1. The letter dated 13 March 2015 was addressed to Ms Lisa Scully, Secretary of Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc. The VGSO stated that it acted for the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('the Tribunal'), and that VGSO was instructed to write in relation to a number of publications appearing on the Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc website ('the website') and Facebook page, concerning the President, Deputy President Dwyer and the Tribunal. The letter enclosed a summary of offending publications, and their location on the website and Facebook page, and stated that several were defamatory of Justice Garde and Deputy President Dwyer. The letter requested removal of the offending publications from the website and Facebook page and wherever else they might be published (including search engine results). In the event that the offending publications were not removed, the letter stated that VGSO would seek instructions in respect of commencing defamation proceedings against those individuals responsible for the publications. The letter added that several of the publications are likely to constitute a contempt of court under s 137(1)(f) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('the VCAT Act') in that they are clearly calculated to lower the repute of Justice Garde, Deputy President Dwyer and the Tribunal. Notice was given that the Tribunal may exercise its power to punish contemptuous conduct should Ms Scully elect not to remove the offending publications within seven days of receiving this letter, or publish similar material in future.
2. The letter dated 20 March 2015 was addressed to Ms Hoskin, in her capacity as President of Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc. In the letter, the VGSO referred to emails from Ms Hoskin dated 13 and 16 March 2015, and several telephone conversations between Ms Hoskin and a VGSO solicitor. The letter discussed the defamatory imputations and potentially contemptuous nature of the offending publications. An enclosure contained extracts from various web publications.

1. At the commencement of the Practice Day hearing on 27 July 2015, the President stated:

Two letters dated 13 March 2015 and 20 March 2015 from the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office respectively addressed to Ms Scully and Ms Hoskin as office-bearers of an organisation known as the 'Rights of Bendigo Residents Inc' have been provided in support of a Practice Day application dated 29 May 2015 that I should recuse myself from this proceeding. The letters express concern about defamatory and potentially contemptuous publications relating to myself and Deputy President Dwyer.

At the outset of today's Practice Day hearing, it is appropriate to declare that I have had no role or involvement whatever in the sending of these letters or the giving of instructions to the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office. I was also completely unaware of the publications referred to in the letters. I did not give, or participate in giving, any instructions to the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office, nor was I aware that any instructions were being given or contemplated. The first that I became aware of the existence of the letters was following my return from overseas on 24 June 2015 when I was provided with a copy of the Practice Day application for recusal made by the group applicants. I was absent on annual leave from 22 May 2015 until 22 June 2015.

VCAT is a large organisation. Under the VCAT Act, the Regulations and the Rules, the Principal Registrar of the Tribunal has important statutory and administrative functions on behalf of the Tribunal. It is the Principal Registrar who is responsible for giving instructions to legal advisers on behalf of the Tribunal. I make it clear that at no stage was I aware that any instructions had been given, or were intended to be given to legal advisers, or even that the publications listed in the letters had occurred, if indeed they did. As I have said, I first became aware of the existence of the letters, and the giving of instructions to the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office only on receipt of the Practice Day request to recuse on return from leave on 24 June 2015. I had no previous knowledge, involvement, or role.

If the Practice Day application to recuse had not been made by the group applicants, I would have been totally unaware of the existence of the correspondence from the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office and of the publications referred to in the correspondence.

In summary, my involvement in the correspondence is zero. I have not, at any stage, had anything at all to do with the letters or directions given to the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office. I had no knowledge at all of the correspondence from the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office or any instructions to that office or of the publications referred to in the correspondence until the group applicants' application to recuse was provided to me on 24 June 2015.

