding the consequences of entering into the Deed.
2. Secondly, Ms Kaur's evidence under cross-examination was difficult. However, she ultimately agreed that she asked Mr Vague if there was "a black mark against her" and that Mr Vague told her there was no restriction on her seeking employment with CBA again if she signed the Deed. I accept Mr Vague's evidence that he also may have told Ms Kaur this, via Mr Dircks, at the conciliation conference and that he also may have told her in that conference that there would be a note on her file that she was dismissed for misconduct. However, even taking Ms Kaur's evidence at its highest, Mr Vague did not threaten her. There is, simply, no threat by Mr Vague. He simply provided her with information. Ms Kaur seems to infer that it is because of the Deed that she has subsequently been unsuccessful in obtaining further employment with CBA. However, I consider this is entirely unsurprising, given her file records that she was dismissed for misconduct. It is clear that the Deed does not, in its terms, prohibit Ms Kaur from seeking further employment with CBA.
3. Thirdly, other than Mr Vague acknowledging receipt of emails from Ms Kaur on 14 and 15 May 2024, Mr Vague had no further engagement with Ms Kaur after the conciliation conference.
4. Fourthly, Ms Kaur was represented throughout the conciliation conference and at all relevant times afterwards, including at the time of the execution of the Deed, by Mr Dircks. Whilst Ms Kaur makes criticisms of Mr Dircks representation, even if they be correct, this does not establish illegitimate pressure by Mr Vague such as to establish duress. As to the assertion that Mr Dircks, Mr Vague and the conciliator laughed during the conciliation, given that the conciliation was conducted by telephone, and in light of the nature of a conciliation conference, I prefer the evidence of Mr Vague that this did not occur. However, even if it did, firstly, I am unable to see the relevance of this in the present context. Secondly, there is simply no evidence to suggest that even if this did occur it was in any way related to the death of Ms Kaur's father and/or mother or other family members.
5. Fifthly, the conciliation conference occurred on 14 May 2024 and Ms Kaur did not sign the Deed until 30 May 2024. Accordingly, Ms Kaur had a period of some two weeks to consider her position before signing the Deed. Further, the evidence before the Court is that Ms Kaur made amendments to the Deed. This is inconsistent with Ms Kaur executing the Deed under duress or emotional distress such that she did not understand the consequences of what she was doing. It is also inconsistent with Ms Kaur's evidence that she did not read the Deed before signing it. Further, I note that at clause 7 of the Deed Ms Kaur warrants that she has read the terms of the Deed, has had an opportunity to seek legal advice about the terms and effect of the Deed and the Group has not made any promise, representation or inducement or been a party to any conduct material to Ms Kaur entering into the Deed, other than as set out in the Deed.
6. Sixthly, on 31 May 2024 Ms Kaur copied Mr Vague into two emails sent to Mr Dircks, arising from Mr Dircks forwarding the Deed to Mr Vague and informing him that Ms Kaur had made amendments to the Deed. The second of those two emails says in the final paragraph "Mr Vague, I am not [sic] longer taking services from this company after today. Let me know if this matter is settled today and so [sic] I can transfer his fee and charges." In light of this, I consider that any contention by Ms Kaur that she did not understand that by entering into the Deed she was settling the matter against CBA, or that she was so distraught in the conference that, to use her words, she was "not in a position to understand what was going on", cannot be sustained.
7. Seventhly, Ms Kaur has accepted payment under the Deed.
8. For completeness, that Ms Kaur may have signed the Deed to, in her words, "avoid any serious harm to my career", does not establish that she executed the Deed under duress. Ms Kaur's motivations for signing the Deed cannot establish illegitimate pressure by another party such as to constitute duress.
9. Accordingly, in light of all of the above, I find that Ms Kaur did not sign the Deed under duress or any incapacity due to emotional distress arising from the deaths of her parents and/or any other family members, such as to vitiate the Deed. Ms Kaur therefore remains bound by it. As such, pursuant to the terms of the Deed, Ms Kaur has released CBA from all claims and is barred from bringing this proceeding. It therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. For all of the reasons set out above, I find that the Application has no reasonable prospects of success.
2. Accordingly, the Application must be summarily dismissed.

I certify that the preceding ninety-three (93) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young.