Joslyne & Carrel [2025] FedCFamC1A 193 (31 October 2025)

Boulton & Boulton [2024] FedCFamC1A 132; (2024) FLC 94-202; [2024]

Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55

Conway v The Queen 2002) 209 CLR 203; [2002] HCA 2

Cross & Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389; [2008] FamCAFC 68

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Fitzgerald v Fish [2005] FamCA 158; (2005) 33 Fam LR 123 at 130; [2005] FamCA 158

FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236

Graham & Squibb [2019] FamCAFC 33; (2019) FLC 93-892[2019] FamCAFC 33

Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63

Joslyne & Carrel (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 25

Joslyne & Carrel (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC1F 134

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48

Leventis & Leventis (No 7) [2024] FedCFamC1F 143

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28

Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554; [2019] HCA 21

Medlon & Medlon (No 6) (Indemnity Costs) (2015) FLC 93-664; [2015] FamCAFC 157

Medlow & Medlow (No 2) [2016] FamCAFC 63

State of New South Wales v JR [2024] NSWCA 308

Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311; [1980] HCA 4

R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR

550; [2016] HCA 22

Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88

Simmons & Simmons [2023] FedCFamC1A 44; (2023) FLC 94-137; [2023] FedCFamC1A 44

Whisprun Pty Ltd formerly Northeast Exports Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48

Willmore & Menendez [2022] FedCFamC1A 73

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay costs of the respondent in the fixed sum of $21,657.46 within 90 days.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This appeal concerns parenting orders, made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) on 13 March 2025, which transferred the primary residence of a child, then aged six, from the mother to the father. The orders were made on the basis of findings by the primary judge, that the mother had engaged in a sustained pattern of manipulative behaviour intended to adversely impact the child's relationship with the father.
2. At trial, the primary judge found the mother to be an unreliable witness whose conduct, including the making of unfounded allegations and repeated police complaints, combined with her obstruction of court-ordered contact, was calculated to frustrate the child's relationship with the father. In contrast, the father was found to be a credible witness who had taken meaningful steps to address past issues and foster a safe and nurturing environment for the child.
3. This appeal, brought by the mother, challenges the orders on multiple grounds, including apprehended bias and the denial of procedural fairness, and contends that the primary judge erred by failing to apply correct legal principles and by making multiple errors of fact.
4. The appellant, however, has failed to satisfy the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) ("The Full Court") as to the existence of any appealable error and, as such, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

1. In the judgment of the primary judge dated 13 March 2025, in which the reasons for the orders subject to appeal were set out ("the judgement"), the primary judge recorded the following events as relevant to the determination of the parties' respective application for parenting orders pursuant to Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"):

(1) In 1979, the father was born.

(2) In 1977, the mother was born.

(3) In late 2014, the parties commenced cohabitation.

(4) In 2018, the child of the relationship was born. It is also noted that, at the commencement of the trial, the child lived with the mother and the mother's two daughters of a previous relationship.

(5) In June 2021, the parties separated on a final basis.

(6) In August 2021, the mother commenced family law proceedings by filing an Application for Final Orders in relation to parenting matters.

(7) In late 2021, the first parenting orders were made by consent; providing for the father to spend supervised time with the child at a contact centre on a fortnightly basis.

(8) From late 2021 until mid-2022, the mother delayed signing the contact service agreement and, as a result, the child did not spend time with the father during this period.

(9) In July 2022, the child resumed contact with the father under the supervision of a contact centre.

(10) In August 2022, the mother issued a complaint about the supervision arrangements, leading to the contact centre withdrawing their offer of service.

(11) In August 2022, the mother filed an Amended Application in a Proceeding seeking to suspend the father's time with the child.

(12) In October 2022, orders were made for the re-commencement of supervised time between the father and the child at an alternate contact centre.

(13) In October 2022, the first Single Expert Report of Ms AA was released.

(14) In June 2023, the mother filed an Amended Initiating Application seeking to reduce the father's time with the child and for orders to be made permitting her to relocate within Australia.

(15) In August 2023, the second Single Expert Report of Ms AA was released.

(16) In August 2023, the Final Hearing commenced but was ultimately adjourned until November 2023 due to the father filing an Amended Response to Final Orders.

(17) In August 2023, interim orders were made for the father to spend supervised time with the child in the presence of the paternal grandfather.

(18) In November 2023, the Final Hearing was postponed again due to the mother's hospitalisation.

(19) In January 2024, the mother filed an Application in Proceeding seeking a psycho-sexual assessment of the father and for the suspension of the father's time with the child.

(20) In February 2024, the third Single Expert Report of Ms AA was released.

(21) In March 2024, the Final Hearing resumed. The mother amended her position to allow supervised time between the child and father in the presence of the paternal grandfather.

(22) In March 2024, the mother further amended her position, abandoning the requirement for the supervision of time between the father and child. Interim orders were made accordingly, and the proceedings were adjourned for a further period of six months to enable the Court to assess the mother's preparedness to support a relationship between the child and the father.

(23) In November 2024, the mother filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking the issue of subpoena and seeking to discharge an injunction prohibiting contact between the child and the mother's former partner. The Application was dismissed.

(24) In November 2024, the mother filed a further Amended Application for Final Orders seeking the reintroduction of supervision of time between the father and the child.

(25) In November 2024, the father then filed a Further Amended Response to the Final Orders.

(26) In December 2024, the father's solicitors sought the mother's consent for the father to attend a school event of the child. The mother did not respond to the request and made a police complaint the following day in relation to an alleged breach of the Apprehended Domestic Violence Order from months earlier.

(27) In January 2025, the Final Hearing concluded, and judgment was reserved.

SUMMARY OF THE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE

1. In considering this matter, it is important to appreciate that, as the proceedings commenced prior to 6 May 2024, the primary judge was required to apply the statutory framework of Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") as it existed at the time. That is, prior to the amendments of the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) taking effect.
2. Relevantly, an important object of the repealed Part VII of the Act was s 60B(1)(a) which, as noted by their Honours Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, and Gordon JJ at [8] in Masson v Parsons [2019] HCA 21; (2019) 266 CLR 554, provided for children to have "the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child" and, in so providing, confirmed the extent to which that object should guide the Court's application of the best interest considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act.
3. In this case, as noted by the primary judge at [183], the primary considerations set out in s 60CC(2) required him to consider:

(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents and

(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence.

1. While the primary judge also considered the additional considerations set out in s60CC(3) at [195]- [224], he placed particular weight on the primary considerations. In so doing, his Honour concluded that there were no operative risk factors impacting the child's safety in the care of the father. Furthermore, his Honour found that, if the alternative care arrangements applied and the child remained in the primary care of the mother, the mother would continue to engage in a demonstrated pattern of conduct which, his Honour found, was intended to undermine the child's relationship with his father.
2. In so concluding, the primary judge found the mother to be an "unconvincing and unreliable witness" at [48] and placed no weight on her evidence unless corroborated by objective sources. In so finding, his Honour noted that the mother provided no explanation for abandoning her allegations of risk, including an allegation that the father had engaged in 'grooming' the child for sexual exploitation. Ultimately, the mother's allegations were rejected and found to be "opportunistic and manipulative" by the primary judge at [49].
3. Comparatively, the father was found to be a more reliable witness who had made appropriate concessions and admissions. Accordingly, where the parties' evidence conflicted, the primary judge preferred the father's evidence at [54].
4. In that respect, the Court was satisfied that the father had perpetrated acts of family violence on those occasions admitted by him, but not to the extent alleged by the mother given her lack of credibility.
5. The primary judge further noted that the risk of family violence had been assessed in the three single expert reports of Ms AA, dated 21 October 2022, 8 August 2023 and 23 February 2024 (Exhibit 70), which specifically addressed the father's admitted family violence, alcohol misuse and mental health issues. The primary judge accepted the family report writer's opinion, as set out in her third report, that the father no longer posed a risk of harm to the child (p. 8 - 9).
6. The primary judge found that the mother had repeatedly attempted to frustrate the child's relationship with the father. This included:

(1) Refusing to sign contact centre agreements;

(2) Making unfounded complaints to police and child welfare services;

(3) Unnecessarily involving a security guard at changeover; and

(4) Filing numerous unmeritorious applications to suspend time between the father and the child or to require that such time be supervised.

