Kailash Lawyers v Patial

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. On 5 September 2025, the Court made a sequestration order in respect of the estate of Prateek Patial. The relevant factual and procedural background is set out in the Court's Reasons for Judgment published on 5 September 2025, Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd v Patial [2025] FedCFamC2G 1432.
2. On 26 September 2025, Mr Patial filed an Application in a Proceeding, seeking that the sequestration order made on 5 September 2025 be stayed, pending the outcome of an appeal in respect of the Court's orders filed on 25 September 2025.
3. Mr Patial filed an Amended Application in a Proceeding on 14 November 2025, which was the first return date of the Application in a Proceeding filed on 26 September 2025. He was granted leave to amend his application. It is the Amended Application in a Proceeding ("Application") which is the subject of these reasons for judgment.
4. The Application seeks the following relief:
   1. That the sequestration order made on 5 September 2025 by Her Honour Judge Obradovic be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal filed in the Federal Court of Australia on 25 September 2025.[1]
   2. That the sequestration order made on 5 September 2025 be set aside pursuant to Rule 25.11 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021.
   3. That proceeding SYG2899/2024 be reopened.
   4. That her Honour Judge Obradovic be recused from hearing any further matters in proceeding SYG2899/2024 on the grounds of actual or apprehended bias, procedural irregularity, and denial of natural justice.
   5. That the matter be transferred to a different judge for rehearing de novo, including reconsideration of all previously filed and closed interlocutory applications and subpoenas.
   6. That the Application in a Proceeding filed on 20 March 2025, Interim Application filed on 11 April 2025, Subpoenas issued on 2 May 2025 and 5 May 2025, and the Application in a Proceeding filed on 26 September 2025, be re-opened and listed for case management directions before a different judge.
   7. That the orders made by Her Honour on 5 September 2025 be set aside on the basis that the final written decision was prepared prior to the hearing of the Application in a Proceeding filed on 6 June 2025 and accepted on 11 June 2025, thereby breaching procedural fairness and natural justice.
   8. Such further or other orders as the Court deems just.
5. On 14 November 2025, Mr Patial was directed to file and serve one consolidated affidavit in support of the Application by 4pm on 28 November 2025. He did not do so. Instead, in support of the Application, Mr Patial relied on an affidavit filed 1 December 2025, in respect of which leave was granted on 17 February 2026. Mr Patial explained that the affidavit was affirmed on 28 November 2025 but, due to its size, he could not file it electronically. The affidavit, together with the annexures, is 1065 pages long. Mr Patial did not take the Court to a single page of that affidavit during his oral submissions. The Court has, however, perused that affidavit, and it was of no relevance. It was a rehashing of the evidence previously before the Court in respect of matters with which it had already dealt.
6. Also on 14 November 2025, Mr Patial was directed to file and serve written submissions (limited to 10 pages) in support of the Application by 4pm on 9 January 2026. He did not do so. At the hearing on 17 February 2026, Mr Patial did make oral submissions in support of the Application.
7. It was some way into his oral submissions that Mr Patial advised the Court for the first time that he was no longer seeking a stay of the orders made on 5 September 2025. He did press the remainder of his Application.
8. The respondent to the Application relied on its submissions filed 6 February 2026, supplemented by oral submissions made at the hearing.

1. Mr Patial asserts that he was denied procedural fairness at the hearing on 26 May 2025, and again on 5 September 2025.
2. In respect of the hearing on 26 May 2025, Mr Patial asserts that the Court failed to provide any procedural directions in relation to Application in a Proceeding filed 20 March 2025, Interim Application filed 11 April 2025, Subpoenas issued on 2 May 2025 and 5 May 2025, and Application in a Proceeding filed 6 June 2025, "before disposing of the entire matter by final orders".
3. Mr Patial alleges that the judicial officer denied him "proper time and procedural opportunity to cross-examine Mr Amit Pall and Mr Gaurav Sareen, allowing only approximately 10 minutes".
4. In respect of the hearing on 5 September 2025, Mr Patial asserts that the Court handed down a fully drafted 26-page written judgment immediately after allowing Mr Patial 15 minutes of oral submissions, without any prior case management directions, timetable for submissions, or notice that the Application in a Proceeding filed on 6 June 2025 would be finally determined.

