In the matter of A.C.N. 063 346 708 (formerly known as South Passage Pty Ltd) [2018] NSWSC 1709

Supreme Court of NSW|2018-09-28|Before: Rees J

Solicitors: Stacks Law Firm File Number(s): 2018/255781

Judgment

HER HONOUR: This is an application for substituted service, reinstatement of a company and ancillary orders pursuant to section 601AH(3)(d) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that, upon the reinstatement of the company, contrary to the position at deregistration: 1. the plaintiff is to be the sole shareholder of the company, holding all 100 shares; 2. the plaintiff is to be appointed sole director and secretary of the company; 3. the registered office of the company is to be the plaintiff's home address; and 4. the constitution of the company is to be dispensed with.
The plaintiff's counsel accepts that, by this application, he seeks ancillary orders on reinstatement which are wide reaching and unusual, but contends that these are unusual circumstances.

Chase v Chase

In June 2016, Stuart Chase and his mother Margery Chase commenced proceedings in this Court against Karen Chase and another family company, Ileaco Pty Ltd, seeking inter alia the following relief: 1. A declaration that [Karen Chase] holds the whole of her shareholding in South Passage Pty Ltd (ACN 063 346 707) on trust for [Stuart Chase]. 2. An order that [Karen Chase] transfer the shares held by her in South Passage Pty Ltd to [Stuart Chase].
In July 2016, Karen Chase filed a defence, which traversed the allegation of the formal declaration of trust sufficiently to suggest that she claimed that she did not sign it. Karen Chase's defence also contained a number of serious allegations and was, by its terms, susceptible to being struck out under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 rule 14.28(1) as having a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay or otherwise as an abuse of the process of the court. As Ms Chase took no steps to prove her allegations with evidence, I will not repeat those allegations here.
In November 2016 the registered office of South Passage Pty Ltd changed from 52 Lee-Steere Crescent, Kambah ACT 2902 to a Brisbane address.
In September 2017, the proceedings were listed for final hearing before Lindsay J on 6 and 7 February 2018.
On 4 December 2017, an application was made for voluntary deregistration of South Passage Pty Ltd and Ileaco Pty Ltd. The application is not in evidence before me but, as Karen Chase was the sole office holder of South Passage Pty Ltd at the time, I infer that the application was made by Karen Chase.
On 6 February 2018, Chase v Chase was listed for hearing before Lindsay J. Karen Chase did not appear. Karen Chase did not respond to a subpoena served on her in the proceedings nor did she put on any evidence. His Honour's treatment of the plaintiffs' claim, in the absence of Karen Chase, was characteristically meticulous. His Honour made inter alia the following notations and orders: 1. NOTE the Statement of Claim filed on 23 June 2016. 2. NOTE the Defence filed on 14 July 2016 ostensibly by [Karen Chase]. 3. NOTE that no separate Defence has been filed by or on behalf of [Ileaco Pty Ltd]. … 8. NOTE the following evidence in support of the Statement of Claim: a) Affidavit of Kate Lorraine Cheney sworn 15 July 2016. b) Affidavit of Joshua Deane Crowther sworn 2 February 2018. c) Affidavit of Bettina Saxby sworn 5 February 2018. d) Affidavit of Bettina Saxby sworn 6 February 2018. e) Affidavit of Kate Lorraine Cheney sworn 6 February 2018. f) Affidavit of Stuart Gordon Chase sworn 3 November 2016, together with Exhibits SGC-1, SGC-3, SGC-4 and SGC-5 to the Affidavit. g) Affidavit of Andrew Peter Chase sworn 25 January 2018. h) Affidavit Margery May Chase sworn 25 January 2018. i) Affidavit of Margery May Chase sworn 27 July 2016. j) Affidavit of Christopher Anderson sworn 10 May 2017. k) Affidavit of Ronald Bruce Smith sworn 5 December 2017. l) Affidavit of Lyndsay John Tooley sworn 31 October 2017. m) Affidavit of Bettina Saxby sworn 6 February 2017. n) Affidavit of John William Hackney sworn 2 November 2016. o) Affidavit of David John Fryatt sworn 6 February 2017. p) Exhibits P2-P13 inclusive. 9. NOTE the written submissions of the plaintiffs marked for identification as MFI P1. 10. DECLARE that [Karen Chase] holds her shares in South Passage Pty Limited ACN 063 346 707 (being 75% of the issued shares in the Company) on trust for the [Stuart Chase]. 11. ORDER that the [Karen Chase] do all such acts and things as are necessary to transfer those shares in South Passage Pty Limited to the [Stuart Chase]. … 18. ORDER that the Defendants pay the Plaintiffs' costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis. 19. ORDER, subject to further order, that the Plaintiffs serve on the Defendants, no later than 12 February 2018, a copy of these Orders. 20. RESERVE to the Defendants jointly and severally, liberty to apply for an order that these Orders be discharged or varied. 21. ORDER, subject to further order, that any application made by the Defendants or either of them pursuant to that reservation of liberty to apply be made by way of a notice of motion, filed and served no later than 19 February 2018. 22. ORDER that these Orders be entered forthwith.
