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[2026] NSWSC 213
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-03-16
Brereton J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2026] NSWSC 213
Hearing dates: 02 March 2026
Date of orders: 16 March 2026
Decision date: 16 March 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Corporations List
Before: Brereton J
Decision: Proceedings stayed under s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and/or the Court’s inherent power until the plaintiff pays the defendant the amounts fixed by costs orders made in earlier proceedings
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – where defendant seeks a stay of proceedings – where defendant contends current proceedings constitute an abuse of process – where costs orders from earlier proceedings remain outstanding – where plaintiff has indicated a lack of intention to pay outstanding costs orders – whether the grant of a stay would stifle proceedings – no prima facie case established in earlier proceedings – where new proceedings mirror grounds addressed in earlier proceedings – stay of proceedings appropriate
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq 426, HL (Sc)
CGU Insurance Ltd v Watson [2007] NSWCA 301
Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178; [1984] HCA 36
Graham v Sutton, Carden & Co [1897] 2 Ch 367
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2024] NSWSC 1052
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2025] NSWCA 177
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2025] HCADisp 247
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1134
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 1214
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 457
Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 5) [2025] NSWSC 590
Texts Cited: N.A.
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Gerald Jaworski (plaintiff)
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
G Jaworski (self-represented litigant) (plaintiff)
J C Giles SC/S D Puttick (defendant)
Solicitors:
Maddocks (defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/248614
Publication restriction: N.A.
1. Based on the circumstances highlighted in the attached affidavit prepared by the plaintiff on 30/6/2025, the Court is requested to make declarations on the lawfulness of the following:
A. The quashing by CA ANZ of all 38 requisitions made by members in relation to the 2020 AGM.
B. The resolution orchestrated by CA ANZ in 2021 to change the By-Laws to increase the number of members required to make an AGM requisition from 10 to 100.
C. Remuneration paid to Directors and office bearers since 1/1/2015 (or a later date if time limitations apply which is not admitted).
D. The financial report prepared by the CA ANZ Board in relation to the financial year ended 30/6/2021.
E. The outcome of changes systematically made to the CA ANZ governance structure since 1/1/2015.
F. The refusal by CA ANZ to arrange for an impartial review of the conduct called into question in these proceedings.
2. The Court is invited to make any declarations or orders it thinks fit in the interests of justice.
By a notice of motion filed on 13 February 2026, CA ANZ seeks an order that the proceedings be stayed until Mr Jaworski pays to it amounts owing in respect of two costs orders that were made in its favour, in respect of earlier proceedings that were pursued unsuccessfully by Mr Jaworski against CA ANZ. There is an alternative application by CA ANZ for security for costs, which it would pursue if the proceedings were not otherwise stayed.
Mr Jaworski resists the applications on the basis that they are brought to seek to thwart or stifle the substantive proceedings in circumstances where the persons controlling CA ANZ have a conflict of interest. Mr Jaworski contends that the proceedings are adverse to the personal interests of those giving instructions in the proceedings, and that a stay is not in the best interests of CA ANZ, its members, or the public.
For the reasons given below, the proceedings will be stayed until Mr Jaworski meets the two costs orders.
Grant of leave for derivative action per Request in attached Affidavit.
Those proceedings gave rise to a series of decisions delivered by Black J.
In Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2024] NSWSC 1052, Black J considered whether Mr Jaworski should be required to serve the summons before determining any question as to whether he should be entitled to pursue the proceedings further at CA ANZ’s cost. His Honour stayed the proceedings until the summons was served on CA ANZ.
In Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1134, Black J declined Mr Jaworski’s application to reopen the first judgment.
In Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 1214, Black J struck from the file a further notice of motion that had been filed (but not served) by Mr Jaworski, by which he sought relief as to costs and to compel CA ANZ to take certain steps.
After Mr Jaworski served the summons, the substantive proceedings were heard by Black J. Mr Jaworski relied on an amended summons, by which he sought the following relief:
On the Court being satisfied that Mr Jaworski has a prima facie claim to be brought in the name [CA ANZ] against its officers, CA ANZ pay the future legal costs of Mr Jaworski’s conduct of that claim.
Black J dismissed the proceedings and the amended summons: Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 457.