(a) Application in a Proceeding filed 21 March 2025, by Mr Patial;

(b) Interim Application filed 15 April 2025, by Mr Patial;

(c) Objection to Subpoena filed 15 May 2025, by Kailash Lawyers, issued to Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd on 2 May 2025;

(d) Objection to Subpoena filed 15 May 2025, by Kailash Lawyers, issued to Australia Taxation Office on 2 May 2025;

(e) Objection to Subpoena filed 15 May 2025, by Kailash Lawyers, issued to Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd on 2 May 2025;

(f) Objection to Subpoena filed 15 May 2025, by Kailash Lawyers, issued to National Australia Bank Ltd on 2 May 2025;

(g) Interim Application filed 15 May 2025, by Kailash Lawyers, seeking orders setting aside the subpoenas to Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, Australia Taxation Office, Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd, and National Australia Bank Ltd;

(h) Creditor's Petition filed 8 November 2024 and opposition; and

(i) Oral application for recusal.

1. On 26 May 2025, orders were made:
   1. Dismissing the Application in a Proceeding filed 21 March 2025, by Mr Patial;
   2. For the filing of written submissions by both parties in respect of the Interim Application filed 15 April 2025, by Mr Patial;
   3. Setting aside the Subpoena issued to Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd on 2 May 2025;
   4. Setting aside the Subpoena issued to Australia Taxation Office on 2 May 2025;
   5. Setting aside the Subpoena issued to National Australia Bank Ltd on 2 May 2025;
   6. Setting aside the Subpoena issued to Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd on 5 May 2025;
   7. Dismissing the Interim Application filed 15 May 2025, by Kailash Lawyers in respect of the four subpoenas;
   8. For the filing of written submissions by both parties in respect of the Creditor's Petition filed 8 November 2024 and the Grounds of Opposition to the Creditor's Petition filed 2 December 2024; and
   9. Dismissing the oral application for recusal.
2. The Court delivered short oral reasons on the day in relation to the relevant interlocutory matters upon which it ruled.
3. Mr Pall, Mr Sareen and Mr Patial were all cross-examined, with a time limit of 15 minutes imposed in respect of each witness.

1. As noted in the Court's Reasons for Judgment published on 5 September 2025, while the Court was reserved in respect of the Creditor's Petition , opposition thereto, and the Interim Application filed 15 April 2025 following the hearing on 26 May 2025, Mr Patial filed an Application in a Proceeding on 6 June 2025.[2]
2. According to the Notice of Filing and Hearing, the Application in a Proceeding filed 6 June 2025, was accepted for filing on 11 June 2025, and listed for "Hearing of Interlocutory Application" at 10.15am on 5 September 2025.
3. On 3 September 2025, the parties were advised that the Court would be delivering its judgment in respect of the Creditor's Petition, objections thereto and the Interim Application filed 15 April 2025, at 10.20am on 5 September 2025.
4. Mr Patial takes issue with this, alleging:

Judge Obradovic proceeded to deliver a judgment favourable to the petitioning creditor in circumstances where Her Honour had not provided any procedural directions in relation to the outstanding interlocutory applications, had not sought from the parties any estimate of the time required for the proper hearing of those matters, had not afforded the parties an opportunity to file written submissions, and ultimately heard and determined the proceeding without prior notice or directions as to the manner in which the applications would be dealt with.[3]

1. It is correct that the Court did not make any directions in respect of the Application in a Proceeding filed 6 June 2025.
2. The Application in a Proceeding filed 6 June 2025, was first called on at 10.55am on 5 September 2025. The Court noted that there had been a 'flurry' of activity on the Court file since the matter had last been before the Court, that the Application in a Proceeding had been filed as well as a number of affidavits. The Court indicated that it would hear the Application in a Proceeding first and then "depending on the outcome of that, judgment is listed to be delivered". In answer to a submission by Counsel for Kailash Lawyers that there were two applications by Mr Patial - one being his Application in a Proceeding filed 6 June 2025, and the second being an oral application that the Court refrain from delivering judgment foreshadowed in an affidavit filed by Mr Patial on 4 September 2025 - the Court indicated that it had not read anything apart from the Application in a Proceeding filed 6 June 2025. Mr Patial did not press any oral application for the Court to refrain from delivering judgment.
3. Mr Patial was granted leave to rely on three affidavits in support of the Application in a Proceeding, namely, the affidavits accepted for filing on 11 June 2025, 11 July 2025 and 4 September 2025. The Court indicated that it would consider the affidavits only insofar as they related to the Application in a Proceeding.
4. The Court adjourned to read Mr Patial's affidavits. After some preliminary questions from the Bench about the evidence, Mr Patial was given a time limit of 20 minutes to make his submissions. Submissions commenced at 12 noon, firstly being made by Mr Patial, then Counsel for Kailash Lawyers, and then Mr Patial in reply. An oral judgment was delivered, commencing at 12.29pm and concluding at 1.02pm, after which the Application in a Proceeding was dismissed. The oral reasons have now been settled. The Court then delivered its judgment in respect of the Creditor's Petition, objection thereto and Interim Application filed 15 April 2025.