By orders 10 and 11, his Honour declared that Karen Chase held her shares in South Passage Pty Ltd on trust for Stuart Chase and ordered that Karen Chase do all such acts and things as are necessary to transfer those shares to Stuart Chase. Amongst the evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs, Margery Chase, the witness to Karen Chase's signature on the declaration of trust, identified her and Karen Chase's signatures on the document. A forensic document examiner also provided a report to support the opinion that the person who signed the declaration of trust was Karen Chase.
Two days later, on 8 February 2018, South Passage Pty Ltd was deregistered by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).
The plaintiffs' solicitors encountered considerable difficulties effecting service of Lindsay J's orders on Karen Chase. An investigator was retained, who attempted service at the registered office of South Passage Pty Ltd in Brisbane, then at a Melbourne address indicated by a search of the electoral role, then at the two addresses in Kambah, ACT. Amongst these efforts, the following two events are significant. 1. On 9 February 2018, a process server, Craig Brooks, attempted to serve Karen Chase at 23 Winser Crescent, Kambah ACT and gave evidence that a woman next door said that a Karen lived at No 23 and offered to go into her backyard and yell out to Karen over the fence, which she did, calling "Karen, Karen". There was no answer. However, this indicates that Karen Chase did live at 23 Winser Crescent, Kambah ACT at the time. 2. On 7 March 2018, Mr Brooks returned to 23 Winser Crescent, Kambah ACT with a photograph of Douglas Marshall provided to him by the plaintiffs. A male drove a black Mercedes car out of the garage onto the driveway. Mr Brooks drove his car to the front of the driveway in an attempt to prevent the male from leaving the property. The driver of the Mercedes drove around Mr Brooks' vehicle, dropped off the gutter and continued driving around the block and ultimately back into the driveway. Mr Brooks approached the driver, who he recognised from the photograph as being Douglas Marshall. Mr Brooks told Mr Marshall said that he needed to speak to Karen Chase and asked whether she was available. Mr Marshall said that he did not know a Karen and there was no Karen here. Mr Marshall declined to provide his name. Mr Brooks told Mr Marshall that he also had an address for Karen at 52 Lee-Steere Crescent, Kambah and Mr Marshall replied, "That is my property as well and there is no Karen there either". Mr Marshall said he was going to report Mr Brooks to the police and took Mr Brooks' hand, pulling Mr Brooks closer to him and saying "You are not to come back to this property and you won't come back to my property".
Further company searches undertaken by the plaintiffs' solicitors at this time revealed that South Passage Pty Ltd and Ileaco Pty Ltd had been deregistered. In May 2018, the plaintiffs brought the matter back before Lindsay J to make further orders in light of the difficulties effecting personal service on Karen Chase and the fact that the companies had been deregistered. His Honour made orders for substituted service on Karen Chase and further: 6 NOTE that the plaintiffs seek orders for the substituted service of process (namely, the orders of 6 February 2018 and these Orders) on [Karen Chase], following which they propose, on notice to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, to make an application under the Corporations Act 2001 Cth, for the reinstatement of [Ileaco Pty Ltd] to the Register on terms designed to facilitate enforcement of the orders made in these proceedings on 6 February 2018. … 9 RESERVE to the plaintiff liberty to apply for further orders relating to service of process on the defendants or for consequential relief designed to enforce the Orders.
In June 2018, the plaintiffs served Karen Chase in accordance with the orders made by Lindsay J for substituted service by placing his Honour's orders in an envelope at both addresses in Kambah, ACT.