1. Additionally, the primary judge found that the mother failed to facilitate the father's communication with the child's school and attempted to exclude the father from decision-making at [202].
2. The primary judge found that these actions, together with baseless allegations of abuse, were intended to undermine the child's relationship with the father.
3. The primary judge also had regard to the recommendations of the family report writer at [87] who, in their final report, recommended that the child remain in the mother's care only if she supported a relationship with the father, otherwise, as a "last resort", a transfer of care was necessary (Single Expert Report dated 23 February 2024, p.100).
4. Appropriately, the primary judge noted the family report writer's opinion as to significance of orders effecting a change of residence for a child and the potential distress this would cause the child at [205]. Having regard to that opinion, the primary judge took the exceptional, but entirely understandable and appropriate course, of adjourning the proceedings for six months to enable the mother to reflect upon her conduct in the context of the weight of evidence and the recommendations of the family report writer. The primary judge referred to his reasons for doing so as set out in Joslyne & Carrel (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC1F 134:

15 During the course of her cross-examination, the Single Expert expressed some considerable misgivings surrounding the mother's unexplained change of position, and whether the mother was bona fide and genuine in now seeking to promote a significant and substantial time arrangement between the child and the father. Nevertheless, the Single Expert remained of the view that a change of residence at this stage was not supported, albeit she contended that it was marginal and finely balanced.

1. I raised with the Single Expert whether the Court should make interim orders and bring the matter back in approximately six months' time and determine then what final arrangements should be made for the child. That proposal had, as an attraction, the ability to really test the genuineness of the mother's proposal and to determine whether she was really committed to maintaining a relationship between the child and the father. The Single Expert was somewhat ambivalent about whether such a proposal was in the best interests of the child but recognised that it would provide at least some evidence of the mother's willingness to facilitate a meaningful relationship, consistent with the orders that the Single Expert then promoted.

1. After the interim orders were made, the proceedings were adjourned part heard to recommence in November 2024. Instead of reflecting upon her conduct, the mother was found to have effectively 'doubled-down' on her allegations against the father and took additional steps to frustrate the child spending time with the father. Her conduct, in that respect is detailed at [160] - [174] of the judgment.
2. Faced with that history, the primary judge determined that a change in primary care was necessary to prevent further frustration of the child's relationship with the father.
3. The Court ordered that the mother spend time with the child on alternate weekends and for half of the school holidays; during which time the child would spend time with their two half-siblings born during a relationship the mother had with a previous partner.
4. Having regard to the potential distress which a change in primary residency would cause the child, the primary judge declined to impose a moratorium on the child spending time with the mother during their transition into the father's primary care.
5. Orders were also made for the child to spend time with the mother on special occasions but orders for the child to spend time with each parent on birthdays was found to be impracticable due to travelling distance between the two households at [234].
6. By way of summary, the final orders provided for:
   • The child to live with the father starting from the first Friday after the making of the orders; that is, from 14 March 2025.
   • The child to spend time with the mother, as agreed in writing, or failing agreement:
     • Each alternate weekend from Friday 5:00 pm to Sunday 5:00 pm, and until 5:00 pm Monday if it is a long weekend; and
     • Half of all Queensland school holidays.
   • On Father's Day, the child spends the full weekend with the father, with make-up time for the mother the following weekend.
   • On Mother's Day, the child spends the full weekend with the mother, with make-up time for the father the following weekend.
   • At Easter and Christmas, time is to be arranged on an alternating arrangement basis on even/odd years.
   • The child is to have video calls with the mother on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 6:00 pm to 6:30 pm, facilitated by the father.
     • Similar arrangements apply during school holidays with the non-residential parent.
   • The father is granted sole parental responsibility for all major long-term decisions concerning the child, subject to the father:
     • Informing the mother via AppClose of any decision to be made;
     • Considering her views if provided within five days; and
     • Notifying her of the final decision within five days.

1. In her Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 4 July 2025, the mother relied on the following grounds of appeal:

(1) The learned trial judge acted upon a wrong principle.

(a) The Learned trial Justice did not consider Section 4, 4A or 4B of the Family Law Act 1975 in consideration and assessment of Family Violence and Risk at paragraphs 55-169.

(2) The learned trial judge erred on the facts as follows.

(a) At Paragraph 202 of the Judgment by His Honour of 13 March 2025, His Honour fell into error where it was stated that the mother has persistently failed to communicate with the father about major long term decisions about the child where there were no long term decisions.

(b) The learned trial Justice erred on the facts at paragraph 222 of Judgement in the reference to admissions where there was a copy of a Police Protection Notice evidencing the fathers admissions annexed to the trial Affidavit of the Applicant mother filed 16 July 2023 at pages 75 and 76.

(3) The learned trial judge failed to take into account material considerations listed as follows;

(a) In the Judgement of 13 March 2025 and assessment of Family Violence and Risk at paragraphs 55 through 169, 217 His Honour did not consider Sections 4A and 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975.

(b) At paragraph 217 of the Judgement of 13 March 2025 his Honour in making the comment "I am satisfied that this request was done with the hope that police might investigate one of her baseless allegations with the aim to frustrate and thwart a relationship between the child and the father" failed to take into consideration previous Protection Orders made in Town PP, NSW, finding of Child Protection Queensland (mid-2022) that the child had been exposed to emotional harm by the Respondent and the Respondent pleading guilty to breach of a Protection Order early 2022.

(c) The learned trial Justice and the Family report writer at paragraph 206 in assessing impact of separation from siblings or the mother as primary carer failed to take into consideration the finding of existing emotional harm finding by Child Protective Services, Queensland.

(4) The learned trial judge's decision was plainly unreasonable or unjust;

(a) The learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration the Affidavit filed by the Applicant 13 November 2024 (annexing previously served material) that had been filed and served on the parties and their representatives prior to 29 January 2025 though not brought to the attention of the court by representatives during trial dates preventing the Applicant from being able to present their case.

(b) The learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration issues were raised as to the existence of evidence in the Affidavit of the Applicant filed 1,13 November 2024 at paragraphs 15,16,17 and 20 November 2024 concerning errors of fact in the third Family Report at paragraph 46 and second Family Report at paragraph 51.

(c) It is submitted that the learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration the fact that Psychologist for the Respondent, Ms M, was not cross examined as to the material relied upon by the father to verify credibility, test evidence relied upon or investigate the Respondents insight regarding Family Violence and considerations of Family Violence pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

(d) The learned Justice failed to take into consideration that evidence to correct errors in the record and Family Reports were filed/served and a further Application in a Proceeding (filed1 November 2024) was filed to bring the issue of errors in evidence to the attention of the court.

(e) The error in the record at paragraph 46 of the third Family Report by Ms AA remains in error.

(f) The error in the record at paragraph 51 of the second Family Report by Ms AA filed 10 August 2022 remains in error.

(6) There were circumstances leading to perception of apprehended bias and procedural fairness

(a) The learned Justice failed to take into consideration that evidence (in the form of Affidavit material filed 13 November 2024 exhibiting clear test results, professional reports regarding relapse prevention and anger management course completion for Witness Mr C), was filed/served to address errors on the record and the need or basis for restraint.

(b) The learned Justice in their considerations of systems abuse failed or did not take into consideration the father opposing an Application in a proceeding filed 30 October 2023 based on the Applicant being diagnosed with serious illness and requiring urgent abdominal surgery to preserve life and more specifically an illness requiring urgent surgery and the impact on the child of the mother becoming terminally ill if surgery was not received at paragraphs 231, 29 of Judgement delivered 13 March 2025.

(c) The learned trial Justice did not consider Section 4, 4A, 4AB Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) or Systems abuse in relation to the withholding of consent by the father to jointly seek adjourning proceedings to afford the Applicant having an urgent medical operation/procedure necessary to prevent serious illness, to preserve and prolong life.

1. There is a strong presumption as to the correctness of the primary judgment with the appellant carrying the onus of establishing material error: Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627 and Boulton & Boulton [2024] FedCFamC1A 132; (2024) FLC 94-202 at [19]- [20] and [22]).
2. The weight given to evidence in the exercise of a judicial discretion under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") is a matter that is quintessentially for the primary judge. The fact that an Appellate Court might have arrived at a different outcome, by virtue of affording different weight to various matters, does not justify the reversal of the decision of the primary judge: Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 519.
3. Similarly, a finding of fact will not be disturbed unless those findings are demonstrated to be "wrong by 'incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony', or 'glaringly improbable' or 'contrary to compelling inferences": Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 331 ALR 550 at [43] and Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129. In that context, it is not the role of an Appellate Court to conduct a second trial with a view to reconsidering the evidence and submissions made at first instance: Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328 at [118] per Heydon JA (Santow JA and Gzell J concurring).
4. In making orders pursuant to Pt VII of the Act, the primary judge exercised the broad discretion reposed in the Court. Accordingly, the primary judge's conclusions attract the standard of appellate review articulated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 ("House v The King") which requires the identification of an error of principle or a material error of fact, the consideration of irrelevant material or the failure to consider relevant material, or, if no specific error can be identified, demonstration that the decision is "unreasonable or plainly unjust" (House v The King p. 505).