There are various aspects of his Honour’s reasons in Jaworski (No 4) that are relevant to the present application.
Black J noted (at [9]) that Mr Jaworski expressed a concern that CA ANZ had been permitted to appear in the proceedings, represented by counsel and solicitors instructed by its current board, to express a position which, he contended, had the consequence that “the alleged controlling officers have been allowed to influence the proceedings which would be plainly prejudicial to the CA ANZ entity, and also a breach of their duty to avoid a conflict of interest”. Black J held that he had earlier rejected that contention (in his first judgment) and that it was wrong for at least three reasons, as follows (at [10]):
First, this hearing comprises an application by Mr Jaworski to be funded by CA ANZ in his proposed conduct of the proceedings in CA ANZ’s name. He brings that application in his personal capacity, to seek an order against CA ANZ, and not on CA ANZ’s behalf. Second, and importantly, the fact that Mr Jaworski alleges wrongdoing against CA ANZ’s “controlling officers” does not establish the fact of that wrongdoing or any consequential “conflict of interest”. Third, and importantly, this submission neglects, as much of Mr Jaworski’s case neglected, the facts that the “controlling officers” to which he refers are the directors or officers of CA ANZ over a period of ten years; unsurprisingly, there has been significant change in the membership of CA ANZ’s board over that ten year period, although it appears that several directors have remained in office for significant parts of that period; and the allegations that Mr Jaworski seeks to make on CA ANZ’s behalf largely relate to conduct of persons who are no longer directors of CA ANZ, although I appreciate that Mr Jaworski seeks to extend those allegations to the current directors of CA ANZ. I recognise that, in my first judgment, I noted that it would be open to CA ANZ to appoint an independent board committee to consider the position in respect of the allegations; I do not know whether it has done so; but any question of conflict affecting the present board of CA ANZ must be considered in the context that the allegations largely relate to the conduct of previous boards of CA ANZ, involving many different people, over a period of at last ten years.
Black J noted (at [11]) that the question that ultimately emerged for determination was whether Mr Jaworski should be funded to bring proceedings in the name of CA ANZ against its officers. Black J noted that Mr Jaworski did not seek declaratory or other relief against CA ANZ as to the validity of the challenged actions, which would have been available to him, at least in respect of several issues, in his personal capacity. That is the relief that Mr Jaworski now seeks by the new proceedings.
Black J considered the various claims that Mr Jaworski sought to bring, in CA ANZ’s name, against CA ANZ’s officers. His Honour did so in considering whether there was a prima facie case and whether it was in CA ANZ’s interests to bring the claim.
Black J recorded (at [32]) that the first claim that Mr Jaworski sought to bring against CA ANZ’s officers (as a collective group) related to the circumstances in which CA ANZ declined to put 38 resolutions proposed by several of its members, including Mr Jaworski, at an annual general meeting in 2020. After considering the evidence and submissions, Black J concluded (at [45]) that Mr Jaworski had not established a prima facie case in respect of the proposed claim or that it was in CA ANZ’s interests to bring the claim.
Black J came to the same conclusion (at [56]) about the second claim, which related to an amendment of CA ANZ’s by-laws in 2021 to increase the minimum number of members required to bring a motion or business before a meeting from 10 members to 100 members.
In relation to the third claim, which concerned payments of directors’ fees by CA ANZ between 2015 and 2025, which Mr Jaworski contended lacked authorisation (by reference to by-law 136A of CAANZ’s by-laws), Black J was not satisfied that it would be in CA ANZ’s interests to bring the claim (at [63]).
The fourth claim that Mr Jaworski sought to bring (see [64]) was a claim that CA ANZ published financial reports which did not present a “true and fair” view and/or did not comply with Australian Accounting Standards. Mr Jaworski contended that CA ANZ’s financial reports were not complaint with CA ANZ’s by-law 154. In respect of this claim, Black J expressed the following conclusions (at [70]):
…I am not persuaded that a claim brought by CA ANZ against numerous individual directors or officers, over many years, is an appropriate mechanism to explore subtle and difficult questions as to the interaction of the true and fair view standard and accounting standards or that the costs that would be incurred by CA ANZ to bring such a claim against its many current and former officers would be warranted. It also seems to me almost inevitable, having regard to the subtlety of Mr Jaworski’s formulation of these issues, that a claim for breach of duty against the current and former officers will fail...