These proceedings

On 20 August 2018, Stuart Chase commenced proceedings in the Corporations List of this Court seeking orders against Karen Chase and ASIC for reinstatement of South Passage Pty Ltd. On 3 September 2018, the Originating Process and affidavit in support were served on Karen Chase using the same means of service as specified by Lindsay J, that is, by placing the documents in an envelope and leaving them at both Kambah addresses.
On 13 September 2018, ASIC wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors advising that it would not oppose reinstatement if various conditions were satisfied including: 2. The applicant notifies the former officeholder/s of the company of this application. If unable to be served, then upon reinstatement the company be wound up and a Liquidator be appointed; 3. The Court orders the name of the company be changed to ACN 063 346 707 Pty Ltd … This is due to another company being registered with the name 'South Passage Pty Ltd', and under the Act the company cannot be restored to the register with the same company/business name as that of another company/business name with an identical name. … The new company called South Passage Pty Ltd is unrelated to the Chase family.
On 18 September 2018, Registrar Walton granted leave to the plaintiff to amend his Originating Process to give effect to ASIC's request. By amending the Originating Process to change the name of South Passage Pty Ltd on reinstatement to ACN 063 346 707 Pty Ltd, the relief sought was not substantively changed. On 24 September 2018, the Registrar referred the matter to me and I directed the plaintiffs to file an interlocutory process seeking further orders for substituted service on Karen Chase and stood the matter over for hearing on 28 September 2018. On 26 September 2018, the plaintiff served the interlocutory process and affidavits in support by placing them in an envelope and leaving them at the two Kambah addresses. On 28 September 2018 the matter came before me for hearing. There was no appearance by Karen Chase.
Having regard to the numerous affidavits of the process server, I am satisfied that the orders for substituted service should be made, as Karen Chase cannot practicably be served in the usual manner, but leaving the documents at two addresses at which Karen Chase either lives, or her de facto partner's mother lives, will bring the documents to her notice.

Should the company have been deregistered at all?

Part 5A.1 of the Corporations Act deals with deregistration of companies. Section 601AA concerns voluntary deregistration on the application of a company, director, member or liquidator. In that event, section 601AA(2) provides: Circumstances in which application can be made A person may apply only if: (a) all the members of the company agree to the deregistration; and (b) the company is not carrying on business; and (c) the company's assets are worth less than $1,000; and (d) the company has paid all fees and penalties payable under this Act; and (e) the company has no outstanding liabilities; and (f) the company is not a party to any legal proceedings.
It can be seen immediately that the requirements of section 601AA are cumulative, that is, each subsection must be satisfied before an application for voluntary deregistration may be made.
In the case before me, the application for deregistration is not in evidence, but it would appear that at least three requirements of section 601AA(2) were not satisfied. First, it seems unlikely that all the members of the company agreed to deregistration as one of the members of the company, Andrew Chase, had transferred his shares to Stuart Chase. Second, the company owned the Bohnock Road property, worth between $1.2 and $1.4 million. Third, the company apparently had an outstanding liability to a secured creditor, Mr Marshall, of $100,000. As such, it would appear that ASIC should not have deregistered the company. Presumably, ASIC acted on the information provided to it.

