• Lawyers in Sydney
• Lawyers in Melbourne
• Lawyers in Brisbane
• Lawyers in Perth
• Family lawyers
• Employment lawyers
• Criminal lawyers
• Wills and estates lawyers
• Find a lawyer

“1. Pursuant to Order 9 of the Orders made on 28 November 2024, the Plaintiff provide a full accounting of the sale proceeds relating to the properties known as:

(a) X/X Pitt Street, Sydney NSW 2000; and

(b) X/X Sussex Street, Sydney NSW 2000.

2. Within 14 days, the Plaintiff file and serve an affidavit exhibiting:

(a) the settlement statements for each property;

(b) all invoices and documents supporting deductions made from the sale proceeds;

(c) invoices for repair, renovation, styling, marketing and cleaning works undertaken in respect of the properties;

(d) unredacted tax invoices for legal costs deducted from the sale proceeds;

(e) copies of any counsel fee invoices referred to in the legal invoices;

(f) the Plaintiff’s solicitor’s trust account ledger recording receipt and distribution of the sale proceeds.

3. The Plaintiff repay to the Third Defendant 50% of any amounts deducted from the sale proceeds which are not supported by proper invoices or which fall outside the orders of the Court dated 28 November 2024.

4. Alternatively, the Plaintiff pay the disputed amounts into Court pending determination of the dispute.

5. The Plaintiff pay the Third Defendant’s costs of this motion.”

3. However, before the matter reached me for consideration, Ms Du’s solicitor, Mr Tomaras, indicated that she no longer pressed the substantive orders sought in the motion but instead sought the following relief:

(a) an order requiring the plaintiff to produce copies of all tax invoices for legal costs with no redactions; (b) an order requiring the plaintiff to produce a complete trust account ledger with respect to the trust account from which the sale proceeds were distributed to her; (c) an order requiring the plaintiff to file an affidavit explaining purported “discrepancies” in the costs explained in the plaintiff’s affidavit and explaining whether legal costs for the preparation of the sale contracts were paid from the sale of the properties; and (d) an order for the “repayment” to her of her share of any amounts improperly deducted by the plaintiff.

4. That motion came before me for the first time on 10 July 2026. On that occasion I did no more than adjourn the proceedings for seven days. Ms Du’s motion was clearly directed to obtaining verification by the plaintiff of amounts expended by him in order to prepare the two apartments for sale as ordered by the Court, including expenditure upon minor renovations and repairs that might in the reasonable opinion of the plaintiff have been necessary or desirable to optimise their sale price.

5. Having regard to the history of the matter and to what appeared to me to be the relatively small sums that were likely to be in issue, and in the hope that some resolution of the dispute between the third defendant and the plaintiff could be achieved by agreement, I engaged the parties in a discussion in the following terms:

“LEONG: Yes, your Honour. I am instructed to complain about that and also the renovation. We just want a little bit more substantiation because it seems to us a pretty expensive renovation.

HIS HONOUR: $11,000?

LEONG: No, I think - was it - I might need my friend’s help for the - I think it’s 20,000 each, isn’t it, roughly?

FOLEY: No, not quite. I can get your Honour the figures.

HIS HONOUR: Can I just say nobody in the plaintiff’s position would have had an interest in renovating or effecting repairs to the property out of his own pocket except for the purposes of maximising the sale price of the property he was about to sell.

FOLEY: Can I just add to that, your Honour, the works were 17,000 and 15,000 respectively, but that includes cleaning, repairs, changing the locks because we had to get a possession order. It includes everything. So, 17,000 for one property, 15,000 for another. We’ve not only provided the invoice for the work but we’ve provided the communication from the real estate agent that said if you want to get market value for these properties, you’re going to have to do this work. That’s all in writing.

HIS HONOUR: That's more or less what I just said, isn’t it?

FOLEY: It is, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Leong, I’m going to do this­­

LEONG: Your Honour, sorry, would it be possible to show the legal invoices unredacted, so with the masking removed, but just to the lawyers only?

HIS HONOUR: I don’t know.

FOLEY: Your Honour has seen the written submissions filed by my learned friend’s instructor. Those instructing me and my client have absolutely no confidence that any additional disclosure will lead to a narrowing of issues or resolution of dispute. It will lead to more issues and more disputes because my learned friend says he wants a little bit more to substantiate work is done, what more is there? Am I supposed to get an affidavit from the tradesmen?

