The decision is wrong because information offered to support my position was improperly interpreted or not used at all. No real evidence to support the decision made has been offered and is perception based and not based in fact. The decision made is flippant and ignore the position I held in the Company completely, my role and desire to please the Company owners and do as I was told to. It affects me financially to an extent I have lost 20 years of hard work over this wrongful perception. At 60 years old I am very unlikely to recover financially from this decision.

6. In consequence of the repeal of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and the commencement of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act), this Tribunal was authorised to hear and determine the review application.
7. For the reasons that follow, I have decided to affirm the decision under review.

1. The review application was heard by the Tribunal on 5 August 2025.
2. The Applicant appeared in person. Ms Cooper of Counsel appeared for the respondent.
3. For the purpose of the hearing, the Tribunal was provided with a joint tender bundle (bundle/TB). The bundle became Exhibit TB.
4. The following documents were marked for identification:

(a) MFI 1 - document entitled Objection to Respondent's Inspection of documents provided by the Applicant; and > > (b) MFI 2 - Summary of Applicant's shareholdings and company officer roles as recorded in ASIC/Company's Commission of Malaysia documentation and/or reported by Applicant, provided by the Respondent.

5. As to MFI 1, the Applicant said that the objection related to the Respondent being able to rely on material produced on summons said to be outside the period to be considered when making a decision under the FEG Act, namely the period 12 months prior to the Company being wound up. In short, it was said this material is not relevant. Following discussions, the Applicant said that, as necessary, he would identify particular documents during the course of making submissions which objection was made, the Tribunal indicating that the rules of evidence do not apply to these proceedings. I have dealt with this objection below.
6. MFI 2 was treated as a submission of the Respondent. The matters recorded therein are not in dispute.
7. The bundle included statements from the Applicant (provided in support of his claim for assistance) and a former employee of the Company, Ms Hunter, whom the Applicant called as a witness in support of his application. Each of these witnesses was cross examined by the Respondent.
8. Each of the parties provided a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFICS). The Respondent also provided a reply to the Applicant's SFICS. At the hearing, the parties also provided oral submissions.

11 Exclusion for personal connection with employer > > (1) A person is not eligible for an advance for the person's employment by an employer if: > > (a) section 556 of the Corporations Act 2001 applies to the winding up of the employer; and > > (b) the person is an excluded employee under that section in relation to the employer.

2. There is no dispute that 556 of the Corporations Act applies to the winding up of the Company. Section 556 specifies the priority certain debts and claims have to other unsecured debts and claims of the Company. In doing so, the entitlement to a person who is an "excluded employee" is modified in respect of an amount "attributable to non-priority days", that is days on which person was an "excluded employee".
3. Relevantly, an "excluded employee" is defined by s 556(2) as follows:

"excluded employee", in relation to a company, means:

(a) An employee of the company who has been:

(i) at any time during the period of 12 months ending on the relevant date; or

(ii) at any time since the relevant date;

or who is, a director of the company;

...

1. The "relevant date" is the date the winding up of the Company commenced, namely 2 July 2023 (Relevant Date).
2. In these proceedings, it is not suggested the Applicant was in fact appointed as a director of the Company under its constitution. Those appointed to the position of director and secretary were, respectively, Mssrs Piper and Hyman.
3. However, the Respondent says the extended definition of director found in the Corporations Act applies to the applicant. Hence, the Applicant is an excluded employee and not entitled to assistance by reason of s 11(1) of the FEG Act
4. As at 2 July 2023, a "director" was defined in s 9 Dictionary of the Corporations Act[1] as follows:

Director of a company or other body means: > > (a) a person who: > > (i) is appointed to the position of a director; or > > (ii) is appointed to the position of an alternate director and is acting in that capacity; > > regardless of the name that is given to their position; and > > (b) unless the contrary intention appears, a person who is not validly appointed as a director if: > > (i) they act in the position of a director; or > > (ii) the directors of the company or body are accustomed to act in accordance with the person's instructions or wishes. > > Subparagraph (b)(ii) does not apply merely because the directors act on advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional capacity, or the person's business relationship with the directors or the company or body.

5. The definition of "director" was moved to s 9AC of the Corporations Act in an amendment that took effect on 20 October 2023.[2] Section 9AC now provides:

9AC Meaning of director > > (1) A director of a company or other body is: > > (a) a person who: > > (i) is appointed to the position of a director; or > > (ii) is appointed to the position of an alternate director and is acting in that capacity; > > regardless of the name that is given to their position; and > > (b) unless the contrary intention appears, a person who is not validly appointed as a director if: > > (i) they act in the position of a director; or > > (ii) the directors of the company or body are accustomed to act in accordance with the person's instructions or wishes (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation).

6. For present purposes, there is no relevant difference in the definition of director.
7. As noted above, the definition in (a) does not apply as the Applicant was not appointed to the position of a director by the Company.
8. The question is whether the Applicant was, in the prescribed period, a director by reason of definition (b). This involves consideration of what is meant by the expressions:

(a) a person who is not validly appointed as a director who "act[s] in the position of a director" (referred to as a de facto director); and > > (b) a person who is not validly appointed as a director who the directors of the company are "accustomed to act in accordance with [that] person's instructions or wishes" (referred to as a shadow director).

9. In the present proceedings, the Respondent contends the Applicant is a de facto director.
10. Section 9AC of the Corporations Act was considered by Derrington J in One Tree Agriculture Pty Ltd v Lye,[3] where His Honour said:

37. This definition identifies two broad classes of directors. Those persons who are validly appointed within subparagraph (a) (de jure directors), and those who have not been validly appointed but are nevertheless treated as directors for the purposes of the Act where they meet either of the descriptions in subparagraph (b) (being de facto directors and shadow directors, respectively). For present purposes, it is appropriate to maintain this ostensibly academic distinction between validly appointed directors and non-validly appointed directors. > > 38. It is also important to appreciate the subtleties that inhere in the expression "act in the position of a director" in s 9AC(1)(b)(i). Much ink has been spilled on the correct understanding of that phrase, but it suffices to say that it requires an assumption of directorial responsibility with the express or implied knowledge and consent of the company: see, eg, Hayes (liquidator), in the matter of Container Freight Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sinadinos [2024] FCA 885, [18], citing In the Matter of ACN 092 745 330 [2017] NSWSC 241, [100] - [113]. In this respect, by requiring proof in the aggregate that a person has assumed or performed functions which only a de jure director or board can properly perform or which are the sole responsibility of a director or board: Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296, 323 [70]: the establishing of a person as a de facto director necessarily has a temporal element to it which is markedly different from the immediacy of the effect of a valid appointment.

11. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin,[4] which dealt with the expression "acting as a director" then found in s 60 of the then Corporations Law, Madgwick J said:

The variety of commercial and corporate life is such that it seems to me unprofitable to attempt a general statement as to what is meant by "acting as a director". Whether a person does so act will often be a question of degree, and requires a consideration of the duties performed by that person in the context of the operations and circumstances of the particular company concerned. I have, for example, referred to the circumstance of the size of the company. In a large and diversified company, great discretion to deal with very important matters must be reposed in employees. In the case of a supermarket chain, as in Tesco, it would hardly occur to anyone to suggest that a managerial employee held to have "acted as the company" in breaking a consumer protection law at a particular store was acting as a director of the vast company concerned. As suggested above, in the case of a single person making decisions for a company the business of which was confined to the operation of a corner store, a different view might be taken. > > Similarly, the internal practices or structure of the company may be relevant: commonly a director with particular expertise is assigned particular concerns, and has a bare minimum to do with the general affairs of the company. In such a case, the circumstances may bear the conclusion that such work is more done as an expert employee or consultant than as a director c.f. Mistmorn Pty Ltd (in liq) and Anor v Yasseen (1996) 21 ASCR 173 at 183 (the cases cited at that reference appear to have been included in error). > > Another relevant factor may be how the person who is claimed to have acted as a director was reasonably perceived by outsiders who deal with the company. This may aid a conclusion that the supposed director has held himself or herself out as such. Express holding-out was treated as a relevant factor in the Re Valleys case and, with respect, this appears obviously correct. However, an express claim to be a director may, in some cases, be carefully not made. That would not prevent a conclusion, nevertheless, that a person's dealings with third parties point to his or her having acted as a director.

12. In reaching this conclusion, Madgwick J had earlier considered the findings of Williams J in Re Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd[5] (R_e Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd_). Of these findings Madgwick J said:[6]

I do not, however, think it necessary to show that Mr Austin performed duties that could only be performed as a director. In Re Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd (1997) 2 Qd.R. 645 at 657 Williams J expressed himself as satisfied that an employed manager, seeking priority for her unpaid wages in a winding-up, had: > > "performed acts which could only be done by a director in accordance with the Articles when she was asked to do so. She was also prepared to hold herself out as a director when, for example, giving instructions to the club's solicitors." > > In my view, Williams J was simply describing what had happened in that case, where the main issue was what the putative director had done, rather than purporting to lay down a general test. > > Companies come, of course, in many sizes. They also come, one may say, in many shapes as to the actual role of their directors, managers and other employees and agents. ...

13. Later, in Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2)[7], which dealt with the definition of director in s 9 of the Corporations Act, the Court relevantly said of a de facto director:[8]

64. (i) A person may be a director even without any purported appointment of that person to that position at any time. The definition applies as much to a person who is a true usurper of the functions of a director in a company: see eg Re Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd [1997] 2 QdR 645 at 654; as to a person who takes "an active part in directing the affairs of [a] company" with the acquiescence of de jure directors: eg Austin & Partners Pty Ltd v Spencer, SC of NSW, 1 Dec 1998, Windeyer J; see also International Cat Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Rodrick [2010] QSC 30. > > 65. (ii) The formula, "acts in the position of a director", which mirrors the language of Mason J in Drysdale at 242 contemplates that in some degree at least the person concerned, though not appointed a director, has been "doing the work of a director" in that company: cf In re Western Counties Steam Bakeries and Milling Co [1897] UKLawRpCh 40; [1897] 1 Ch 617 at 630. Or to put the matter more fully, the person concerned, though not a director de jure, has been acting in a role (or roles) within the company and performing functions one would reasonably expect to have been performed by a director of that company given its circumstances. > > 66. (iii) The roles and functions so performed will vary with the commercial context, operations and governance structure (to the extent it is operative: see Mistmorn Pty Ltd (in liq) v Yasseen (1996) 21 ACSR 173 at 177-178) of the company: Austin at 569-570. Their performance by that person may well be at variance with what is permitted by the Act or by the company's constitution. Nonetheless, whether they suffice in the circumstances to constitute the person a director for the Act's purposes will often be a question of degree having regard to "the nature of the functions or powers which are exercised and the extent of their exercise": Austin, at 569-570; Natcomp Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Graiche [2001] NSWCA 120 esp at [14]-[15]; Re Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd, at 656. > > ... > > (vi) Though the point seems not to have been authoritatively settled in Australia, we agree with Lord Collins in Holland (at [91]) that, with the extension of the de facto director concept to persons who have never purportedly been appointed director, a rigid distinction between a de facto and a shadow director cannot be maintained. A person's power or influence over the directors of a company may provide the capacity to secure as of course compliance with his or her wishes or instructions for "shadow director" purposes: see Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd [1995] FCA 1663; (1995) 133 ALR 1 at 52-53. But the possession and exercise of such power or influence by a person alleged to be a de facto director may throw direct light on the evaluation of that person's true position and influence in the affairs of the company. We also consider that like a shadow director whose wishes or instructions need not relate to all facets of the management of the company's business: see AS Nominees at 52; the functions assumed by a de facto director likewise may be limited in their scope: see Austin. Nonetheless, as Williams J observed (at 656) in Re Valleys Rugby League Ltd there will commonly be the need to determine "how much a person must do before it can be held that such person is occupying or acting in the position of a director". > > 70. (vii) It has commonly been said in both Australian and English cases (though it has been disputed by Madgwick J in Austin at 489-490) that to be a de facto director one must be shown to have assumed or performed functions which only a de jure director or board can properly perform: see eg Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd at [250]; Re Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd at 657; see Re Hydrodam at 182 but note the further elaboration in Holland at [111]; or which are the "sole responsibility" of a director or board: see eg Holland at [91]. This shorthand description of what is required to be established may be understandable, but it has the capacity to mislead in that it suggests that the duties or functions that can only properly be performed by de jure directors - or which are their sole responsibility - are capable of a priori enumeration. This may be possible in relation to those functions required by the Act or by the corporation's constitution to be performed by directors or by the board (assuming the directors' power of delegation has not been exercised: see s 198D of the Corporations Act and Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, vol 1 [7.264]). But when one comes to that most fundamental of functions - managing the business of the company - which in a typical "Table A" type company is entrusted to the directors (see Art 73), a priori classification has no general utility. As we noted in our earlier discussion of officers, there has long been a spectrum of management practices which can result in a company's business being managed by the board, under the board, by directors individually, by delegates, by some combination of these, by senior managers, by executive committees, etc. In many instances when one asks what can only properly be done by a director (or is the sole responsibility of a director) of a given company, one is actually inquiring whether, in the circumstances of that company, what is being done ought reasonably be regarded as being a responsibility of a director of that company. Or put shortly, was the work done, work for a director of that company? In a given company, this may involve an alleged director in the day-to-day management and business affairs of that company and may require his or her doing many things for reasons of need, expediency or whatever, but which hardly could be said to be things that only a de jure director can properly do: see eg Mistmorn at 342. In another corporate setting, the work done may be simply selective and strategic action. In the end what is being asked for is the making of a value judgment about the proper characterisation of what in its context the person in question had been doing. > > 71. (viii) Because the definition of 'officer' includes a person (s 9(b)(i)) who, though not a director, "makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation" or (s 9(b)(ii)) "who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing", proof that a person exercises senior management functions, while ordinarily "a necessary condition of acting as a director" (to use Madgwick J's words in Austin at 342) will not necessarily be a sufficient condition: ibid. We would note in relation to this, first, that the Corporations Act's s 9 definition of 'senior manager' mirrors exactly that part of the "officer" definition given above; and, secondly, in many cases (of which the present is one), the application of ss 180 to 183 to a "director or officer" can eliminate the need to differentiate between a de facto director and an officer (de facto or not) who is not a director: for the sharply contrasting situation in the UK see Re Hydrodam at 183.