1. The Full Court's consideration of the grounds of appeal was complicated by the appellant mother relying on an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 4 July 2025 and a Summary of Argument filed on that day but which referred to the mother's original grounds of appeal filed on 2 May 2025.
2. Nevertheless, in circumstances where the mother is self-represented, the Court endeavoured to correlate the arguments set out in her Summary of Argument, with the amended grounds of appeal.

Ground 6 - Alleged Apprehended Bias and Absence of Procedural Fairness

1. Grounds of appeal in relation to bias and procedural fairness challenge the integrity of the administration of justice and, accordingly, must be dealt with first, before other discrete grounds of appeal are considered: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577 at 611-612 and 634; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9]-[10].
2. Therefore, the Court shall turn first to Ground 6 which contends the reasons of the trial judge are vitiated by both apprehended bias and the absence of procedural fairness.

1. I will deal firstly with the contentions that the decision is vitiated by apprehended bias.
2. The relevant test in considering the question of apprehended bias was recently described by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in State of New South Wales v JR [2024] NSWCA 308 at [253] - [254] as follows:

The test for apprehended bias is the "double might" test of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably consider that the judicial officer might not carry out his or her judicial functions with an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issues arising on the motion: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6];Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls ( 2011) 244 CLR 427; [2011] HCA 48 at [31]. This test is objective. It does not require an assessment of the state of mind of the judge, as is necessary on an inquiry about actual bias: Michael Wilson at [33].

The application of this test requires, first, the identification of what it is said might lead the decision-maker to decide a question other than on the merits of that question and, second, an articulation of the logical connection between the matter identified and the apprehended or feared deviation from the course of deciding the question other than on its merits: Ebner at [8], Michael Wilson at [32]-[33]. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. This is sometimes referred to as the third step: Ebner at [8]; Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20 at [59] (Gageler J); Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29 at [11]; CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50 at [21] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J).

1. The appellant's amended grounds of appeal do not allege conduct that would satisfy the first aspect of the test referred to in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337. That is, the appellant has not identified the issue or issues in respect to which a fair-minded lay observer might consider the primary judge might not carry out his or her judicial function with an impartial and unprejudiced mind.
2. Accordingly, in so far as the Amended Notice of Appeal contends apprehended bias on the part of the primary judge, this ground of appeal is without merit.

1. In respect of the alleged denial of procedural fairness, the appellant mother asserts, at p.8 -9 of her Summary of Argument, that:

The learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration the Affidavit filed by the Applicant 13 November 2024 (annexing previously served material) that had been filed and served on the parties and their representatives prior to 29 January 2025 though not brought to the attention of the court by representatives during trial dates preventing the Applicant from being able to present their case. It is submitted that the material was filed to correct errors of fact contained within the Family Reports more specifically being paragraph 51 of the Second Family Report (Paragraph 51 of the Appeal Book, Item 36) and paragraph 46 of the third Family Report (Item 38 Settled Appeal Index, page 931 of the Appeal Book) that are incorrect statements.

1. In his Summary of Argument, the respondent father contends that, at paragraphs [32]-[34]:

Procedural fairness requires each party to be given an adequate opportunity to be heard, and to present their cases. Procedural fairness is only concerned with the fairness of the hearing, and not the fairness of the outcome.

Procedural fairness does not involve a fixed body of rules to be applied in a formulaic manner. It's role is to avoid practical injustice.

An absence to afford procedural fairness must be material before it invites appellate intervention. A breach is only material if it operates to deny a party an opportunity to be properly heard (to give evidence or to make arguments) and thereby deprived that party of the possibility of a different and more favourable outcome. It is submitted that this is distinctly not the case in this matter.

[footnotes omitted]

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer noted at paragraphs [35] and [38] of their Summary of Argument that the mother raised broad complaints regarding a lack of procedural fairness but that such complaints were without substance. This is because, in so far as the mother contends the primary judge failed to consider an affidavit filed by her on 13 November 2024, the Independent Children's Lawyer submits that the affidavit was not part of the evidence.
2. There is, with respect, substance in the submission of the Independent Children's Lawyer. On 29 January 2025, the matter resumed for further hearing. The mother had filed several affidavits in November 2024, including one dated 13 November 2024. In respect to that affidavit, Counsel for the mother, Mr Duplock, sought leave, at the outset of the hearing, to rely on three affidavits filed in November 2024, including the 13 November affidavit.
3. His Honour required the mother to nominate a single affidavit to rely upon, in accordance with trial directions made in respect to the proceedings. When Counsel for the mother initially elected to rely on the affidavit of 13 November 2024, the primary judge questioned Counsel as to the relevance of that affidavit, given that the mother's final position, at hearing, was to seek unsupervised time for the father, and not to press for supervision or risk-based orders (Transcript, 29 January 2025 p. 5 line 4).
4. During the course of that discussion, the primary judge observed that, in the above-mentioned circumstances, much of the content of the 13 November 2024 affidavit - particularly the material asserting risk or supporting the making of orders for supervision - was rendered irrelevant.
5. Ultimately, Counsel for the mother conceded that most of the 13 November 2024 affidavit was not relevant and did not press reliance on that affidavit for the purposes of the Final Hearing (Transcript, 29 January 2025 p.5 line 40).
6. Accordingly, this ground of appeal, in so far as it contends there was a denial of procedural fairness, is also without merit.
7. Having determined the grounds of appeal in respect of alleged apprehended bias and the absence of procedural fairness, I will now consider the balance of grounds of appeal contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 4 July 2025.

GROUND 1 - THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE ACTED UPON A WRONG PRINCIPLE IN THAT THE LEARNED TRIAL JUSTICE DID NOT CONSIDER SECTION 4, 4A OR 4B OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 IN CONSIDERATION AND ASSESSMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE AND RISK AT PARAGRAPHS 55-169.

1. It is the case that the primary judge did not explicitly refer to ss 4, 4A, or 4B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") in their reasons for judgment. Those sections define "family violence" for the purpose of the Act and provide examples as to what constitutes family violence and exposure to family violence. However, a failure to specifically refer to a legislative provision does not, in and of itself, demonstrate appealable error: Willmore & Menendez [2022] FedCFamC1A 73 at [93] and the cases cited therein. This is in circumstances where the judgment demonstrates that the principles embedded in those sections were considered by the primary judge.
2. In that respect, the primary judge made specific findings that the father had engaged in acts of family violence including the following:
   • Being angry and frustrated with the mother;
   • Calling the mother derogatory terms and names;
   • Urinating at the end of the bed when intoxicated;
   • Locking up the house after the mother had left, although she had a key to return;
   • Driving off in anger during an incident in Victoria but contacting the mother the next morning and apologizing;
   • Getting angry when intoxicated and punching a door in anger;
   • Unintentionally walking in on the mother's daughter in the shower;
   • Arguments in front of the children about money and throwing the remote control on the ground; and
   • Placing the mother in a bear hug from behind.
3. The primary judge noted that those allegations, which were candidly admitted by the father, constituted family violence at [68].
4. The primary judge also considered but ultimately rejected at [58] and [68], the mother's broader allegations that the father engaged in a pattern of physical, emotional, psychological, and financial abuse. This included allegations that the father engaged in:
   • Physical violence, such as holding a weapon to her throat, butting her chest, punching a door, and threatening to kill her;
   • Self-harming behaviour;
   • Verbal abuse, involving derogatory name-calling, accusations of prostitution, and disparaging remarks made in the presence of the children;
   • Substance misuse, including excessive alcohol consumption while on prescription painkillers and engaging in compulsive gambling;
   • Aggressive behaviour, such as throwing her belongings onto the lawn, smashing household items, and yelling at her children;
   • The provision of alcohol to an 11-year-old and inappropriate conduct towards her son while he was showering; and
   • Coercive control and surveillance, including monitoring the appellant's activities post-separation, breaching domestic violence orders, and engaging in stalking behaviour.
5. Due to concerns about her credibility, the primary judge was not persuaded by the mother's evidence unless it was corroborated by an objectively sourced document or established through the father's admissions [48].
6. In preferring the evidence of the father where it conflicted with that of the mother, the primary judge noted that the mother's allegations were inconsistent and seemed to be aimed at limiting the father's contact with the child or avoiding a change in primary care at [49]. This included her claim that the father was "grooming" the child for sexual abuse which was seen as a desperate and manipulative attempt to distort an innocuous event [49]. The primary judge also noted that the mother had no evidence to explain the abandonment of her assertions as to the risk of harm posed by the father at [49].
7. Given that factual analysis, it was reasonably open for the primary judge to prefer the evidence of the father where it conflicted with that of the mother.
8. While finding that the father had perpetrated acts of family violence, the primary judge found that the father had taken steps to address his past conduct. The primary judge agreed with the opinion of the single expert that the father had made significant efforts to reduce his alcohol consumption and had demonstrated, through independent testing, that he had no problematic use of alcohol over a sustained period since April 2022 at [77]. It was also noted that the father had engaged with support services to improve his parenting capacity and had shown a keen and genuine desire to develop a positive relationship with his child at [80].
9. The judge accepted the conclusions of the family report writer, who had assessed that the father made substantial and sustained changes to position himself as a safe and responsible parent. The report writer noted that the father's previous alcohol and prescription medication misuse, as well as mental health concerns, were no longer current factors. The primary judge also found that the father's efforts to address his vulnerabilities and improve his parenting insight and capacity were both credible and supported by the evidence at [212].
10. As a result, the primary judge was satisfied that the father "does not pose a risk of harm to the child let alone an unacceptable risk of the type variously contended by the mother" [83].
11. There was no error in the approach of the primary judge, who gave detailed consideration to the issue of family violence and made findings that were each reasonably open to him on the evidence, in assessing family violence and risk.
12. Accordingly, there is not merit to this ground of appeal.

