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[2026] NSWSC 690
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-06-16
Brereton J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Nova Minerals Limited [2026] NSWSC 690
Hearing dates: 02 June 2026
Date of orders: 02 June 2026
Decision date: 16 June 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Corporations List
Before: Brereton J
Decision: Orders made approving schemes of arrangement
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – schemes of arrangement – application for orders approving schemes of arrangement – where the Court has the power to give a headcount direction – where value test in s 411(4)(a)(i) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) satisfied – where statutory majorities for each scheme have been achieved – where each scheme is fair and reasonable – orders made approving schemes of arrangement
Legislation Cited: Companies Act 2006 (UK)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Securities Act of 1933 (US)
Cases Cited: Avita Medical Limited, in the matter of Avita Medical Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 674
In the matter of Argo Blockchain PLC [2025] EWHC 2951 (Ch)
In the matter of Australian Energy Ltd [2006] FCA 155
In the matter of Cardtronics PLC [2021] EWHC 1617 (Ch)
In the matter of Coventry Resources Limited [2012] FCA 1252
In the matter of Ellerston Global Investments Limited [2020] NSWSC 1108
In the matter of Foundation Healthcare Ltd [2002] FCA 742; 42 ACSR 252
In the matter of GW Pharmaceuticals PLC [2021] EWHC 716 (Ch)
In the matter of Nova Minerals Limited [2026] NSWSC 420
In the matter of Ortho Clinical Diagnostics Holdings PLC [2022] EWHC 657 (Ch)
In the matter of Telstra Corporation Limited (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 1460; 163 ACSR 543
PR Finance Group Ltd, in the matter of PR Finance Group Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 704
Re Equitable Life Assurance Society (No 1) [2002] BCC 319
Re Niagara Mining Ltd (2002) 132 FCR 266; [2002] FCA 1651
TriAusMin Limited, in the matter of TriAusMin Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 833
Texts Cited: N.A.
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Nova Minerals Limited (plaintiff)
Representation: Counsel:
I Ahmed SC (plaintiff)
Solicitors:
Ashurst Australia (plaintiff)
File Number(s): 2026/120223
Publication restriction: N.A.
On 20 April 2026, the Court ordered that Nova Minerals Limited (Nova) convene meetings in relation to two proposed schemes of arrangement. The first was between Nova and its ordinary shareholders and the second was between Nova and holders of its listed warrants.
A description of the two schemes and their effect on Nova's shareholders and other persons is set out in In the matter of Nova Minerals Limited [2026] NSWSC 420. By way of summary, the schemes involve all of the issued capital and certain warrants in Nova being acquired by Nova Minerals Corp. The purpose of the schemes is to redomicile Nova to the United States.
Scheme meetings were held on 29 May 2026.
Nova sought approval for the schemes pursuant to s 411 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). On 2 June 2026, I made orders approving the two schemes, together with some ancillary orders. These are my reasons.
Order 5 of the orders made on 20 April 2026 was not complied with insofar as it required that a copy of the hard copy scheme booklet be sent to the 22 shareholders for whom an email bounceback was received. Instead, those persons received a hard copy letter which contained a link to the scheme booklet (amongst other materials). An officer of Nova proffered an apology on behalf of Nova in respect of this oversight.
I accepted that this failure did not require the Court to withhold its approval of the schemes. Each of the 22 shareholders received a hard copy communication alerting them to the scheme meeting and enabled them to access the scheme booklet. Each of those shareholders holds a very small amount of Nova shares (with the largest being 0.0098%). Having regard to the overwhelming support for the share scheme (see below), even if all of those shareholders had voted against the share scheme, it would still have been approved by Nova’s shareholders by a considerable margin.
There was a failure to comply with order 4(e) of the Court’s previous orders in relation to Vanguard Marketing Corporation. Vanguard is one of two shareholders holding Nova shares quoted on the OTC market, and holds 1.5% of such shares (comprising 4,586 Nova shares, representing 0.001% of the total share capital in Nova). Vanguard was to be sent the material in relation to the schemes on 28 April 2026. The material was sent to it on 1 May 2026, and then again on 8 May 2026. It was confirmed that Vanguard received the material. I accepted that the non-compliance was relatively minor, being a matter of a few days, and was quickly rectified. I accepted that the failure did not impinge on the integrity of the meeting of shareholders.
