[2025] VCC 1465
General information, not legal advice.
County Court of Victoria
2025-10-09
Original judgment source is linked above.
"A court must not give leave under sub-section (4)(d) unless it is satisfied that the injury is a serious injury."
s93(17)(a) - "a serious long-term impairment or loss of a body function". The relevant body function in this application is the spine. 2. The enquiry under sub-paragraph (a) of the definition focuses attention, first, upon whether the injury has produced an organic impairment or loss of body function, and then by reference to the consequences of that impairment, to determine whether it is serious and long term. 3. In forming a judgment as to whether the consequences of an injury are "serious", the question to be asked is, can the injury, when judged by comparison with other cases in the range of possible impairments, be fairly described as "at least very considerable" and "more than significant or marked".[1] 4. The serious injury defined by sub-paragraph (a) can have its seriousness measured in part by a mental response to a physical impairment. What it will not recognise is that the mental disorder can, of itself, constitute or be the producer of the impairment of a body function.[2] 5. An application was also brought by the plaintiff claiming a psychiatric impairment pursuant to s93(17)(c). 6. Sub-paragraph (c) requires any psychiatric impairment be a "severe long-term mental or severe long-term behavioral disturbance or disorder" to meet the serious injury definition. 7. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mobilio v Balliotis & Ors[3] resolved the meaning of "severe". Brooking JA without suggesting the use of any particular adjective to mark the distinction, said that "severe" was used in the definition as a stronger word than "serious".[4] 8. A chronic pain syndrome can result in an impairment under sub-paragraph (c) if a plaintiff can establish a sufficient causal link between an initial compensable physical injury and a chronic pain disorder which meets the "severe" criteria of a claim under definition (c).[5] 9. The plaintiff affirmed three affidavits and was cross-examined. He also relied on an affidavit affirmed by his wife, Etedal Souleiman, on 31 January 2025. In addition, both parties relied on medical reports and other material which was tendered in evidence. I have read all the tendered material. 10. The plaintiff's case was that "there's still ongoing support for his condition having begun as a physical injury but there's also heavy support for the development of a psychological condition stemming from that initial physical injury". That psychological condition has been the subject of extensive psychiatric treatment by Dr Pinto, who diagnosed Major Depressive Disorder with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and also Chronic Pain Syndrome.[6] 11. The plaintiff has suffered pecuniary disadvantage in combination with pain and suffering, which meets Humphries and Anor v Poljak[7] "serious" or "severe".[8] 12. It was not in issue that the plaintiff injured his spine in the accident, but the defendant's case was it was really a soft tissue injury that had been transient, and basically resolved back to what it was pre accident.[9] 13. There was also a real issue as to whether any impairment was organic and whether the consequences thereof were serious and long term. The plaintiff had a relatively significant pre-existing symptomatic back and neck condition with treating osteopath, Dr Alivizatos, particularly on attendances on 3 and 6 August 2020, reporting the plaintiff's symptoms were extreme and acute and being unable to work as a result thereof.[10] 14. Further, in terms of the sub-paragraph (c) application, it was common ground that the plaintiff suffers depression and anxiety, but the evidence was against that being severe.[11]
"... [The plaintiff's] neck condition prior to treatment was significant in that it would affect his day to day life. On the 3rd of August and the 6th of August, 2020, the [plaintiff] complained of a headache and a severe acute pain respectively. After treatment, the ... [plaintiff] reported an improvement in symptoms and did not require a follow up until the 13th of August, 2020, where in the [plaintiff] reported of a motor vehicle accident in which he was rear ended."
Dr Saleem Khan, consultant in rehabilitation and pain medicine
Professor Mark Walterfang, consultant psychiatrist
Dr Mohammed Awad, neurosurgeon and spinal surgeon
Dr Ali Mehr, neurophysiologist and specialist rehabilitation physician
"A comparison must be made of the condition of the applicant immediately before the accident with his condition thereafter and an assessment made of the extent of that additional impairment and if that additional impairment was not serious so it was said then leave must be refused. ... ."
"... the weight to be attached to the plaintiff's account of the pain experience will, of course, depend upon an assessment of the plaintiff's credibility."
"... On the 3rd of August and the 6th of August, 2020, the ... [plaintiff] complained of a headache and a severe acute pain respectively. After treatment, the ... [plaintiff] reported an improvement in symptoms and did not require a follow up until the 13th of August, 2020, where in (sic) the ... [plaintiff] reported of a motor vehicle accident in which he was rear ended. ... ."
"The ... [plaintiff] initially complained of lower back stiffness, which we successfully treated with soft tissue and joint mobilisation. On subsequent visits, the ... [plaintiff] presented with recurring back stiffness, which we managed through similar treatment plans and exercises. Despite these symptoms, the ... [plaintiff] remained proactive in managing ... [his] condition and maintained good spinal function, allowing ... [him] to continue working effectively."
"... The chronic pain was a prominent feature of the appellant's case. The endurance of permanent daily pain requiring frequent medication, must, according to ordinary human experience, raise a real prospect of a 'very considerable' consequence."
[1] See Humphries and Anor v Poljak [1992] VicRp 58; [1992] 2 VR 129 at 140-141
[2] Richards v Wylie [2000] VSCA 50; (2000) 1 VR 79
[5] Per Ashley JA in Veljanovska v Socobell Oem Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 227
[14] Affidavit sworn on 31 January 2025
[48] Plaintiff had seen this GP once in 2015
[91] [2010] VSCA 69; (2010) 31 VR 1 ("Haden Engineering") at paragraph [12]
[92] [2006] VSCA 254 at paragraph [14]
[113] [2009] VSCA 181 at paragraph [43]
[115] [2007] VSCA 267; (2007) 17 VR 592 at paragraph [199]
[117] Ellis Management Services Pty Ltd v Taylor [2013] VSCA 326
[118] T150 - Richter v Driscoll & Ors [2016] VSCA 142; (2016) 51 VR 95
[119] Georgopoulos v Silaforts Painting Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 179 at paragraph [21]
Ibrahim
Transport Accident Commission [2025] VCC 1465
(2000) 1 VR 79
(2010) 31 VR 1
(2017) 17 VR 592
(2016) 51 VR 95
(2007) 17 VR 592