Reinstatement by the Court

Subsections 601AH(2) and (3) concerns reinstatement by the Court and provide: (2) The Court may make an order that ASIC reinstate the registration of a company if: (a) an application for reinstatement is made to the Court by: (i) a person aggrieved by the deregistration; or (ii) a former liquidator of the company; and (b) the Court is satisfied that it is just that the company's registration be reinstated. (3) [Courts' powers upon reinstating registration] If: … (b) the Court makes an order under subsection (2); the Court may: (c) validate anything done during the period: (i) beginning when the company was deregistered; and (ii) ending when the company's registration was reinstated; and (d) make any other order it considers appropriate. Note: For example, the Court may direct ASIC to transfer to another person property vested in ASIC under subsection 601AD(2).
Section 601AD provides that, on deregistration, a company ceases to exist and all property that the company held on trust immediately before deregistration vests in the Commonwealth and other property vests in ASIC.
Notes form part of the Corporations Act and have the same status as the provisions of the Act: section 13, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth); Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 8th ed. (2014) at [4.47], [4.57]. It would appear from the Note that an example of an order which may be made on reinstatement includes directing ASIC to transfer to another person property vested in ASIC under subsection 601AD(2). In this case, it would appear to endorse this Court directing ASIC to transfer the company's property, including the Bohnock property, to Stuart Chase.
On an application to reinstate a company, the first matter to consider is whether Stuart Chase is "a person aggrieved by the deregistration". As Gleeson JA explained in Re European Metal Recyclers Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (deregistered) [2018] NSWSC 946 at [17]-[18], the expression "aggrieved person" is of wide import and should be construed liberally and includes a person who has been damaged in the legal sense. The fact that an applicant is a former director and shareholder of a deregistered company is not of itself sufficient to establish that he is a person aggrieved by the deregistration, as Barrett J explained in Melluish v Underwood Development Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 429 at [6]: A shareholder does not, by that status alone, have the character of a "person aggrieved" for this purpose. In those cases where the company is insolvent, neither a shareholder nor director is aggrieved by the deregistration because, as a consequence of the insolvency, the shareholder has no asset of any value and the director's office was displaced by the liquidator … [A] shareholder needs to show some particular prejudice, such as also possessing the status of creditor or … that there might well be a surplus of assets if the company was reinstated and certain events occurred.
Here, Stuart Chase is a person aggrieved by the deregistration of South Passage Pty Ltd as he is the beneficial owner of a company which owns valuable property. Those assets presently vest in ASIC.
The second matter to consider is whether "it is just that the company's registration be reinstated". His Honour Austin J succinctly explained this requirement in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2000] NSWSC 316 at [27]: The wording of the section is very broad, and the cases confirm that it gives the court a wide discretion. The court takes into account the circumstances in which the company came to be dissolved, whether, if the order were made, good use could be made of it, and whether any person is likely to be prejudiced by the reinstatement: Re Kilkenny Engineering Pty Ltd (in liq) (1976) 1 ACLR 285; Drysdale v Australian Securities Commission (1992) 10 ACLC 1427; Re Steelmaster Pty Ltd (in liq) (1992) 6 ACSR 494.
It is not "just" to resurrect a company which will then be devoid of proper governance and it is for this reason that applicants seeking reinstatement of companies often seek the appointment of a liquidator in conjunction with reinstatement: see, for example, CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd v Rockwall Interiors Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 690 at [9] per Barrett J.
I am satisfied that it is "just" that the company's registration be reinstated. It may be inferred from the sequence of events that Karen Chase applied to voluntarily deregister South Passage Pty Ltd in order to frustrate the processes of the Court. Unless the company is reinstated, Stuart Chase will not enjoy the benefits of the orders made in his favour in Chase v Chase.
However, section 601AH(5) provides: Effect of reinstatement If a company is reinstated, the company is taken to have continued in existence as if it had not been deregistered. A person who was a director of the company immediately before deregistration becomes a director again as from the time when ASIC or the Court reinstates the company. Any property of the company that is still vested in the Commonwealth or ASIC revests in the company. If the company held particular property subject to a security or other interest or claim, the company takes the property subject to that interest or claim.
As such, if South Passage Pty Ltd is reinstated, Karen Chase "becomes a director again" and any property of the company that is still vested in the Commonwealth or ASIC revests in the company subject to any security interest. Concern was expressed that if the company was reinstated, Karen Chase would be automatically reappointed as the sole director and thus able to deal with the assets of the company in a manner potentially inconsistent with the orders of Lindsay J. That concern appears to me to be well founded.
This brings me to the third matter, being the extent of the Court's power to make ancillary orders under section 601AH(3)(d), and what orders are appropriate in this case. It was submitted that section 601AH(3)(d) is wide and the Court should not read it down. It was submitted that the orders sought advance the objects of the section because the orders protect the company and the beneficial shareholder and the assets of the company which are presently exposed. In order to protect the beneficial owner of the company, the officer on reinstatement should not be Ms Chase.
Section 601AH(3)(d) gives the Court power to "make any other order it considers appropriate". The "other" refers back to section 601AH(3)(c), which empowers the Court to validate things done during the period of deregistration. In Pagnon v Workcover Queensland [2001] 2 Qd R 492, McPherson JA considered the power to be very wide at [15]. In Re Bele & Co Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1824, Black J read the power as incidental to the Court's power to reinstate a deregistered company, and not as independent of it: at [6].