HIS HONOUR: There was about $630,000 odd nett proceeds following the sale, wasn’t there?

FOLEY: I think that’s right, your Honour, from both properties together. Yes.

HIS HONOUR: You get half of that. Mr Leong’s client gets half of that.

FOLEY: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: So, we’re now arguing, at most, about half of $20,000?

FOLEY: I think we’re actually arguing over much less than that, your Honour, because I think a lot of the costs are now conceded, although now the works are back in. But, today we’re really arguing over $3,300 for contract for sale invoice, that’s what’s in the orders that are pressed in the submissions, and about $1,100 in what is said to be discrepancies, which are in fact not, because they just didn’t take into account the cleaning invoices. So, we’re arguing over hundreds, maybe tens of dollars.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Leong, you’ve only come into this recently. You and I­­

LEONG: I am pretty good­­

HIS HONOUR: You and I share that privilege. I’m inclined to stand this motion over to a date sometime in the future before me with a judicial direction to you to explain under the umbrella of ss 56, 57 and 58 of the Civil Procedure Act how the Court does not view expensive arguments in the Supreme Court of New South Wales about sums of money of the sort that we’ve been discussing today.

It's not effective, it’s disruptive and some serious thought needs to be given to the propriety in the light of those sections of pursuing judicial answers to issues that either should not exist at all or should be resolved by a reasonable discussion between the parties.”

6. Before the matter returned to me on 17 July 2026, Mr Tomaras, who appeared for Ms Du, provided me with some submissions. They were filed for the stated reason that they were “in response to [my] observations” on 10 July 2026, some of which I have set forth above. Those submissions included the following:

“H. Proposed Resolution Without Further Hearing

23. In direct response to His Honour’s invitation at Transcript p 9 (“if the matter could be resolved without another hearing then I’ll make orders by consent”), the Applicant proposes the following.

24. The Applicant invites the Respondent, within 7 days of the 17 July 2026 mention, to produce:

(a) bank statements or EFT records confirming payment to Longxiang Construction Pty Ltd for both renovation invoices; and

(b) the before-and-after photographs of both properties.

25. If that material is produced and confirms the works, the Applicant will provide written confirmation within 3 further days that she accepts the renovation deductions, and will separately indicate her position on the redacted legal fees.

26. If the parties can resolve the matter in that way, the Applicant’s solicitor will contact the Respondent’s solicitor and His Honour’s associate to vacate the 17 July 2026 date and file a notice of discontinuance or agreed short minutes. The Applicant genuinely wants to resolve this without further court time.

27. If the Respondent declines to produce the documents, the matter should proceed on 17 July 2026 for directions on a confined basis. The Applicant asks the Court to note that at that point the only outstanding question will be whether the Respondent is prepared to produce two categories of evidence that, on his own case, should demonstrate that the works were performed and paid. If he is not prepared to do so, the inference available to the Court is obvious.” [Emphasis added.]

7. The matter returned to me on 17 July 2026. I made orders on that occasion. Part of my judgment was as follows:

“It does seem to me that Mr Tomaras’ proposal has, in effect, borne fruit, and the plaintiff has provided the very documents that Mr Tomaras has intimated might see the end to the proceedings. Having regard to my limited knowledge of the matter, it does appear to me that that ought to follow.

In the circumstances, I make the following orders:

1. I will adjourn this notice of motion until 10 o’clock on Friday 24 July 2026, before me.

2. I will order that the costs of the plaintiff be paid from the common fund, including the costs of this notice of motion.

3. In the event that the third defendant is satisfied that the documents referred to in para 24 of Mr Tomaras’ submissions satisfy her, that the expenditure on the property is genuine, then the third defendant, by her solicitor or counsel, should notify my Associate that the proceedings may be dismissed.”

8. In the events that occurred, the matter was not heard on 24 July 2026. Instead, it was adjourned by consent to 8 September 2026 for the hearing of the motion. The third defendant was directed to serve further evidence by 17 August 2026. The plaintiff was ordered to do so by 31 August 2026.

9. In accordance with these consent orders, the plaintiff served two affidavits. One was affirmed by Zeru Zheng on 27 August 2026. The other was affirmed by Weijia Pu on 31 August 2026. For reasons that will shortly become apparent, it is necessary to record parts of what these deponents had to say.