Ground (2) - The learned trial judge erred on the facts.

1. Ground 2, which is comprised of two sub grounds, contends that the primary judge erred on the facts.

1. I will firstly consider sub ground (a) which is as follows:

At Paragraph 202 of the Judgment by His Honour of 13 March 2025, His Honour fell into error where it was stated that the mother has persistently failed to communicate with the father about major long term decisions about the child where there were no long term decisions.

1. Relevantly, at [202] the primary judge stated:

I am satisfied that the mother has persistently failed to communicate with the father about major long-term decisions in relation to the child and would continue to do so the most recent example being Exhibit 44 as referred to above. I accept that the father has consistently sought to spend more time with the child and that the mother has persistently sought to restrict it.

1. Contrary to that which is asserted in this sub-ground of appeal, there was specific evidence that justified the relevant finding by his Honour. Indeed, [202] immediately follows an extract of the evidence given by the family report writer during the trial as set out below:

MS WARDLE: Would you characterise the way the mother has exercised decision-making to date as that excluding the other party?

MS AA: I am not aware of any times when Ms Joslyne has consulted with the father. So yes I believe that she has excluded over those key decisions.

(Transcript, 4 March 2024, p. 192 lines 40 - 45)

1. That opinion, and the finding of the primary judge, was reasonably open on the evidence. For example, records produced by the child's school, referenced in the judgment at [170] and tendered as Exhibit 44 at trial, evidenced the mother's attempts to limit the father's involvement in their child's life. Specifically, the records included a communication from the mother to the child's school requesting that the school provide the father with only academic information about the child. It was reasonably open to the primary judge to find that this was a deliberate attempt by the mother to deny the father information about his son's progress at school and to impede his ability to participate in his child's education.
2. Additionally, the primary judge found that the mother has taken steps to limit the father's contact with the child. This included the mother attempting to frustrate the father's relationship with the child by making baseless complaints to authorities and not facilitating the father's time with the child as ordered by the court (at [160] - [169]).

1. Part (b) of this ground of appeal is as follows:

The learned trial Justice erred on the facts at paragraph 222 of Judgement in the reference to admissions where there was a copy of a Police Protection Notice evidencing the fathers admissions annexed to the trial Item 27 Appeal Book, Affidavit of the Applicant mother dated 15 July 2023 at pages 500 and 501.

1. At [222], the primary judge stated that he drew "no inference" from a Domestic Violence Order in circumstances where "it was made on a without admissions basis".
2. Relevantly, pages 500 - 501 of the Appeal Book, which reproduce the annexures at p 75 - 76 of the mother's trial affidavit filed 15 July 2023, contain a copy of an Application for a Police Protection Notice dated 12 May 2021 which names the father as the respondent and the mother and child as protected persons alongside the mother's two children of a previous relationship. The relevant event referred to in that application alleges that, during an argument on 12 May 2025:

... the respondent has approached the aggrieved and placed her in a bear hug from behind. She has dropped her phone and he has thrown this outside. Again the children were home and witness to this occurring. The respondent has then told the aggrieved that it was over and he would "get her and hunt her down."

1. Under cross examination by Counsel for the mother, the father stated that he admitted to police that he "bear hugged" the mother causing her to drop her phone but denied admitting to police that he told the mother he "would get her and hunt her down" and, furthermore, denied making the comment to the mother (Transcript, 4 March 2024 at p 155). In circumstances where the primary judge found the father to be a witness of truth, it was reasonably open for the primary judge to accept that evidence.
2. Based on the admissions of the father, the primary judge found that the father had placed the mother in a bear hug from behind at [13] and [65]. The primary judge did not, however, accept those allegations of the mother which were not admitted by the father. As earlier noted, this was the result of adverse credibility findings in respect to the mother and the denials by the father to which I have referred.
3. Authorities recognise that the advantage enjoyed by a trial judge in determining factual questions extends, not only findings of fact, but to inferences drawn or not drawn from those findings: FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236 at [203]. No error has been established in the primary judge refraining from drawing any inference from the father consenting to the Application to the Protection Order in circumstances where that consent by the father was on a without admissions basis.
4. Accordingly, this sub ground of appeal is also without merit.

GROUND 3 - THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. As this ground of appeal is also pleaded in sub-grounds, each sub ground will be separately considered.

In the Judgement of 13 March 2025 and assessment of Family Violence and Risk at paragraphs 55 through 169, 217 His Honour did not consider Sections 4A and 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975.

1. This sub ground of appeal raises the same issues as those raised in Ground 1. For similar reasons to those earlier provided in respect to Ground 1, this sub-ground of appeal also fails.

At paragraph 217 of the Judgement of 13 March 2025 his Honour in making the comment "I am satisfied that this request was done with the hope that police might investigate one of her baseless allegations with the aim to frustrate and thwart a relationship between the child and the father" failed to take into consideration previous Protection Orders made in Town PP, NSW, finding of Child Protection Queensland (mid-2022) that the child had been exposed to emotional harm by the Respondent and the Respondent pleading guilty to breach of a Protection Order early 2022.

1. The relevant finding of the primary judge at [217] was made following a reference by the primary judge, in the immediately preceding paragraph, to an application made by the mother for following order:

That leave be granted for the Applicant to provide Family law documents, Orders and correspondence be released to the Queensland Police Service and lawyers for the purposes of investigating criminal breaches of the Domestic Violence Order commencing proceedings in State Courts.

1. The reasons of the primary judge make it clear that his Honour's conclusion, as to the mother making baseless complaints against the father, was based on extensive evidence including:
   • Numerous complaints by the mother to police and child protection services, including:
     • Alleging a breach of a Domestic Violence Order due to the father parking near her at a McDonald's restaurant (Exhibit 14), which police determined to be a chance encounter and that such an allegation was unfounded;
     • Complaining about stickers in a lolly bag given to the child by the father (Exhibit 11), which police investigated and declined to prosecute;
     • Contacting Queensland Child Safety immediately after orders were made for the father to spend time with the child as supervised by the paternal grandfather (Exhibit 23), without disclosing that such time was court-ordered; and
     • Lodging a complaint about a photograph and candy canes months after the event, coinciding with the father's request to attend a school event (Exhibit 47), and in respect of which police found that no offence had occurred.
2. Further to the above, multiple applications filed by the mother were found to have lacked merit and were designed to delay proceedings or disrupt the father's time with the child, including:
   • An application for a forensic psycho-sexual assessment of the father, which dismissed in Joslyne & Carrel (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 25;
   • An application to discharge the family report writer and reduce the father's time (30 October 2023) which was dismissed;
   • An application to proceed on an undefended basis (1 November 2024), which was dismissed; and
   • An Amended Initiating Application (13 November 2024) (Exhibit 43), which was earlier referred to, seeking leave to release family law documents to police, despite no evidence being presented to indicate the police had requested such information.
3. In the context of that evidence, the primary judge accepted the opinion of the family report writer that the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour at [228]. Therefore, having regard to the relevant evidence and the opinion of the family report writer, the primary judge concluded that there is a significant risk that the mother will continue to make baseless complaints and take steps to frustrate the child's relationship with the father if she remained the child's primary carer at [229].
4. This conclusion, that the mother would likely continue to undermine the child's relationship with the father should the child remain in her primary care, was soundly based on the evidence to which his Honour referred. This is particularly so in circumstances where aspects of that conduct continued even after the primary judge, in March 2024, adjourned the proceedings for a period of six months to provide the mother an opportunity to reflect upon the weight of evidence presented during the hearing; including the opinions expressed by the family report writer. The conduct of the mother which continued even after the adjournment included the following:
   • Seeking a psycho-sexual assessment of the father based on an incident where his genitals were accidentally exposed while the child sat on his lap - an allegation which the Court found to be baseless, opportunistic and designed to delay proceedings and undermine the father's time with the child;
   • Filing an application to reintroduce supervision of the father's time in November 2024, despite having previously abandoned the need for supervision in March 2024; and
   • Attempting to have the Final Hearing proceed on an undefended basis for reasons which the Court described as a "mystery" and entirely unmeritorious at [161].
5. This evidence, together with those findings in respect of the mother's conduct in the period prior to March 2024, justified the findings of the primary judge that the mother's conduct was consistently obstructive, manipulative, and aimed at frustrating the child's relationship with the father and, furthermore, would likely continue in the future.
6. In the joint judgment of Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ in Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55], their Honours stated that the advantage enjoyed by a trial judge, afforded by their opportunity to gain "impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses", extends to "findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts." In this case, I are satisfied that the primary judge enjoyed that same advantage and that his findings were reasonably open on the evidence.
7. Accordingly, this sub ground of appeal is without merit.

