I regret that I cannot accept these arguments. There is a perfectly rational explanation for the differentiation of the jury's verdicts. The jury were repeatedly and correctly instructed by O'Reilly DCJ that they must bring in separate verdicts upon each of the counts of the indictment. Each of those counts was differentially explained to them. The possibility of separate verdicts was never contradicted and, logically, could not be so for each count referred to a distinct and separate incident to which evidence of the complainant, the appellant and other witnesses was relevant. Before the jury could convict upon any of the counts, they were instructed that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution had proved the facts necessary to establish each offence. It would have been perfectly open to the jury to have a reasonable doubt about whether the prosecution had proved the facts necessary for a conviction on the second count. While the indictments were phrased generally, the Crown presented its case on the basis that one incident had occurred on a weeknight and one on a Saturday morning. The incident referred to in count 2 was alleged to have occurred after school, mid-week. Evidence suggested that at the relevant time the appellant's wife and children had invariably driven home with him. That evidence contradicted the evidence of the complainant that the appellant and the complainant were left alone. Either on the basis of the uncertainty and confusion about when this incident occurred or, more likely, on the footing that it had not been proved to the requisite standard, the jury, conforming to their duty, could have rejected that count without necessarily rejecting the complainant's testimony as a whole. For example, they might have considered that the incident probably did occur but, in conformity with the instruction about the standard and burden of proof, they could properly conclude that they should acquit on that count.