74. ... . That a company has an active director or directors apart from the alleged de facto director, or has a properly constituted and apparently "functioning" board (whatever that might mean in a given setting), does not preclude a finding that the person in question was a director: see eg Mistmorn (one active director); Austin & Partners (functioning board); International Cat Manufacturing (one de jure director). That person's activities may, for example, have simply been accepted as of course or acquiesced in by the de jure director(s) whatever their formal powers may have been to disavow them. Or they may be acting together "on an equal footing ... in directing the affairs of the company": Re Richborough Furniture Ltd [1996] 1 BCLC 507 at 524; Holland at [91]; by for example, sharing (formally or otherwise) responsibilities for the company's affairs. All this illustrates is that the differing contexts in which the issue can arise can contrive what may or may not be some of the relevant considerations of which account should be taken. > > 75. Secondly, whether the company itself has held the person out as a director will itself be a relevant but not decisive consideration: see Re Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd. Similarly, in our view, perceptions of those dealing with the company that the person was a director can themselves be of some contextual evidentiary significance. This is more likely to be so where those perceptions were independently formed, reasonable in the circumstances and support the appearance that the person was acting "under colour of office". That concept has a long history in the law of de facto officers: see Dixon, "De Facto Officers" (1938) 1 Res Judicatae 285 at 291. Third party perceptions, though, cannot change the reality of the true character of the position in which the person acts: Re Richborough Furniture, at 526.

15. More recently, Rees J said in Brown v Etna Developments Pty Ltd (Brown):[9]

De facto directors > > 22. A person not formally appointed as a director of a company may still be considered a director if they act in the position of a director, or the directors of the company are accustomed to act in accordance with their instructions or wishes: s 9AC(1), Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Whether a person fulfils the role of de facto director is a question of fact: Morley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 205; [2010] NSWCA 331 at [893]. In considering this question, Ward CJ in Eq (as the President then was) summarised relevant factors to consider in the matters of Earth Civil Australia Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 966 at [955]: > > They include: the size of the company and the allocation of the responsibilities; the internal practices or structure of the company; whether those outside the company considered the person to be a director; the duties that would be expected to be performed by a director in the relevant company (namely, top-level management functions); the duties actually performed by the person; whether others in the company considered the person a director; whether the company held out the person as a director; and whether the person held themselves out as a director. ... > > 23. The "vital factor" is that the de facto director "has the potentiality to control": Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 at [230] (Young JA). See more recently Alora Davies Developments 104 Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Raphael [2024] NSWSC 547 at [84]- [91] (Black J).

16. As to the scope of the evidence that may be considered in determining whether a person is, during the relevant period, a director within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of the definition, the following observations of Williams J in R_e Valleys Rugby League Football Club Ltd[10]_ are relevant:

Section 556(2) of the Law fixes the relevant period as the 12 months ending on the relevant date. For purposes of that section one must find that the person in question acted as a director during that period, but in determining whether or not that person so occupied or acted in the position of a director the court can, in my opinion, take into account acts falling outside of that 12 month period. Acts in the wider period may give colour to an act within the period. It is true, for example, that in the present case the authority under the Club's seal given to the Bank of Queensland in April 1994 was executed by the respondent as a director outside of the applicable 12 month period. So also was the directors' meeting of August 1995 at which the respondent voted in favour of the Deed of Company Arrangement. But those acts can be considered, along with the other facts I have found, in determining whether or not the respondent occupied the position of director during the relevant period, and in particular on 9 May 1995.

17. Consequently, contrary to the Applicant's objection to production contained in MFI 1, documents that may show the Applicant acted as a director at a time before the 12 months period are relevant to determining if the applicant is an excluded employee. Therefore, the Applicant's challenge to production and access by the Respondent should be dismissed.

1. It is convenient to summarise the evidence before the Tribunal concerning the business carried on by the Company and the role of the applicant in that business.