The learned trial Justice and the Family report writer at paragraph 206 in assessing impact of separation from siblings or the mother as primary carer failed to take into consideration the finding of existing emotional harm finding by Child Protective Services, Queensland.

1. This ground of appeal is misconceived. At [206] of his reasons for judgment, the primary judge expressed concern in respect to the potential loss of the relationship between the child and his father and not the potential impact of orders for change of residence; although this was elsewhere considered. Relevantly, [206] is as follows:

That said I have little doubt given the mother's attitude to date that she will attempt to frustrate his relationship with his father and that a loss of that relationship will be intensely felt by the child and have long-term consequences.

1. The finding, as to the potential impact of the loss of the child's relationship with the father, in no way diminished the primary judge's acute awareness of the potential impact which orders for a change of primary residence would have upon the child. In these circumstances, the primary judge's focus on that potential impact was entirely appropriate. In Simmons & Simmons [2023] FedCFamC1A 44; (2023) FLC 94-137 at [52] the Full Court recognised that orders changing a child's place of residence from that of their primary caregiver has the potential to cause significant emotional distress to the impacted child. In Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221; (2022) FLC 94-123 at [30] the Full Court stated that, in contemplating such an order, the Court should therefore reflect upon "the immediate, medium and long-term impact of proposed orders upon the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being."
2. In this case, the primary judge gave careful consideration to that potential impact upon the child of orders for a change of residence and specifically noted that this change would be distressing for the child and that he would likely "suffer a sense of emotional loss" at [205]. The primary judge was also concerned that, in making such an order, the child would also have a lesser relationship with his half-siblings at [205].
3. However, as against that negative impact upon the child, the judge also found that the mother had consistently attempted to frustrate the child's relationship with the father, and that a loss of the relationship with the father would be intensely felt by the child and have long-term consequences at [206]. Ultimately, the primary judge concluded that the only way the child could have any form of relationship with both parents, was where the child resided primarily with the father, despite the distress caused by the change at [234].
4. In respect to this sub-ground of appeal, the mother contends, at p. 8 of her Summary of Argument, that the primary judge failed to have regard to the findings of Child Protection and/or any referrals made in relation to family violence. In doing so, she makes specific reference to pages 116 - 119 of the mother's trial affidavit filed 15 July 2023.
5. Those pages contain a copy of a report from "QQ Organisation" and a one-page exit summary from the service ("the QQ Organisation documents"). The report notes that the child received early childhood intervention support from QQ Organisation under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) between September 2022 and April 2023. The report and discharge letter summarise several behavioural and emotional regulation challenges faced by the child and make recommendations as to how such challenges might be addressed in the future.
6. It is the case that the QQ Organisation documents are not referenced in the judgment. It is, however, unnecessary for a trial judge to "mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue"(Whisprun Pty Ltd formerly Northeast Exports Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62]).
7. While not expressly referencing the QQ Organisation documents, it is clear that the primary judge was aware of the potential impact of the parties' conduct on the child's emotional wellbeing and future development and that such matters were considered when determining what orders were in the child's best interests.
8. In that respect the primary judge referred to and accepted the assessment of the family report writer that:
   • The mother's efforts to interfere with the child's relationship with his father were detrimental to the child's emotional development [74];
   • The lack of a healthy relationship with both parents was likely to adversely impact the child's long-term ability to develop a healthy self-identity [73];
   • The mother's actions, such as making baseless complaints and attempting to frustrate the child's relationship with the father, were harmful to the child's emotional well-being [80]; and
   • The mother has denied the child "the right to complete identity formation" and that her behaviour could lead to the child feeling isolated and rejected [87] and [151].
9. In the context of the primary judge's consideration of the impact of the parental conflict and the mother's role in that conflict, it cannot be said that the failure of the primary judge to refer to the QQ Organisation documents was material to the outcome of the proceedings (Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203 at [37]).
10. Accordingly, this sub-ground of appeal is without merit.

GROUND 4 - THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE'S DECISION WAS PLAINLY UNREASONABLE OR UNJUST

1. While framed as a reasonableness challenge, this sub-ground of appeal, in substance, appears to contend that the primary judge failed to consider material facts; namely, those set out in the 7 sub-grounds of appeal. It is therefore necessary to consider each of those sub-grounds separately.

a) The learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration the Affidavit filed by the Applicant 13 November 2024 (annexing previously served material) that had been filed and served on the parties and their representatives prior to 29 January 2025 though not brought to the attention of the court by representatives during trial dates preventing the Applicant from being able to present their case.

1. For reasons earlier set out at paragraphs 42 - 45 herein, noting that the mother's affidavit of 13 November 2024 was not relied upon in the proceedings, there is no merit in this ground of appeal.

b) The learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration issues were raised as to the existence of evidence in the Affidavit of the Applicant filed 1,13 November 2024 at paragraphs 15,16,17 and 20 November 2024 concerning errors of fact in the third Family Report at paragraph 46 and second Family Report at paragraph 51.

1. The documents relied upon by the mother at the first instance proceedings are referred to at [16] of the reasons and are set below:
   • Initiating Application filed 26 June 2023;
   • Affidavit of mother sworn 15 July 2023;
   • Affidavit of mother sworn 16 February 2024;
   • Financial Statement filed 14 July 2023;
   • Notice of child abuse, family violence or risk filed 5 August 2021; and
   • Outline of Case Document.
2. That paragraph reflects the advice provided to the Court by Counsel for the mother in the first instance proceedings (Transcript, 1 March 2024, p 166). Furthermore, the above-listed documents were set out in the mother's case outline document filed in the proceedings at first instance and confirmed by her Counsel as the documents upon which she relied during the hearing. The mother is bound by the way in which her case was conducted and the forensic decisions of her Counsel (R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 683 - 684).
3. Accordingly, this sub-ground of appeal is without merit.

_ It is submitted that the learned trial Justice failed to take into consideration the fact that Psychologist for the Respondent [Ms M] was not cross examined as to the material relied upon by the father to verify credibility, test evidence relied upon or investigate the Respondents insight regarding Family Violence and considerations of Family Violence pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)._*

1. Counsel for the mother did not seek to cross examine the psychologist for the respondent, Ms M.
2. This is specifically confirmed at p. 5 of the Transcript dated 1 March 2024. Further, at p. 12 of that transcript, Counsel for the mother confirmed that she required Ms AA, the family report writer, for cross examination but made no such request in respect to Ms M.
3. As earlier noted, a party is bound by the forensic decisions made by their counsel during the proceedings.
4. Accordingly, this sub-ground of appeal is without merit.

d) The learned Justice failed to take into consideration that evidence to correct errors in the record and Family Reports were filed/served and a further Application in a Proceeding (filed 1 November 2024) was filed to bring the issue of errors in evidence to the attention of the court.