There was non-compliance with the Court's orders in respect of the publication of ASX announcements. Orders 17 and 18 of the earlier orders provided for Nova to publish ASX announcements substantially in the form that was annexed to the orders. The forms of the announcements that were published varied from the forms approved by the Court. There is evidence that an officer of Nova took it upon himself to make changes to the forms of announcement approved by the Court, and made the subject of orders, in the belief that the information could be presented more clearly, or could avoid duplication, without removing material information. He did not appreciate that the result was that Nova failed to comply with the orders of the Court.
The failure to comply with the Court orders was regrettable and should not have occurred. Nova proffered an apology.
However, I accepted that the failure did not impinge on the integrity of the scheme process. Nova published to the ASX a further announcement on 22 May 2026 to seek to ensure that all of the information in the announcements as approved by the Court had been provided to the market. Furthermore, the deletions from the announcements was of material that was otherwise available to shareholders. The deletions did not deprive them of material information. I was satisfied that the non-compliance was not deliberate and was not motivated to achieve an advantage by withholding information or by presenting information in a manner to better advance the likelihood of a preferred outcome.
The majorities required by s 411 of the Corporations Act were comfortably obtained in respect of the share scheme. In particular, at the share scheme meeting:
98.88% of the votes cast were in favour of the proposed share scheme; and
87.29% of shareholders who cast votes were in favour of the proposed share scheme.
The level of voter turnout was higher than the number of votes cast at Nova's most recent AGMs. While the shareholder turnout would not be characterised as high (3.63% of shareholders by number holding 20.60% of available votes), it is nonetheless a reflection of a substantial number of the shares that were available to be voted. There was no suggestion that the shareholder turnout was the result of shareholders being deterred from voting or a lack of notice. As Farrell J observed in TriAusMin L**imited, in the matter of TriAusMin Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 833 at [10], “apathy should not be presumed to be antagonism”. It was also appropriate to take into account that the schemes did not involve any radical change in the nature of Nova; it was, in substance, a redomiciliation of its operations. It was not remarkable that the share scheme did not elicit significant engagement by all shareholders.
A problem arose in respect of the warrant scheme. The scheme enjoyed strong support from the beneficial owners of the warrants. In terms of the number of beneficial owners, 18 (or 81.8%) were in favour, 3 were opposed and 1 abstained. In terms of votes cast, 57,247 of 57,311 were in favour – an approval rate of 99.89%. The problem lay in the fact that there was only one registered warrant holder – Cede & Co. It held the warrants as bare trustee for the Depository Trust & Clearing Co. Cede & Co appointed the underlying beneficial owners of the warrants as its proxy to vote in respect of the warrant scheme. But Cede & Co is taken as the person voting. The consequence is that Cede & Co split its votes – a great majority were cast in favour of the warrant scheme and a tiny minority were cast against. This created a difficulty in terms of compliance with the statutory majorities set out in s 411 of the Corporations Act.
Nova accepted that the warrant scheme is a creditors’ scheme: see the observations made in Avita Medical Limited*, in the matter of Avita Medical Limited* (No 2) [2020] FCA 674 at [12] (Jagot J), citing In the matter of Coventry Resources Limited [2012] FCA 1252 at [18] (Barker J). The holder of a warrant has a right to 5 Nova ADSs (representing 60 Nova shares) at an exercise price of US$1.4532. A warrant holder has been considered to be a contingent creditor (rather than as a contingent member). Nova submitted that the position is not uncontroversial and referred to Re Niagara Mining Ltd (2002) 132 FCR 266; [2002] FCA 1651 at [30]-[32] (Lee J); In the matter of Foundation Healthcare Ltd [2002] FCA 742; 42 ACSR 252 at [12] (French J) and In the matter of Australian Energy Ltd [2006] FCA 155 at [10] (Lindgren J). However, Nova did not urge me to approach the warrant scheme otherwise than as a creditors’ scheme.