Black J also dealt “for completeness” with Mr Jaworski’s allegations concerning “disenfranchisement of members’ rights and eschewing accountability”, which involved a range of wider criticisms as to the structure established by CA ANZ’s by-laws. Black J noted (at [71]) that Mr Jaworski, rightly, placed less weight on those matters in his submissions, “where it is not apparent that compliance with the structure created by CA ANZ’s by-laws could support a claim by CA ANZ against its current or former directors and officers”.
Black J proceeded to address Mr Jaworski’s claims as a whole (at [72]ff). His Honour concluded as follows (at [75]):
Mr Jaworski has not satisfied me that he has a prima facie claim to be brought in the name of CA ANZ against its officers or that CA ANZ should pay the future legal costs of such a claim, in respect of the particular claims that I have addressed above or his claims taken as a whole.
It followed that the proceedings had to be dismissed.
Black J subsequently made orders on 10 June 2025 that Mr Jaworski pay CA ANZ’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings, as agreed or assessed: see Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (No 5) [2025] NSWSC 590.
Mr Jaworski filed a notice of appeal against the orders made by Black J to dismiss the proceedings and to award costs in CA ANZ’s favour. On 7 August 2025, Stern JA dismissed the appeal as incompetent on the basis that the relevant orders were interlocutory and leave was required: Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2025] NSWCA 177. Her Honour ordered that Mr Jaworski pay CA ANZ’s costs (at [34]).
Mr Jaworski sought special leave to appeal to the High Court from the decision of Stern JA. In detailed submissions in support of his application, Mr Jaworski attacked the reasons of Black J in Jaworski (No 4). The application was late. On 6 November 2025, the High Court refused to grant an extension of time within which to seek special leave and, after referring to the reasons in Jaworski (No 4), refused special leave on the basis that the application did not raise any questions of law of public importance and the proposed appeal had no prospects of success: Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2025] HCADisp 247.
On 19 December 2025, Black J made orders by consent fixing the sum of Mr Jaworski’s costs liability under the orders made in Jaworski (No 5) at $101,000. On the same day, Stern JA made orders by consent fixing the sum of Mr Jaworski’s costs liability under the orders made by her Honour at $13,600.
Mr Jaworski has not paid any amount on account of those costs orders and has indicated that he does not propose to do so.
In the current proceedings, Mr Jaworski seeks declaratory relief against CA ANZ (not any of its current or former directors or officers) concerning the same underlying complaints that were the subject of his application that was dismissed in Jaworski (No 4*)*. The relief he seeks in his summons is set out at [1] above. Paragraphs 1A-1D of his summons closely mirror the 4 claims addressed by Black J in Jaworski (No 4). Paragraph 1E appears to reflect the matter Black J considered “for completeness”. The matter raised by [1F] of the summons appears to be new, but is related to allegations that Mr Jaworski made in the earlier proceedings.
In the earlier proceedings, Mr Jaworski failed to convince the Court that there are prima facie claims to be brought in the name of CA ANZ against its officers, or that it was in CA ANZ’s interests to pay the future legal costs of those claims. With the addition of a new but related claim, Mr Jaworski seeks to make the same allegations against CA ANZ in his own name. He is not a current member of CA ANZ.
CA ANZ brings its application for a stay pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) or the Court’s inherent power to stay proceedings that are an abuse of process. Section 67 confers power, subject to the rules of the Court, to stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day.
CA ANZ relied on the reasons of Giles JA (Spigelman CJ and Basten JA agreeing) in CGU Insurance Ltd v Watson [2007] NSWCA 301. His Honour made the following observations:
[40] The Supreme Court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its procedures, and may stay or dismiss proceedings the bringing or continuance of which is an abuse of process... There may also be abuse of process if a plaintiff brings against the defendant second proceedings “in the same cause” without having paid the costs of the first proceedings; this will ordinarily found a stay of the second proceedings until the costs have been paid.