1. Mr Balzola submitted that the President should nonetheless recuse himself. He referred to the test in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy,[1] whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.[2] He submitted that while the Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc was not a party, Ms Hoskin was, and had close associational links with Ms Scully. He referred to the eight tests on apprehended bias summarised in AJH Lawyers Pty Ltd v Careri,[3] and applied by Justice Croft in Comaz (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue.[4]
2. Mr Balzola also submitted that as a public body, the Tribunal could not be defamed,[5] and that no concerns notices fulfilling the statutory criteria had been issued.[6] He claimed that the VGSO letters were intimidatory in character and constituted misfeasance in public office.[7] Mr Balzola variously contended that the letters did not comply with the Model Litigant Guidelines (Victoria), that the President should recuse himself under the guidelines followed in Comaz, that Deputy President Dwyer had not shown procedural fairness in his decision in Evers v Greater Bendigo CC & Ors,[8] and that Parliament had specific sensitivity in planning and environment decisions.[9] Finally, Mr Balzola referred to the test in actual bias and to the VCAT Oath of Office.[10] Mr Balzola stated that if the President did not recuse himself, he would seek a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court.
3. Mr Walker, who appeared for the responsible authority, opposed the application made by the group applicants. As to the decision by Deputy President Dwyer in Evers, the challenge was misconceived as the hearing had concluded. Any appeal against the decision should have been made by 15 August 2014 under s 148 of the VCAT Act. No appeal has been lodged.
4. Counsel also submitted that while it was important that justice must be seen to be done, it was equally important that judges (and members of the Tribunal) discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of apprehension of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, or Tribunal member, that they will have their case tried by someone thought more likely to determine the case in their favour.[11]
5. Counsel submitted that the material did not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias:

(1) the reliance on the statutory declaration of Ms Hoskin was misconceived as the test for apprehended bias is an objective test. Evidence of the subjective effect of the VGSO correspondence on Ms Hoskin is not relevant;

(2) the VGSO letters were not written on behalf of the President of the Tribunal or Deputy President Dwyer;

(3) it is imperative that the impartiality and independence of the Tribunal be, and be seen to be, above reproach. In the circumstances, and given the nature of the material published on the Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc website, it was perfectly reasonable for the VGSO to send the VGSO letters;

(4) there was no evidence that the President or Deputy President Dwyer instructed the VGSO to send the VGSO letters;

(i) in the course of the lengthy proceedings, exhibited any bias towards the group applicants, at all, let alone in connection with the material placed on the website, or as a result of the VGSO letters; or

(ii) is unable to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the appeal; and

(6) finally, the timing of the application for recusal was curious. The VGSO letters were sent on 13 and 20 March 2015. The final day of the hearing was 11 May 2015 - almost two months after the VGSO letters were sent. Notwithstanding this, the allegation of bias was not raised on 11 May 2015. The application for a Practice Day hearing was lodged on or around 29 May 2015.

1. In submitting that the Tribunal should not accede too readily to the suggestion of an apprehension of bias, counsel referred to the fact that the hearing had been completed, all submissions had been made, and that all evidence had been given. The responsible authority had engaged a solicitor to appear on its behalf over the six days of the hearing. Unless there is a very good reason to do so, the responsible authority did not wish to be put to the expense and inconvenience of running its case again.
2. Mr Tweedie SC and Ms Trewhella submitted that the group applicants had failed to demonstrate that there was any proper basis on which the President should recuse himself.
3. Referring to Ebner, senior counsel observed that the High Court had held that the apprehension of bias must be a real and not a remote possibility.[12] The principles that have evolved with regard to apprehended bias reflect the importance of the principle that justice must both be done, and be seen to be done.
4. Senior counsel relied on a general principle applicable to the consideration of bias application that he contended was of equal importance:

The duty of a judge to disqualify himself for proper reason is matched by an equal duty not to disqualify himself except for proper reasons. Parties ought not be encouraged to believe that, by an application for the disqualification of a judge, they can have their case heard by a judge thought more likely to decide a case in their favour.[13]

1. Senior counsel further submitted that in Able Demolitions and Excavations Pty Ltd v State of Victoria,[14] Dodds-Streeton J said:

... a trial judge should not "too readily" accede to objections based on apprehensions of bias, in order to avoid the dangers of forum shopping "or manipulation of the composition of the bench" which may attend such an approach.[15]

1. Senior counsel submitted that the group applicants had failed to identify any logical reason why the sending of the VGSO letters might lead, objectively, to a conclusion that the President might not be able to bring an impartial mind to the proceedings. The VGSO letters clearly state that:

(1) the VGSO was acting on behalf of the Tribunal, and not the President personally;

(2) the VGSO made the assessment that the publications were defamatory and that several of the publications were likely to constitute contempt of court under s 137(1)(f) of the VCAT Act; and

(3) the VGSO asserted that the publications were calculated to lower the repute of the President, Deputy President Dwyer and the Tribunal.

1. The permit applicant also noted the following matters which it submitted a fair minded lay observer would take into account in considering whether there exists a reasonable apprehension of bias:

(1) the requests made in the VGSO letters to remove the offending material were apparently complied with. No further action has been taken or threatened against the recipients, or against the Rights for Bendigo Residents Group Inc;

(2) there was no evidence that the President harboured any ill feeling towards the group applicants as a consequence of the publications in question;

(3) the group applicants place no reliance on anything done, or said, during the conduct of this extended hearing by the President that would provide a basis upon which a reasonable person might infer that any ill-will exists;

(4) no basis has been identified on which it could be said that a reasonable person might reach the conclusion that the President might not consider the issues with an open, impartial mind;

(5) the individuals who received the VGSO letters are not the only objectors to the permit application. There was no logical basis upon which to conclude that there exists a real possibility that the President would have any reason to be ill-disposed towards those other objectors who have no connection with the publications in question or the group who published them, or be unable to bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the matters that affect them; and

(6) the proceedings are not adversarial, inter-party proceedings. Rather, they concern matters of general community interest, and require a consideration of net community benefit. There exists no basis on which a reasonable person could conclude that the President would not make an impartial assessment of these matters.

1. Senior counsel also relied on the delay in making the application for recusal as a relevant factor. He submitted that the evidence was:

(1) Ms Hoskin declined to tell her legal representative about the VGSO letters until 11 May 2015;

(2) the group applicants filed supplementary written submissions in the hearing on 25 May 2015 and that submission made no reference to the need for recusal;

(3) the application for recusal was not made until 29 May 2015; and

(4) the delay in making the application for recusal is not explained.

1. At the conclusion of the Practice Day hearing, the President on behalf of the Tribunal ruled[16]:

The Tribunal has substantially completed its reasons for decision in the review application and in the conditions application. In the normal course of events, the Tribunal's decision in both applications would be published in the near future.

The group applicants have sought that I recuse myself from the proceedings. Argument has been presented in support of this motion by Mr Balzola, who appears for the group applicants. Mr Walker of counsel for the Greater Bendigo City Council and Mr Tweedie SC and Ms Trewhella of counsel for the permit applicant opposed the motion by Mr Balzola. Having considered the motion, I have decided that I should not recuse myself and will publish written reasons for this ruling at the same time as the Tribunal publishes its reasons in the review application and the conditions application.

Mr Balzola has foreshadowed that he may wish to seek a writ of prohibition directed against the Tribunal. The Tribunal is conscious of a number of matters:

(a) the letters which are the subject of objection were received on 13 March 2015 and 20 March 2015. The hearing continued until 11 May 2015 when the Tribunal reserved. The group applicants have had ample time and opportunity to make an application for recusal during the main hearing but did not do so;

(b) the reserved decision has been pending for some time. Balancing the interests of justice, and the position of the parties, it is fair that it should be published in the near future and not further delayed;

(c) many decisions have highlighted the undesirability of fragmentation of proceedings. It is likewise highly undesirable that the present proceedings be fragmented; and

(d) importantly, the position of the group applicants will not be adversely affected. They have rights of appeal to the Court of Appeal on questions of law under s 148 of the VCAT Act. A failure to recuse, or to provide procedural fairness, is a matter of law. It is likely to be convenient for all challenges to the Tribunal's deliberations and decision to be made at the same time.[17]