Section 411(4) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:
411 Administration of compromises etc.
(4) A compromise or arrangement is binding on the creditors, or on a class of creditors, or on the members, or on a class of members, as the case may be, of the body and on the body or, if the body is in the course of being wound up, on the liquidator and contributories of the body, if, and only if:
(a) at a meeting convened in accordance with an order of the Court under subsection (1) or (1A):
(i) in the case of a compromise or arrangement between a body and its creditors or a class of creditors—the compromise or arrangement is agreed to by a majority in number of the creditors, or of the creditors included in that class of creditors, present and voting, either in person or by proxy, being a majority whose debts or claims against the company amount in the aggregate to at least 75% of the total amount of the debts and claims of the creditors present and voting in person or by proxy, or of the creditors included in that class present and voting in person or by proxy, as the case may be; and
(ii) in the case of a compromise or arrangement between a body and its members or a class of members—a resolution in favour of the compromise or arrangement is:
(A) unless the Court orders otherwise—passed by a majority in number of the members, or members in that class, present and voting (either in person or by proxy); and
(B) if the body has a share capital—passed by 75% of the votes cast on the resolution; and
(b) it is approved by order of the Court.
Section 411(4)(a)(i) provides for a minimum vote count in order for a creditors’ scheme to be binding. Relevantly, what is required is a majority in number of the creditors present and voting, being a majority whose debts together is at least 75% of the total amount of debt of the creditors who voted.
[10] I begin with the Spark RE scheme. The applicable provision is s 411(4)(a)(i) dealing with a compromise or arrangement between a Pt 5.1 body and a class of its creditors. One of the matters to which that section directs attention is the “total amount of the debts and claims of … the creditors included in that class present and voting in person or by proxy”. A conclusion that the approval of creditors has been given in accordance with the section depends on its being found that the “majority in number of the … creditors included in that class of creditors” who agreed to the scheme was a majority “whose debts or claims against the company amount in the aggregate to at least 75% of” that total amount.
[11] The underlying assumption is that each creditor will account for a single amount of debt or claim which, no doubt, may itself be an aggregate derived from several separate debts or claims. The “total amount” to which the section refers is arrived at by adding together the amounts of the debts or claims of all creditors in the class.
[12] Attention is then directed to which creditors voted, whether in person or by proxy, on the question of whether the scheme should be agreed to. The debts or claims of those who voted in a positive way are then compared with the debts and claims of those who voted in a negative way to determine whether the 75% requirement has been met.
[13] Because only a single amount of debt or claim is attributed to a particular creditor, the creditor can, by voting, deploy only that single amount in favour of the scheme or against it. The creditor cannot apportion part to support and the remainder to opposition. Nor can the creditor vote part for or against and leave the balance uncommitted.
[14] It follows that a creditor’s vote, for the purpose of determining whether a “majority in number” has approved the scheme, cannot be split. Just as the creditor’s single debt amount cannot be broken into two, so the creditor, as a person, cannot be within both the “for” camp and the “against” camp.
[15] In relation to the Spark RE scheme, therefore, the conclusion must be that a creditor who purported to vote in favour of approval as to part of the creditor’s debt and against as to the remainder (or another part) did not vote in the way the statute contemplates and allows, with the result that the proper course, in determining the result of voting, was to ignore the purported positive vote and the purported negative vote of that creditor.
[16] The same conclusion would apply to a creditor who purported to vote for or against in respect of part only of the creditor’s single amount of debt or claim. Because the section works on the basis that a creditor is to be taken into account for the whole of the creditor’s amount, someone who purports to abstain for part of their debt does not vote in the way for which the law makes provision.
[17] In short, s 411(4)(a)(i) does not recognise or accommodate any concept of split voting by a single creditor. It does not allow a creditor either to vote (whether “for” or “against”) in respect of part only of the creditor’s amount or to vote “for” in respect of one part and “against” in respect of the remainder (or another part). Any vote purportedly cast in such a way must be disregarded.
The effect of Spark Infrastructure in this case would be that Cede & Co's votes would be treated as split, and therefore disregarded. Given that Cede & Co was the only listed warrant holder, the consequence would be that the warrant scheme would not attain the majority required under s 411, and the warrant scheme could not be approved.