[41] The necessity for the second proceedings to be in the same cause as the first, an expression which I have taken from Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2006] NSWCA 202 at [104], has been variously stated… In Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd the sameness of cause was later expressed at [110] as “identity of issues” and at [112] as “an identity of the central issue”…
[43] The exercise of the inherent jurisdiction is not tied to a particular form of words, and the various expressions I have noted were in aid of the concept of abuse of process; it was the true measure of whether the second proceedings were to be stayed…
In the earlier proceedings, the central issue was whether Mr Jaworski should be funded to bring proceedings on 4 main claims in the name of CA ANZ against its current and former officers. By the current proceedings, Mr Jaworski seeks relief in his own name against CA ANZ. The new case is different to the previous one in that the new proceedings seek relief against CA ANZ, whereas the previous proceedings contemplated relief against its current and former officers by way of a derivative action brought for the benefit of CA ANZ. However, the underlying conduct that is said to justify the relief in the new proceedings is essentially the same conduct that Mr Jaworski advanced to justify the relief sought in the earlier proceedings.
By his summons in the current proceedings, Mr Jaworski seeks, as a matter of substance, to advance in his own name the claims that he wished previously to advance in CA ANZ’s name against current and former officers of CA ANZ. In Jaworski (No 4), Black J held that the claims against current and former officers did not have a prima facie evidentiary basis (at [56]). His Honour’s reasons indicate that this conclusion was not drawn merely because the prospective plaintiff was CA ANZ, rather than Mr Jaworski in his own capacity. The relief that Mr Jaworski seeks by the fresh proceedings against CA ANZ relies on the same underlying alleged wrongdoing by its officers. That underlying misconduct, on Mr Jaworski’s case, vitiates various things done by CA ANZ.
It is not necessary to engage in a close consideration of what is meant by proceedings “in the same cause”. Mr Jaworski has had an opportunity in proceedings against CA ANZ to show, on a prima facie basis, that his claims of wrongdoing have substance, and has failed. He now wishes to make the same claims of wrongdoing (together with a closely related claim) in new proceedings against CA ANZ.
In the submissions before me, Mr Jaworski was critical of the reasons delivered by Black J In Jaworski (No 4). He submitted that their cogency “is very difficult to fathom”. He drew specific attention to the final sentence of [41] of his Honour’s reasons, which concerned Mr Jaworski’s first proposed claim. For context, [40] and [41] of those reasons read:
[40] In his opening written submissions. Mr Jaworski submits that, in respect of this matter, that:
The first matter is a legal question of whether it was lawful for the CA ANZ Board to quash the 38 requisitions led by ten members for the 2020 AGM. It is alleged that the quashing was not justified by the company’s constitutional provisions and it’s [sic] reason for existing. The key issue is the scope of rights provided by article 13 of the Charter. The key facts are submitted as being uncontroversial: that the requisitions were made; that they were quashed; and the relevant contents of the CA ANZ Charter and By-Laws at that time. It is submitted that the relevant facts are evidenced to the required legal standard.
[41] Mr Giles in turn refers to the case law which has recognised that shareholders of a company cannot ordinarily give directions to a company’s board as to matters which are within the scope of the Court’s power under the company’s constitution, including Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 at 105 –106, National Roads and Motorists Association v Parker (1896) 6 NSWLR 517 and the decisions to which Mr Jaworski had referred . Mr Jaworski in turn responds to CA ANZ’s reliance on these cases by pointing to article 13 of CA ANZ’s charter (to which I referred above) which, he contends, makes the exercise of the board’s power subject to the control and regulation of general meeting. I recognise that there may be a question in this case as to whether the position that would likely exist as to a company is diluted or excluded by the terms of that article, as Mr Jaworski submits, but it is not necessary to determine that question in order to determine the proceedings.
In oral submissions before me, Mr Jaworski described the final sentence of [41] as “extraordinary”.
When the final sentence of [41] is read in the context of the judgment as a whole, it is unremarkable and not open to any reasonable criticism. Black J was merely acknowledging that there may be an open question about whether CA ANZ’s charter has the consequence that the usual position that applies to companies does not apply to CA ANZ, but noting that it was not a matter that had to be determined on the application. When the reasons are read as a whole (see [32]-[45], particularly [44]), it is apparent that a conclusion on that question would not have made any difference to his Honour’s conclusion that Mr Jaworski had failed to establish a prima facie claim, or that it was in CA ANZ’s interests to bring the claim. There was a more fundamental difficulty with Mr Jaworski’s claim, being that he had not identified the steps taken by current or former officers of CA ANZ that were said to have breached their duties. That fundamental difficulty meant that it was unnecessary to resolve the question that his Honour identified at [41].