1. Mr Patial submitted that the judicial officer "always mocks, always smears".[4]
2. Mr Patial further submitted that the judicial officer at the hearing on 26 May 2025 made a 'totally false' statement that certain documents subpoenaed between 2 May and 5 May 2025 had been produced within time.
3. On this issue, Mr Patial said in his Application:

On 26 May 2025, Judge Obradovic made a false and misleading statement during hearing proceedings, asserting Mr Amit Pall and Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd had complied with subpoenas dated 2 May 2025. Court transcript of 26 May 2025 records this. However, evidence confirms neither Mr Pall, nor the corporate creditor, nor the banks (NAB and ANZ) produced subpoenaed documents by the due date (22 May 2025).

1. On 26 May 2025, the Court heard and determined applications to set aside 4 subpoenas. The Court indicated that ANZ Bank Ltd had produced documents, but the documents had not been released due to the Notice of Objection that had been filed. The transcript records as follows:

HER HONOUR: I'm not prepared to make the orders that you're asking me to make in terms of procedure. The notices of objection have been filed. I propose to deal with the notices of objection and, if required, the application to set aside the subpoena. So, first of all, the notice of objection filed on 15 May 2025, that was filed by Kailash Lawyers Proprietary Limited in respect of the subpoena to ANZ. Those documents have been produced, but because of the notice of objection, they have not been released.

MR PATIAL: So the Kailash Lawyers have produced the documents?

HER HONOUR: The documents have been produced, but they have not been released.[5]

1. While there may have been some confusion on the part of Mr Patial as gleaned from his question to the Court, read in context and fairly, the Court was referring to the subpoena issued to ANZ Banking Group Ltd, and not the subpoena issued to Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd, which was dealt with a few minutes later. The Court further indicated, at that point that the Australian Taxation Office had produced documents in answer to a subpoena, but that Mr Patial had withdrawn the subpoena.
2. The transcript records as follows:

HER HONOUR: Thank you. The court notes that the subpoena issued to the Australian Taxation Office has been withdrawn. I also note that it appears that the ATXO [sic] - the Australian Taxation Office - has filed - I withdraw that - has produced documents in answer to that subpoena which the respondent has withdrawn. I therefore make an order setting aside the subpoena, as it still appears to be on the court file, and an order for the documents produced by the Australian Taxation Office to be returned and/or destroyed, as appropriate. Next, the notice of objection filed on 15 May 2025 issued by the applicant in respect of the subpoena to Kailash Lawyers Proprietary Limited - that objection being an objection to the production of the documents, on the basis that the subpoena should be set aside. So, Mr Edney, do you wish to say anything in addition to what's contained in your outline of submission?[6]

1. Accordingly, Mr Patial's submission that the statement made by the Court was 'totally false' in respect of documents produced under subpoena is an unfair categorisation of what occurred on the day.

What Mr Patial says about the Recusal Application

1. Mr Patial asserts that the circumstances that the Court has outlined above create a reasonable apprehension that the decision was prejudged, and that Mr Patial was denied natural justice and procedural fairness. Mr Patial also asserts that the facts amount "to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, and a breach of the right to a fair hearing".

1. The New South Wales Court of Appeal[7] summarised the relevant legal principles in relation to actual bias as follows:
   1. A finding of actual bias is a grave matter: Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) (Sun v Minister) 81 FCR 71 at 127 per Burchett J. Authority requires that an allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved; that such a finding should not be made lightly; and that cogent evidence is required: South Western Sydney Area Health Services v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16 at [97] and the authorities there cited.
   2. Where the issue is actual bias in the form of prejudgment, the appellant had to establish that the primary judge was "so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17...; 205 CLR 507 at [72] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J (Hayne J agreeing at [176]). See also Kirby J at [127].

70. As Gleeson CJ and Gummow J observed in that case at [71]:

"The question is not whether a decision-maker's mind is blank; it is whether it is open to persuasion."