1. The Company carried on a business in Western Australia consisting of the manufacture and sale of boats and as well as after sales services (Business).
2. Mr Piper was the director of the Company and Mr Hyman was the Secretary.[11]
3. Neither Mr Piper nor Mr Hyman gave evidence in those proceedings, although there was a statement of Mr Hyman to which I will refer below.
4. As noted above, the Company had liquidators appointed on 2 July 2023. The liquidators are Mssrs Dudley and Mohen (liquidators).[12]
5. Documents indicated winding up may have initially occurred by way of the members of the Company resolving to wind the company up on that day. However, it appears the company was insolvent. Consequently, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) records indicate the Company entered a Creditors Voluntary Winding Up.
6. Of the operations of the Company, its liquidators described its activities as follows:[13]
   • The Company was incorporated on 27 June 2008 and operated a boat sales and manufacturing business from premises in Henderson, WA. The Company's business ceased to trade on my appointment.
   • The Company engaged UES International Sdn Bhd (UESI), a third-party entity based in Malaysia, who held an exclusive licence agreement with the Company to manufacture LeisureCat vessels.
   • The Company had approximately 25 orders from customers to manufacture LeisureCat vessels at the date of my appointment.
   • The Company held various items of plant and equipment, motor vehicles, boats and boat trailers which have all been realised in the liquidation.
   • The Company also owned various moulds which were used in the LeisureCat manufacturing process. ...
7. The Company acquired the Business from Leisurecat Australia Pty Ltd (also known as Eastport Pty Ltd, Leisurecat Pty Ltd and ACN 088 346 883 Pty Ltd) (LAPL) in about 2008. The applicant was a director and shareholder of LAPL, holding 33% of the shares in LAPL.
8. LAPL was placed in liquidation on 14 May 2009.[14]
9. The exact transaction by which the Business was sold is unclear. However, it would appear that Mssrs Piper and Hyman (or their interests) incorporated the Company which was registered on 27 June 2008 and used the Company to carry on the Business thereafter. The applicant became a 30% shareholder in the Company.
10. Prior to this time, on 4 October 2006, another company, Leisurecat Malaysia SDN BHD (Leisurecat Malaysia), had been incorporated in Malaysia to receive the moulds and store the moulds to be used by a contractor in Malaysia to build the boats. The Applicant was a 90% shareholder of Leisurecat Malaysia as at May 2020 and as at November 2023, owned 100% of its shares. He became a director of Leisurecat Malaysia on 17 June 2010 and the sole director from 6 April 2021.[15] These details are recorded in MFI 2.
11. The Applicant is also associated with a third company, West Coast Suzuki Marine Pty Limited (West Coast Suzuki). This company was registered on 31 August 2016. The Applicant is a shareholder and director of West Coast Suzuki. This company provides motors to the Company for installation in its boats. It operated out of the same premises as the Company in Western Australia.

Documentary evidence relating to the role of the Applicant

1. Documentary evidence regarding positions held and the role of the Applicant within the Company are contained in the business records of the Company and those of ASIC. In addition, there are documents from parties who have provided goods or services to the Company describing his position. They include the following:

(a) In his claim form lodged with the Respondent under the FEG Act, the Applicant described his position as "General Manager of Sales and operations in WA and Malaysia".[16] > > (b) The Applicant was described as a "Working Director" in the schedule to the workers compensation insurance policy for the Company the period ending 30 January 2023, provided by Oracle Group Australia, insurance brokers (Oracle Group).[17] > > (c) Payslips issued by the Company to the Applicant noted a work classification of "General Manager".[18] > > (d) In a letter to the Applicant dated 11 August 2023, in the course of their investigation of the Company's affairs, the liquidators identified the following facts and matters said to be indicative of the role of the Applicant:[19]

• You are a signatory to the Company's bank accounts.
  • Your Company business card, readily available, states you are a Managing Director. Accordingly, the Company suppliers and the general public would likely perceive you to be a director of the Company.
  • Your email signature at times records your title as Director. Any customers and suppliers who engaged with you via email would have assumed you to be a director.
  • Oracle Group's Insurance Policy for Workers Compensation which we understand you were involved in placing, has you covered as a working director. The invoice was then addressed to you on behalf of the Company.
  • The Company held an insurance policy with CGU Insurance limited in which you signed an acknowledgement of authority and record your title as director.
  • The Company entered into an exclusive build agreement with Catamaran International Pty Ltd. You signed on behalf of the Company and listed your position as CEO.
  • The Company entered into a licencing agreement with UES International Sdn Bhd. You signed this agreement on behalf of the Company and listed your position as CEO.
  • You have entered into numerous trade credit applications in which you signed on behalf of the Company in your capacity as Director. These suppliers, therefore, would have believed you to be the director of the Company. A sample of those agreements is as follows:
    • Credit Application - Fusion Electronics Pty Limited
    • Trade Account Application - BOC Australia
    • Credit Application - Sam Allen Wholesale
    • Credit Application - Amelec Australia Pty Ltd
    • Credit Application - Marine Warehouse
    • Credit Application - JPW (Aust) Pty Ltd
    • Credit Application - Jaycar Pty Ltd
    • Credit Application - NMT Oceania Pty Ltd
  • You were responsible for the hiring of new staff. Employee contracts state they are to report to the Managing Director - Kevin Horsley.
  • Staff would also need to have their leave applications approved by you. In which you sign and authorise the request in your capacity as Managing Director. Accordingly, staff would likely have perceived you to be the director of the Company.
  • On your Facebook profile, you record your job title as CEO & Founder of the Leisurecat.

Sample documents are in the bundle following the liquidators' letter. The documents bear dates between September 2008 and January 2022.[20] There are other examples found later in the bundle.[21] These documents bear dates between June 2009 and February 2023. > > (e) In respect of the business card,[22] this stated: > > LeisureCat > > Australia/Malaysia > > Kevin Horsley > > MANAGING DIRECTOR > > (f) Documents recording instructions given by the Applicant to solicitors for the Company in relation to litigation in which the Company was a party.[23]

2. The Applicant's employment contract was not in evidence. I understand the position of the Applicant is that these records would be in possession of the Company or the liquidators but have not been produced. I note the Applicant did not call the liquidators to give evidence in relation to his claim, nor did the Respondent.
3. Other documents said to support the Applicant's contention that he was not performing the role of the director in the relevant period include:

(a) an undated letter from Oracle Group, the insurance broker for the Company which stated:[24] > > ... > > History on the file determines Mr Kevin Horsley was detailed as a Working Director in relevant correspondence between the period 2015 to 2019. > > Following this period Mr Kevin Horsley managed the relationship in capacity as General Manager of the business, no longer a director of the company. > > I note this letter is at odds with the details recorded in the insurance policy schedule for the year ending 30 January 2023 referred to above. > > (b) the applicant's wages slip for the period ending 13 June 2023 which described his classification as "General Manager";[25] > > (c) a letter from Mr Mucciacciaro, a partner of the former accountants for the Company, Grant Thornton Australia Ltd, that stated:[26] > > We, Grant Thornton Australia Limited, have acted as the accountants and tax agents for Catamaran Investments Pty Ltd from the date it was incorporated, 27 June 2008 until it went into liquidation. > > During our tenure as accountants and tax agents, Mr Kevin Horsley never held the office of director of the company as evidenced by the ASIC's records. It was the directors of the company, Mr Lexan Piper and/or Mr Kim Hyman who signed off on all financial statements and income tax returns for the company. > > Regarding the work we were engaged to complete, we dealt with the internal bookkeeper and on occasion Mr Horsley on some day-to-day transactions regarding sales, stock and items of that nature.