1. In respect to this sub-ground of appeal, the mother argues that error has occurred as a result of the primary judge failing to consider affidavit material filed on 13 November 2024 which annexed previously served material intended to correct factual errors in the second and third family reports (specifically, paragraph 51 of the second report and paragraph 46 of the third report).
2. I have earlier set out the evidence relied upon by the mother in the proceedings at first instance. She did not seek to rely upon an affidavit filed on 13 November 2024 nor did she seek to rely upon material filed in support of an Application in a Proceeding filed on 1 November 2024.
3. Accordingly, that evidence was not before the Court and, as such, there was no error on the part of the primary judge in failing to have regard to it.
4. Additionally, I note that Counsel for the mother had the opportunity, during cross examination, to put such material to the family report writer as considered necessary to correct any error contained in any of the reports of the family report writer. That did not occur.
5. Finally, in respect to this sub-ground of appeal, it is not explained, by the mother, how any perceived error in the reports of the family report writer, were material to the outcome of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, this sub-ground of appeal fails.

e) The error in the record at paragraph 46 of the third Family Report by Ms AA remains in error.

1. At paragraph 46 of her third family report, Ms AA stated:

There is a current five-year Protection Order listing the father as the respondent and the mother as the aggrieved with the child and his older half siblings as named children. This expires July 2026. There have been no formal breaches of this Order.

1. The relevant evidence in respect to the father's non-compliance with a protection order was before the Court and is clarified by the mother during her cross-examination; the relevant exchange is set out below (Transcript, 21 August 2023, p. 11):

MS EVISTON: It's still one of the risks that you continue to raise about my client being a risk to the child in terms of domestic violence?

MS JOSLYNE: Yes.

MS EVISTON: And you raise that on the basis of breaches of the domestic violence order?

MS JOSLYNE: I raise it on - based on a number of factors.

MS EVISTON: Ma'am, you raise it on the basis of breaches of domestic violence order?

MS JOSLYNE: That would be one of them.

MS EVISTON: And how many breaches has my client been charged with?

MS JOSLYNE: My understanding is he has been charged - sorry, charged and convicted with one.

MS EVISTON: He has been charged and convicted with one in [early] 2022; you would accept that?

MS JOSLYNE: Yes.

MS EVISTON: And he received no conviction recorded and a fine?

MS JOSLYNE: Yes. I believe there's a certificate of recognisance.

MS EVISTON: Sorry, yes. Correct. I withdraw my question. He did receive a good behaviour bond in that regard. So you will accept that?

MS JOSLYNE: Yes.

MS EVISTON: And he didn't breach the good behaviour bond, did he?

MS JOSLYNE: Not to my knowledge, no.

MS EVISTON: And that was the last breach that he was charged with?

HIS HONOUR: Well, that's the only breach.

MS EVISTON: It's the only breach that he has been charged with. And that was back in [early] 2022.

1. Thereafter, the transcript records the mother attempting to explain why she advised the family report writer of more recent occasions where the respondent father had breached a protection order. A fair characterisation of the evidence provided by the mother is that she believed there had been further breaches but that such breaches were not confirmed by any evidence produced by the mother during the hearing.
2. In so far as the mother asserts error in paragraph 106 of the third family report, she provided evidence to correct the record and it rose no higher than the father being convicted of breaching such an order in early 2022.
3. As earlier noted, the primary judge acknowledged that a Protection Order was made against the father on a "without admissions" basis and, accordingly, the primary judge gave no weight to its evidentiary value other than to the extent that the father admitted certain conduct referred to in the application for the protection order.
4. The primary judge did not accept the mother's evidence that the father had breached the Protection Order on multiple occasions and found the mother's numerous complaints to that effect were baseless and aimed at frustrating the father's relationship with the child rather than protecting against genuine risk.
5. For these reasons, in so far as there is error at paragraph 46 of the third Family report, it is not an error that is material to the outcome of the case.

f) The error in the record at paragraph 51 of the second Family Report by [Ms AA] filed 10 August 2022 remains in error.

1. Ms AA's only report of 2022 is dated 21 October 2022 not 10 August 2022. It is assumed that this sub ground of appeal is intended to refer to that report. At paragraph 51 of that report Ms AA states:

The couple moved into live together formally late 2014 as Ms Joslyne accepted a new position on the [City RR], the father then proposing to her over the Christmas period of the same year, 'I thought it .Vas sudden, but said yes anyway ... it's only an engagement'.

1. The mother has failed to identify how any error contained in that paragraph had a material impact on the outcome of the proceedings.
2. If I am wrong and the intention of the mother is to refer to paragraph 51 of the second report of Ms AA dated 8 August 2023, then the relevant paragraph is as follows:

[Mr C] 44 years [...] advised he met the mother in August 2021, moving to live together in November of 2022. He described their relationship as 'great, fresh. It's different...clean. We talk. We've never has conflicts. We have a lot in common'.

1. Having regard to that paragraph, it remains the case that the mother has failed to specify the nature of the error or how any such error was material to the outcome of the case.
2. Accordingly, this sub ground of appeal is without merit.

1. As there is no merit in any of the appellant's grounds of appeal, the appeal must be dismissed.

1. The respondent father sought an order for costs in the event of the appeal being dismissed. That was opposed by the mother.
2. The issue of costs in respect to proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") is to be determined in accordance with s 114UB of the Act. That section relevantly provides that, ordinarily, each party will bear their own costs in family law proceedings. However, the Court may depart from this position if it considers that the circumstances of the case justify the awarding of costs in favour of a party or parties. Those circumstances are set out in s 114UB(3) of the Act and include the following:

(a) the financial circumstances of each party to the proceedings;

(b) whether any party to the proceedings is receiving assistance by way of legal aid in respect of the proceedings and, if so, the terms of the grant of the assistance to that party;

(c) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting paragraphs (a) and (b), the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters, and in relation to their duty of disclosure under subsections 71B(1), 90RI(1) or 90YJA(1);

(d) whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;

(e) whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;

(f) whether a party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer;

(g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.

1. In Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311 at 315, when considering the equivalent section of the Act, the Court held that beyond the "essential preliminary" consideration of those matters set out above, there is no "additional or special onus" on the applicant, for the Court to make an order for costs.
2. In considering whether it is appropriate and just to make an order for costs in favour of a party, it is unnecessary for the Court to be satisfied in respect to each and every factor set out in s 114UB (Fitzgerald v Fish [2005] FamCA 158; (2005) 33 Fam LR 123 at 130 [41]). Nor does any factor set out in that section have priority over another (Medlon & Medlon (No 6) (Indemnity Costs) [2015] FamCAFC 157; (2015) FLC 93-664 at 80,400 [24]).
3. In opposing an order for costs, the mother referred to facing difficult financial circumstances, primarily in respect to the litigation in which she has been involved with the father. I note, however, that, pursuant to property adjustment orders made on 13 March 2025, the mother will be entitled to receive a lump sum amount of money. In any event, in Cross & Beaumont [2008] FamCAFC 68; (2008) 39 Fam LR 389 at 402 [60], the Full Court held that financial incapacity to pay a costs order is not a barrier to the making of such an order where the conduct of the party may warrant a costs order being made.
4. In considering the question of costs, I note that an appellant who has been wholly unsuccessful in their appeal will ordinarily be required to pay the respondent's costs (Medlow & Medlow (No 2) [2016] FamCAFC 63 at [30]). I am satisfied that this course is appropriate in this matter, particularly where all grounds of appeal have been found to be without merit.
5. The question then becomes whether the Court should award costs in a fixed sum as sought by the respondent. Rule 12.17(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) permits the Court to order costs in a specific amount. The power to do so is to "avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in protracted litigation arising out of taxation" (Graham & Squibb [2019] FamCAFC 33; (2019) FLC 93-892 at [92] quoting Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120).
6. I am satisfied that the costs sought by the respondent have been assessed at the relevant scale at $21,657.46 and that such costs are logical, fair and reasonable.
7. I acknowledge that there may be some time required for the property settlement orders to be implemented and, on that basis, we will require the appellant mother to pay costs of the respondent in the fixed sum of $21,657.46 within 90 days.

1. For all of these reasons, the appeal is dismissed and the appellant mother is required to pay costs of the respondent in the fixed sum of $21,657.46 within 90 days.

1. The appellant, Ms Joslyne, appeals parenting orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) on 13 March 2025 in respect of the parties' only child. By those orders, the child lives primarily with the respondent, Mr Carrel. The child is to spend alternate weekend time, generally from 5.00 pm on a Friday to 5.00 pm on a Sunday, or to 5.00 pm Monday in the event that it is a long weekend; and half of his school holidays with the appellant. The respondent has the obligation of an order for sole parental responsibility for the child.
2. We have the advantage of reading, in draft, the reasons of the Deputy Chief Justice. We agree with the orders that his Honour proposes for the disposition of this appeal. These are our reasons for so doing.
3. By her Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 4 July 2025, the appellant advances five grounds of appeal. The grounds allege an error of principle, errors of fact, a failure to take into account certain material considerations as well as assertions of apprehended bias and a lack of procedural fairness. None of the grounds have merit.