1. In the same case, Hayne J noted at [185] the several distinct elements underlying the assertion that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, or the assertion that there is a real likelihood that a reasonable observer might reach that conclusion. The first is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. The second is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to the matter in issue. The third is the contention that a decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case.
2. His Honour observed at [186] that allegations of actual bias through prejudgment often fail at the third step he had identified. This was because notwithstanding whatever expression of preconceived opinions by the decision-maker, it does not follow that the evidence will be disregarded.
3. The test of actual bias in the form of prejudgment requires an assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question: Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls & Others [2011] HCA 48; 244 CLR 427 at 437 [33]. However, actual bias need not be confined to an intentional state of mind. Bias may be subconscious, provided it is real: Bilgin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Bilgin v Minister) [1997] FCA 1022; (1997) 149 ALR 281 at 289-290 per Finkelstein J; Sun v Minister at 127 per Burchett J and 135 per North J. As Finkelstein J said in Bilgin v Minister at 290:

"The wrong involved is the failure to decide a case impartially. Whether that failure was deliberate or not should be beside the point insofar as the validity of the decision is concerned."

1. The circumstances in which actual bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons for decision must be considered to be rare and exceptional: SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2000] FCA 668 at [38] per von Doussa J, who explained:

"... Reasons for decision reflect conclusions reached at the end of the decision making process, and if the decision is against the party complaining, the expression of adverse findings on credit and fact are an inevitable part of the expression of the reasons. The mere fact of adverse findings at the end of the matter give rise to no inference as to the state of mind of the decision maker before and whilst the matter was under consideration, nor of prejudgment of the issues that fell for decision. Even where it is possible to show that the adverse findings or some of them are contrary to the evidence or unreasonable, or that the reasoning process is hopelessly flawed, that without more is unlikely to demonstrate that the decision maker had embarked on the case with a closed mind, not open to persuasion. However, where the party alleging actual bias can point not only to an adverse judgment containing demonstrable error but also to conduct by the decision maker antithetical to that party's interests such as a hostile attitude throughout the hearing or ... an inference of actual bias by prejudgment might then be more readily drawn. But even then the circumstances are likely to be rare and exceptional that the combination of factors and circumstances will clearly prove actual bias."

1. The Court adopts these principles as being relevant to the determination of the application for recusal on grounds of actual bias which Mr Patial makes.

1. The relevant legal test for whether a judicial officer is affected by apprehended bias is well settled. It is "whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide."[8]
2. The application of this test is not to be assessed with the benefit of hindsight, but at the time of the events which are said to give rise to that possibility.[9] It is a question of possibility, real and not remote, not probability.[10]
3. The existence of the apprehension of bias admits the possibility of human frailty and its application, therefore, is as diverse as human frailty.[11]
4. The application of the principles to a particular case is a two-step process:

(1) Identification of what it is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and

(2) Identify the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.[12]

1. An argument that there is a real likelihood that a reasonable observer might conclude that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue has several distinct elements at its root:

(1) The decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case;

(2) The decision-maker will apply that opinion to that matter in issue;

(3) The decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in the light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case; and

(4) The question which is said to have been prejudged is one which should be considered afresh in the particular case.[13]

1. Whether there has been excessive judicial intervention will depend on the context, number and circumstances of the intervention. The judge must ensure the appearance of an impartial and unprejudiced mind.[14]

1. Apart from unhelpful and rambling submissions, which confused rather than elucidated the issues, the Court was not taken to any particular evidence in support of the submission that either actual or apprehended bias had been made out.
2. The confusing submissions seemed to mesh together complaints about the Court's findings with the complaint that the judicial officer had not acted in an impartial manner, and a complaint that the Court had acted ultra vires or without jurisdiction.
3. The suggestion that the Court had predetermined the issues on the interlocutory applications because it had prepared its draft judgment on the substantive issue, being the Creditor's Petition and opposition thereto, as well as the interim application in respect of which the Court was reserved, is misconceived.
4. The Notices of Filing and Hearing on each of the interlocutory applications which were heard by the Court, had the respective applications listed for hearing on the day in question. There were orders made by a Registrar listing the matters in respect of the subpoenas and objections thereto. Mr Patial was, therefore, on notice about all the listings and the reasons for the listings.
5. No application for adjournment had been made on either 26 May 2025 or 5 September 2025, in respect of any of the applications that were before it. The Court gave Mr Patial the opportunity of referring to the evidence upon which he sought to rely, and of making submissions.
6. Mr Patial's complaint that the Court did not follow its own procedures or rules in hearing the interlocutory applications in the manner that it heard them, in that it failed to provide a timetable for the filing of responses and submissions, demonstrates a misunderstanding of court process and a misunderstanding of procedural fairness.
7. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) is a busy trial court. The Court manages its business and is obliged to manage its business in a manner that is consistent with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) and the relevant Court Rules.
8. The Court may give directions about limiting the time for oral argument in proceedings before it.[15] The Court may also give directions about the use of written submissions and the length of those written submissions,[16] but it does not need to do so. The overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions in relation to the Court, is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law, and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.[17] The parties to a civil proceeding before the Court must conduct the proceeding in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose.[18]
9. In coming to its determination in respect of the recusal application, the Court has had regard to the principles that:

Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.[19]

... if the mere making of an insubstantial objection were sufficient to lead a judge to decline to hear or decide a case, the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable.[20]

1. In respect of the hypothetical observer (in relation to the apprehended bias argument) the Court notes:

... two things need to be remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed is "a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial ...[21]

1. The reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice.[22]
2. In pressing the recusal application, Mr Patial did not take the Court to any part of the transcript, nor make any submissions which tied the evidence to the relevant legal principles, in support of his argument.
3. Mr Patial has not made out the recusal application, on either the basis of actual bias or apprehended bias.

The Procedural Fairness Complaint and the Application to Set Aside Court Orders

1. Much of the complaint made by Mr Patial in his Application encompasses a dissatisfaction with the result of the numerous applications that the Court had already heard and determined, whether interlocutory or final.
2. Procedural fairness relates to the fairness of the procedure by which a decision is made, and not the fairness in a substantive sense of that decision.[23]
3. Dissatisfaction with the Court's decision is a matter properly the subject of the appeal process. Mr Patial is already engaged in that process.
4. Mr Patial's reliance on:

(a) s 25 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), which applies to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), being a different court to the one which is hearing this application and in which these proceedings have been filed;

(b) s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), which provides for the Court's discretionary power to dismiss a creditor's petition;

(c) the Court Rules, whether:

(i) r 25.11 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021, which speaks for applications for writ, order or other means of enforcement of a judgment, and was in any event replaced by the 2025 rules from 1 September 2025;

(ii) r 25.11 of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025, which applies in Migration proceedings; or

(iii) r 25.11 of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) Bankruptcy Rules 2021, which does not exist;

1. Mr Patial's argument that the Court should set aside its own judgment because it was entered into by fraud is entirely without merit. What Mr Patial is raising is his dissatisfaction with the Court's refusal to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice served on him on 17 September 2024. The Court dealt with these issues in its judgment of 5 September 2025.
2. The Court does have the power to set aside its own judgment where it was entered into by fraud.[24] However, Mr Patial has not made out the argument that the Court should so exercise its power.
3. Furthermore, it is long-established that the Court has inherent power to control its own processes:

The power of each Court over its own process is unlimited; it is a power incident to all Courts, inferior as well as superior; were it not so, the Court would be obliged to sit still and see its own process abused for the purpose of injustice.[25]

1. In respect of other grounds for setting aside orders, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Court would set aside or vary a perfected order. Generally speaking, the jurisdiction is not to be exercised unless it can be shown that without fault on the applicant's part, he had not been heard on the relevant question,[26] and further:

... it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the Court; nor is it to be exercised simply because the party seeking a rehearing has failed to present the argument in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put. What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to re-argue their cases.[27]

1. Mr Patial has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances which would warrant the Court exercising its power and/or discretion to set aside any judgment and/or order made and/or entered.
2. For all of those reasons, the Application is to be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Obradovic.

[1] The Applicant ultimately did not press the relief sought in paragraph 1.

[2] Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd v Patial [2025] FedCFamC2G 1432 at [20].

[3] Amended Application in a Proceeding filed 14 November 2025.

[4] It was confirmed with Mr Patial at the hearing on 17 February 2026, that he said "smears", although it may be that the word he meant to use was "sneers".

[7] Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 at [68]- [74].

[8] Johnson & Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11] ("Johnson & Johnson"); Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 at [83] ("Ebner").

[9] Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 260; (2020) 103 NSWLR 307 at [41], citing Ebner (n 8) at [7]-[9], [33].

[13] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 at [185].

[14] Edinger & Duy [2023] FedCFamC1A 194 at [21], citing Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 281-282.

[15] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 187.

[16] Ibid s 188.

[17] Ibid s 190.

[18] Ibid s 191.

[19] Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 at [5] (per Mason J).

[21] Saklani & Valder [2023] FedCFamC1A 163 ("Saklani & Valder") at [31], citing Johnson & Johnson (n 8) at [12].

[22] Johnson & Johnson (n 8) at [13].

[23] Mohareb v Kelso (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 246 at [15].

[24] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) r 24.04.

[25] Jeffrey & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 43 at [27], citing Cocker v Tempest [1841] EngR 242; (1841) 7 M & W 502 at 503-4; [1841] EngR 242; 151 ER 864 at 865.

[26] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 363 at [14] ('Black on White').

[27] Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) [1993] HCA 6; (1993) 176 CLR 300 at [4], cited in Black on White (n 26) at [16].