1. The legal principles surrounding an application for recusal are clearly articulated in the authority cited during the hearing of the application for recusal. The test to be applied is set out in Ebner, whether:

... a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.[18]

1. The general principle is to be applied to problems of apprehended bias, whether arising from interest, conduct, association, extraneous information, or some other circumstance.[19]
2. In AJH Lawyers Pty Ltd v Careri,[20] the Court of Appeal described the relevant principles governing the issue of apprehended bias as well-settled. Essentially, there are eight principles which the court described in the following terms:

The relevant principles governing the issue of apprehended bias are well-settled. Essentially, there are eight relevant principles.

First, when one of the grounds of appeal is based on actual or apprehended bias, the Court of Appeal needs to deal with that ground first. If the appellant establishes actual or apprehended bias, the Court will set aside the decision below and remit the matter back. This is so even if the Court is satisfied that the decision below is correct on the merits.

Secondly, as noted in Antoun, judges should not 'too readily accept recusal because a party has demanded it'. Further, as held in Ebner, '[j]udges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. ... If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.' That being said, the principle that a judge should not disqualify him or herself too readily is not a 'blanket that smothers the effect of disqualification where it has already arisen'.

Thirdly, the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias was stated in Johnson as being 'whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide'. The word 'might' in the phrase 'might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind' was clarified in Ebner as referring to 'possibility (real and not remote), not probability'. On the basis of Ebner, where, as in this case, 'the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge'.

Fourthly, the apprehension in question is apprehension that the judge will not decide the case impartially, not merely an apprehension that he or she 'will decide the case adversely to one party'.

Fifthly, the application of the test involves two steps. The first step is 'the identification of what it is said might lead a judge ... to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits'. The second step is the 'articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits'. Contrary to AJH Lawyers' submission, the two-step approach is applicable to cases of apprehended bias on the ground of pre-judgment. In such a case, the matter to be identified in the first step is the conduct of the judge said to give rise to apprehension of bias. And the logical connection that needs to be articulated in the second step is the logical connection between the conduct of the judge and the feared prejudgment of a question the judge is required to decide.

Sixthly, 'the perception of a lay observer will not be as informed as the perception of a lawyer, particularly a litigation lawyer'. The fictional lay observer 'is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge'. Yet the fictional observer is taken to understand the dynamics of modern judicial practice. Modern judges 'are not expected to wait until the end of a case before they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced and arguments are presented. On the contrary, they will often form tentative opinions on matters in issue, and counsel are usually assisted by hearing those opinions, and being given an opportunity to deal with them'. '[T]he expression of tentative views during the course of argument as to matters on which the parties are permitted to make full submissions does not manifest partiality or bias'.

Seventhly, '[a] line is drawn between forthright and robust indications of a trial judge's tentative views on a point of importance in a trial and an impermissible indication of prejudgment that has the effect of disqualifying the judge from further conduct of the proceedings'. A key factor determining whether that line has been crossed is the extent to which the views expressed by the judge appear to be final rather than merely tentative.

Finally, ['j]udges do not have to devote unlimited time to listening to unmeritorious arguments. Sometimes, a brief hearing will suffice'. That having been said, when a party makes an application, the judge must normally give the party some reasonable opportunity to make submissions in support of that application. This is so even if the judge's preliminary view is that the application will be unmeritorious. If the judge refuses an application before receiving any submissions, the impression created by that conduct is not erased if the judge, after having announced his or her decision, agrees to listen to the party's submissions under sufferance.[21]

1. This decision was recently applied by Croft J in Comaz in the context of the Tribunal.
2. In making the application for recusal, the group applicants may have overlooked the fact that it is not the role of the President or other judicial officers serving at the Tribunal to instruct legal advisers on behalf of the Tribunal.
3. In R v Perkins,[22] the Court of Appeal made the following remarks regarding allegations of contempt of the Tribunal:

Clearly, it would be highly desirable in most situations that the tribunal dealing with an allegation of contempt has the assistance of counsel. These tasks would reasonably be undertaken by the Principal Registrar. Their performance would not involve any delegation of the function or powers of the tribunal as was suggested in argument on behalf of the applicant. The Principal Registrar cannot, in performing functions of this kind, including the securing of counsel to assist the tribunal, which are at least incidental if not crucial to the conduct of a proper hearing, be viewed as a party seeking to appear before it in accordance with ss 59 and 60, but as carrying out of their role in a legally permissible and entirely appropriate fashion.[23]

1. The Tribunal has published guidelines which set out the process for bringing contempt proceedings under s 137 of the VCAT Act.[24] The guidelines are available on the Tribunal's website, and state:

The Principal Registrar will usually initiate an action for contempt for unacceptable behaviour ...

In these matters the Principal Registrar will usually instruct the Victorian Government Solicitor to prosecute the matter and will be guided by the Victorian Government Solicitor's advice.

If a decision is made that the matter should be prosecuted, the Principal Registrar will usually schedule a directions hearing before a judge, serve the documents on the Respondent and any other relevant parties and notify all parties of the hearing.[25]

1. The guidelines were adopted by the Tribunal's Rules Committee[26] on 1 April 2004.
2. As provided by the guidelines, the Principal Registrar, acting of his own motion and in his own capacity, gave instructions to the VGSO. As a result of the instructions given by the Principal Registrar, the VGSO letters were sent. A decision by the Principal Registrar not to consult with, or inform, the President of the potential for contempt proceedings under s 137(1)(f) of the VCAT Act would be consistent with the strict separation and clear demarcation of the respective roles of the Principal Registrar and judicial officers sitting at the Tribunal as contemplated by the Court of Appeal in R v Perkins.[27] Although referred to in the VGSO letters, the President had no role in the giving of instructions to the VGSO, and was entirely unaware that any correspondence had occurred with Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc or with Ms Scully or Ms Hoskin. The President did not give, or participate in the giving, of instructions to the VGSO. The President was absent from the Tribunal on annual leave from 22 May 2015 until 22 June 2015 and first became aware of the existence of the VGSO letters only on return from annual leave when provided with a copy of the Practice Day application for recusal made by the group applicants.
3. If the Practice Day application to recuse had not been made by the group applicants, the President would have been totally unaware of the VGSO letters and of the publications referred to in that correspondence.
4. In considering the application of the Ebner test to the circumstances before the Tribunal and as submitted by the parties, there are two important steps to be considered. The first step is to consider what might lead a judge to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits. In the present case:

(1) it is not suggested that the President has any financial interest or any interest or association with any party, or has received any extraneous information or has conducted himself in any improper or inappropriate way;

(2) while the hearing was lengthy and was completed over six days, and there were also preceding Practice Day hearings, there is no suggestion of apprehended bias on the part of the President arising out of anything that was said or done during any part of the hearing process. The application for recusal was made only after the conclusion of the merits hearing and when the Tribunal had reserved its decision;

(3) the application to recuse was made by the group applicants under the mistaken understanding that the President had given instructions to the VGSO, or been involved in the giving of instructions concerning the VGSO letters. In fact, this was not the case;

(4) the group applicants (and without intending any criticism) were unaware of the guidelines published on the Tribunal's website relating to possible contempt for unacceptable behaviour, and the roles of the Principal Registrar and VGSO in such circumstances;

(5) following the correspondence, it would appear that steps were taken by Rights for Bendigo Residents Inc to remove various publications, resulting in the ending of correspondence and communication with the VGSO; and

(6) there was a strict separation and clear demarcation between the role of the Tribunal as a decision maker in administrative review and contempt proceedings and the role of the Principal Registrar.