There was no appearance of bias or want of procedural fairness

1. Ground 6 (which seems to be erroneously numbered because the Amended Notice of Appeal only contains five grounds of appeal) has two parts. The first asserts that the trial judgment is infected by apprehended bias and the second that the primary judge failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness. These grounds are difficult to follow and are not the subject of any submissions from the appellant in her Summary of Argument filed on 4 July 2025.
2. To establish a claim of apprehended bias, the appellant must show that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide (see Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11]). In order to succeed, the appellant must first identify what it is said might lead the judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merit and then articulate the logical connection between that matter and the apprehension that the judge will not decide the case on its merits (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [8]).
3. Neither in her Amended Notice of Appeal, her summary of argument nor her oral argument does the appellant identify either of those matters. In the absence of a clear articulation of either, there is no basis for her to assert that the primary judge's decision is impugned by reason of apprehended bias.
4. The appellant asserts that a lack of procedural fairness arose in three ways. The first relies upon the proposition that the primary judge was somehow in error in not taking into account an affidavit deposed by the appellant and filed on 13 November 2024.
5. However, his Honour was not in error. Judges make their decisions based upon the evidence before them. In proceedings under Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), evidence is primarily given by affidavit. To become part of the body of evidence before the court, an affidavit must be read by the party seeking to rely upon it, its contents otherwise adopted by the deponent as his or her evidence in the case, or the affidavit or relevant parts thereof tendered by an opposing party as statements against interest or to prove a prior inconsistent statement. The affidavit at issue here falls into none of those categories. In the circumstances explained by the Deputy Chief Justice, the affidavit in question was not before the court and did not form part of the body of evidence before the primary judge. That being so, his Honour was right to pay it no attention.
6. The second and third aspects of this part of Ground 6 point to the respondent's opposition to an Application in a Proceeding filed by the appellant on 30 October 2023 for an adjournment of the trial because she had been diagnosed with a serious illness and, she says, required urgent surgery. It is difficult to understand the point of this ground in light of these facts:

(a) The trial of the proceedings was to recommence on 22 November 2023 following an adjournment of the proceedings by the primary judge on 22 August 2023.

(b) The appellant filed an Application in a Proceeding on 30 October 2023 in which she sought to adjourn the hearing of all future court dates by three months because her health was poor.

(c) In the same application she also sought further interim parenting orders designed to limit the child's time with the respondent, for the time to be supervised by a person other than the then appointed supervisor and that an alternate Family Report writer be appointed. She also sought some other orders.

(d) Insofar as the Application in a Proceeding sought an adjournment of future hearing dates, it was heard and determined by the primary judge on 1 November 2023. His Honour vacated the proposed resumption of the trial on 22 November 2023 to a date to be fixed following the filing of some further evidence about the appellant's health and the arrangements for the child.

(e) The balance of the Application in a Proceeding was adjourned to be heard and determined by another judge. Resumption of the part heard trial was listed for 1 March 2024.

(f) When the matter recommenced before the primary judge on 1 March 2024, no application was made by the appellant for the proceedings to be further adjourned for any reason.

1. Notwithstanding that the adjournment sought by the appellant in her Application in a Proceeding was granted, she argues that the primary judge failed to take into account, in his consideration of "systems abuse", that the respondent opposed the adjournment application. Further she asserts that the primary judge did not consider "Section 4, 4A, 4AB Family Law Act 1975 or Systems abuse in relation to the withholding of consent by the father to jointly seek adjourning proceedings".
2. None of these matters were raised by the appellant in the course of her counsel's submissions at the conclusion of the trial before the primary judge. Nothing was made of the fact that the respondent opposed the appellant's adjournment application and, there is no evidence that any particular prejudice flowed to her, or to the child for that matter, by reason of the respondent's stance in relation to the adjournment application.
3. This ground of appeal has no merit.

1. Alive to the difficulty that ordinarily confronts an appeal against a discretionary judgment, the first four grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant seek to engage the relevant principles identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505. In particular, she argues that:

(a) the primary judge has acted upon a wrong principle (Ground 1);

(b) the primary judge has made errors of fact (Ground 2);

(c) the primary judge has failed to take into account certain material considerations (Ground 3); and

(d) upon the facts of the case, the primary judge's orders are unreasonable or plainly unjust (Ground 4).

The primary judge did not act upon a wrong principle

1. The appellant does not particularise Ground 1 in her Amended Notice of Appeal other than to assert, and repeat in her summary of argument, that the primary judge did not consider ss 4 (or s 4(1) as set out in her summary of argument), 4A or 4B (or s 4AB as set out in her summary of argument) of the Act when he considered the issues of family violence and risk that she had raised in the trial.
2. Subsection 4(1) of the Act is the general interpretation section of the Act. It defines many terms within the Act, but for present purposes the definitions of abuse and family violence are relevant. That part of s 4(1) dealing with family violence directs attention to s 4AB which, in turn, provides a definition of family violence in s 4AB(1). It provides numerous examples of what will be within that definition in s 4AB(2) and s 4AB(2A).
3. It is correct to say that the primary judge did not refer in terms to s 4(1) or s 4AB. However, it was unnecessary for him to do so. The definitions direct attention to the behaviour of the party alleged to have perpetrated abuse or family violence and in most circumstances, to the effect of that behaviour on others the subject of it. The evidence informs findings about that behaviour such that, depending upon the allegations found proved by the court, the court might reach a factual conclusion as to the existence of the claimed abuse or family violence. But to do so does not require specific reference or recitation in reasons for judgment of the text of each of those sections. Rather, what is necessary, within the context of the issues framed by the parties for the court's determination, is an application of the provisions of the legislation to the facts found by the judge.
4. The primary judge's reasons demonstrate, with respect, an engagement with the issues raised by the appellant and the evidence she adduced to make good her case on those issues. His Honour resolved the contentious issues of fact between the parties to the extent they needed resolution having regard to the issues as they were finally formulated at the conclusion of the trial.
5. It is clear from his Honour's reasons that he understood the case that both parties wished to make insofar as both asserted, for different reasons, that the child was at risk of harm in the care of the other by reason of the other's conduct. In particular, the primary judge catalogued the appellant's allegations concerning the respondent's conduct, said to amount to family violence at [29]-[31], [44] and [58]-[60] of his reasons. On this appeal, the appellant did not suggest that the primary judge did not understand her case as it was put to him.
6. The respondent conceded some of the appellant's allegations concerning family violence. The primary judge recorded these concessions at [33] and [65] of his reasons. He made a finding that the respondent perpetrated family violence on the occasions conceded by him at [68]. The appellant does not cavil with this finding, notwithstanding that the primary judge did not refer to either s 4(1) or s 4AB(1) in terms when doing so.
7. Otherwise, the primary judge rejected the appellant's evidence about the episodes of conduct relied upon by her to establish a case based upon family violence or abuse of the child by the respondent at [66]-[69] of his reasons.
8. In her summary of argument, the appellant refers to Leventis & Leventis (No 7) [2024] FedCFamC1F 143 at [90]-[91]. Her reliance on those passages is, however, misplaced. The first recites orthodox statements concerning statutory interpretation. The second records the trial judge's findings in that case that one party had not proved the elements of the definition of family violence. Although those paragraphs represent an unremarkable application of the facts as found by the court in that case to the applicable law, they are of no assistance in resolving this appeal.
9. Even assuming that it was some failure of principle on the part of the primary judge not to refer in terms to s 4(1) or s 4AB of the Act, the argument is nonetheless of no utility because in final submissions the orders proposed by the appellant did not suppose that the child was at any risk of harm by reason of exposure to family violence or abuse from the respondent.
10. The appellant has not demonstrated the primary judge acted upon a wrong principle.

The primary judge did not make any errors of fact

1. In her Amended Notice of Appeal, the appellant particularises two factual errors made by the primary judge.
2. First, she submits that the primary judge erred when he stated at [202] of his reasons that she had persistently failed to communicate with the respondent about major long-term decisions about child, "where there were no long-term decisions [to be taken]".
3. However, this argument cannot succeed. There was evidence to support the primary judge's finding. The appellant's evidence was that there was no communication between she and the respondent at all. She said in cross-examination that she had not communicated with the respondent about schools for the child (Consolidated Transcript 21 August 2023, p.14 lines 18-30). Further, the evidence was that the appellant had failed to communicate with the respondent about the child's attendance upon a therapist and paediatrician (Consolidated Transcript 21 August 2023, p.14 lines 30-45 and 1 March 2024 p.29 line 30 to p.31 line 20) and that she had sought to limit the information provided by others to the respondent about the child (Exhibit 44). The finding made by the primary judge was open on the evidence.
4. Second, the appellant submits that the primary judge "erred on the facts at paragraph 222 of Judgement in the reference to admissions where there was a copy of a Police Protection Notice evidencing the father's admissions annexed to the trial Affidavit of the Applicant mother filed 16 July 2023 at pages 75 and 76".
5. This submission is misplaced. A little context about this is necessary. Following the issue of a Police Protection Notice issued pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) in May 2021 and a temporary protection order, a subsequent final protection order was issued for a period of five years in mid- 2021 by a Magistrates Court of Queensland (referred to in the primary judge's reasons as "the DVO").
6. At [222] of his reasons the primary judge says:

I draw no inference from the DVO in circumstances where it was made on a without admissions basis.