10. Mr Zheng is a construction worker employed by Longxiang Constructions Pty Ltd. He deposed to the following things:

“3. I performed works at the following properties:

(a) X/X Pitt Street, Sydney in the State of New South Wales, being the whole of the land contained in folio identifier XX (Pitt Street Property); and

(b) X/X Sussex Street, Sydney in the state of New South Wales, being the whole of the land contained in folio identifier XX (Sussex Street Property);

(together, the Properties).

4. I performed works, and I observed other workers of Longxiang Construction Pty Ltd performing works, at the Sussex Street Property from 5 June 2025 to 28 June 2025. I observed the following works being undertaken and completed:

(a) The painting of interior wall and ceiling (using paint supplied by Longxiang).

(b) Carpet being replaced.

(c) All lights being replaced.

(d) Repairs being done to the kitchen and bathroom.

5. I performed works, and I observed other workers of Longxiang Construction Pty Ltd performing works, at the Pitt Street Property from 4 June 2025 to 23 June 2025. Specifically:

(a) The painting of interior wall and ceiling (using paint supplied by Longxiang).

(b) The removal of old carpet and the installation of timber flooring.

(c) All lights being replaced.

(d) Repairs being done to the kitchen and bathroom.”

11. Ms Pu is an estate agent employed by Ray White. She deposed to the following things:

“3. … I was appointed to act as the selling agent for the following properties:

(a) X/X Pitt Street, Sydney in the state of New South Wales, being the whole of the land contained in folio identifier XX (Pitt Street Property); and

(b) X/X Sussex Street, Sydney in the state of New South Wales, being the whole of the land contained in folio identifier XX (Sussex Street Property);

(together, the Properties).

4. In the course of my engagement as selling agent, I managed the key access for the Properties and observed that Mr Songshan Guo arranged for works to be done to the Properties. Specifically:

(a) In relation to the Sussex Street Property, I observed that:

(i) workers, who informed me they were from ‘Longxiang Construction’, performed works at the Sussex Street Property during the period commencing around 5 June 2025 and concluding on around 28 June 2025; and

(ii) workers, who informed me they were from ‘James Cleaning Service’ performed works at the Sussex Street Property in or around June 2025.

(b) In relation to the Pitt Street Property, I observed that:

(i) workers, who informed me they were from ‘Longxiang Construction’, performed works at the Pitt Street Property during the period commencing around 4 June 2025 and concluding on around 23 June 2025.

(ii) workers, who informed me they were from ‘James Cleaning Service’ performed works at the Pitt Street Property in or around June 2025.

(iii) workers, who informed me they were from ‘Jenny Lock & Key Service’ performed works at the Pitt Street Property in or around June 2025.

5. I have been provided with copies of invoices issued by Longxiang Constructions Pty Ltd in relation to the Sussex Street Property and Pitt Street Property, being:

(a) the invoice which records the address of the Sussex Street Property dated 26 July 2025 (Sussex Street Invoice); and

(b) the invoice which records the address of the Pitt Street Property dated 26 July 2025 (Pitt Street Invoice).

A copy of the Sussex Street Invoice is annexed and marked A.

A copy of the Pitt Street invoice is annexed and marked B.

6. I have reviewed the Sussex Street Invoice and the Pitt Street Invoice.

7. In relation to the works described in the Sussex Street Invoice, I observed works being performed and completed at the Sussex Street Property as described in the invoice, being:

(a) the painting of an interior wall and ceiling;

(b) the replacement of carpet;

(c) the replacement of lights; and

(d) repairs to the kitchen and bathroom.

8. In relation to the works described in the Pitt Street Invoice, I observed works being performed and completed at the Pitt Street Property as described in the invoice, being:

(a) the painting of an interior wall and ceiling;

(b) the replacement of carpet with timber flooring;

(c) the replacement of lights; and

(d) repairs to the kitchen and bathroom.

9. Longxiang Constructions Pty Ltd was not engaged by me as agent. I understand Longxiang Constructions Pty Ltd was directly engaged by Mr Songshan Guo. Accordingly, I have no direct knowledge regarding the terms of its engagement or the payments made to it.”