Nova submitted that the decision in Spark Infrastructure, and particularly the assumption identified by Barrett J at [11] that creditors will account for a single amount of debt, is not an assumption that finds direct expression in the statute. Nova submitted that it is a notion more apposite to the position of a traditional creditor, which is owed a debt, rather than a creditor in the form of a warrant holder (or option holder) who will typically hold readily divisible securities that represent the obligation owed to the holder. Nova submitted there is a real question as to whether the observations made by Barrett J in Spark Infrastructure are applicable in a case such as the present.
Nova advanced a mechanism that addressed the difficulty that the application of Spark Infrastructure would mean that the overwhelming support of the beneficial owners of the warrants would be defeated. That mechanism drew inspiration from the decision of Snowden J in In the matter of GW Pharmaceuticals P**LC [2021] EWHC 716 (Ch).
In that case, his Lordship was concerned with an application for an order to convene a scheme meeting of members of a company to approve a scheme of arrangement under Pt 26 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). A depositary held 97.4% of the scheme shares. There was an issue about how to treat that depositary for the purposes of the “headcount” test in s 899 of the Companies Act. That section provides:
899 Court sanction for compromise or arrangement
(1) If a majority in number representing 75% in value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members (as the case may be), present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting summoned under section 896, agree a compromise or arrangement, the court may, on an application under this section, sanction the compromise or arrangement.
(1A) Subsection (1) is subject to section 899A (moratorium debts, etc).
(2) An application under this section may be made by—
(a) the company…
(3) A compromise or arrangement sanctioned by the court is binding on—
(a) all creditors or the class of creditors or on the members or class of members (as the case may be), and
(b) the company or, in the case of a company in the course of being wound up, the liquidator and contributories of the company.
(4) The court's order has no effect until a copy of it has been delivered to the registrar.
The section is similar in effect to s 411(4) of the Corporations Act.
In GW Pharmaceuticals, the scheme proponent proposed that the Court should give a direction that for the purpose of the majority in number test, the Chair of the Court meeting shall treat a holder of scheme shares that casts a vote both for and against the scheme as voting in favour of the scheme if such holder casts more votes for the scheme than against the scheme, and otherwise that it should be treated as voting against the scheme. This was referred to as the "headcount direction". A direction to that effect was made.
Nova sought a similar direction. In GW Pharmaceuticals, the direction was made at the initial Court hearing; that is, before the meeting was convened. That is the most appropriate time for such an order. Nova did not seek a headcount direction at the first hearing. Nova had not adverted to the difficulty that may flow from the sole listed warrant holder seeking to split its vote (in order to give effect to the views of those holding the beneficial interests in the warrants). Nova sought an order by which the Court would give a headcount direction under s 1319 of the Corporations Act, or otherwise pursuant to the Court's inherent power, and for the order to take effect nunc pro tunc.
I concluded that the Court has power to give a headcount direction on that basis and that the direction should be given in this case.
As to the wisdom of a headcount direction, Snowden J made various useful observations in GW Pharmaceuticals. At [24]-[25], his Lordship said:
[24] The underlying objective of a court meeting is to determine fairly the views of the class as to the interests of the class: Re Dee Valley Group Plc [2017] EWHC 184 (Ch); [2018] Ch. 55; [2018] B.C.C. 486 at [44]. It is also well established that the court has the inherent power to give appropriate directions as to how a court meeting should be held: see Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385 at 395–396; Re RhythmOne Plc (No.06223359) [2019] EWHC 967 (Ch) at [14]; Re Dee Valley Group Plc (above) at [50].
[25] Recognising the realities of the way that interests in shares and debt are now often held through intermediaries, the modern practice of the court is to give directions which aim to ensure voting at a court meeting is representative of those with the underlying economic interest at stake in the scheme: see e.g. Re Noble Group Ltd [2018] EWHC 2911 (Ch); [2019] B.C.C. 349 at [162]. Although plainly desirable, that approach has given rise to difficulties with the headcount test under Pt 26. Different solutions have been suggested to this type of problem in a number of cases.
His Lordship considered a solution suggested in Re Equitable Life Assurance Society (No 1) [2002] BCC 319. In that case, Lloyd J directed that a nominee which split its vote should be regarded as having voted once for and once against the scheme for the purposes of the headcount test.