1. This was not a finding of fact, let alone an error of fact. It was the primary judge recording that he declined to draw an inference, presumably a negative inference, against the respondent from the fact of the existence of a protection order alone. Nothing more and nothing less.
2. However, insofar as the appellant, by this ground, submits that the primary judge did not take into account the facts upon which the relevant protection order was made, the submission cannot be accepted. The Police Protection Notice issued in May 2021 was in evidence before the primary judge. Section 4 of the notice sets out the grounds for a protection order and it purports to record a number of events upon which the notice is based and the respondent's acceptance of most of those events when they were put to him by the police. The respondent was cross-examined about the events described in that notice and, by and large, he conceded them. Those events were the basis of the concessions referred to by the primary judge at [33] and [65] and which led, in part, to the findings made by the primary judge at [68] of his reasons. To the extent that the respondent did not accept that he made certain admissions to police, as recorded in the notice, the primary judge accepted his denials.
3. The appellant does not demonstrate that the primary judge has made any factual errors.

The primary judge took into account all material matters

1. There are three matters particularised in Ground 3 of the appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal, said to be material to the primary judge's decision, that the appellant submits his Honour did not take into account.
2. As to the first, the appellant repeats and relies upon the submissions she made in respect of Ground 1 of her Amended Notice of Appeal. She argues that the primary judge's failure to specifically refer to s 4(1) and s 4AB of the Act was a failure by him to take into account a material consideration. For the reasons set out above, we reject that argument.
3. The second matter, said to be a failure to take into account a material consideration, arises in the following context. At [215] the primary judge expressed the finding that the appellant had "consistently over the course of the litigation contacted the police and other authorities on numerous occasions with I am satisfied the aim of attempting to persuade them to investigate the father with the aim of disrupting if not ending the child and parent relationship and in almost every instance they were baseless allegations". At [216] his Honour expressed the view that the appellant had persisted in that endeavour throughout the litigation and, to that end, sought an order in her Amended Initiating Application filed on 13 November 2024 that she have leave to provide the documents in the case, the orders and correspondence to the Queensland Police Service and lawyers for the purposes of "investigating criminal breaches of the Domestic Violence Order commencing proceeding in State Courts".
4. Then, at [217] the primary judge says:

Beyond her assertion, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the police have requested this information. As a [professional in her own business], she would know that the police could at any time contact the court to access court files. I am satisfied this request was done with the hope that the police might investigate one of her baseless allegations with the aim to frustrate and 'thwart' a relationship between the child and the father. There is a significant risk that she will in the future continue to make baseless complaints.

(Emphasis added)

1. The appellant argues that in reaching the conclusion set out in the emphasised portion of [217] above, the primary judge has failed to take into consideration:

(a) previous "Protection Orders" made in another state;

(b) the finding of "Child Protection Queensland" to the effect that the child had been exposed to emotional harm by the respondent; and

(c) the respondent pleading guilty to breach of a Protection Order.

1. To the extent that the appellant argues that the primary judge should not have made a finding set out in the emboldened portion of [217] above, her argument cannot be accepted. To succeed on an argument that the trial judge has made an error of fact (for that is what she must argue to attack that finding) she must demonstrate that there was no evidence upon which the primary judge could make that finding. As the reasons of the Deputy Chief Justice demonstrate, there was ample evidence however, upon which the primary judge could reach that conclusion.
2. Further, to the extent that the appellant argues that the primary judge gave no consideration to the matters we have set out above, even if one was to accept that was so, the primary judge's failure to take those matters into account could not be considered material in circumstances where the appellant abandoned her claim that the respondent represented a risk of harm, unacceptable or otherwise, to the child.
3. The third particular relied upon by the appellant to support Ground 3 is an asserted failure by the primary judge to take into consideration a finding of existing emotional harm made by "Child Protective Services, Queensland" when "assessing impact of separation from siblings or the mother as primary carer". The appellant argues that the primary judge did not "reference the involvement and finding of Child Protection and/or any referrals made in relation to Family Violence". She refers to documents annexed to her affidavit filed on 15 July 2023. Those documents do not make out her assertion but consist of records from an organisation upon which the child had attended under a NDIS plan.
4. Nonetheless, the material that the appellant argues ought to have been "referenced" (by which we assume she means accepted) by the primary judge was but part of the evidence before the primary judge. The primary judge set out clearly in his reasons for judgment why he rejected the appellant's evidence about important events, including her claims about family violence. He carefully considered the potential effects upon the child of the orders proposed by the respondent in light of that evidence. The appellant's submissions do not establish that the primary judge failed to take into account matters that were material to the outcome of the application.

The primary judge's orders are not unreasonable or plainly unjust

1. The appellant asserts in the Amended Notice of Appeal that the primary judge's orders are reasonable or plainly unjust because he failed to take into consideration:

(a) the affidavit filed by the appellant on 13 November 2024;

(b) that issues were raised as to the existence of evidence in the affidavit of the appellant filed 1 November 2024, 13 November 2024 at paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 20 November 2024 concerning errors of fact in the third Family Report at paragraph 46 and the second Family Report at paragraph 51;

(c) the fact that the psychologist for the respondent "was not cross examined as to the material relied upon by the father to verify credibility, test evidence relied upon or investigate the Respondents insight regarding Family Violence and considerations of Family Violence pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 Cmwlth"; and

(d) that evidence to correct errors in the record and Family Reports were filed/served and a further Application in a Proceeding (filed 1 November 2024) was filed to bring the issue of errors in evidence to the attention of the court.

1. Further she points to two errors, the first "in the record" at paragraph 51 of the second family report and the second in paragraph 46 of the third family report, both of which were in evidence before the primary judge. She does not identify the errors that she says needs to be corrected.
2. Her written submissions do not advance these assertions in any material way. Rather than advancing her argument that the primary judge's orders are unreasonable or plainly unjust, these grounds as articulated in the Amended Notice of Appeal and in her Summary of Argument advance a grab-bag of grounds asserting a failure to consider material matters, errors of fact and perhaps a want of procedural fairness. Whatever the case, the grounds cannot succeed for these reasons:

(a) the affidavits deposed by the appellant and filed on 1 November 2024 and 13 November 2024 were the subject of discussion before the primary judge at the resumption of the trial on 29 January 2025. Neither were relied upon by the appellant;

(b) counsel for the appellant told the primary judge that the respondent's psychologist was not required for cross-examination. In those circumstances she cannot now make complaint about that course;

(c) the appellant cannot be heard to complain that the primary judge did not consider that she had filed evidence to correct what she alleges were factual errors in the trial evidence when her counsel did not press the reception of that evidence;

(d) the assertion that there is error "in the record" at paragraph 51 of the second family report is not made out. The second family report, dated 8 August 2023 says:

51. Mr C 44 years, advised he met the mother in August 2021, moving to live together in November of 2022. He described their relationship as 'great, fresh. It's different ... clean. We talk. We've never had conflicts. We have a lot in common'.

Even if there is some factual error in the above passage, it is not readily apparent why any error is material to the primary judge's decision; and

(e) the assertion that there is error in paragraph 46 of the third family report is also not made out on the appellant's argument. The third family report, dated 23 February 2024, is styled as an update of the report dated 8 August 2023. In that paragraph, the report writer recites the protection order between the parties and that "There have been no formal breaches of this Order". It is accepted that this statement was an error. But the appellant corrected it in the course of her cross-examination, which established that the respondent had been the subject of one breach proceeding that resulted in a sanction being imposed upon him. However, there is nothing to suggest that the primary judge was not alive to this evidence or that the misstatement of the position in the updated family report was in any way material to the orders that the primary judge made.

1. The appeal must be dismissed.
2. We agree with the orders proposed by the Deputy Chief Justice with respect to costs and the reasons for those orders.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy-seven (177) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Deputy Chief Justice McClelland and Honourable Justices Hogan and Jarrett.