12. Lest this evidence be thought to exist in isolation, the plaintiff had himself earlier affirmed an affidavit on 23 June 2026 concerning advice he had received from Ray White with respect to the sale of the properties, the instructions he gave for the recommended works and the costs incurred. His evidence should also be noted as follows:

“Agent’s Advice with respect to sale of Pitt Street and Sussex Street Properties

17. I appointed Ray White to act as selling agent for the Properties.

18. On 13 May 2025 I received advice from my real estate agent to the effect that:

(a) if we wanted to achieve a sale price for the Sussex Street Property consistent with comparable properties in the area, he recommended we do some repair and replacement work to the Sussex Street Property, being to:

(i) replace the timber floor;

(ii) paint the property plus the roof;

(iii) replace the rangehood;

(iv) remove the broken microwave;

(v) change to ceiling lights;

(vi) do a whole property cleaning;

(b) if we wanted to achieve a sale price for Pitt Street Property consistent with comparable properties in the area, he recommended we do some repair and replacement work to the Pitt Street Property, being to:

(i) repair the timber floor;

(ii) paint the property plus the roof;

(iii) replace the rangehood;

(iv) repair the glass door(s) of wardrobe(s);

(v) do a whole property cleaning.

A copy of the WeChat message from my agent to me, with a NAATI translation, is at page 5 of the Exhibit.

Works

19. I instructed works to be done to the Properties in accordance with the agent’s advice, and was invoiced for those works: Specifically:

(a) the works performed with respect to the Sussex Street Property are described in the invoices at pages 7 to 8 of the Exhibit - those invoices totalled $17,611 (Sussex Street Works Invoices); and

(b) the works performed with respect to the Pitt Street Property are described in the invoices at pages 9 to 11 of the Exhibit - those invoices totalled $15,910 (Pitt Street Works Invoices).

Other sale expenses (excluding legal costs)

20. I incurred expenses in relation to the sale of the Properties (not including legal costs) as set out in the following invoices:

(a) the expenses incurred with respect to the Sussex Street Property are described in the invoices at pages 12 to 15 of the Exhibit - those invoices totalled $11,055 (Sussex Street Sale Invoices); and

(b) the expenses incurred with respect to the Pitt Street Property are described in the invoices at pages 16 to 19 of the Exhibit - those invoices totalled $10,955 (Pitt Street Sale Invoices).”

13. Mr Tomaras himself swore an affidavit on 18 August 2026, more in the nature of submissions, in which he formulated a series of contentions to the effect that the evidence of Mr Guo, was insufficient to satisfy me that the works were carried out. Part of what he said is as follows:

“17. I note, in particular:

(a) the invoices for professional photography and premiere online listing of both Properties are dated 22 April 2025 some three months before the date borne by the Longxiang invoices such that, if the ‘after’ photographs comprising part of the Photograph Production are, as Ms Miao's email states, taken from the current online listings, those photographs cannot depict the results of works not invoiced until three months later, unless the listing photographs were subsequently retaken or updated, a matter on which no evidence has been produced;

(b) both Longxiang invoices each covering extensive works, including interior repainting of walls and ceilings, floor coverings, replacement of all light fittings, and kitchen and bathroom repairs, at two separate properties bear the identical date of 26 July 2025;

(c) the sales commission invoices claiming commission on the contract price for both Properties are dated only three to four days later, on 29 and 30 July 2025, indicating that contracts for the sale of both Properties had, by that time, already been exchanged or were imminently to be exchanged; and

(d) the realestate.com.au property history referred to at paragraph 15 above independently corroborates, and in fact narrows, that timing. It records the Pitt Street Property as sold on 28 July 2025, two days after the date borne by the Longxiang invoice for that Property ($15,070.00), and the Sussex Street Property as sold on 27 July 2025, only one day after the date borne by the Longxiang invoice for that Property ($17,061.00).

(e) accordingly, the extensive works said to have been invoiced on 26 July 2025 at each Property a full interior repaint of walls and ceilings, floor coverings, all light fittings, and kitchen and bathroom repairs would, in the case of the Sussex Street Property, have had to be completed within a single day of the invoice date, and before the Property was sold.

18. No evidence has yet been produced by the Plaintiff of the dates on which the Longxiang works actually commenced or were completed at each Property, as distinct from the date borne by the invoices, or of who performed the works, over what period, or by what method two properties were worked on concurrently or sequentially by what I am informed by the Third Defendant, and believe, was a single small contracting business.

