Further issues
10 In the present case my attention has been drawn to a number of issues, only two of which require any further comment.
11 The first is the letter that was sent by ASIC relating to the disclosure in the Scheme Booklet. As I have said, I have also been taken to a detailed response from Avita Australia in relation to that matter, and am satisfied that the company has adequately dealt with all of ASIC's concerns in an appropriate manner.
12 The second relates to various options also inclusive of warrants and restricted security units (RSUs). In the written submissions for the plaintiff, reference is made to the decision In the matter of Coventry Resources Limited [2012] FCA 1252 (Coventry Resources) at [18], where it was held that "[option holders] have generally been considered to be contingent creditors and that a scheme of arrangement that involves an adjustment of the rights of option holders, such as existing options being cancelled or new options being acquired, will require a separate creditor scheme of arrangement to adjust the option holders' rights, in addition to a scheme for the members.
13 As set out in the written submissions for the plaintiff, however, Coventry Resources is premised on there being some adjustment to the rights of option holders. In the present case, the plaintiff is not asking the Court to approve an arrangement that will result in an adjustment of the rights of option holders. The holders of unlisted options, warrants and RSUs have no entitlement to attend the meeting to consider the Proposed Scheme on the basis of the securities. Rather, they have a prospective right to shares subject to satisfaction of the conditions of vesting and exercise attaching to their securities. The written submissions for the plaintiff also note that an issue which might arise for consideration is whether members who hold ordinary stock and who also hold additional unlisted options, warrants or RSUs should constitute a separate class from members who do not hold these securities. I accept the submissions for the plaintiff that these shareholders will not require voting in any separate class.
14 The principles applicable to the constitution of classes in the context of a scheme of arrangement have been outlined in In the matter of URB Investments Limited [2019] FCA 1977 at [44] to [48]. Reference is there made at [45] to the decision in Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd [1892] 2QB 573 at 583, where Bowen LJ set out the test for identifying a class for a scheme of arrangement as follows:
It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term 'class' as will prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.
15 I am satisfied that the interests of members holding the additional securities are not so different as to make it impossible for them to consult with the other members of Avita Australia for the purposes of voting on the proposed scheme, and that no separate classes are required. In this regard, I refer to In the matter of Think Childcare Limited [2019] FCA 1862 at [33] to [34], in which Markovic J dealt with certain performance rights and stated as follows:
33 The regime set out in cl 4 of the scheme implementation deed is intended to effect an amendment to the [Think Childcare Limited (TNK)] performance rights with effect from the Scheme Record Date; on vesting TNK Performance Rights Holders are issued with Stapled securities rather than unstapled TNK shares. The proposed amendment to the terms of the TNK Performance Rights Plan involves a change to the securities to be issued on vesting and exercise of the TNK performance rights (from TNK shares to Stapled securities following implementation of the Stapling Proposal). It does not concern the removal or relaxation of any vesting conditions which TNK shareholders have previously approved.
34 As submitted by TNK these circumstances do not give rise to TNK Performance Rights Holders constituting a different class of shareholder as there is no relevant distinction between the rights of Scheme Shareholders. As Finkelstein J observed in Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 813; (2009) 179 FCR 20 at [64], it is 'the difference in rights, not interests, that are relevant to determining whether or not separate classes exist'. See too [In the matter of Hills Motorway Ltd [2002] NSWSC 897 (2002); 43 ACSR 101].
16 Further, my attention has been drawn to In the matter of Skilled Group Limited (No 1) [2015] VSC 789 (2015) 113 ASCR 525 at [82] in which Robson J said:
I am satisfied that the performance rights or options held by some employees do not give rise to a separate class of members. It is worth noting at the outset that the rights will not vest until after the meeting to approve the scheme is held. Accordingly, the issue of additional shares will not influence the voting at the meeting directly. The question is whether the rights and options themselves (and the prospect of additional shares upon their vesting) gives rise to a divergence of interests with other shareholders. I do not consider that it does. The shares to be issued if the rights or options vest are not of a different type than those of other shareholders. Moreover, it appears to me that the employees with performance rights or options are in no different position from any other employee of the company who would be impacted by the scheme's implementation in different ways on the basis of various interests extraneous to their status as members.
17 Having regard to these matters, I am satisfied that I should accept the submissions for the plaintiff, in particular that the explanatory statement in the form of the Scheme Booklet discloses all matters material to the decision of its members whether or not to approve the Proposed Scheme, noting that the Avita Australia directors have confirmed that all statements of fact contained in the Scheme Booklet in relation to the Avita Group are true and accurate in all material respects, and are not misleading or deceptive. I refer also to the existence of the report of the independent expert, Mark Whittaker, of BDO Australia, who has reached an opinion that the advantages of the Proposed Scheme outweigh its disadvantages, and, as such, the Proposed Scheme is in the best interests of shareholders of Avita Australia as a whole in the absence of an alternative proposal, or any further information.
18 In these circumstances, I am satisfied that I should make orders for the convening of the scheme meeting as set out in the proposed orders for the plaintiff. .
I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Jagot.