4. The bundle included a statement prepared by Mr Hyman dated 23 February 2023. I note the date on the statement is prior to the Company being wound up, however this date may be an error.

1. Mr Hyman's statement is found at TB 835.[27] He was not called as a witness by the Applicant not required for cross examination by the Respondent.
2. An extract of Mr Hyman's evidence concerning the role of the Applicant is set out above. Mr Hyman then continues:

I have been made aware that the work credit applications and similar documents that were signed by Mr Horsley, but I view these to have been completed as a "day-to-day" administrative function and not in any way demonstrative of Mr Horsley holding himself out to be a director. > > As far as I am aware any statutory documentation relating to the business requiring execution under section 127 of the Corporations Act was completed by Mr Piper and myself, including the annual accounts as prepared by the company accountants Grant Thornton Australia and banking documents. > > Business strategy and any decisions made as to its growth or expansion in terms of new models, entering into agreements with other entities or participation in major tenders was done in consultation with Mr Piper who was the ultimate decision-maker. > > I am not aware of any instances whereby Mr Horsley's actions could be either construed or characterised as acting as a "shadow" or "de facto" director of the business or that he directly or impliedly held himself out as a director of Catamaran Investments Pty Ltd. > > Again, for clarity, I am aware that on some correspondence he was described as "Director, Marketing & Sales" but on any reading of the context this was merely a descriptive term recognised mostly in dealing with clients in the USA and carrying no statutory force. He was at the time and still is as I understand, a Director of Leisurecat Malaysia Sdn Bhn (A company registered in Malaysia) as a required process of manufacturing in that country.

1. Before the Tribunal, the Applicant adopted as true the statements of fact contained in his SFICS.[28] This evidence, sometimes in the form of a submission, included the following.
2. The Applicant noted that s 556 of the Corporations Act was concerned with the role of the employee in the 12 months prior to the commencement of the liquidation or after the date the Company was wound up being the relevant period of the enquiry. He identified a payslip during this period that identified him as General Manager and showed that he was paid wages and long service leave in an amount totalling $102,734.
3. The Applicant gave evidence that the Company was a small business. This, he said, was significant in terms of the role played by an employee, as opposed to a director. He said his job was "day-to-day running of the business to reach targets and provide wages and supplier payments". As general manager, authority was sought and given by the directors "as and when required for him to do his job".[29] In this regard, there were regularly scheduled meetings to meet with Mr Piper, one of the directors, once every month although "Mr Piper was busy with his other businesses and travelling the world" which meant that meetings were sometimes less frequent.[30]
4. The Applicant said that in the years preceding the relevant period, he made various employment related decisions on behalf of the Company, including signing off on employee termination letters and offers of employment, which is work he described "as expected of the General Managers position".[31] He also provided instructions to external legal providers in connection with litigation "because he was intimate with each case and its origins".[32]
5. As to signing guarantees, credit and insurance applications as a director, the Applicant said this did not occur in the relevant period. Further, insofar as applications were signed by him, this was his administrative assistant's responsibility, the Applicant just signing the forms when presented to him.[33]
6. As to his business cards, and the use of the expression "Sales and Marketing Director" the Applicant said:[34]

As a General Manager also in charge of Sales and Marketing, the terms "Sales and Marketing Director" appeared on business cards especially intended for the USA market, where the term is better understood. (In the USA company directors are presidents). This decision along with the printing of over 5000 business card (sic) was made by a local production manager in Malaysia who knew him also as a director of Leisurecat Malaysia Sdn Bhd. No business card ever printed says he was a director of Catamaran investments Pty Ltd, the company in liquidation and in question.

7. Notwithstanding this statement, I note the business card, the content of which I have set out above, under the heading "LeisureCat" is a reference to "Australia/Malaysia". In this regard I note the Company used the trading name "Leisurecat Australia". The business card contains an Australian mobile telephone number and uses an Australian domain for the email address.
8. As to the content of various social media, and the references to director and CEO, the Applicant said this was in fact true in relation to West Coast Suzuki Marine, LAPL and LeisureCat Malaysia.
9. In cross examination, the Applicant said that he does not make decisions concerning funding. In this regard funding was provided by the directors. The Applicant said Mr Piper wished to sign cheques although, because the difficulties in making contact with Mr Piper due to his other commitments, Mr Hyman had suggested that the Applicant be given authority to do so. As such, both he and the administrative assistant, Ms Hunter each had a daily financial limit. At the time the Company was placed in liquidation, the limit for each of them was $100,000 each per day.
10. Despite having this daily limit, the Applicant said he would call Mr Piper or Mr Hyman regarding approval if he was to exercise any authority given to him. He said he would get authority from Mr Piper even though he had a delegation. More generally, payments were authorised by Ms Hunter, the daily limit being sufficient to cover ordinary expenditures. The Applicant said it was fairly rare he would be required to authorise payments.
11. In relation to accounting for the Company, the Applicant said he did not have access to the accounting software MYOB, nor did he sign tax returns, business activity statements or accounts for the Company. All of these matters were signed off by Mssrs Piper and Hyman or Ms Hunter.[35]
12. The Applicant was cross examined concerning his understanding of what was meant by administration and what Mr Hyman had said in that regard and gave the following evidence[36]

A: The administration of the business in Kim's eyes and mine may might differ but certainly there is no grey area about the way the business was administered as far as what I had control of.