19. On the material presently available, the matters set out in paragraph 16 above raise a real question as to whether works of the scope described could have been carried out, by a single contractor, at two separate properties, within the period available before their sale, and, having regard to the matters at paragraphs above, whether they were reasonably necessary at all.

20. I do not suggest, and the Third Defendant does not allege, that the Plaintiff has acted otherwise than in good faith. As was accepted in the Amended Submissions, the Plaintiff, as mortgagee exercising a power of sale, had every commercial incentive to achieve the best price reasonably obtainable for the Properties and no personal interest in incurring unnecessary expenditure.

21. The matters set out above are put forward as questions properly arising on the evidence now available, going to whether the sums deducted for the Longxiang works were expenses ‘with respect to the sale’ within the meaning of orders 7(b) and 8(c) of the orders made 28 November 2024, and not as an allegation of dishonesty.” [Emphasis added.]

14. Mr Tomaras did not have the affidavits of Mr Zheng or Ms Pu when that affidavit was sworn. Subsequently, however, and with the benefit of all of those affidavits, Mr Tomaras provided me and the plaintiff with detailed written submissions dated 7 September 2026 in advance of the matter returning on 8 September 2026. It is important that these submissions be understood. Without intending to do injustice to the whole of these submissions by referring only to part of them, the following portions at least should be included in these reasons:

“(6) The Pu and Zheng Affidavits do not establish that the Longxiang Deductions were properly incurred

27. Neither the Pu Affidavit nor the Zheng Affidavit resolves the matters raised above, and in several respects they sharpen them. Neither Ms Pu nor Mr Zheng engaged Longxiang, and neither has any knowledge of the terms of its engagement, its invoicing practices, or whether it was paid (Pu Affidavit, para 9; Zheng Affidavit generally).

28. Ms Pu does not depose to when, or from whom, she was provided with the copies of the Longxiang invoices now annexed to her affidavit as Annexures A and B, nor to any email or other communication by which those invoices were transmitted (Pu Affidavit, para 5). Neither witness exhibits any photograph, work order, quote, or other contemporaneous document corroborating their recollection of the works, each given more than fourteen months after the events described.

29. The evidence of Ms Pu and Mr Zheng, at its highest, establishes that persons associated with Longxiang attended each Property in June 2025 and performed work generally consistent with the descriptions later appearing in invoices dated a month after that work is said to have concluded. It does not establish that the amounts invoiced were reasonable, that they were in fact paid, or that the invoices accurately record the timing or cost of the work described. The Third Defendant repeats her submission at paragraph 13 above.

E. CONCLUSION

30. Taken together, these matters mean that the Plaintiff has not discharged, and on the material presently available cannot discharge, the onus described at paragraph 9 above of establishing that the Longxiang Deductions were properly and reasonably incurred expenses of the sale within the meaning of orders 7(b) and 8(c) of the 2024 Orders.

31. At its highest, the Plaintiff’s evidence, including the Pu Affidavit and the Zheng Affidavit, establishes only that some works generally consistent with the Longxiang invoices were carried out at each Property in June 2025, by persons associated with Longxiang.

32. It does not establish that the amounts invoiced were reasonable, that they were in fact paid, that the invoices accurately record when that work was performed, or that the work was reasonably necessary to achieve a proper sale price, as distinct from improving the Properties at the Third Defendant’s expense, which Silven Properties confirms the Plaintiff was under no obligation to do.

33. The Third Defendant does not allege that the Plaintiff has acted dishonestly, and does not contend that no works at all were carried out at the Properties; for present purposes, the Third Defendant accepts the evidence of Ms Pu and Mr Zheng that some works were performed in June 2025.

34. What remains in dispute is whether the specific amounts invoiced by Longxiang, some four to five weeks after that work is said to have concluded, were properly incurred and reasonable expenses of the sale within the meaning of orders 7(b) and 8(c) of the 2024 Orders, and it is the Plaintiff, not the Third Defendant, who bears the onus of establishing that: see paragraph 9 above.

35. Where a party bearing that onus fails, without explanation, to produce evidence of a kind that would ordinarily be readily available to it, in particular evidence of engagement, invoicing and payment that lies within the Plaintiff’s own knowledge or that of Longxiang, rather than that of Ms Pu or Mr Zheng, and that has been sought from the Plaintiff repeatedly over an extended period and, most recently, by orders of this Court, the Court may more readily draw an inference against that party’s case: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.