Mr Jaworski did not seek leave to appeal the decision of Black J. His attempt to appeal as of right was dismissed as incompetent, and special leave to appeal against that decision was refused.
In the circumstances where this Court has concluded that the claims that Mr Jaworski wishes to bring have no prima facie evidentiary basis, Mr Jaworski is making vexatious use of the processes of this Court in seeking to agitate the same claims when he has failed to meet outstanding costs orders of this Court and the Court of Appeal. So long as he has failed to pay those costs, it is unreasonable for him to pursue the current proceedings, and it is an abuse of the processes of this Court. Similar reasons justified a stay in Graham v Sutton, Carden & Co [1897] 2 Ch 367.
I acknowledge that a stay pending the payment of costs may stifle the proceedings. The significance of that concern is considerably diminished once it is appreciated that Mr Jaworski has tried, but failed, to persuade the Court in earlier proceedings that there is a prima facie basis for the claims he wishes to advance. He has had an opportunity to advance his contentions as to wrongdoing.
I also appreciate that in determining whether it is appropriate to make an order that a plaintiff give security for costs, a matter that may be relevant is whether the order would stifle the proceedings: see Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.21(1A)(f). There is an important difference between the potential for a costs order in proceedings that have been commenced, and an actual costs order for earlier proceedings that have been concluded. Security is given for a prospective costs order. Here, CA ANZ seeks that Mr Jaworski honour costs orders that it has already secured as a successful litigant. I do not consider that there is a relevant analogy between an application for security for costs of a prospective costs order, and an application for a stay pending payment of previous costs orders.
Subject to what is addressed below, this is a clear case where the proceedings should be stayed pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act, or the Court’s inherent power, until the day Mr Jaworski pays the costs that he is obliged to pay to CA ANZ pursuant to the orders of Black J and Stern JA made on 19 December 2025.
Mr Jaworski submitted that the current directors of CA ANZ, as well as its current Chief Executive Officer and General Counsel, are affected by a conflict that prevents them having any involvement in giving instructions to CA ANZ’s external lawyers. He submitted that I should decline to consider the application for the stay. Mr Jaworski made similar arguments without success before Black J. I have set out the (cogent) reasons why Black J did not accept these arguments.
There is evidence that the Chief Executive Officer and the General Counsel of CA ANZ hold authority to give instructions in these proceedings, and that they report to the board of directors through the Audit and Risk Committee. Mr Jaworski contended that a finding of unlawful conduct would have a detrimental impact on the careers of CA ANZ directors, the Chief Executive Officer and the General Counsel, and would have financial implications. Mr Jaworski pointed out that the Chief Executive Officer earns more than the Australian Prime Minister and the General Counsel earns more than a Supreme Court judge, and suggested that their interest in maintaining these “high” salaries conflicts with an interest in exposing earlier wrongdoing by other officers of CA ANZ. He submits that there is a conflict because the current officers are covering up earlier wrongdoing.
Mr Jaworski relied on the following passage from the judgment of Lord Cranworth in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq 426, HL (Sc) at [471]-[472]:
A corporate body can only act by agents, and it is of course the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting. Such agents have duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature towards their principal. And it is a rule of universal application, that no one, having such duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect.
Mr Jaworski relies in particular on the notion that the agents of a corporation cannot enter into engagements where there is a possibility of conflict. Mr Jaworski does not point to any engagements entered into by any officer of CA ANZ on his or her own behalf and contend that the engagement is affected by the possibility of conflict.
…a person who is under a fiduciary obligation must account to the person to whom the obligation is owed for any benefit or gain (i) which has been obtained or received in circumstances where a conflict or significant possibility of conflict existed between his fiduciary duty and his personal interest in the pursuit or possible receipt of such a benefit or gain…
An insubstantial possibility of conflict does not suffice.