1. In the circumstances, the Tribunal concludes that nothing has been shown by the group applicants that might lead the President of the Tribunal to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits.
2. The second step is to articulate the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. In this respect, it is significant that:

(1) the correspondence and communication between the VGSO and Ms Hoskin took place entirely outside the hearing process. Although it was open to Ms Hoskin or the group applicants to raise any concerns about the VGSO letters during the hearing of the proceedings, they elected not to do so. As a result, the merits hearing concluded without mention of the VGSO letters by Ms Hoskins or the group applicants;

(2) the President was unaware of the existence of the VGSO letters or the publications at all times during the hearing of the proceedings, and until receipt of the recusal application;

(3) no application was made for recusal of the President until almost two months had passed after the correspondence with the VGSO commenced. In the meantime, the group applicants filed supplementary written submissions and presented their case before the Tribunal;

(4) the proceedings are multi-party proceedings, with numerous parties to the group application and the conditions application. It is not apparent why the President should have any predisposition or apparent bias towards one party or another;

(5) no reasons or connection has been advanced as to why the President should be apprehended to be biased against Ms Hoskin, who gave evidence at some length during the hearing, or any other group applicant; and

(6) the ultimate issue in the proceedings concerns whether or not there is a net community benefit associated with the proposal. The proceedings are not of a direct adversary character, where opposing parties give contradictory evidence and credit issues relating to the parties stand to be determined. They are about the application of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) and the Greater Bendigo Planning Scheme to a proposal for the use and development of land in Bendigo East.

1. In the circumstances, the Tribunal cannot see any logical connection between the matter that has arisen and the feared deviation from a merits decision of a planning application.
2. The Tribunal does not accept Mr Balzola's submissions concerning the separate application for review of Evers. Ms Evers was not a group applicant. She was an individual applicant on a separate application for review of the notice of decision under s 82 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic). Likewise the group applicants were not parties in her application for review. They were given notice of the hearing in Ms Evers' proceeding because they were group applicants in a separate application for review and might wish to make submissions. Deputy President Dwyer heard the suppression application by Ms Evers on 17 July 2014 as a matter of urgency under the Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic). Ms Evers appeared in person, as do most parties before the Tribunal. The suppression application by Ms Evers was unsuccessful. Ms Evers obtained leave of the Tribunal to withdraw her separate application for review. That proceeding is now at an end. There was no appeal by any party from Deputy President Dwyer's decision.

1. As a result, the President declined to recuse himself, and the Tribunal will make orders in the recusal application to this effect.

[1] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 ('Ebner').

[2] Ibid [6], [33], [37], [83], [92], [97]-[99].

[3] [2011] VSCA 425; (2011) 34 VR 236.

[4] [2015] VSC 294 [19]-[20] ('Comaz').

[5] Referring to the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) ss 6 and 9; and the VCAT Act s 8.

[6] Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 14.

[7] Morgan v Fry (1968) 2 QB 710, 724C-D; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day [1998] HCA 3; (1998) 192 CLR 330.

[8] [2014] VCAT 816 ('Evers').

[9] Referring to Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, Thursday 14 May 1998, 1786-1789 (Rob Hulls, Attorney-General).

[10] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Oath and Affirmation of Office) Regulations 2013, reg 5.

[11] Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342, 347 ; Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488, 504 [45]; Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225, 233 [35]-[37] .

[13] Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 272, 272.

[14] [2004] VSC 511.

[15] Ibid [67]. See also Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (In Liq.) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411, 417, citing Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342, 352.

[16] In accordance with s 107(1) of the VCAT Act, questions of law arising in these proceedings have been decided by the President.

[18] Ebner 344 [6]; Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20.

[20] [2011] VSCA 425; (2011) 34 VR 236.

[21] Ibid [17]-[25] (citations omitted).

[22] [2002] VSCA 132.

[24] Bringing Contempt Proceedings under Section 137 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998.

[27] [2002] VSCA 132; Bringing Contempt Proceedings under Section 137 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998.