13. When asked about the statement by Mr Hyman,[37] namely that the Applicant consulted with Mr Lex Piper concerning issues of funding, the following exchange occurred between Counsel for the Respondent and the Applicant.[38]

Q And you would agree with that statement. > > A: Oh, yeah, yes, ... As I already said, if there was a need to. increase funds or to put funds into the business, I would ask Lex if he was if he was capable of doing that, or if he wanted to do that, in terms of things like demonstration craft, new forklift, you know, whatever it is that was required over and above what we had funds for. > > Q: And Mr. Piper was necessarily guided by your recommendations and instructions on those issues, wasn't he? > > A: Um. Yeah, I would have thought that he was guided by my requests, and then, would often say to me whether, you know, what was the need? Why was the need? What were we doing? Where we were going? And he would make his decisions based on that, yes. > > Q: And that's the decision of whether to give you the money to implement the ... > > A: Whether to give Leisurecat Malaysia the money or whether to put the money into Catamaran Investment, yes.

14. In relation to employees, the Applicant agreed he did the hiring and dismissal of employees.
15. The applicant was cross examined about a boat that he had purchased, which was to be refurbished and sold by the Company. Of this event, he said he invested money so that workers could be kept on due to the seasonal nature of the work. When he could not recover his investment, the amount was converted to a loan. The Applicant said this decision was made by him in the interests of the business and retention of staff.
16. Of litigation, the Applicant maintained the position that he had knowledge of events and was, in essence, a witness. At one point in his evidence, the Applicant said he did not recall giving instructions to the Company's lawyers. Having said so, he accepted that he was probably the person who communicated with the lawyers the most. During the course of this evidence, the Applicant appeared somewhat evasive but ultimately accepted that he had been instructing the lawyers.
17. The Applicant was cross examined concerning credit applications, including the document at TB 201. This document he had signed above the position description of "Director". It was dated 31 July 2012. He also signed a document "Authority to act as a customs broker"[39] to which was affixed the company seal. When asked about his understanding as to the role of director he said "clearly not".
18. The Applicant's attention was drawn to an Annual Leave Request Form,[40] which had a place for authorisation by the "foreman", "manager" and "managing director". The form was dated 2 April 2019 and had again been signed by the Applicant as managing director. Other documents signed by the Applicant offering employment at the Company were also drawn to his attention.[41]
19. As to the business card and webpages, the Applicant accepted that these documents constituted a holding out that he was CEO for Managing Director and that he had top-level management functions for this company.
20. As to the company being placed in liquidation, the Applicant said he was unaware this was to occur, giving evidence to the effect that he would have been expected to be told and not summarily dismissed.
21. Finally, the Applicant's attention was drawn to letters sent when the Business was acquired by the Company from LAPL. First was a letter to clients which said:[42]

Dear Valued client, > > ... > > Note that all current building contracts will not change as the company and its business is picked up by the new Entity in the sale. There is no effect on current production schedules or work in progress. > > Kevin Horsley one of the present Directors will also be a Director of the new company Catamaran Investments Pty Ltd which will trade as Leisurecat Australia was (sic) the transfer is complete. > > ... A change in invoicing accounts to reflect the new entity may be the only change you notice in the Status Choir.

22. Letters concerning Dangerous Goods Licenses and a notice to creditors contained similar statements concerning the role of the Applicant in the Company.[43] Of this correspondence, the Applicant said that in 2008 he was intending or understood he would continue as a director of the Company. He also accepted that his role with the Company did not change from that which he previously performed. When asked the point at which things changed, the Applicant's evidence was to the effect that this occurred in 2022/2023 when a decision was made by the directors to wind up the Company.

1. Ms Hunter was employed by the Company as an administration officer for 13 years. She prepared a statement for the review application, bearing at the end a handwritten date of 1 May 2025, [44] which she adopted upon being affirmed as a witness at the hearing.
2. Ms Hunter gave evidence as to her role in the preparation of the payroll, business activity statements, company accounts and payment of creditors.
3. As to the role of the applicant in the Company, Ms Hunter said:

At the time of change over (around 2008-9) it was not clear to me what position the only previous owner staying on with the company (Kevin Horsley) had in the new company but was advised for the purpose of Payroll going forward he was the General Manager. > > I understood from discussions with Kevin he had been offered a shareholding in the new Company similar to that he had held previously in the initial one (Leisurecat). > > The Company Secretary was Kim Hyman and he set up a new Accountancy Firm to handle the lodgement of all matters to do with the ATO and ASIC with Grant Thornton.

4. In her statement, Ms Hunter gave evidence concerning a trip to Malaysia taken by the Applicant and Mr Piper to review the manufacturing plant. She also gave evidence concerning "delays in receiving paperwork signed back by [Mr Piper or Mr Hyman] as Directors [which] saw delays in production and therefore progress payments". Consequently, she was "advised that [the Applicant] was authorised and could sign on behalf of [Mr Piper or Mr Hyman] for accounts required at the time". If an enquiry was made by a supplier to do an ASIC check of who were the directors of the Company (a matter which Ms Hunter said did not often occur), "then that application was sent to [Mr Piper] to sign and eventually return or be taken to and delivered back by [the Applicant] after a meeting with the Directors.
5. As to year end accounts, these were sent to Mr Hyman and Mr Piper by Grant Thornton. The applicant did not have authority to sign these. At the request of the Applicant, Ms Hunter did prepare profit and loss statements as well as other reports that would be provided to the directors.
6. Ms Hunter also said that she knew the Applicant was "responsible for Sales and Marketing of the product and once the product was sold, would attend to the factory to advise and check on production of same".
7. Having given evidence concerning authority to operate bank accounts, Ms Hunter said:[45]

Personally, although a little confusing at the beginning of the changeover of ownership, I always saw [the applicant] as our General Manager and this was often reinforced by my numerous dealings with Grant Thornton and [the Applicant's] often ongoing annoyance from time to time at trying to get hold of both [Mr Hyman and Mr Piper] when he needed to, for urgent decisions involving the company. I would not have considered him as a Director of [the Company] given, I knew his relationship in the business with [Mr Piper and Mr Hyman] and my working relationship with Grant Thornton Accountants".