36. Applying that principle, and for the reasons given at paragraphs 13 and 16 above, the Third Defendant submits the Court should infer that the amount and timing of the Longxiang invoices have not been reliably established, and that they should not be accepted, in the amounts claimed, as expenses properly and reasonably incurred with respect to the sale.” [Emphasis added.]

15. Despite the conciliatory tone and content of these submissions, and paragraph 20 of his 18 August 2026 affidavit, things changed on 8 September 2026 when Mr Tomaras resiled from the suggestion that the plaintiff had not acted dishonestly or that no works at all were carried out at the properties or that the plaintiff had acted otherwise than in good faith. Indeed, Mr Tomaras’ submissions moved from that concession to a contrary position that alleged that at least with respect to the Pitt Street property, the works were not carried out as Ms Pu and Mr Zheng had indicated. Mr Tomaras in terms asserted that he was instructed to allege fraud on the part of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff and these deponents were somehow “in cahoots”.

16. Allegations of that type were never made or suggested at any time before Mr Tomaras’ oral submissions to me on 8 September 2026. Indeed, somewhat strikingly, perhaps worryingly, Ms Du, who I have inferred is clearly the main proponent of these allegations, has not even provided an affidavit deposing to any matters within her knowledge explaining the basis for the very serious allegations of fraud that Mr Tomaras has now made, presumably upon her instructions.

17. Mr Foley of counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff has already incurred significant costs in these proceedings, and presumably in the Court of Appeal, none of which costs have been paid. Her Honour Peden J at [56] of the primary judgment accepted that Ms Du had acted unreasonably in the proceedings and ordered her to pay the plaintiff’s costs on an indemnity basis. The plaintiff was successful in the Court of Appeal and Ms Du, among others, was ordered to pay his costs in that Court as well.

18. It is in my experience highly unlikely, if not in realistic and practical terms almost inconceivable, that the monetary significance of any complaint that Ms Du might have about the extent to which the plaintiff has accurately or honestly accounted to her for the costs of the sale of the two properties could ever come close to any sum for costs she is currently liable to pay the plaintiff as ordered by Peden J and by the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff’s evidence is that the works performed upon the properties in order to prepare them for sale, and the costs of sale excluding legal costs, amounted to $55,531.00. Less than half that amount is in issue in the present application. There is authority in this Court for the proposition that the beneficiary of an unsatisfied costs order may be entitled to a stay of proceedings at the suit of a recalcitrant costs debtor until the costs are paid: see, for example, CGU Insurance Ltd v Watson [2007] NSWCA 301 at [40]; Jaworski v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2026] NSWSC 213.

19. Mr Foley has urged upon me that the notice of motion should be dismissed with costs. The burden of his submission is that Ms Du’s application is, having regard to the history of the proceedings and to the very small amount in issue, an abuse of process. As the transcript of the proceedings before me will reveal, I became concerned from day one that Ms Du’s motion was on a collision course with the overriding purpose. At the very least, the costs of this motion alone are undoubtedly completely disproportionate to the relief that is sought.

20. I am also particularly troubled by Mr Tomaras’ latter day assertions, despite numerous written disavowals, that he now has instructions to allege that the plaintiff has fraudulently failed to account to Ms Du for the costs and expenses incurred by him in the sale of the properties. I am not prepared at this stage of these proceedings to entertain a doubtful claim that the plaintiff somehow conspired to cheat Ms Du out of her full entitlement to the proceeds of sale when the plaintiff’s actions in expending money to improve the marketability of the properties was both entirely consistent with the obligations he had as a mortgagee exercising a power of sale in the first place as well as with attempts to secure the best outcome for Ms Du, among others, in the second place.

21. Mr Tomaras wished to embrace the prospect of a full day’s hearing to determine the foreshadowed claims of fraud that have so far not even been pleaded or particularised. He also indicated that at any such hearing he would want to cross-examine not only the plaintiff but Mr Zheng and Ms Pu, with the certain prospect that that would require a Mandarin interpreter. In my opinion, Mr Tomaras’ proposal lacks merit and becomes more questionable the longer it is considered.

22. Ms Du’s notice of motion might in a different context be considered to be frivolous and vexatious. Whether or not that be the case, it is in the present circumstances clearly a vexatious use, if not an abuse, of the process of the Court. It is at odds with the notion of the just, quick and cheap disposition of proceedings. It should be dismissed with costs.

**********