The most expansive review of the legislative history and case law in respect of section 601AH(3)(d) was undertaken by McKerracher J in Bell Group Limited v ASIC [2018] FCA 884. His Honour was asked to reinstate 16 companies related to The Bell Group Ltd, itself in liquidation since 1991. The deregistered companies fell into two categories. In the first category were companies which stood to receive distributions from a $1.7 billion settlement fund after the Bell Group proceedings were concluded in 2013. As shareholders of the deregistered companies, the plaintiffs stood to receive a distribution in liquidation if the companies were reinstated. In the second category were companies which held shares in other Bell Group companies which prevented those companies forming part of a tax consolidated group under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Under that Act, wholly owned subsidiaries can form part of a consolidated group within which losses would be offset against tax liabilities of other entities. On deregistration, the shares held by the deregistered companies vested in ASIC, which prevented any of the companies whose shares were so held forming part of the consolidated group. These companies, having suffered significant losses, would reduce the overall tax liability of the consolidated group if they became a part of it. The Bell Group Ltd sought orders under s 601AH(3)(d), as his Honour put it, "to achieve the effect that the shares held by a number of the Deregistered Companies be deemed and taken at all times from the date of dissolution of those companies to have been beneficially owned by the companies": at [32].
As to the scope of the power conferred by section 601AH(3)(d), McKerracher J noted at [110]: Both the plaintiffs and the Commissioner have argued the matter partly by reference to the legislative history and partly by reference to various cases. On one view of the matter, however, one would enquire simply as to why the text should not be given its plain meaning. It seems to me that is an appropriate starting point, recognising, of course, that the apparently wide discretion should always be directed to ordering what is 'just' or to doing justice to all persons affected by the making of the order(s).
His Honour noted that there was no suggestion in the statute that an order could only be made where it was justified by exceptional circumstances, rather, "The power to make the orders is cast in very broad terms": [129]. His Honour considered the section clearly permitted an ancillary order which had significant, not merely incidental, retrospective consequences: [137].
ASIC pointed to Barrett J's observation in CGU v Rockwall Interiors Pty Ltd at [18]: …the section 601AH(3) jurisdiction should, in my opinion, be used principally to remove anomalies or impediments.
His Honour McKerracher J did not consider that Barrett J's observation detracted from the approach to be taken, at [141] (emphasis original): This observation was not central to his Honour's reasoning in the case, but in any event, it is clear that his honour does not say it should only be used to remove anomalies or impediments or only for small anomalies. The section itself certainly does not suggest that it be used merely to remove anomalies or impediments, nor does his Honour suggest so. Where his Honour says 'principally', I would take that to mean 'usually'. It may be common for the subsection to be used for such purpose, but there is no reason to think it is exclusively so confined.
His Honour noted that The Bell Group's objectives were on their face entirely lawful and reasonable. The Commissioner of Taxation still had ample opportunity to oppose the tax consequences of the ancillary orders in other administrative or judicial proceedings if the Commissioner chose to do so; the ancillary orders simply allowed The Bell Group to contend for such consequences. However, his Honour considered that it was desirable to grant no more than the minimum relief necessary to do justice and to do so solely for the stated purpose in the way described by The Bell Group: at [147].
The breadth of the power can be seen from the instances in which the power has been exercised. Under section 601AH(3)(d), the courts have made orders suspending the limitation period during the period in which a company was deregistered: Re Regional Planners Developments Co Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1996 per Brereton J; Pagnon v Workcover Queensland at [15] per McPherson JA. In contrast, in Re Bele & Co Pty Ltd, a creditor sought an order that ASIC pay the creditor $193,000, being funds which ASIC held in respect of deregistered company, alternatively, reinstatement of the company and an order that ASIC pay the creditor the relevant amount pursuant to section 601AH(3)(d). His Honour Black J considered that the power in section 601AH(3)(d) did not allow the Court, in effect, to determine a claim between a creditor and a deregistered company, without the attendance of the deregistered company and in a manner that would not bind it, and then make an order for ASIC to make a payment consequential upon its determination of that claim. See likewise Randall v City of Canada Bay Council (No.4) [2015] NSWSC 1759 at [200].
Having regard to these authorities, it seems to me that the Court has a wide power under section 601AH(3)(d). The case law, by and large, concerns applications for reinstatement brought by those wishing to make a claim against, or by, the deregistered company. In both situations, the merits of that claim remain to be determined in other proceedings. The case before me is unusual in that Stuart Chase's right to be recorded as the beneficial owner of the whole of the share capital of South Passage Pty Ltd has been finally determined in proceedings to which Karen Chase was a party. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the Court can be more confident in identifying what orders are appropriate. I also do not consider that section 601AH(5) confines the Court's power in section 601AH(3)(d) such that the Court may not make orders modifying the effect of reinstatement. Rather, section 601AH(3)(d) gives the Court the power to alter the ordinary incidents of reinstatement in appropriate circumstances.
As I observed earlier, the Notes to section 601AH(3)(d) give, as an example of an exercise of the power, an order directing ASIC to transfer to another person property vested in ASIC under subsection 601AD(2). As such, it seems to me that the Court has power to order ASIC to transfer the Bohnock property to Stuart Chase. If that were done then, following the transfer of the Bohnock property, the company could, and probably should, again be deregistered. This would reduce the possibility of Karen Chase dealing with the company on reinstatement in a way to frustrate the orders made by Lindsay J in Chase v Chase. I do not know whether Stuart Chase wishes to continue to hold the Bohnock property via a corporate structure or directly. There may be tax implications and stamp duty considerations which favour one structure over the other. It may be that ASIC has a view about whether ASIC can or should be ordered to transfer real property in this way. It may be that the Registrar General would need to be joined if title was to be transferred in this manner.
As such, the orders proposed by Stuart Chase commend themselves for their simplicity, and because each of the orders, save for the order in respect of the constitution, arises squarely from the final orders made in Chase v Chase. So far as the constitution is concerned, Stuart Chase does not have a copy of any former or current constitution of South Passage Pty Ltd. He does not know what the current constitution is and has not been able to obtain a copy of it from Karen Chase. He sees no apparent need for a constitution. As Stuart Chase is entitled to be registered as the sole shareholder and office holder of the company, and to avoid any issues which may arise under a constitution which he has not been able to obtain, I consider it appropriate to make such an order.
It may be that the Registrar General will become involved in any event if Stuart Chase wishes to remove the impediments on the title of the Bohnock property, being the registered mortgage and any further lease said to have come into existence by exercise of an option under the registered lease. The natural home for the determination of such matters would be in Chase v Chase rather than in these proceedings.