8. In cross examination, Ms Hunter was asked questions about various documents in the bundle. In relation to an application for credit which the Applicant had signed,[46] Ms Hunter said she inserted the word "Director" beside the word "Position", which the Applicant signed.
9. Of such documents, she said she was never asked to correct the title. She said she inserted the description "director" because she assumed that's what the recipient wanted, it was impossible for her to get Mr Hyman to sign and she said it was wrong of her to do so. In giving this evidence, she indicated that the Applicant's authority to sign depended on the document in question.
10. When asked if the Applicant was in charge of the business, Ms Hunter said words the effect "yes, he was the manager". In relation to the hiring and dismissal of staff, she said that was the manager's job. In relation to accounting tasks, Ms Hunter said the Applicant did not see business activity statements but did work on profit and loss statements concerning boat builds, "money coming in and money going out" and would use this information to report to Mr Piper.
11. In relation to the document entitled "Authority to act as a customs broker,"[47] to which the seal had been affixed and about which the Applicant was also cross-examined, Ms Hunter said she was not familiar with the document and did not attach the seal. She also said she could only assume the Applicant prepared this document.
12. As to why she described the Applicant as director rather than general manager, Ms Hunter said that was her mistake. She was uncertain when she found out the difference between those positions and suggested she did not really know what these titles meant. She also said that Mr Hyman had indicated the Applicant could sign on his behalf. In this regard, Ms Hunter said Mr Hyman and Mr Piper never came in. Otherwise, Ms Hunter said the Applicant did not sign business activity statements or tax returns for the Company.
13. When referred to the statement of Mr Hyman,[48] Ms Hunter agreed with the description provided by Mr Hyman of the role performed by the Applicant. In that statement, Mr Hyman had said:

Mr Horsley was responsible for the operations and administration of the business but regularly consulted the Director, Mr Piper in respect of business direction and matters related to funding. In some cases (due to Mr Piper's availability and geographical location) permission was given if requested, for Kevin to sign on behalf of Mr Piper to open an account or access goods required in the ordinary course of boat production, if that was acceptable to the Vendor.

14. Of her interaction with Mr Piper and Mr Hyman, Ms Hunter recalled that in 13 years up until the Company was wound up, there was only one occasion where Mr Hyman came to the office and that she only met Mr Piper on four occasions.
15. Finally, in cross examination, Ms Hunter agreed that the applicant had top-level management functions and that there was no one else like Mr Horsley in the business.[49]

1. LAPL originally operated the Business. The Applicant was a director and shareholder of LAPL.
2. The Business was sold to the Company by LAPL in about 2008. The Company operated the Business until it was wound up on 2 July 2023.
3. During that time, the records of ASIC available to the Tribunal indicate that Mr Piper was the director of the Company and Mr Hyman was the secretary of the Company.
4. Following liquidators being appointed, the Applicant applied for financial assistance under the FEG Act (Claim). In that application, the Applicant described his job title as "General Manager" and listed his main duties as "General Manager of Sales and operations in WA and Malaysia".[50]
5. The question for determination is whether the Applicant was a de facto director of the Company in the 12 month period before the Relevant Date. If so, he would be an excluded person for the purpose of the FEG Act.
6. The evidence establishes the following.
7. After the Business was acquired by the Company, the Applicant was employed by the Company and received wages.
8. The Company was a small business. It had staff in Western Australia, operating in premises from which sales were made and which undertook fit-out, repairs and maintenance of boats. It would appear that as at 2 July 2023, the Company had 4 employees (including the applicant).
9. The boats sold were built in Malaysia, under licence, by a Malaysian company (UES International Sdn Bhd) which used moulds and other intellectual property of the Company in carrying out its manufacturing work.[51] Motors for the boats, or at least some of the boats, were supplied by West Coast Suzuki, which operated from the same premises as the Company in Western Australia.
10. When the business was sold by LAPL and the Applicant commenced with the Company, clients and suppliers were advised of the change. An example of this advice is a document headed Notice to Creditors[52] which stated:

Please be advised that as from the 18th August 2008 LeisureCat Australian Pty Ltd, ABN 75 008 346 883 will be changing its name to ABN 75 088 346 883 as a result of the sale of the business and trading name. > > All outstanding monies will be paid in a timely manner. > > Note that all unfilled orders will need to be transferred to the new entity Catamaran Investments Pty Ltd ABN 54 131 921 894 which will be trading as LeisureCat Australia. > > The Directors would like to express their thanks for your support over the years and hope that you will continue to support the new entity. > > Kevin Horsley one of the present Directors will also be a Director of the new company Catamaran Investments. > > Catamaran Investments do wish to continue the trading relationship with all the suppliers and will be in contact shortly to organise trading accounts etc.

11. Since that time, the evidence establishes that the Applicant held himself out as a director, variously describing himself as "Managing Director" on business cards[53] as well as "Director Marketing and Sales".[54]
12. In his email to the Respondent dated 26 February 2024, the Applicant said of his use of the title Director of Sales and Marketing:[55]

My business card with Director Sales and Marketing was printed in Malaysia by the Administration Manager of LeisureCat Malaysia in a rather large batch. It was a descriptive error in so much I was handling Marketing and sales and was a Director of LCM and in the US was regarded as Director of Marketing and sales, a common term there given they have Presidents of Companies and not Directors. Again it did not reflect my duties to the company (Catamaran Investments Pty Ltd) but was more a term used for my role the sale of the product (sic).

13. The Applicant signed documents as a "director". Examples include:

(a) Notice of Completion of apprenticeship;[56] > > (b) Employee leave request;[57] > > (c) Employee Termination Notice;[58] > > (d) Credit applications;[59] > > (e) An Authority to Act as a Customs Broker;[60] > > (f) A letter to suppliers concerning account irregularities.[61]

14. Indeed, some documents were signed by the Applicant as director under seal of the Company[62], including tenders to government agencies of other countries such as Qatar.[63]
15. As confirmed in oral evidence, the Applicant had authority to authorise payments up to $100,000 per day. This is despite his statement to the respondent on 24 February 2024 as follows:

I could not sign any company cheques, only Lex Piper could sign Cheques.

16. At this point I should note for completeness that the evidence shows Ms Hunter had the same authority.
17. On insurance documents, for instance the period 30 January 2022 to 30 January 2023, the Applicant was shown as a Working Director.[64]
18. In passing, I note this is contrary to an undated letter from the Company's insurance brokers, Oracle Group, which states:

History on file determines Mr Kevin Horsley was detailed as a Working Director in relevant correspondence between a period 2015 to 2019. > > Following this period Mr Kevin Horsley manage the relationship in capacity as the General Manager of the business, no longer a Director of the company.

