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[2004] NSWIRComm 75
Industrial Relations Commission (NSW)
2004-04-02
Marks J, Mr J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in Court Session
CITATION : Inspector Woodington v Peter Austin [2004] NSWIRComm 75 revised - 13/05/2004 PROSECUTOR Inspector Clive Woodington PARTIES : DEFENDANT Peter Francis Austin FILE NUMBER: 6328 of 2002 CORAM: Marks J CATCHWORDS : Occupational health and safety prosecution - Plea of guilty - Agreed facts - Appropriate penalty considered - Some mitigating circumstances - Fine imposed - Discount applied - Capacity to pay - Further fine reduction - Costs order. Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Act 1999 Constructions Safety Act 1912 LEGISLATION CITED : Fines Act 1996 s 6 Justices Act 1902 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) Occupation Health and Safety Act 1983 s 50 CASES CITED : Inspector Mansell v Eleven Lighting Pty Ltd [2002] NSWIRComm 339 HEARING DATES: 03/04/2004 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/2004
PROSECUTOR Mr J Atkin of counsel SOLICITORS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: WorkCover Authority, NSW DEFENDANT Mr M Duncan of counsel
JUDGMENT: - 2 - INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES IN COURT SESSION CORAM: MARKS J Friday 2 April 2004 Matter No IRC 6328 of 2002 INSPECTOR CLIVE WOODINGTON v PETER FRANCIS AUSTIN Prosecution pursuant to s 50(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983
1 The defendant Peter Francis Austin has pleaded guilty to a breach of s 50 of the Occupation Health and Safety Act 1983 ("the Act") in proceedings instituted by the prosecutor Inspector Clive Woodington of the Workcover Authority of New South Wales. A statement of agreed facts became evidence in the proceedings and is in the following terms:
2 In addition to the agreed statement of facts there was tendered into evidence a factual inspection report, an affidavit of David Ng who relevantly was head of the mechanical unit operated by the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales and a series of photographs.
3 The manner in which the incident occurred may be appreciated from the material contained within the agreed statement of facts sufficiently for the purpose of these proceedings.
4 I should add that the defendant gave personal evidence which included reference to the equipment which was being utilised at the time of the accident and the circumstances in which the accident occurred. Relevantly the defendant said that the equipment had been dismantled and reassembled three times before the accident, that employees engaged in the operation on the day of the accident had had previous experience during the dismantling and reassembling process and that in any event he had closely supervised the manner in which the work was carried out. He had also liaised with the manufacturer of the equipment and discussed the methodology to be used in its dismantling and reassembly.
5 The defendant said that he had become closely associated with and friends with the deceased employee who was a ship's engineer by trade and who had showed him his qualification papers and trade certificates.
6 The defendant admitted, however, that on the day of the accident the methodology used was different because it was necessary to comply with RTA height restrictions whilst conveying the equipment from Waverton to the accident site. Nevertheless he said that he had prepared and coordinated the procedures for the operation.
7 Ultimately, whilst the defendant is able to offer explanations as to the reasons why the accident occurred, and as to why he thought that the manoeuvre could be carried out without risk, the defendant properly conceded that the work operation and the resulting incident constituted a serious breach of the Act by the company of which he was a Director.
8 The defendant gave evidence concerning the impact that the accident had on him personally and on his company. The defendant was on site when the accident occurred and said that he was devastated by it and remains devastated to this day. The accident had resulted in the termination of the company's business and had "turned my life upside down".
9 In fact, the defendant said that the equipment which he was using was unique and had a lot of potential in terms of removal of waste material on building sites and the like. The existing contract which his company had was lost following the accident, his cash flow dried up and the company became insolvent. He said that he was required to sell all of his own assets to pay debts and currently had no assets, living in rented accommodation and driving an old vehicle which had been given to him by his son.
10 The defendant is aged 62 and despite his engineering qualifications is unable to obtain work. He said that in 2003 he project managed a remediation job but that this finished on Christmas Eve and he has been unable to obtain any work since. He has submitted twelve job applications since that time without success.
11 The defendant currently suffers also from some health problems including depression.
12 The defendant had earlier pleaded guilty to a breach of s 16(1) of the Act by reason of his directorship of the same company, Brentwood Services (NSW) Pty Ltd. The incident which gave rise to those proceedings occurred on 15 February 2001 in connection with some excavation work carried out by the company. The incident on that occasion arose when a ladder which was being used by a contractor at the excavation site slipped, it not having been secured in any way and it not having been tied off. The Chief Industrial Magistrate imposed a fine of $3,000 which is the subject of an order for payment by instalments of $200 per month commencing on 26 March 2004.
