[2021] AATA 21
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2021-01-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
I have no family members in Vietnam and have no future there. My future is in Australia amongst people who supported me. I am determined to make them proud of me.
Strength, nature and duration of ties (to Australia) (paragraph 14.2)
Impact on Australian business interests (paragraph 14.3)
Extent of impediments if removed (paragraph 14.5)
Notwithstanding these features, as the Minister submitted, the terms of Direction No 55 to not purport to direct a decision maker as to the outcome of the s 501(2) residual discretion in relation to any given individual, or categories of individuals. Further, by the use of qualifying words such as "generally" (for example, in cl 8(4) that primary considerations "should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations"), the weighing process in each case is in substance left, as it must be, to the individual decision maker exercising the power under s 501.
I certify that the preceding 120 (one-hundred and twenty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member D. J. Morris
...[sgd]....................................................................
Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185
Lam and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re [1999] AATA 56
Minister for Home Affairs v HSKJ [2018] FCAFC 217
This part of the clause is concerned with the consequences that should befall a non-citizen who has fallen foul of the first expectation. It should be understood as expressing an expectation about the outcome of the exercise of the power conferred by s 501(1) of the Act in respect of the particular person whose circumstances are under consideration.
Before proceeding further it must be emphasised that cl 11.3 does not purport to preclude the decision-maker from reaching his or her own view as to whether the non-citizen should or should not be granted a visa, as the decision-maker must necessarily do. The question that arises on this appeal is not whether the decision-maker is precluded from doing so, but whether the decision-maker's own assessment of the appropriate outcome is relevant to the task of identifying the content of the expectations of the Australian community under cl. 11.3 of the Direction. The clause implicitly recognises that the decision-maker's assessment as to whether or not a visa should be granted may differ from the expectations of the Australian community, as the government has deemed those expectations to be.
I have accepted the Minister's submission that cl. 11.3 is intended to give effect to the principle that the Minister may make a statement of the government's views about the expectations of the Australian community, which statement may be acted on by the person conferred with the power in a particular case, as recognised in Uelese [v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 348]. In my view, the task of the decision-maker is to identify what is the "government's view" about community expectations in the particular case, to 'have due regard' to that view and to "generally" afford that view more weight than other non-primary considerations in accordance with cl. 8(4). The phrase "may be appropriate" does not permit the decision-maker to equate the expectations of the Australian community (as expressed in cl. 11.3) with the decision-maker's own view as to the preferable outcome in the ultimate exercise of the discretion. To construe cl. 11.3 in that way would be to ignore the fact that the clause is intended to express a consideration that is capable of being given more weight relative to "other considerations" in the exercise of the discretion, as cl 8(4) of the Direction generally requires. The primary judge was correct to say that importing into cl. 11.3 all countervailing factors bearing on the ultimate decision would render cl. 8(4) of the Direction unworkable.
(2016) 241 FCR 461