Orders

I note that ASIC's opposition to the application for reinstatement was conditional upon various matters, including that if Karen Chase was unable to be served, then upon reinstatement a liquidator be appointed. Karen Chase has been served, albeit pursuant to orders for substituted service. As such, it is not necessary for a liquidator to be appointed in order to satisfy ASIC's conditions. In any event, it does not appear to me that the appointment of a liquidator is necessarily otherwise warranted.
The Court makes the following orders and directions: 1. Order pursuant to rule 10.14(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) that the delivery of a copy of the Originating Process filed on 20 August 2018 and the affidavit of Stuart Gordon Chase made 31 July 2018 and filed in these proceeding be taken to have been served on 3 September 2018. 2. Order pursuant to rule 10.14(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) that the delivery of a copy of the Interlocutory Process filed on 24 September 2018 and the affidavits be taken to have been served on 26 September 2018. 3. Pursuant to subsection 601AH(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), order ASIC to reinstate the registration of the company formerly known as South Passage Pty Ltd A.C.N. 063 346 707. 4. Pursuant to subsection 601AH(3)(d) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): 1. Order that the name of the company formerly known as South Passage Pty Ltd A.C.N. 063 346 707 be changed to A.C.N. 063 346 707 Pty Ltd. 2. Order that ASIC record the plaintiff as the sole shareholder of A.C.N. 063 346 707 Pty Ltd. 3. Order that ASIC record the plaintiff as the sole director and secretary of A.C.N. 063 346 707 Pty Ltd. 4. Order that ASIC record the registered office of A.C.N. 063 346 707 Pty Ltd as 90 Bohnock Road, Bohnock NSW 2430. 5. Order that the existing constitution of the A.C.N. 063 346 707 Pty Ltd be repealed. 1. Order the plaintiff to serve this judgment and orders on the first defendant by placing the documents in an envelope and leaving them at 23 Winser Crescent, Kambah ACT 2902 and 52 Lee-Steere Crescent, Kambah ACT 2902 on or before 16 November 2018. 2. Direct the plaintiffs to provide this judgment and orders to the second defendant, ASIC, on or before 16 November 2018. 3. Order the first defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings. 4. Grant liberty to the first defendant to apply for an order that these Orders be discharged or varied by way of an interlocutory process, filed and served no later than 7 December 2018.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 09 November 2018

Corporations Act 2001(Cth)s 601AH(2), s 601AH(3)(d)

At a glance

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Judgment (9 paragraphs)

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