19. The Applicant gave instructions to lawyers in connection with legal disputes with customers, signed settlement documents and negotiated disputes with customers.[65]
20. The Applicant negotiated significant new contracts, including in respect of a potential purchase of patrol boats by the authorities in Malaysia.
21. In performing these tasks, there is no contemporaneous evidence the Applicant obtained instructions from or was acting on directions from Mr Piper or Mr Hyman. There was no business plan or written directions provided by Mr Piper or Mr Hyman to the Applicant. There is no evidence of particular meetings between Mr Horsley and Mssrs Piper and Hyman where he was told what to do or emails containing instructions from Mssrs Piper and Hyman. There is no evidence of any board meetings where resolutions were passed.
22. Rather, the evidence over the period of his work at the Company satisfies me that the Applicant managed the business of the Company, making decisions in respect of the day to day operations and the long term strategy in promoting the Business and selling boats.
23. This view is supported by the evidence of Ms Hunter, set out above, including that the Applicant had top-level management functions and that there was no one else like him in the business.
24. In forming this view, I note Mr Hyman statement, where he says:[66]

As far as I am aware any statutory documentation relating to the business requiring execution under section 127 of the Corporations Act was completed by Mr Piper and myself, including the annual accounts as prepared by the company accountants Grant Thornton Australia and banking documents. > > Business strategy and any decisions made as to its growth or expansion in terms of new models, entering into agreements with other entities or participation in major tenders was done in consultation with Mr Piper who was the ultimate decision maker.

25. While I accept that Mr Piper or Mr Hyman signed "the statutory documentation", there is no evidence of particular strategies that Mr Piper required be implemented or particular directions he or Mr Hyman gave to Mr Horsley concerning management of the Business. As to agreements with other companies, the documents to which the Tribunal has been referred have been signed by Mr Horsley.
26. The exception, or perhaps limit to what the Applicant could do, arose where a particular business proposal required external funding. It is unsurprising such matters were referred to Mr Piper. As reflected in the liquidators' report, it was Mr Piper, and/ or his interests external to the Company, that provided significant financial support to the Company which, as reflected by the Company being wound up following withdrawal of Mr Piper's financial support, could not generate sufficient cashflow to survive. Otherwise, to the extent the applicant consulted with Mr Piper or Mr Hyman concerning funding, this appeared to be for the purpose of keeping them informed as opposed to being directed by Mr Piper about how the Business was to be run.
27. The oral evidence of Mr Horsley, which I have set out above, supports this view. In effect, Mr Horsley would inform Mr Piper what he proposed to do, and Mr Piper would decide whether he would fund particular proposals and/or had the capacity to do so.
28. My view is also supported by the applicant's evidence concerning the availability of Mr Piper and that "Mr Piper was busy with his other businesses and travelling the world". This evident suggests that Mr Piper left Mr Horsley to run the Business.
29. The fact Mr Horsley was holding himself out as a director, making decisions under the guise of a director and promoting the Company is further evidence of the role actually performed by the Applicant.
30. The actions of the Applicant occurred over a long period of time, and I am satisfied the position remained the same up until the Company was wound up. In effect, the Applicant continued to manage the Business in the same manner as he had when owned by LAPL up until it was wound up.
31. The fact the Applicant was not consulted on the decision to wind up the Company when Mr Piper decided to withdraw funding does not alter the position. Nor does the fact statutory documents and accounts were signed by Mr Piper as director or Mr Hyman as secretary. As the authorities above make clear, a person may still be a de facto director even if their role is limited to only some aspects of what a director might be expected to do.
32. It follows that the Applicant was a de facto director and continued to act as such up until the Company was wound up.
33. Lastly, in my view, the size of the company does not support a conclusion Mr Horsley was simply acting as an employee, as opposed to performing top-level management functions in directing the affairs of the Company, or at least some of those affairs. Nor does the Applicant's involvement in the more basic day-to-day activities of the Company alter the fact he acted as a director. This was not a company with many employees that required a complex and layered management structure in which Mr Horsley was a subordinate.
34. It follows that I am satisfied that in the 12 month period prior to the relevant date, Mr Horsley was a director within the meaning of the Corporations Act and therefore an excluded person for the purpose of s 11 of the FEG Act. Consequently, he is not entitled to assistance under s 10 of the FEG Act and the Respondent was correct to refuse his application.

1. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

[1] s 9AC Corporations Act.

[2] Treasury Laws Amendment (2023 Law Improvement Package No. 1) Act 2023.

[3] [2025] FCA 126.

[4] [1998] FCA 1034; (1998) 28 ASCR 565 at 570.

[5] (1997) 2 Qd.R. 645 at 657.

[6] [1998] FCA 1034; (1998) 28 ASCR 565 at 569.

[7] [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296.

[9] [2025] NSWSC 358 at [22]- [23].

[10] [1997] 2 QdR 645 at 656-657.

[13] TB 233 - Statutory Report to Creditors.

[15] Applicant's oral evidence - 5 August 2025.

[20] TB 192-230, which includes a staff annual leave form signed as managing director - TB 211, a credit account application form signed as director - TB 212; the license agreement with UES International, a Malaysia company to build boats signed as "CEO LeisureCat Australia" - TB 216-224 and a business card for recording the applicant's position as "Managing Director" - TB 230

[21] See documents produced by the liquidator on summons: TB 438 - 833.

[23] See eg account from Company's solicitors dated 24 December 2021 - TB 476 and following including item of work "Telephone call from K Horsley regarding defence" (TB 477) and item of work "Settling advice to clients; perusing reply from K Hyman, L Piper and K Horsley" (TB 478).

[35] Sound recording time mark 1:14:30.

[36] Sound recording time mark 1:14:55.

[38] Sound recording at time mark 1:15:25.

[49] Sound recording time mark 1:18:47.

[51] Liquidator's report TB 233 and following.

[62] See eg Appointment of agent in Kuwait dated 15 May 2015 - TB 608 at 609

[65] See eg TB 587 and following, particularly TB 588 where the Applicant describes himself as "Director. Marketing & Sales".