[38] However, Mr Todd QC submitted, and I accept, that the headcount direction is a more appropriate solution to adopt for the court meeting on the facts of the instant case, for the following reasons:
i) The approach in Equitable Life could result in there being more voters for the purpose of the headcount test than there are actually members of the company. Whilst I do not think that this has the same conceptual problem as fractionalising a member, as Lloyd J recognised, it would be an “oddity”. The proposed headcount direction avoids that result.
ii) Since it is almost inevitable that the depositary will receive some instructions both in favour of and against the scheme, the approach in Equitable Life is likely to result in 97.4% of the scheme shares having no effect on the outcome of the headcount test. The depositary will be regarded as having voted once in favour and once against the scheme, making its overall position neutral. The same would apply to any other members of the company holding scheme shares as trustee or nominee that might wish to split their votes or appoint multiple proxies. Since it is at least possible that there could be a very low turnout among members other than the depositary, who only hold a total of 2.6% of the scheme shares, this approach could give those other members a disproportionate influence on the outcome at the court meeting.
iii) By contrast, the headcount direction enables the depositary (and any other members holding as trustee or nominee who might be required to split their vote) to have at least some effect on the result of the headcount test. Whilst the headcount direction may only add one head to the count in respect of the depositary and each other member that split its votes or appointed multiple proxies, it at least has the consequence that the result of the headcount will be more representative of the views of the persons having the overwhelming majority by value of the underlying economic interest in the scheme.
[39] I recognise that adopting the headcount direction may improve the prospects of the scheme achieving the necessary majority in number at the court meeting. If and to the extent that any issues arise in this respect which might be said to have affected the result of the court meeting, or otherwise go to the fairness of the voting on a dissenting member, the court will still be able to deal with these issues at the sanction hearing when exercising its discretion.
GW Pharmaceuticals has been followed or approved in decisions in England: see In the matter of Ortho Clinical Diagnostics Holdings PLC [2022] EWHC 657 (Ch) at [32]-[33] (Green J); In the matter of Argo Blockchain PLC [2025] EWHC 2951 (Ch) at [138] (Hildyard J). In In the matter of Cardtronics PLC [2021] EWHC 1617 (Ch), Sir Alastair Norris referred to Equitable Life and GW Pharmaceuticals as alternative solutions to the “single registered shareholder” problem and observed (at [16]) that what was most fundamental was whether the Court feels able to rely on the outcome of the meeting as a true expression of the will of the members.
If a direction of the kind made in Equitable Life was made in this case, Cede & Co would be taken to have voted once for and once against the warrant scheme. The consequence would be, given that only Cede & Co could vote, that there would not be a majority of votes in favour of the scheme. Conversely, if a GW Pharmaceuticals headcount direction was made, then Cede & Co would be taken to have voted in favour of the warrant scheme. The value test in s 411(4)(a)(i) would be satisfied, because Cede & Co holds 100% of the debt.
It would plainly have been desirable if the issue concerning the consequences of Cede & Co being the only registered warrant holder, but as trustee ultimately for persons with beneficial ownership of specific numbers of warrants, had been adverted to prior to or at the first Court hearing. It would have been much better if an appropriate direction had been sought at the time of the first Court hearing. If that had been done, various solutions could have been considered. In GW Pharmaceuticals, Snowden J referred (at [26]) to solutions in the context of creditor schemes where bonds were held through custodians. In this case, the issue was not identified until after the warrant scheme meeting. The chair of the meeting declared the resolution passed, by reference to the votes cast by proxy (although even in that there was an error in the tallying of votes). That declaration failed to give effect to the decision in Spark Infrastructure.
Nova canvassed 3 possibilities that may flow from what occurred. One was simply that the warrant scheme failed because the requisite votes at the scheme meeting were not achieved. That outcome would flow from the technical operation of law. However, the consequence would be that the views of those with the underlying economic interest in the warrants, and who expressed a view by their proxy votes, would, in effect, be jettisoned. The persons with the economic interest in the warrants are those who hold the warrants beneficially. Those economic interests are share-like, in that each warrant might be thought to reflect a contingent interest in a specific number of shares. The views of those with the real economic interest should be respected.