13 The applicant supplemented his oral evidence concerning his financial situation by tendering bank statements. They showed that he had a current credit balance of approximately $1,500.
14 The defendant, through his counsel, sought that I apply s 6 of the Fines Act 1996 in considering the amount of any monetary penalty.
15 I was informed by the parties that the maximum monetary penalty is $55,000. There can be no doubt, as was conceded by the defendant, that the offence was a serious one. In assessing appropriate penalty I will take into account the need to ensure public deterrence, although I doubt whether this defendant will become involved in any activities in the future which would personally expose him to a breach of the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the question of personal deterrence becomes marginal.
16 The defendant is entitled to the benefit of some mitigating circumstances. He pleaded guilty at the earliest possible opportunity and expressed remorse and contrition with respect to the incident. There is no suggestion that he did not cooperate fully with the WorkCover Authority in connection with its investigations of the matter. Furthermore, the evidence is such that I conclude that the applicant has suffered severe financial consequences as a result of the impact of the accident on the business operations of the company and that he has personal limited opportunities of further gainful employment or further entrepreneurial activities.
17 Without any consideration of the impact of the Fines Act 1996 I would impose a fine of $24,000, but apply a discount of one-third with respect to the mitigating factors to which I have already referred.
18 It is obvious that the defendant has neither the means nor the income to pay a fine of this magnitude, particularly as the prosecutor will also be entitled to a costs order. The prosecutor has assessed costs at $5,555, which the defendant has agreed are reasonable.
19 It is now necessary to consider the provisions of s 6 of the Fines Act and the application of that section to these proceedings. Section 6 is in the following terms: 6 Consideration of accused's means to pay (cf Crimes Act 1900 sec 440AB and Justices Act 1902 sec 80A) In the exercise by a court of a discretion to fix the amount of any fine , the court is required to consider: (a) such information regarding the means of the accused as is reasonably and practicably available to the court for consideration, and (b) such other matters as, in the opinion of the court , are relevant to the fixing of that amount.
20 The application of s 6 of the Fines Act has been considered on a number of occasions by Judges of this court. I referred to a number of those decisions in Inspector Mansell v Eleven Lighting Pty Ltd [2002] NSWIRComm 339. In general terms s 6 of that Act has been applied by taking into account the means of the defendant to pay a penalty whilst having regard also to the need to impose an appropriate penalty so as to reflect the circumstances of the offence and so as to create a deterrent for others. Obviously, each case must be dealt with on its own merits.
21 There is no suggestion in any decided case that the quantum of any monetary penalty should be qualified by the ability of a defendant to make payment of a fine assessed by reference only to his or her means. In addition, the financial circumstances of a defendant may change, although given the age of the defendant and the evidence concerning his employment prospects, I do not assign any significant weight to this factor. Some of the cases consider the means of a defendant in the context of the ability to pay a fine imposed concurrently with a sentence of imprisonment, a factor which is obviously not relevant in the context of these proceedings.
22 Counsel were unable to assist me with any alternative approach to the imposition of a monetary penalty on this defendant. It seems that the awarding of bonds and the imposition of community service orders may be confined to those circumstances where a custodial sentence might be imposed, by reason of the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Act 1999. I observe that the circumstances of the defendant in these proceedings are not unusual in the context of prosecutions brought under the occupational health and safety legislation. Here, the defendant is the subject of a prosecution because he was a director of a company which was in breach of the legislation. That company failed financially as a result of the circumstances which gave rise to the breach, and the defendant's personal assets were interwoven with the fate of the company. Accordingly, in these circumstances, the impecuniosity of this defendant is intimately involved with and related to the financial failure of the company. It seems from the evidence tendered to the court that in reality this defendant has no hope of meeting any financial penalty imposed which is greater than that of a token nature. I am not prepared, consistent with my understanding of the relevant principles, to impose a penalty which reflects in reality only the ability of the defendant to make payment. It is a pity in these circumstances, given the way in which this defendant comes before this court and by reason of his age and financial circumstances making it appear unlikely that he can pay any substantial monetary penalty, that some alternative sentencing means are not available to this court. I instance by way of ready example a community service order which hopefully would have greater beneficial communal effect than the imposition of a monetary penalty which the defendant has no hope of meeting. However, that is a matter for the legislature and not a matter for this court.
23 In all the circumstances, I am prepared to reduce the penalty of $16,000 which would otherwise be imposed on the defendant by a further $6,000, leaving a net penalty of $10,000. In addition the defendant will, of course, be liable to pay the costs of the prosecution assessed at $5,555. The prosecutor has sought a moiety of the penalty and the defendant has not objected to this.
ORDERS 1. The defendant is found guilty and convicted of the offence specified in the summons.
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Inspector Woodington
Peter Austin