As Lord Cranworth observed in Aberdeen Railway, a corporate body can only act by its agents. Putting aside the question of the precise character of CA ANZ’s legal personality, it can only act through its agents. Acting through its agents, it has successfully defeated Mr Jaworski’s earlier proceedings and has the benefit of two costs orders. In dealing with the new proceedings, CA ANZ must again act through its agents. It does so through external lawyers who are taking instructions from senior executives of CA ANZ. Mr Jaworski has failed to point to anything pertaining to those giving instructions to CA ANZ’s external lawyers to cause me to conclude that there is anything improper or inappropriate in CA ANZ’s application for a stay pending the payment of the costs owed to it by Mr Jaworski, such that the Court should not entertain the stay. Mr Jaworski has not identified anything that indicates a conflict or a significant possibility of conflict on the part of those making the decisions for CA ANZ in the prosecution of the notice of motion now before the Court.
As a matter of substance, Mr Jaworski is attacking the retainer of CA ANZ’s external lawyers, who advance the application for a stay on CA ANZ’s behalf. The evidence he relies on falls well short of what is required to persuade me that the application to stay the proceedings, and the submissions made on behalf of CA ANZ, are tainted and should not be entertained, or should be dismissed, on the grounds that the external lawyers are taking instructions from individuals who cannot properly give them on behalf of CA ANZ.
There is no proper reason for me to conclude that either the current Chief Executive Officer or the General Counsel is doing anything other than taking the responsible step of seeking to avoid the inevitable cost and distraction of legal proceedings, in circumstances where Mr Jaworski has already agitated the underlying claims without success and is refusing to pay the amounts he owes to CA ANZ for past costs. Neither the current Chief Executive Officer nor the General Counsel is specifically alleged to have engaged in any of the underlying wrongdoing. Mr Jaworski accuses them of seeking to cover up earlier wrongdoing. Generalised references to a cover up are not sufficient to undermine the application now made by CA ANZ through its external lawyers. Nor does reference to what is said to be their “high” salaries. The possibility of conflict appears to me to be remote and tenuous.
It may be that on a fully contested hearing, all of Mr Jaworski’s allegations would be established. It may be that they would all fail. Either way, it is reasonable and responsible for the current senior executives to seek a stay of the proceedings until Mr Jaworski has paid the costs that he owes to CA ANZ arising from the earlier proceedings. The possibility that Mr Jaworski will succeed is not a sufficient basis for me to decline to entertain or accept the submissions now advanced on CA ANZ’s behalf. Mr Jaworski appears to be motivated by a deep sense that the litigation is in the public interest. But that does not absolve him from his liability to pay costs or justify him continuing to pursue the claim before he has met that obligation.
If Mr Jaworski pays the costs, the stay will lift and he can pursue these proceedings in the ordinary way. In saying that, I do not foreclose any steps that CA ANZ might take in these proceedings. It has, for example, foreshadowed an application that challenges Mr Jaworski’s standing to bring these proceedings. If the stay is lifted, any applications in these proceedings will be considered on their merits. In the meantime, Mr Jaworski should not be permitted to advance these proceedings while he continues to refuse to pay the costs of his previous failures.
I reject Mr Jaworski’s contentions that the stay should be declined because of an asserted conflict of interest.
The summons should be stayed until the day Mr Jaworski pays the costs that are the subject of the orders of Black J and Stern JA of 19 December 2025. That stay is to be made in the exercise of power under s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act and pursuant to the Court’s inherent power. For so long as the costs remain outstanding, the current proceedings are an abuse of this Court’s processes.
I do not need to consider CA ANZ’s alternative claim for security for costs.
I make the following orders:
The proceedings are stayed until the Plaintiff pays the Defendant:
(a) $101,100 in respect of order 1 made by Black J on 10 June 2025 and order 1 made by Black J on 19 December 2025 in NSW Supreme Court proceedings 2024/00238672; and (b) $13,600 in respect of order 2 made by Stern JA on 7 August 2025 and order 1 made by Stern JA on 19 December 2025 in NSW Court of Appeal proceedings 2024/00362807.
**********
Jaworski
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2026] NSWSC 213
(1984) 154 CLR 178
(1896) 6 NSWLR 517