A GW Pharmaceuticals headcount test is a mechanism that would ensure that the views of those with the underlying economic interest are taken into account. The second possibility that Nova canvassed was for the Court to give such a direction and order that there be another meeting of the warrant holders, where the direction was to apply. I accepted that this course is within power. The Court has power under s 1319 of the Corporations Act to give directions with respect to meetings ordered by the Court. I accepted that the Court also has inherent power to do so. There is no reason why the Court would not have power to make a GW Pharmaceuticals headcount direction at a first Court hearing if it considered it to be appropriate. I did not consider that such a direction would amount to a departure from the voting requirements imposed by s 411(4). Rather, it would facilitate s 411 to operate by reference to economic reality and not merely by reference to legal form. The existence of power has not been doubted in England where the legal framework is relevantly the same as it is in Australia.
The Court has power to order that there is a further or supplementary meeting of warrant holders. The power is analogous to the one exercised by Farrell J in PR Finance Group Ltd*, in the matter of PR Finance Group Ltd* (No 3) [2013] FCA 704, see particularly at [18]. While this course was open, I was persuaded that it would be a waste of time and expense because the outcome of any fresh meeting would be a foregone conclusion given that, as a matter of substance, nothing would have changed from the time of the first meeting.
That leads to the third possibility, which Nova urged as the most appropriate. Nova sought an order that I make a GW Pharmaceuticals headcount direction nunc pro tunc. The effect of the order, if made nunc pro tunc, would be that the requirements of s 411(4)(a)(i) would have been satisfied, because Cede & Co (holding 100% of the debt) would be taken to have voted in favour of the warrant scheme, and there would be no-one voting against the warrant scheme. The amount of the debt held by the entity voting in favour was 100%. I concluded that this would give effect to the wishes of those who held the underlying economic interest in the warrants, as expressed by the proxy votes at the warrant scheme meeting. On a pure headcount basis, over 80% of those voting (via proxy in proportion to their beneficial interest) were in favour. In terms of value, the percentage was close to unanimous (99.89%).
In GW Pharmaceuticals, Snowden J recognised that the headcount test could result in unfairness and other issues. His Lordship contemplated (at [39], set out above) that those matters could properly be addressed at the sanction hearing. I was in a position to consider whether the headcount direction proposed by Nova resulted in unfairness or caused other difficulties at the time of the sanction hearing. I was in a position to assess whether the direction would unfairly result in the arrangement becoming binding. I was satisfied that fairness demanded that the scheme be approved, having regard to the clear views expressed by those holding the economic interest in the warrants. I was also satisfied that fairness did not demand that there be a further meeting. To hold another meeting would not achieve anything useful given the views that had already been expressed. The prospect that another meeting would yield a different result could be assessed as so close to nil that it could be disregarded as a possibility.
The statutory preconditions to the Court's approval were satisfied prior to the second Court hearing.
In accordance with s 412(6) of the Corporations Act, on 22 April 2026, Nova lodged with ASIC a copy of the scheme booklet and provided ASIC with the orders of the Court made on that date convening the scheme meeting.
ASIC provided a letter dated 1 June 2026 advising that, under s 411(17)(b) of the Corporations Act, it had no objections to the two schemes.
Nova led evidence establishing that the conditions precedent to the schemes had in each case been satisfied or waived.
I was advised at the first Court hearing that in the event the schemes are approved by the Court, Nova Minerals Corp intends to rely on the Court's approval of the schemes for the purpose of qualifying for exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (US). The relevant exemption is provided for by s 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act and operates in connection with the new Nova Minerals Corp shares and warrants that will be issued pursuant to the schemes.
It is not for the Court to determine whether the conditions necessary to enable reliance on the exemption have been satisfied.
However, Nova sought, and I made, a notation to the orders sought recording the fact that Nova Minerals Corp will rely on the Court's approval for the purposes of the exemption. I adopted the practice recorded in In the matter of Ellerston Global Investments L**imited [2020] NSWSC 1108 at [18]-[19] (Black J) and followed in In the matter of Telstra Corporation L**imited (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 1460; 163 ACSR 543 at [55]-[57] (Black J).
Share Scheme
Warrant Scheme
Other
The Court notes:
**********
[2026] NSWSC 420
(2002) 132 FCR 266
(2010) 79 NSWLR 756